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Edited by

Nunziatella Alessandrini and João Teles e Cunha

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Crossing Borders: The Social and Economic Impact of the Portuguese Maritime Empire in the early Modern Age

Introduction

Nunziatella Alessandrini and João Teles e Cunha
(Universidade NOVA de Lisboa)

The following ten studies deal with the social and economic history of the Portuguese Maritime Empire, showcasing its many facets and the way it impacted at home, in the empire and abroad during this period, which covers broadly the Early Modern Age and the first globalisation. The editors of this dossier preferred to choose papers dealing with different periods of time and contrasting geographical spaces, highlighting crucial moments, distinct players, relevant commodities and market organisation in order to give distinctive perspectives of the character and evolution of the Portuguese Maritime Empire. For that purpose, the editors distributed the essays around two areas: Commercial routes and commodities; and mercantile networks, its agents and cross/intra-cultural trade.

While the first section deals more with the structural side of the Portuguese Maritime Empire economy, namely by evolving around nuclear trade routes in the Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean, and with its key commodities; the second part works over the people who made those routes possible, and their endeavour to adapt, thrive and survive in face of adversity. Another thing worth noticing is the fact that despite analysing the Portuguese Maritime Empire, at least two papers deal with other European empires of the Early Modern Age, namely the Spanish and the British, evincing a greater connection between distinct imperial spaces, mainly through private trading networks, especially those belonging either to Portuguese New Christians, or to their relatives who returned to Judaism in The Netherlands and England, as seen in the studies of Elsa Penalva and Carla Vieira.

These trading and financial networks overlapping different polities and economic worlds previous to a unified world economy, show the importance some European traders and financiers had in the establishment and development of the Portuguese Maritime Empire since the fifteenth century, namely the Italians and the Germans. Though their presence and importance in the Portuguese economy is attested since the later Middle Age, their role

became crucial in financing and redistributing throughout Europe some key commodities, especially spices, but also sugar, exotica and other precious goods, since the discovery and the exploration of the Atlantic Islands and Africa's west coast in the fifteenth century. The studies of Jürgen Pohle, Mark Häberlein and Nunziatella Alessandrini display these pivotal connections Portugal had with the German world and Italy (particularly Genoa), important to finance the Portuguese imperial expansion in the Atlantic and in Asia, as well as to distribute and consume the commodities brought back to Europe, among which the fabled spices. Though the importance of German networks in Portugal seems to wane at the end of the sixteenth century, the Italian influence, particularly of the Genoese, lasted longer, and we can still see their investment in the Portuguese Maritime Empire in the eighteenth century, along with other players from the Italian peninsula, namely those coming from Livorno (which included Jews). But European input to the Portuguese Maritime Empire, and to its economy, can also be assessed by the scientific contribution made by some men like Martin Behaim, as Rui Loureiro points out. Behaim was a valuable intermediary between the discoveries being made in the Atlantic and the importation of scientific instruments to Portugal, and in mapping the new spaces discovered, of which the first globe made around 1492 in Nuremberg was his most memorable achievement, as it pointed to the feasibility of a direct maritime route to India, a goal that Portugal and Spain wanted to achieve by different ways.

The discovery of the maritime access to India by way of Africa's southern tip, the Cape of Good Hope, and the creation of a permanent maritime trade route after the voyage of Vasco da Gama (1497-99), was a break with the past but it didn't change completely the commercial pattern established between Europe and Asia as shown by João Teles e Cunha. Therefore, the old Mediterranean route could compete with the new Atlantic route established by the Portuguese due to the way the trade with Asia was organised and financed since the reign of King D. Manuel I (r. 1495-1521), though it lost its weight when Europe managed to create a unified consuming market for spices in the seventeenth century thanks to the supply made by the Dutch and the English East India Companies. The establishment of the Cape Route, however, was the forerunner of the other great transoceanic routes created in the sixteenth century, as was the case of the Manila Galleon linking Asia to America through the Pacific after 1570. As Elsa Penalva points out, Portuguese private players invested in both trade routes during the period of political union between Portugal and Spain (1580-1640), accidentally sapping the economic exploration of the Cape Route to their profit.

Furthermore, Elsa Penalva and Paulo Pinto display the way Portuguese private traders and their local associates built their trading networks in Southeast and East Asia, and how they had to cope with the Crown, and its representatives, and other Asian players for their share of the market. Their papers highlight the role and weight of Portuguese private trade in Asia, and of its resilience and capability to adapt to an ever-changing commercial environment, and also by taking advantage of every opportunity they had, especially in a region with little state presence and capability to enforce its policies, and where the Portuguese and the Spanish empires overlap, thus opening the door to informal commercial connections.

The Atlantic World is represented by three essays, which enlighten different periods and aspects of its construction. Arlindo Caldeira stresses the importance of São Tomé in the establishment of an early Atlantic economy in the sixteenth century by linking Africa to Europe first, and then creating a triangular connection between Africa, America and Europe based on sugar and slaves. Though Portuguese private investors, as traders, slavers and plantation owners, thrived in the Atlantic, some of them started crossing into other European empires in the area, namely the Spanish in the sixteenth and seventeenth century as purveyors of slave workforce. The New Christians excelled in that role, but, as Carla Vieira shows, they started crossing into other European empires in the seventeenth century and returning to Judaism, beginning with the Dutch (taking advantage of their presence in Brazil, where they were decisive in the transference of sugar transforming technology to the Dutch Caribbean plantations) and continuing with the British. The closely knit family networks enabled them to tap into different imperial spaces through backdoors, sometimes using relatives who had stayed behind in Portugal and in her empire, but also connecting with Portuguese and British traders (both Home and colonial merchants), which enabled them to build extensive commercial routes, and shift from one place to another when it suited them to ripe a good profit.

Last, but not the least, the study by Margarida Machado points out the importance of key commodities in the construction of the Atlantic economy, tobacco in her case. Rapidly made into a monopoly, the sale of tobacco in Portugal and in her empire was an important source of revenue for the Crown, though it was made by private individuals and syndicates who bade its contracts for a given region. Margarida Machado takes us on a tour for the impact that such contracts and the entrepreneurs who bade for them had on the overall Azorean economy.

The following pages will provide an overview of the social and economic impact of the Portuguese Maritime Empire at Home and abroad, with its players and commodities, enlightening how it worked during the Early Modern Period.

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Sugar, Pepper, Precious Stones: The Economic Impact of the Portuguese Overseas Expansion in the German World around 1500

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Abstract
At the beginning of the early modern history three luxury merchandises triumphed in Germany: sugar, spices – especially pepper – and precious stones. All these mentioned commodities were already well-known in the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, but it was at the turn of the fifteenth century to the sixteenth century that these goods gained a new dimension in various parts of that Empire as a result of the Portuguese overseas expansion. We will also see that, at this time, there were significant changes in relation to the main protagonists of the Portuguese-German trade.

Keywords
Portuguese-German relations; Portuguese maritime empire; Overseas trade; Hanseatic League; German trade houses

Resumo
No alvorecer da Modernidade três mercadorias de luxo impuseram-se na Alemanha: açúcar, especiarias – sobretudo pimenta – e pedras preciosas. Todos estes produtos mencionados eram já bem conhecidos no território do Sacro Império Romano-Germânico, mas é na viragem do século XV para o século XVI, que estas preciosidades ganharam, em várias partes do Sacro Império, uma nova dimensão em consequência da Expansão Portuguesa. Veremos também que, precisamente nesta altura, se registaram mudanças significativas em relação aos principais protagonistas do comércio luso-germânico.

Palavras-chave
Relações luso-alemãs; império marítimo português; comércio ultramarino; Hansa; casas comerciais alemãs

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Introduction

In the Late Middle Ages, the biggest boost to Luso-German trading came from the merchants of the Hanseatic League (Durrer, 1953; Oliveira Marques, 1980; 1993; Arnold, 2019). The Hansa had its roots in the 12th century and was originally a kind of merchants' corporation, predominantly from Lower Germany, which specialized in foreign trade. In the mid-14th century, the Hansa became an organization of merchants and cities with both economic, as well as political, objectives[2]. The economy of northern Europe was dominated by a network of Hanseatic trading posts known as *Kontore*. By that time, the Hansa had extended its trading activities to the western coast of France, as well as to the Iberian Peninsula. From the 1370s onwards, therefore, direct and regular maritime connections between the Hansa and Portugal had become well-established. The initiative came from the cities of the Teutonic Order in Prussia and Livonia, where, during the 15th century, ships sailed for Lisbon almost every year, laden mostly with cereal grains as well as with wood for naval construction. In Portugal, the Hansa merchants bought wine, fruit, olive oil, cork, and especially salt. A. H. de Oliveira Marques proved that while Portuguese salt was not any cheaper than the famous salt from the Bay of Bourgneuf, it was of a much better quality (Oliveira Marques, 1993, pp. 66-69)[3]. Furthermore, the Hanseatic merchants found Portugal to be a better market for their products than France. It appears that these two factors justified the high cost of the long voyage to the south westernmost tip of Europe. Danzig[4] was the preferred port of departure for the Hansa's voyages to Portugal[5], and only in the 16th century did ships from other Hanseatic cities like Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck appear with more frequency in the mouth of the rivers Tagus and Sado.

