Anglo-American Energy Talks and the Oil Revolution, 1968-1972
Abstract
In November 1965, a Defence Review Report to the Cabinet illustrated Britain’s long term strategy in the Middle East. As regarded the potentially unstable area of the Persian Gulf, with numerous small States and great wealth deriving from oil, for budget reasons Britain was obliged to withdraw, but at the same time it was necessary to try to keep the Shah aligned with the West and minimise the repercussions of a likely withdrawal. This policy was not possible to carry out without the support of the United States. In fact, the Americans attached great importance to the defence review and had the intention to discuss at least its conclusions before reaching any official decision. But it is important to highlight that the British were considering priorities only on the basis of their own interests.
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