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2 In the first half of the 15th century, it is believed that approximately 200 cities belonged to the Hanseatic League (Hammel-Kiesow, 2000, pp. 10-13). These cities were mostly situated along the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, but also in the interior of the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, Hanseatic cities extended from the Low Countries in the west to the eastern edge of the Baltic Sea. Thanks to a network of trading hubs, notably the *Kontore* in London, Bruges, Bergen, and Novgood, the Hansa became the main intermediary for commerce in northern Europe during the Late Middle Ages.

3 Regarding the price of salt in Portugal in the 15th century, see Rau, 1968, pp. 178-182.

4 Gdansk in Polish.

5 Oliveira Marques (1993, pp. 45-60) demonstrated that a voyage from Danzig to Lisbon lasted around 38 days. In general, ships bound for the Iberian Peninsula joined whichever fleet sailed annually to the Bay of Bourgneuf and other places on the western coast of France in order to buy the coveted salt of the respective region.

The exchange of goods between Portugal and Germany, however, was not restricted to Portuguese soil. Other important Luso-Hanseatic commercial hubs were the trading posts of the Hansa and of Portugal in Bruges and Antwerp. Up until the end of the 15th century, the Hansa *Kontor* in Bruges, in particular, was a major factor in the international trade of the Hansa, Europe's great mercantile intermediary.

It is in the third quarter of the 15th century that the volume of Portuguese business in Bruges reached its peak, mostly due to the lucrative sale of sugar from Madeira. Towards the end of the 1470s, according to A. H. de Oliveira Marques, a significant change occurred in the purchasing patterns of sugar from Madeira (Oliveira Marques, 1993, p. 92). At the beginning of the last quarter of the 15th century, the production of Portuguese sugar on the island of Madeira was affecting the trade of Levantine and Valencian sugar. Shipped to Bruges, the sugar from Madeira rapidly penetrated the German market; it also conquered the markets of Nuremberg and Lower Germany. In October of 1477, the directors of the *Große Ravensburger Handelsgesellschaft*[6], which had interests in Spanish sugar, started complaining about losses incurred in Lyon, Bruges, and Nuremberg as a result of the competition posed by Portuguese sugar. In March of the following year, the company was already negotiating for sugar from Madeira in recognition of the low value of Valencian sugar, which was difficult to place in the Flemish and German markets. And in 1479, Madeiran sugar was bought in Flanders for half the price of Valencian sugar. These examples can explain the total success reached by the Portuguese in the exportation of sugar in the second half of the 15th century. It also explains how, around that time, Portuguese sugar reached not only Flanders, but also Germany (*Ibidem*).

It is worth noting, therefore, that this period marked a turning point in Luso-German commercial relations, both in terms of quantity and quality. While up until the end of the 15th century, trade was mainly based on the exchange of various national goods, a new phase was now initiated with the German importation of overseas products: Atlantic sugar to start with, and, after the

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[6] The *Magna Societas Aleman(n)orum* was founded at the end of the 14th century by members of three families: the Humpis of Ravensburg, the Muntprat of Constance, and the Mötteli of Buchhorn. In the 15th century, the Society's membership numbers rose to around 100 families from ten cities. This was the base which constituted the offices and created an international commercial network. The sale of textiles, as well as the commercialization of both oriental products (spices) and Mediterranean products (sugar, wine, etc.) were particularly important contributing factors. The Ravensburg company, for its part, however, entered into decline in the late 15th century, and its history came to an end around 1530. In this regard, see Schulte, 1923.

early 1500s, products based on the riches coming from the region of the Indian Ocean, in exchange for precious metals. This new chapter in business relations was supported by other protagonists, such as merchants from Cologne, but mainly by the great trading companies of Nuremberg and Augsburg[7].

This article is based on original manuscripts, in particular from Southern German archives. In addition, both relevant and more recent studies and source editions are taken into account, such as two volumes of the important series *Deutsche Handelsakten des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Müller, 1962; Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014)[8].

It is the author's intention to translate some excerpts from German-language sources from the late 15th and early 16th centuries into English and thus make them accessible to a broader international readership interested in the history of German-Portuguese relations around 1500.

1. *Sugar*

The German city of Cologne was particularly noteworthy vis-à-vis the trade of sugar. From 1488 onwards, Rhenish merchants in Antwerp recorded annual purchases of this commodity (Gramulla, 1972, pp. 317-321). Between 1502 and 1513, at least 113 shipments of sugar were sent from Antwerp to Cologne (*Ibi*, p. 319), a large part of which being distributed in the Holy Roman Empire via the Cologne-Frankfurt-Nuremberg trading route. Of note to the sugar trade in Lisbon and Madeira during the first decade of the 16th century are the activities of merchants from Cologne, e.g., Johann Byse and Jacob Groenenberg (*Ibi* , pp. 324-329).

Sugar from Madeira, therefore, soon became famous in Nuremberg, which, in the 15th century, was the biggest economic centre of the Holy Roman Empire. Hartmann Schedel's renowned *Nuremberg Chronicle* (*Liber Cronicarum*, first published in 1493), explicitly mentions "sugar from Madeira"[9] in the chapter entitled *Portugalia* (Schedel, 2004, Fol. CCLXXXV-CCLXXXVv.).

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7 On the commercial firms of Upper Germany and their business dealings with the Portuguese Crown in the early 16th century, see Häbler, 1903, pp. 1-37; Kellenbenz, 1967; 1970; Grosshaupt, 1990; A. A. M. de Almeida, 1993, pp. 55-61; Hendrich, 2007, pp. 169-191; Pohle, 2000, pp. 97-134; 2017.

8 *Ibidem.* To the research history of the economic relations between Upper Germany and Portugal cf. also the introduction in the article by Mark Häberlein in the present *dossier*.

9 Schedel, 2004, Fol. CCLXXXVv.: "*zucker von Madera*".

> Prince Henry, all too aware that Portugal's territory was contained by narrow borders, and eager to expand the Kingdom, ploughed the Atlantic Ocean most vigorously (…) [he thus] discovered many different islands never before inhabited by man. To the delight of his men, they sailed towards an island more remarkable than all the others, which, although uninhabited, was irrigated by springs, boasted fertile soil and forests, and so provided favourable living conditions. He sent people from various social strata to inhabit the island. As well as lending itself to other crops, the land seemed particularly favourable for the cultivation of sugar, which, nowadays, is produced with such high yields that all of Europe has more sugar than ever before. Madeira is the name of the island, from which the designation of "sugar from Madeira" arose[10].

A caption on the Behaim globe, constructed in Nuremberg in the early 1490s, also mentions the "island of Madeira, where the sugar of Portugal grows"[11]. Martin Behaim himself[12] was involved in the sugar business in the context of a mission that took him from Portugal to Antwerp in 1494[13]. In 1496, the first German sugar producer is documented in Madeira under the name of Herman ("Armão"), identified by A. H. de Oliveira Marques as the German merchant Armão Álvares, who first appeared in Lisbon in the 1460s (Oliveira Marques, 1993, pp. 103-104).

The most prominent German company in the sugar trade was that of the Welser-Vöhlins, who, in September of 1503, founded an office (*Faktorei*) in Lisbon, and, a few years later, another in Funchal[14]. The exact date of the arrival in Madeira of this prominent German trading house is not known. Lucas Rem, the Welser-Vöhlins' Lisbon factor, mentions the commercial activities on the

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10 Translation of J. M. de Almeida, 1959, pp. 213-214: "(...) o infante D. Henrique, ao reconhecer que o território de Portugal se confinava em limites exíguos, desejoso de ampliar o Reino, sulcara, com as máximas forças, o oceano Atlântico, (...) descobriu [assim] muitas e diferentes ilhas que o homem nunca habitara. Não sem alegria dos seus, navegara em direcção a uma ilha, famosa entre as demais, a qual, embora não habitada, era regada de nascentes, plena de terra fértil, arborizada, propícia para nela se viver. Para lá mandou gente de diversa condição, que a habitasse. Entre os demais produtos, a terra mostrava-se particularmente boa para a cultura do açúcar o qual nela se produz hoje em dia com tamanho rendimento, que a Europa inteira tem mais açúcar do que era habitual. Madeira se chama a ilha, e, daqui, a designação de "açúcar da Madeira".

11 *Apud* Knefelkamp, 1992, p. 94: "(...) *insel Madera da des portugals zucker wächst*".

12 On Behaim (1459-1507) and the Portuguese Discoveries, see Bräunlein, 1992; Jakob, 2007; Pohle 2007; 2021; Garcia, 2012, vol. 2, pp. 27-49. See also the contribution of Rui Loureiro in the present *dossier*.

13 Stadtarchiv Nürnberg / Nuremberg [henceforth StadtAN], E 11/II, *FA Behaim*, Nr. 569,4. See also Pohle, 2007, pp. 30-31, 80-81.

14 In this regard, see Vieira, 1987; Häberlein, 2014b; 2016, pp. 107-111. Cf. Wilczek, 2009.

island in his diary entries of 1503 to 1508 (Greiff, 1861, p. 9). In 1506, the Madeiran sugar crop reached a peak of 200,000 *arrobas*[15] (Costa - Lains - Münch Miranda, 2011, p. 107), a fact which may have had a bearing on the company's decision to set up a permanent trading post in the archipelago (Pohle, 2000, p. 104). The sources cite the names of several commercial agents who represented the Welsers in Madeira from 1507 onwards[16]. The historian Fernando Jasmins Pereira ascertains that "in 1507, Lucas Rem gave power of attorney to João Rem, his brother, for that time in Funchal"[17]. This referred to Hans Rem[18], who possibly went by the name of "João (de) A(u)gusta", and whom we find mentioned in the island records in the following years[19].

In 1508, King Manuel I decreed that the Welsers be paid the equivalent of 10,500 *cruzados* for 12,000 *arrobas* of sugar. This was in compensation for the pepper they had initially acquired through their direct participation in D. Francisco de Almeida's expedition to India; pepper which subsequently had been confiscated by the *Casa da Índia* (House of India)[20] upon the return of the fleet in 1506 (Häbler, 1903, p. 29)[21]. In 1508, João de Augusta received in Madeira 4,035 *arrobas* and 18 a*rráteis* of sugar[22] and, in the following year, no less than 167 *arrobas* (Costa - Pereira, 1989, pp. 185-188, 208). In 1510, the Welsers managed to obtain another 3,731 *arrobas* and 16 *arráteis* of this luxury commodity[23]. In September 1512, agents of the company sent 25 boxes of sugar from Funchal to Flanders (Häberlein, 2014b, p. 56). After that, news of the Welsers' activities in Madeira became less frequent. Until a few years ago, the date of the company's departure from the archipelago was unknown. However, documents only recently published by Peter Geffcken and Mark Häberlein reveal that their departure was likely to have occurred in 1514 (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 74-76). The same sources refer to Leo Ravensburger as the

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15 One *arroba* (corresponds to a quarter of a *quintal* or 32 *arratéis*) is in Portugal in the 16th century about 14 kilograms.

16 According to Vieira (1987, p. 174), Lucas Rem may have travelled to Madeira even before 1507.

17 Pereira, 1969, p. 128: "(…) Lucas Rem passou em 1507 procuração a João Rem, seu irmão, por esse tempo em Funchal".

18 He was also in Funchal in 1509. See Vieira, 1987, p. 174.

19 We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that this may instead refer to Hans Schmid, a name which Lucas Rem mentions in his diary regarding the employees of the Welsers in Madeira.

20 The *Casa da India* was created in Lisbon about 1503 to manage the Portuguese territories overseas, as well as all aspects of foreign trade, navigation and product sales.

21 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo / Lisbon (henceforth ANTT), *Corpo Cronológico*, I-7-85.

22 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, II-14-119.

23 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-10-124.

Welsers' representative in Funchal during the last years of the trading post's existence. A document dated February 1515 reveals that Ravensburger had received instructions to sell the inventory of the branch office and send the proceeds to the company's post in Lisbon (*Ibi*, p. 76). It is unclear whether the departure of the Welsers from Madeira was connected with their definitive withdrawal from the Canary Islands, where the firm had been involved in the sugar business until 1513[24]. The fact remains that the Madeiran sugar business became much less profitable due to a drastic drop in sugar production during the second decade of the 16th century (Everaert, 1991, p. 110).

During the 16th century, the Welser-Vöhlin company played a prominent role in the acquisition and distribution of sugar in Europe. Sugar came from various points of origin: not only from Madeira and São Tomé, but also from the Mediterranean; the latter arrived in Upper Germany (Ulm) via Genoa, while sugar from the Welser-owned trading post in Santo Domingo owned by the Welsers in Santo Domingo was shipped to the markets of Seville and Antwerp (Häberlein, 2014b, pp. 64-66). However, as Mark Häberlein asserts, sugar was never the most important product within the economic plans of the Welsers. Häberlein also holds that Flemish and Italian merchants played a much more important role in the sugar business than their German counterparts (*Ibi*, p. 65).

During the 16th century, sugar increasingly became a product of mass consumption. In the territory of the Holy Roman Empire its consumption grew considerably. According to Donald J. Harreld,

> Germans were significant consumers of the products being transported into from all over the world. Of all the products most clearly of Atlantic origin available in Antwerp during the sixteenth century, sugar was the most important. Germans controlled to a large degree the distribution of sugar throughout Europe and to a lesser extent the refining of sugar in Antwerp (Harreld, 2003, p. 162).

In this dynamic process of growth towards mass consumption, the sugar of Portugal's Atlantic islands featured prominently. During the reign of King Manuel I, over 150,000 *arrobas* and no fewer than 6,000 boxes of sugar from the islands of São Tomé, Cabo Verde, and Madeira arrived at the trading post in Antwerp (Goris, 1925, p. 239).

[24] In 1513, the Welsers sold the sugar plantations they owned in the Canary Islands to Johann Byse and Jacob Groenenberg. Cf. Gramulla, 1972, 327-330.

2. Spices

Up until the early 16th century, spices from India arrived in Germany by way of Italy, initially via Venice. Through the *Fondaco dei Tedeschi*, German merchants acquired the coveted oriental goods, which included silk and precious stones. When the Portuguese brought spices in large quantities to Europe via the Cape Route[25], some German firms started establishing themselves in Lisbon. In 1505 and 1506, the Welser-Vöhlins, the Fuggers, the Höchstetters and the Gossembrots of Augsburg, as well as the Imhoffs and the Hirschvogels of Nuremberg, actively participated in fitting ships for the Portuguese fleets sailing for India[26]. Several extensive contracts, signed in Portugal, between the firms of Upper Germany and the Portuguese Crown, are documented and included pepper and other spices. Other firms established in Lisbon in the first two decades of the 16th century were the Rehlingers, as well as the Herwarts and the Rems of Augsburg, all of whom involved in the spice trade.

Two sources, written in German, document the presence of two German commercial agents at the beginning of the 16th century, as well as making mention of the Portuguese overseas markets. The first, the so-called "Leutkirch manuscript"[27], includes a description of the products traded in the lands of the Indian Ocean, especially along the Malabar coast, often specifying their origins, quality, and price. The second document is a chapter about "Calicut (*Callachutt*)" in the *Triffasband*[28], written in 1514/15 by a member of the Imhoff family[29]. It deals with the trading conditions in India and is based on observations made *in situ* by a German merchant in 1503 (Müller, 1962, pp. 259-260). Both sources are unequivocal in indicating the great interest in oriental spices, especially pepper, on the part of the merchant bankers of Nuremberg and Augsburg[30]. Attesting to this is the fact that in 1503 several firms from

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25 It is estimated that the importation of spices rose from over 20,000 *quintais* in the period between 1503 and 1506, to an annual average of 37,500 *quintais* between 1513 and 1519, of which almost 30,000 *quintais* was pepper. Cf. Feldbauer, 2005, p. 146; Häberlein, 2014, p. 43.

26 Regarding German participation in the Portuguese trips to India in the first quarter of the 16th century, see Hümmerich, 1918; Ehrhardt, 1989, pp. 25-101; Kellenbenz, 1989; Pohle, 2000, pp. 189-218.

27 An edition of the manuscript in Müller, 1962, pp. 201-213.

28 The *Triffasband*, or, more precisely, *Driffas von kauffmanschaft*, of 1514/15, contains an extensive description of goods and mercantile practices of the world's most important markets in the early 16th century. Published in Müller, 1962, pp. 236-304.

29 In line with the results of Theodor G. Werner's (1965, pp. 26-29, 34-35) research, the author of the *Triffasband* was probably Andreas (or Endres) Imhoff (1491-1579), one of the most remarkable figures among the Nuremberg patricians of the 1500s. See also Schultheiβ, 1959.

30 On the consumption of pepper in Europe in the early Modern Age, see Schmitt, 1999.

Upper Germany, attracted by these products, founded the first German offices in Lisbon.

At the end of his report, the author of the "Leutkirch manuscript"[31] specifies the price of pepper and other merchandise, including the exchange rates in various places along the Malabar coast:

> *Im jar 1504 under dem h[a]uptman Alfonso Dalbuquerque hat die speceri golten:*
> *In Cananor piper der bachar fanomen 160.*
> *In Cotschin 161.*
> *In Colam 160½.*
> *In Cananor zinziber der bachar fanomen 60.*
> *In Colam canella der bachar fan. 255.*
> *In Colam garoffeli der bachar fan. 377.*
> *In Colam muschatnuß der bachar fan. 135.*
> *Matziß in Colam das farasol fan. 29½. (...)*
> *Cobre in Cananor das farasol fonomen 45.*
> *Cobre in Colam der farasol fon. 36. (...)*
> *Das send die preiß und alle recht damit betzalt. Das gewicht in Colam ist glich als in Malaca.*
> *[1] Bachar in Liβbona [ist] 3 quintal und 50 rotal, der c[anter] 128 ratel, die retal 14 onz. In Cotschin der bachar macht in Portigal 3 quintal 1 rattel. In Calecud und Cananor ain bachar macht in 4 c[ante]r in Liβbona. Farasol ist allwegen 20 ratel nach seinem gewicht. Fanomen ist ain guldin myntz von lichtem gold von 15 karat. Und 19 fonomen gelten ain cruzatten im kouf von spetzeri* (*Apud* Müller, 1962, pp. 211-212).

> [In 1504, under captain Afonso de Albuquerque, spices were worth:
> In Cananor, a *bahar*[32] of pepper [cost] 160 *fanons*.
> In Cochim, 161.
> In Kollam, 160½.
> In Cananor, a *bahar* of ginger 60 *fanons*.
> In Kollam, a *bahar* of cinnamon 255 *fanons*.
> In Kollam, a *bahar* of cloves 377 *fanons*.
> In Kollam, a *bahar* of nutmeg 135 *fanons*.
> Mace in Kollam [cost] 29½ *fanons* per *faraçola*. (...)

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[31] This, presumably, refers to Peter Holzschuher of Nuremberg, who accompanied the fleet of Afonso and Francisco de Albuquerque in 1503. In this regard, see Pohle, 2000, pp. 199-204.

[32] According to Luís Filipe Thomaz (1998, p. 37), the weight of a *bahar* (or bar) varied from port to port: in the ports of Cochim and Kollam, it did not surpass 166,27 kg, but in Cananor it went up to 205,63 and in Calecut to 208,15. In around 1515, the annual production of pepper on the coast of Malabar was approximately 20,000 *bahars*. – On weights, currencies, and the price of pepper in the region of the Indian Ocean during the first quarter of the 16th century, see *Ibi*, pp. 37-46.

> Copper in Cananor [cost] 45 *fanons* per *faraçola*.
> In Kollam, 36 *fanons*. (...)
> These are the prices and all duties are paid with this. Weights in Kollam are the same as in Malacca.
> In Lisbon, one *bahar* is the equivalent of 3 *quintais* and 50 *arráteis*, one *cântaro* to 128 *arráteis*, the *arrátel* to 14 ounces. A *bahar* in Cochim corresponds to 3 *quintais* and one *arrátel* in Portugal. One *bahar* in Calicut and Cananor equals 4 *cântaros* in Lisbon. A *faraçola* corresponds to the weight of 20 *arráteis*.
> The *fanon* is a bright gold coin of 15 carats. And 19 *fanons* are worth one *cruzado* in the purchase of spices.]

Regarding the purchase of pepper, the merchant author explains that it could only be bought "on condition that half of the payment, or at least one third of it, be in copper"[33], with copper in Cochim stated as being worth 11 to 12 *cruzados* per *quintal.* The data recorded in the *Triffasband* refer mainly to the Calicut market in 1503 (Müller, 1962, pp. 259-260). In the chapter entitled "*Callachutt*", the author outlines that the local measurement of weight is known as "*ferras*" (*faraçola*), which equals one fifth of a Portuguese *quintal*, whereas the *bahar* was worth 4 *quintais* in Lisbon. Next, he focuses on the price of spices, starting with pepper. In 1503, while costing 9 *fanons* per *faraçola* in Calicut, pepper cost only 6 *fanons* in its place of origin, a mere thirty miles from Calicut. He writes that a *bahar* of mace costs 12½ *cruzados* in Calicut, while in Malacca it could be purchased for as little as 2 *cruzados*. He also records the price of ginger (2 *fanons* per *faraçola*), cinnamon (1 *cruzado* per *faraçola*), and clove (30 *cruzados* per *bahar*) (*Ibidem*).

In subsequent years, with all this information available to them, the German firms capitalized on this highly useful data regarding the spice trade. By 1504, the Fuggers and the Höchstetters were buying up the lion share of spices that had reached the Antwerp market via Lisbon (Pölnitz, 1951, p. 149). In August of 1504, Lucas Rem set up a contract with King Manuel I, which granted German merchant bankers permission to purchase spices directly in India. The three ships they commissioned, together with several Italian merchants[34], brought around 13,800 *quintais* of spices back to Portugal (Kellenbenz, 1990, vol. 1, p. 51). It is evident that in this enterprise of 1505/06, pepper was the focus of the Germans. This interest did not wane during the following decade, despite a monopoly on pepper held by King Manuel I and which, for a few years, greatly complicated business for German companies in Lisbon. Notwithstanding the

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[33] *Apud* Müller, 1962, p. 204: "(...) mit condicion, das die bezalung sey das halb tail in kupfer, oder auf das mindest das drittail".

[34] On the Italian merchants in Lisbon in the first half of the 16th century, see Alessandrini, 2006.

considerable problems and risks involved, the spice trade remained fairly lucrative for the firms of Upper Germany. The consortium that invested in the fleet of D. Francisco de Almeida, for example, achieved profits of at least 150%, despite its disputes with King Manuel I[35]. Around 1507, the Imhoffs owned 400 *quintais* of pepper in Lisbon[36]. In his role as company representative of the Welser-Vöhlins in Portugal, Lucas Rem claimed to have bought large quantities of spices in the first decade of the 16th century, although he did not specify prices. In the short period between August 1509 and January 1511, his successors purchased spices at a price of over ten million *reais* (Godinho, 1985, vol. 3, p. 195)[37]. During that same period, Marx Zimmermann, the factor of the Fuggers, spent 9,750,000 *reais* in the House of India (*Ibidem*). The Fugger company also bought around 73 *quintais* and three *arrobas* of pepper in 1513, in addition to the annual quota they were entitled to under the contract negotiated with the Crown in 1512[38]. The Imhoffs, for their part, belonged to a group of contractors who, between 1512 and 1516, warehoused 20,000 *quintais* of pepper each year, while the Welser-Vöhlin company, in 1516 alone, invested 7,000 *cruzados* in pepper-related contracts (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, p. XLIII). The annual revenue of the German firms depended largely on the results of business conducted with the Portuguese Crown. Lucas Rem mentioned that "in 1516 and 1517, we struck it lucky in Portugal and France, where our profits in these two years amounted to 30%"[39]. The "lucky years" of the Welsers in Portugal were plainly reflected in the final accounts of 1516/17, with company profit margins exceeding 13%, more than twice the usual annual figure (Ehrenberg, 1922, vol. 1, pp. 195-196).

Luso-German trade was, of course, not only carried out in Lisbon. The Low Countries, by way of Antwerp, also played a fundamental role in commercial relations between Portugal and Germany. Antwerp was the traditional trading hub of the merchants from Cologne and Southern Germany, and all the important German commercial firms had set up their trading offices there. This coincided with the transfer of the *Feitoria de Flandres* (Royal Portuguese trade office in the Low Countries) from Bruges to Antwerp on the one hand, and with the arrival in Antwerp of the first Portuguese fleets laden with spices on the

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35 Greiff, 1861, p. 8. Cf. Walter, 1987, pp. 47-51.

36 Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg / Nuremberg, *FA Imhoff*, Fasz. 37, Nr. 1a.

37 According to V. M. Godinho's calculations, the brothers Rem, as well as Ulrich Ehinger ("Rodrigo Alemam, '*feitor*' of the company") spent 10,727,720 *reais*.

38 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-12-77. See also Kellenbenz, 1974, p. 208; Doehard,1962, vol. 3, p. 233.

39 *Apud* Greiff, 1861, p. 31: "Jar 1516, 1517, hett wir gros gluck In Portugal und Frankreich, gewannen diese 2 Jar - 30 pro Cº."

other. Consequently, Antwerp soon became the main distribution centre for products from Portugal's overseas territories. Of all the overseas goods, pepper from India was by far the most important.

In Antwerp, in addition to the merchant bankers who were already established in Lisbon, other firms from Upper Germany – such as the Hallers (Themudo Barata, 1973, p. 107) and, from the 1520s onwards, also the companies of the Haugs of Augsburg (Meilinger, 1911, pp. 80-83), and the Tuchers[40] of Nuremberg – came into contact with the Portuguese Crown. The Ravensburg company, a traditional client of the Venetians in the spice trade, also maintained commercial relations with Portugal, particularly through their Antwerp branch (Brunschwig, 1957, p. 23).

At that time, almost all imports and exports of relevance within the Luso-German trade were carried out via the Lisbon-Antwerp maritime trade route. Every year, two Portuguese fleets circulated between the two cities. The first arrived in Antwerp between May and July; the second in the last months of the year. It is estimated that during the second decade of the 16th century, between 30,000 and 40,000 *quintais* of spices were transported every single year (A. A. M. de Almeida, 1993, p. 35)[41].

With the pepper trade flourishing, and because Portugal required large quantities of copper and silver for her African-Asian trade, the metals trade also peaked. During the reign of King Manuel I, around 10,000 *quintais* of copper were imported through the *feitoria* of Antwerp every year (Godinho, 1985, vol. 2, p. 11)[42]. The biggest part of it came from the copper mines that the Fuggers operated in Hungary (Häberlein, 2006, p. 55)[43]. Between 1507 and 1526, this powerful firm from Augsburg traded approximately half of the copper output of its Hungarian mines in Antwerp.

Regarding the quantities of silver purchased by the Portuguese Crown, the historian Philipp Robinson Rössner ventures the assumption that in the first two decades of the 16th century, virtually all the silver from Central Europe

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40 The Tuchers' internal communication mentions the importation of Portugal, via Antwerp, of pepper and jam. Cf. StadtAN, E 29/IV, Nr. 292, 1487, 1490, 1515.

41 Conversely, goods bought in Antwerp were shipped to Portugal, especially cereal grains and metals. Furthermore, the purchase of firearms was also of considerable importance, and the Portuguese Crown imported these through the *feitoria* of Antwerp. According to J. A. Goris (1925, p. 241), 2,947 *fusils* arrived in Portugal between 1495 and 1521, and most of them were supplied by the merchants from Cologne.

42 During the reign of King Manuel I, according to Carlo M. Cipolla (1999, p. 39), Portugal imported over 5,200 tons of copper via Antwerp.

43 As early as 1503, 41 ships arrived in Antwerp, originating in Danzig and laden with copper from the Fuggers.

found its way to the regions of the Indian Ocean via Lisbon (Rössner, 2012, p. 263)[44]. According to the calculations of J. A. Goris, the *feitoria* of Antwerp exported over 14,000 silver marks to the Portuguese capital during the reign of King Manuel I (Goris, 1925, p. 240).

Luso-German trade, which was based on the exchange of oriental spices for metals, was not only carried out in Lisbon and Antwerp, however, but also in Upper Germany. It is worth noting that senior officials of the Portuguese agency in Antwerp, such as Tomé Lopes in 1515, and Rui Fernandes de Almada in 1519, travelled to Nuremberg and Augsburg to negotiate contracts with the big German firms. These contracts centred mainly on copper and pepper.

The correspondence between Rui Fernandes and King Manuel I[45] shows that by the late 1510s, the sale of pepper in Germany was beginning to decline. At that time, Jacob Fugger steadfastly refused to acquire pepper in exchange for copper. Previously, in 1515, this powerful merchant banker had told Tomé Lopes that he wanted to reduce pepper purchases from 30,000 to 15,000 *quintais* per year. From then on, the Fuggers can be seen to slowly withdraw from the pepper business. This had several adverse consequences for the Portuguese government, because the Fugger company was the major supplier of European copper. Nonetheless, in 1519/20, Rui Fernandes de Almada observed that a number of individual merchants and smaller firms showed an interest in buying pepper. King Manuel I continued to insist on negotiating contracts with the big firms of Augsburg in order to secure the metals he so badly needed. While the Fuggers increasingly lost interest in pepper, other companies like the Welsers, Höchstetters, and Rems remained favourably disposed towards buying pepper and other spices. To that effect, one of the main intermediaries for these companies in Lisbon was Jörg Herwart, who had been installed there for some time. In February of 1520, King Manuel I ordered officials of the *Casa da Índia* to hand over 200 *quintais* of pepper to Herwart and his partners in compensation for losses incurred because a contract that included cinnamon and clove had been cancelled[46]. Another source refers to a contract of Herwart's worth 70,000 *cruzados* regarding the purchase of pepper, an amount which, according to V. M. Godinho, was equivalent to over 3,100 *quintais* (Godinho, 1985, vol. 3, p. 210)[47].

At the end of King Manuel I's reign (1495-1521), the price of pepper sold in the Holy Roman Empire rose significantly. In the Low Countries, for example, it

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44 See also Westermann, 2011; 2013, p. 471.

45 In this regard, see Themudo Barata, 1971; Kellenbenz, 1974.

46 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico,* I-25-119; A. A. M. de Almeida, 1993, p. 134.

47 On the German merchant Jörg Herwart, see chapter 3.

ranged from 19-22 *dinheiros* per *quintal* in 1516 to 1517, to as much as 30 *dinheiros* in November 1519[48]. The price in Frankfurt and Nuremberg, on the other hand, stood at 28 *dinheiros* in September 1519, increasing in the following two months to 32 *dinheiros*, while in Antwerp, it dropped to 27¾ *dinheiros* in February 1520, although a subsequent rise was anticipated.

Around 1520, the inflated cost of spices became a vehemently disputed issue in Germany[49]. The big companies were publicly accused of usury because of their monopolies, which controlled the distribution and sales of goods in the Holy Roman Empire. News had spread that some of the big firms purchased spices from the King of Portugal at any price, with a view to selling them at exceedingly high prices later on[50]. This not only resulted in bankruptcy for small merchants, but also in a "diversion and waste of good money and currency on the part of the big companies, which greatly harmed the common good"[51]. As prices continued to rise, the matter was discussed in different Imperial Diets (*Reichstage*). Some guilds took it into their own hands to penalize the offenders. In this regard, Jacob Fugger's temporary refusal to buy oriental spices can be better understood within the context of the debate over the monopolies created by the German merchant bankers. In the winter of 1519/20, he turned down several Portuguese proposals to acquire pepper, arguing that he did not want to lose either his reputation or his estate[52].

Unlike the Fuggers, other Augsburg firms continued to trade in spices, despite the somewhat precarious nature of this period. The Welsers were especially noteworthy buyers and distributors of Portuguese spices in the decades that followed[53], and oriental riches were dispatched to Vienna, Prague, and Brno via the trading routes of Cologne-Frankfurt-Nuremberg, as well as those of Cologne-Frankfurt-Leipzig (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 95-96, *passim*). It is not known for certain whether the Welsers closed their Lisbon office temporarily, but there are records of a company factor *in situ* in 1521

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48 On the evolution of the prices of spices in the Low Countries and Upper Germany, see Themudo Barata, 1971, pp. 162-163.

49 On the so-called *Monopolstreit*, cf. Hecker, 1875; Johnson, 2008.

50 New studies suggest, however, that the prices of pepper hardly increased, bearing in mind that inflation affected prices in general. Cf. O'Rourke - Williamson, 2009; Häberlein, 2016, pp. 18, 96-99.

51 Passage from the accusation made by the imperial tax inspector (1522) *apud* Hecker, 1875, p. 197: "Wie die grossen geselschafft gut gelt und müntz zu gemeins nutz grossem nachteil verfüren und verschwenden".

52 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-25-76.

53 According to Häbler (1903, p. 35), in 1523, the Welsers bought almost all, if not all, of the pepper that the Portuguese brought from India. Cf. Häberlein, 2014, pp. 54-61.

(Häbler, 1896, p. 73); his name, however, is not known, as the Welser ledgers of 1525 make merely reference to "our employees in Lisbon" (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 108, 111, 242, 245).

An important factor contributing to the decline in business for German companies in Lisbon was the transfer of world trade to Seville. By March 1520, the factor of the Hirschvogel company in Lisbon, Jörg Pock, had realized that trade in the Portuguese capital was "diminishing, while in Seville it was increasing"[54]. In order to take advantage of the highly favourable economic scenario in Seville, many companies from Augsburg and Nuremberg sent their representatives to this city on the Guadalquivir River in order to permanently establish themselves in this new hub of global trade. It is not surprising, therefore, that from the 1520s onwards, we find several agents from Upper Germany, who had previously worked in the Portuguese capital, now ensconsed in Andalucia (Pohle, 2000, p. 256). At this very point in time, a number of German firms left Lisbon altogether. Thanks to Rui Fernandes de Almada's correspondence, for example, we know that the Höchstetters had already closed their office in Lisbon[55]. Over the next few years, other firms followed suit. Around 1523, in the ambit of the above-mentioned case against the big German companies accused of usury, Conrad Peutinger, the famous humanist and son-in-law of Anton Welser, commented that all the German firms, bar one, had closed their offices in Lisbon (Grosshaupt, 1990, p. 380, note 141)[56]. Even if slightly exaggerated, this statement[57] evinces a clear tendency on the part of various firms from Augsburg and Nuremberg to withdraw from Lisbon all through the 1520s. The Welsers and Fuggers, Augsburg's largest companies, also appear to have departed from Lisbon, but only temporarily, because years later they once again set up offices there, while, in the intervening years, maintaining contact with Portugal by way of their agencies in Antwerp and Seville[58].

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54 StadtAN, E 11/II, *FA Behaim*, Nr. 582,13: "(...) *ab Nimpt vnnd zuo Sebiliya zuo".*

55 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-44-4; Themudo Barata, 1971, doc. XIX.

56 On Conrad Peutinger (1465-1547) and the Portuguese Discoveries, see Lopes, 2007; Pohle, 2019, pp. 47-69.

57 Around 1522/23, at least three German companies were well-established in Lisbon: the Hirschvogels of Nuremberg, as well as the Herwarts and the Rems of Augsburg.

58 On the business dealings of the Fuggers and the Welsers, both in Portugal and overseas, during the 16th century, cf. Kellenbenz, 1990; Häberlein, 2016; Pohle, 2017.

3. Precious stones

After the late 1510s, some trading companies of Upper Germany, particularly the Hirschvogels of Nuremberg, changed their business strategy and started specializing in precious stones[59]. The growing interest of the Hirschvogel company in this economic sector contributed greatly to a sharper focus on Indian markets. Between 1517 and 1520, therefore, the Hirschvogels sent their commercial agents, Lazarus Nürnberger and Jörg Pock, to Asia. At the head of the Hirschvogel outpost in Lisbon in 1517 was Joachim Prunner from Berlin. Prunner specialized in buying precious stones in Portugal. According to his successor, Jörg Pock, these acquisitions reached a considerable volume[60]. Pock went to India in 1520. He worked for the Hirschvogels and the Herwarts of Augsburg at least until 1523 and remained on the Indian subcontinent until his death in 1529[61]. His commercial interests were primarily in precious stones. He travelled to the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara (Bisnaga in Portuguese written sources), "where a stone called diamond is appreciated"[62]. Pock was very impressed with the wealth of Bisnaga, where he lived from April to November 1521. Its capital, Vijayanagara, was one of the most important markets for precious stones in all of Asia. The management of the Hirschvogel company later confirmed that "Jörg Pock had sent from India a great many gemstones"[63]. Buying and selling precious stones played a major role in the business strategies of the Hirschvogels, and in the 1520s, it became the most profitable business branch for the company.

After Jörg Pock's departure for India, Friedrich Löner took over the position of factor for the Hirschvogels in Lisbon, where his presence until 1525 was documented (Schaper, 1973, p. 243). In 1524/25, he was aided (or substituted) by Christoph Spaigel of Nuremburg[64]. Apart from carrying out the usual functions in the Lisbon office, Löner was in charge of estimating the value of the precious stones that Pock sent to the representatives of the Herwarts, because the Hirschvogels were entitled to a third of the profits on each piece[65]. The

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59 On the Hirschvogels and their connections in Portugal, see Schaper, 1970; 1973, pp. 205-251.

60 StadtAN, E 11/II, *FA Behaim*, Nr. 582,11c.

61 Stadtarchiv Augsburg (henceforth StadtAA), *Rst, Reihe "Kaufmannschaft und Handel", Akten*, Fasz. 4, Nr. 24/11.

62 StadtAN, E 11/II, *FA Behaim*, Nr. 582,14: "Narsingen (…), do der stein genandt demandt gefelt".

63 StadtAA, *Rst*, Reihe *"Kaufmannschaft und Handel", Akten*, Fasz. 4, Nr. 24/11, *apud* Schaper, 1973, p. 279: "(...) *etlich stayn do Jörg Pock aus yndia geschyckt*".

64 Cf. *Apontamentos para a História da Moeda em Portugal*, 1878, Mappa demonstrativa, n.º 6/1524; Godinho, 1985, vol. 3, p. 178.

65 StadtAA, *Rst, Reihe "Kaufmannschaft und Handel", Akten*, Fasz. 4, Nr. 24/11.

Hirschvogels remained in Lisbon until 1532. After that, there are no known records of the firm's activities in Portugal.

At the beginning of King John III's reign (1521-1557), the Herwarts intensified their business activity in Portugal. They dealt mostly in precious stones and pearls, and kept their Lisbon offices open until 1531[66]. At the same time, Jörg Herwart, a family member, specialized in the trade of precious stones, earning for himself a great reputation on the Iberian Peninsula. In 1511, the presence of Jörg Herwart in Lisbon is first documented as representing the Fuggers[67]. Between 1517 and 1524, he was among the German merchants who submitted silver to the *Casa da Moeda* (the National Mint) and who bought spices in the *Casa da Índia* (Godinho, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 197-199). He also owned a diamond cutting workshop on the outskirts of Lisbon, which became rather famous (Amburger, 1931, p. 230.) Herwart acquired the stones through his factor Jörg Imhoff, whom he had sent to India in 1526[68]. According to the historians Hermann Kellenbenz and Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, King John III allied himself with Herwart in the purchase of precious stones (Kellenbenz, 1960, p. 135; Godinho, 1985, vol. 3, p. 77). Godinho refers to 'Jorge Herwart' in 1531 as "a powerful capitalist from Augsburg […] involved in the sale of diamonds of exceptional value, sharing with the Portuguese Crown the monopoly of buying precious stones in India and importing them into Europe"[69]. At the same time, the Spanish ambassador, Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, negotiated with Herwart the acquisition of a large diamond which the Spanish Court greatly coveted[70].

In the following years, other German commercial agents moved to Portugal, and also Asia, in order to buy precious stones (Kellenbenz, 1990b; 1991). They

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66 Christoph von Stetten, the last representative in Lisbon of the Herwarts, liquidated the company's office in early 1531. On this merchant's stay in Portugal, see Haemmerle, 1955, pp. 57-64.

67 Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal / Lisbon, *Reservados*, Cód. 9820, fol. 21.

68 StadtAA, *Rst, Stadtgerichtsakten* 189, Fol. 387-395. Under a contract set up with Jörg Herwart in April of 1526, Jörg Imhoff served as Herwart's factor in India until August 1534. Imhoff was responsible for considerable business deals on the Indian subcontinent, particularly the purchase of precious stones and pearls, as well as the sale of metals and textiles.

69 Godinho, 1985, vol. 3, p. 210: "Em 1531 é um poderoso capitalista de Augsburg, Jorge Herwart (...) anda metido na venda de diamantes de excepcional valor, compartilhando com a coroa portuguesa o monopólio da compra de pedraria na Índia para importar para a Europa".

70 The negotiations showed how the trade of precious stones was a highly speculative activity. While Herwart's asking price was 160,000 *ducados* for the above-mentioned piece, Mendoza tried to push the price down to less than 100,000 *ducados*. See Kellenbenz, 1960, pp. 135-136, 140.

were, more often than not, employees of the German firms that had settled in Lisbon around 1530, as was the case of the Prunner-Rietwiesers, the Paurs of Nuremberg, and the Nuremberg branch of the Welsers. It was a time when we see a second generation of German firms establish themselves on Portuguese territory. This heralded the beginning of a new stage in Luso-German commercial relations.

4. Conclusion

As a result of the Portuguese Expansion, the turn of the 16th century was marked by a profound change in commercial relations between Portugal and Germany. While Luso-German trade exchanges during the Late Middle Ages were dominated by the Hansa, new protagonists and products emerged in the late 15th century. Madeiran sugar, surpassing Mediterranean sugar in both quality and quantity, was one of the foremost overseas goods to be found in the Holy Roman Empire. Once it arrived in Bruges and Antwerp, the sugar produced in Portugal's Atlantic colonies (Madeira, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé) was distributed throughout central and northern Europe. Particularly prominent among the German merchants who commercialized this luxury product were those from Cologne and Upper Germany, notably the Welsers of Augsburg.

This scenario changed once more, and profoundly, with the opening of the Cape Route to India, resulting in the arrival of the coveted Asian spices in Lisbon. In the early 1500s, the large German firms, located almost exclusively in Augsburg and Nuremberg, decided to send their agents to Lisbon in order to enter into direct negotiations with the Portuguese Crown regarding overseas trade. After 1503, and attracted primarily by Indian pepper, several companies from Upper Germany founded the first German outposts in Lisbon. As part of his expansion policies, King Manuel I soon realized that the German merchant bankers might be able to play a fundamental role as investors and suppliers of precious metals. At that time, they dominated the European market for copper and silver, both so indispensable to the commercial exchanges in the regions of the Indian Ocean. Between 1503 and 1511, therefore, King Manuel I granted the Germans the most favourable privileges ever awarded to foreign merchants in Portugal in the entire 16th century (Amaral, 1965; Rau, 1970). The so-called "Privilege of the Germans" reveals the exceptional status of German companies in Portugal who, in the first two decades of the 16th century, made substantial purchases of pepper and other oriental spices. Only from the 1520s onwards did

precious stones acquire more commercial importance for some firms from Upper Germany than spices did.

The decline in trade of the German firms in Lisbon around 1520, in turn, was precipitated by various contributing factors. One was King Manuel I's decision to sell pepper and other oriental spices almost exclusively in Antwerp. This meant that it was no longer imperative for German companies to maintain their Lisbon offices in order to negotiate spice contracts. What's more, the sale of metals, as well as that of sugar, had always been carried out in Antwerp. In the 1520s, however, Antwerp went through a critical stage as a result of the French-Habsburg conflict, which jeopardized trade in the region (Häberlein, 2010, p. 341). Simultaneously, Seville became the most important port for overseas commerce on the Iberian Peninsula, while Venice, in the following decade, also began to gain renewed momentum in the spice trade.

While the interests of many companies from Upper Germany in the commercial exchanges with the Portuguese Crown lost their permanence over the 16th century, the economic contact of the Hanseatic League with Portugal, in contrast, proved to be longer-lasting. Their relations had a long tradition and were mainly based on the exchange of domestically-produced goods; they also depended less on overseas products. Given that trade between the Hansa and Portugal did not suffer big oscillations in the context of the sensitive Asian spice market, Luso-Hanseatic business remained relatively stable, even though it never reached the volume of business between King Manuel I and the firms of Upper Germany. In this way, economic relations between the Hansa and Portugal transitioned from the 16th into the 17th century, taking on great importance during the Iberian Union (1580-1640)[71].

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[71] Regarding commercial relations between the Hansa and Portugal in the late 16th century and the first half of the 17th century, cf. Schumacher, 1892; Meier, 1937; Rau, 1951; Jeannin, 1975; Oliveira Marques, 1987, pp. 17-22.

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6. Curriculum vitae

Jürgen Pohle, born in Trier (Germany), studied History and Geography at the Albertus-Magnus-University in Cologne. His PhD deals with *Deutschland und die überseeische Expansion Portugals im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (Münster 2000). In 2000 he became Assistant Professor for Economic and Social History on the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (2000-06) and the Universidade Atlântica in Oeiras (2000-14). Since 2009 he is "integrated researcher" at the Centre for the Humanities (CHAM, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa).
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Connected Histories: South German Merchants and Portuguese Expansion in the Sixteenth Century[1]

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Abstract
German merchant companies reacted quickly to the Portuguese discovery of the maritime route to Asia. This essay argues that their participation in Portuguese expansion remained important until the mid-sixteenth century but underwent significant change during that time. While the intercontinental spice trade was declared a crown monopoly by King Manoel I, Germans obtained spices from Portuguese agents in Lisbon and Antwerp, invested in the Atlantic sugar economy, and purchased precious stones in Portugal and India. The connected histories of German merchant firms and Portuguese expansion involved multilateral trade networks and initiated processes of cultural transfer.

Keywords
Commercial networks; Spice trade; Sugar trade; Portuguese overseas expansion.

Resumo
As casas comerciais da Alta Alemanha reagiram rapidamente à descoberta portuguesa do caminho marítimo para a Ásia pela Rota do Cabo. Este artigo defende que a participação destas companhias alemãs na Expansão Portuguesa manteve a sua importância até meados do século XVI, mas passou por mudanças significativas durante esse período. Enquanto o comércio intercontinental de especiarias era declarado monopólio da Coroa portuguesa por D. Manuel I, os alemães obtinham especiarias de agentes portugueses em Lisboa e Antuérpia, investiam na economia açucareira atlântica e adquiriam pedras preciosas em Portugal e na Índia. As ligações das sociedades mercantis alemãs com a Expansão Portuguesa criaram redes de comércio multilaterais, iniciando processos de intercâmbio cultural.

Palavras-chave
Redes comerciais; comércio de especiarias; comércio do açúcar; Expansão portuguesa.

[1] An earlier version of this essay has been presented as the opening lecture of the conference "Novas fronteiras, novas culturas. O impacto económico da Expansão Portuguesa na Europa (seculos XIV–XVII)", organized by Nunziatella Alessandrini and Jürgen Pohle at the Universidade Nova in Lisbon on November 24, 2016.

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Introduction. 1. New sources for a history of the Welser Company. - 2. Pepper and sugar: The Welser Company and Portuguese overseas expansion. - 3. The Welser Company and the Portuguese Empire at mid-century. - 4. Conclusion. - 5. Bibliography. - 6. Curriculum vitae.

Introduction

The economic and cultural relations between southern Germany and Portugal in the sixteenth century are a well-tilled field. Historiographical interest in the German contribution to Portugal's overseas expansion at the dawn of the modern era began around 1900 with the work of scholars like Konrad Häbler (1903) and Jean Denucé (1909). It has continued throughout the twentieth century, with important studies coming from Hermann Kellenbenz (1960; 1974; 1990) and Walter Großhaupt (1990), and it has yielded the more recent contributions of Jürgen Pohle (2000) and Yvonne Hendrich (2007). While older studies were partly motivated by a desire to uncover the origins of German engagement on a global scale – a highly pertinent theme in the age of Emperor Wilhelm II, when Germany was striving to become a world power –, scholars working on the topic in recent decades have been more interested in processes of cultural transfer and "proto-globalization" (Walter, 2014, pp. 51-72). As a result of more than a century of scholarship, archives and libraries in Nuremberg, Augsburg, Lisbon and elsewhere have been mined intensively for relevant materials; royal privileges, letters, autobiographies, travel narratives and business accounts have been carefully studied for evidence on German-Portuguese relations.

On the basis of these works, the outline of the economic and cultural ties between German cities and Portugal is well-established by now. News about Vasco da Gama's opening of a sea route to India reached the commercial centers of southern Germany shortly after the return of the Portuguese fleet in 1499 and initiated a flurry of activity there. While Portugal rapidly replaced Venice as the major supplier of Asian spices to western European markets, German merchants were able to supply silver and copper from central European mines that were indispensable items of exchange for Portuguese overseas trade. Philipp Robinson Rössner has emphasized that as much as two-thirds of central Europe's copper and silver production may have been siphoned off to Portugal during the first four decades of the sixteenth century,

resulting in a massive currency shortage and causing deflationary tendencies in the Holy Roman Empire (Robinson Rössner, 2012, pp. 251-310).

In quick succession, merchant companies from Augsburg and Nuremberg obtained commercial privileges from the Portuguese crown (Denucé, 1909) and opened branch offices in Lisbon from 1503 onwards. Their activities culminated in the participation of six German firms in Francisco de Almeida's India fleet in 1505. After King Manoel I had declared the spice trade a royal monopoly in 1506, German firms like the Fugger, Welser, Herwart and Höchstetter companies of Augsburg as well as the Imhoff and Hirschvogel companies of Nuremberg lingered on. They purchased spices in the Casa da India, marketed central European metals, engaged in the diamond trade (which remained open to private merchants), and looked out for commercial opportunities in the sugar, fruit, wine, and ivory trades. Together with German artisans and soldiers (who are much less prominent in the sources than merchants), the trading companies' representatives formed an active 'national' community in the Portuguese capital and participated in the activities of the brotherhood of St. Bartholomew[2].

During the 1520s and 30s, however, a combination of factors caused most German merchant companies to withdraw from Lisbon. These included the recovery of the traditional Levantine spice route via Venice (Lane, 1968, pp. 47-58; Williamson - O'Rourke, 2009, pp. 655-684) legal suits initiated against the large companies in German imperial courts on charges of monopolizing the spice trade and garnering outrageous profits (Mertens, 1996); repeated epidemics in the Portuguese capital, which took the lives of several young merchants; and the opening of the Spanish American trade, which made Seville look like an attractive alternative to Lisbon. Most scholars agree that economic relations between southern German cities and the Portuguese capital were rather sporadic and largely stagnant during the middle decades of the sixteenth century before experiencing a revival when the Portuguese crown adopted a new system of monopoly spice contracts with groups of private investors in the 1570s (Pohle, 2000, pp. 255-272; Kalus, 2010; Mathew, 1997).

Occasionally, however, new sources still become available and enable us to refine and modify this established narrative. Exactly this happened when remnants from business ledgers and journals of one of the large German merchant firms, the Welser Company of Augsburg, came to light in several German archives and libraries (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014). This essay uses

[2] For a good survey of these developments, see Pohle, 2000, pp. 97-188. On the brotherhood, see Schickert - Denk, 2010.

these business accounts to suggest some modifications to the standard account of German-Portuguese business relations. More particularly, it argues that the two major branches of Portuguese overseas commerce, the Asian spice trade and the Atlantic sugar trade, were more intimately connected than is generally recognized. Moreover, it intends to show that commercial relations between Augsburg and Lisbon were livelier in the middle decades of the sixteenth century than is often assumed. Before examining their participation in Portuguese expansion in more detail, however, a few remarks about the nature of the sources and on the history of the Welsers of Augsburg seem appropriate.

1. New sources for a history of the Welser Company

For a long time, the Welser Company of Augsburg has been recognized as the second largest commercial enterprise in sixteenth-century central Europe after the Fugger Company. Despite its prominence in the annals of southern German trade, however, research on the Welsers' commercial activities has been sketchy since the firm's archives were disbanded after its bankruptcy in 1614. As paper was a valuable raw material, the business ledgers and journals were handed over to bookbinders, who maculated the books and recycled them in order to reinforce bindings. Naturally, these bookbinders paid no attention to the documents' original contexts and cut the pages to suit their purposes. When fragments of the Welsers' account books came to light during restoration work on bindings in various libraries and archives, economic historians immediately recognized their potential value. Nevertheless, due to the difficulties associated with interpreting and contextualizing these fragmentary records, the analysis did not proceed beyond a very general appreciation of their significance. Following previous abortive attempts by Jakob Strieder, Karl Rossmann, Götz Freiherr von Pölnitz and Hermann Kellenbenz, Peter Geffcken and I were eventually able to edit all known fragments of the Welsers' account books from 1496 – the year when the company of "Anton Welser, Konrad Vöhlin and Associates" was formed – to 1551 – the year in which Anton Welser's son Bartholomäus withdrew from the management of the company's affairs. On 530 pages of edited documents, which have survived as remnants of almost forty different account books, the publication contains an abundance of new material on all aspects of the Welsers' business activities. These include the firm's interior organization, personnel, finances, monetary transactions and

movements of goods[3]. In addition, substantial fragments of a general account book from the 1550s, when the Welser Company was headed by Bartholomäus Welser's son Christoph, were edited by Sven Schmidt and published in 2015 (Schmidt, 2015). The publication of all surviving internal business accounts of the Welser firm from 1496 to 1560 enables scholars to study the commercial strategies of one of the largest southern German merchant companies of the Renaissance era much more thoroughly than has hitherto been possible.

In its early years, the firm was labelled "Anton Welser, Konrad Vöhlin and Associates" and was run from two headquarters in the Swabian imperial cities of Augsburg and Memmingen. After Konrad Vöhlin's death in 1511, however, Augsburg emerged as the sole headquarters. While the company had no fewer than eighteen associates who hailed from ten different families in 1508, a concentration process set in during the following decade, and the company was run by a small circle of four to six associates from 1517 onwards. Originally the company's mainstay was the export of textiles, especially linen and fustian, from southern Germany and adjacent parts of Switzerland. No less than ten of the seventeen branch offices established before 1500 were located in the region between the city of Nuremberg and Lake Constance. During the following three decades, however, the firm's managers oversaw a remarkable geographic expansion. While merely seven offices existed outside the firm's southern German core area around 1500 – in Frankfurt on the Main, Cologne, Milan, Venice, Antwerp, Lyons and Vienna – additional offices were subsequently opened in Italy (Genoa, Rome, L'Aquila, Bari) and on the Iberian Peninsula. Thus the Welsers established branch offices in Lisbon in 1503, in Saragossa a few years later, at the Spanish court (which did not yet have a fixed location but moved between various cities) around 1520, and in Seville in the late 1520s. Whereas the other leading Augsburg company, the Fugger firm, largely focused on the production and marketing of silver and copper as well as on loans to European princes[4], the Welsers traded a wide variety of goods, including textiles, spices (especially pepper and saffron), metals, leather, dyestuffs, furs, wax, soap and foodstuffs. It was only during the 1520s, under the leadership of Bartholomäus Welser, that the company began to invest larger sums into mining ventures, particularly the extraction of copper and tin from the mines of Saxony and Bohemia. Following the election of King Charles I of Spain as Emperor Charles V in 1519, which the Welsers had helped to finance, the firm

[3] Geffcken – Häberlein, 2014. The documents, their locations, and previous attempts to edit them are described in detail in the introduction to this volume.

[4] For a survey, see Häberlein, 2012.

also became a major creditor of the Spanish crown. In Lyons, where the company engaged in a long and fruitful cooperation with the local firm of the Salviati group of Florence, they invested large sums in French crown finances as well. As a result of these ventures, the Welsers' geographical focus shifted to western and southern Europe (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. XXXII-LII)[5].

A unique feature of the Welser Company was its consistent pursuit of commercial opportunities outside Europe. While other Augsburg and Nuremberg firms participated in overseas ventures only sporadically (Kellenbenz, 1978, pp. 45-59; Bernecker, 2000, pp. 185-218; Häberlein, 2014, pp. 19-38), the Welsers did so regularly and on a grand scale. Thus they opened their Lisbon office in 1503 with the clear intention to take an active part in the East India trade. When six mercantile firms from Augsburg and Nuremberg were permitted to fit out three ships of Francisco de Almeida's East India fleet in 1505, the Welser-Vöhlin Company contributed 20,000 cruzados to the venture – more than the other German companies combined (Großhaupt, 1990, pp. 366-375; Pohle, 2000, pp. 99-104). After Charles V had opened his overseas possessions to non-Castilian businessmen in 1525, the Welser Company was the first German firm to send its own employees across the Atlantic and establish an outpost on the island of Española. Two years later the company's representatives contracted with the Spanish crown for the colonization of Venezuela, the shipment of 4,000 African slaves to America, and the recruitment of fifty Saxon miners for Spain's overseas colonies. The Augsburg merchant house agreed to build three fortresses, settle at least 600 colonists in two towns, govern its South American colony, and Christianize the natives. The Welsers' local representatives, however, quickly turned the Venezuela venture into a purely military enterprise whose sole purpose became the conquest of an indigenous empire and the plundering of precious metals. The German governors and captains-general led their troops into the vast interior plains and rain forests of Venezuela and Colombia, while subaltern officers raided indigenous slaves in the coastal areas. Meanwhile, other economic opportunities like mining, plantation agriculture and pearl-fishing remained largely unexplored. Consequently the Spanish crown suspended the Welsers' rights to Venezuela provisionally in 1546 and, after lengthy lawsuits, definitely in 1556[6]. In the era of the Portuguese spice contracts after 1570, however, it was

[5] On the company's loans to the Spanish crown, see Großhaupt, 1987, pp. 158–188. On their cooperation with the Salviati Company in Lyons, see Lang, 2020.

[6] On the Welsers' involvement in the conquest of Venezuela and the Atlantic slave trade, see Großhaupt, 1990, pp. 1-35; Denzer, 2005; Simmer, 2000; Häberlein, 2016, pp. 116–130.

once again the Welser Company which sought to benefit from the crown's policy of granting monopoly leases to private investors. From 1586 to 1592, the firm participated in the contracts that leased the shipment of spices from India to Portugal and their distribution in Europe to mercantile consortia (Kalus, 1997).

2. Pepper and sugar: The Welser Company and Portuguese overseas expansion

As this brief survey indicates, the spice trade was of crucial importance to the Welser Company. Like other German merchant firms, the Welsers primarily imported Indian pepper from Venice in the years around 1500. From 1505 onwards, however, the firm shifted its pepper trade quite abruptly to Lisbon and Antwerp. The commercial metropolis in the Netherlands became the central hub from which the company distributed the coveted spice in central Europe, especially through the Frankfurt and Leipzig fairs and the Nuremberg market[7]. The Portuguese discovery of the sea route to India, therefore, is closely reflected in the Augsburg firm's reorientation from Venice to the Lisbon–Antwerp axis, while pepper imports via Venice dwindled to insignificance (Häberlein, 2014a, pp. 49-52). For the period from 1505 to 1550, the Welsers' business accounts, which can be supplemented by public records from the city of Antwerp (Doehaerd, 1962-63) reveal a steady flow of spices from Lisabon via Antwerp to western and central European markets.

A few examples may serve to illustrate the scale and organization of this trade: In 1510, "Anton Welser, Konrad Vöhlin and Associates" arranged the shipment of twenty bales of pepper from Antwerp to Geneva via Lyons (Gascon, 1960, p. 661). Four years later, their representatives in Lisbon loaded twenty bales of pepper on two ships destined for Antwerp. Both transports shipwrecked, but the Augsburg firm had insured the cargo and ordered its Antwerp office to collect the insurance premium. In 1525, the Welsers' Lisbon office sent letters of exchange to the amount of 17,000 cruzados to Antwerp, where the firm's representatives were to pay the sum to the Portuguese royal agent João Brandão. The business accounts identify these transfers as partial payment for 21,000 *quintais* of pepper, for which the German firm had contracted with agents of the Portuguese crown (Geffcken – Häberlein, 2014, pp. 77, 245; Häberlein, 2014a, pp. 53, 56).

[7] On the role of German merchants in Antwerp, see Harreld, 2004.

Other spices were less important for the company's trade in quantitative terms, but underscore its sustained interest in exploring new trade routes and commercial opportunities. As is well known, the establishment of the Portuguese *Carreira da India* also increased the supply of Asian spices like cloves, ginger, mace, nutmeg and cinnamon on European markets, and the Welsers played an important role in the marketing of these exclusive goods in central Europe. One of the most spectacular entries in the company's business journals, which dates from early 1515, refers to four ships from Malacca, one of them laden with goods for the Augsburg firm. On this ship, the Welser employees in Lisbon received 54 hundredweight of nutmeg, nine hundredweight of mace, eight hundredweight of ginger and four hundredweight of cinnamon along with quantities of tin and musk. As the south-eastern Asian trading emporium of Malacca had been conquered by the Portuguese only in 1511, the Augsburg firm had apparently seized the occasion to participate in an overseas commercial venture that was just beginning to unfold, thus exploring fresh opportunities for profit (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, p. 78; Häberlein, 2014a, p. 53).

In later years the Welser Company abstained from direct involvement in trade with the Indian Ocean and confined itself to purchasing large quantities of Asian spices in Portugal. In 1518, for example, their Lisbon office bought 250 hundredweight of cloves from the Portuguese king's agents at the *Casa da India* for the sizable sum of 22,500 *cruzados*. Payment for this transaction was handled by the company's office in Antwerp and the Flemish agent of the Portuguese king, Francisco Pessoa. Transactions registered by the firm's Leipzig and Nuremberg branches in the summer of 1518 show that large amounts of Asian spices continued to reach central Europa via Antwerp at the time. In early 1528, the Welsers' representative in Frankfurt, Jakob Neuhaus, stored quantities of nutmeg, mace, cinnamon and cloves in his vault (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 85, 94, 144).

Lucas Rem, the Welser employee who had set up the company's Lisbon office and overseen preparations for its participation in the India fleet of 1505, tells us in his autobiographical account that he pursued a wide range of commercial opportunities in Portugal: he marketed grain, metals, textiles and manufactured goods and purchased fruits, wine, olive oil, cotton and ivory. According to his own account, Rem also engaged in trade with Madeira, the Azores and the North African coast during his first tenure in Lisbon, which lasted from 1503 to 1508 (Greiff, 1861, p. 9). A particularly important commercial item in this context was sugar. While direct access to Asian spice markets was an important motive for the opening of a maritime route to India,

the rising demand for sugar drove European economic activities in the Atlantic basin. Recent research has emphasized the crucial importance of sugar for the emergence of the Atlantic plantation complex along with the multinational character of the European sugar trade. In the sixteenth century, the sugar business was organized by Italian, Flemish and German merchants as well as by Iberian investors (Everaert, 1991; 2001; Schwartz, 2004; Ebert, 2008). The commercial activities of the Welser firm reflect the expansion of the Atlantic sugar economy in considerable detail (Häberlein, 2015).

In 1507, Lucas Rem's brother Hans traveled to Madeira on the Welser-Vöhlin Company's behalf in order to survey local business opportunities and make sugar purchases. Hans Rem was probably identical with the João de Agusta who was present there in the following year. By late 1509, the company had established its own office in the town of Funchal. Jürgen Pohle has suggested that the record sugar harvest of almost 3,000 tons on the island of Madeira in 1506 may have prompted the Welsers to extend their activities there (Haebler, 1903, pp. 30-31; Pohle, 2000, pp. 104-105). But the Augsburgers' growing involvement in the Madeira sugar trade was intimately connected with their investment in the East India trade as well. After Francisco de Almeida's fleet had returned in 1506, King Manoel I had seized the pepper cargo on the three ships financed by the German and Italian merchant houses – a drastic measure which intended to stabilize the pepper price on European markets, but which provoked strong protests from the foreign merchants. After years of negotiation and litigation, Lucas Rem eventually managed to sign a contract with Manoel I in which the Welser-Vöhlin firm agreed to sell 475 out of the 2,200 *quintais* of pepper imported from India in 1506 to the crown for 22 cruzados per *quintal*. Instead of paying in cash, however, King Manoel assigned 12,000 *arrobas* of Madeira sugar to the firm. In effect the Portuguese crown, which was entitled to a portion of the island's sugar production in lieu of tithes and tax payments, signed these over to the company at a bargain price of less than one cruzado per *arroba*, thus providing the Augsburg firm with an enticing opportunity for profit. The actual quantities of Madeira sugar which the Welser-Vöhlin agents received between 1508 and 1510, however, fell almost 3,000 *arrobas* short of the stipulated amount (Haebler, 1903, pp. 23, 30; Großhaupt, 1990, pp. 384-386; Pohle, 2000, p. 104).

While the Welser-Vöhlin Company shipped some Madeira sugar to Antwerp, a large portion was apparently marketed in Italy, which consumed about half of Madeira's production during the first half of the sixteenth century (Everaert, 1991, p. 110). In May 1509, Anton Welser the Younger, who represented the Welser-Vöhlin Company in Lyons at the time, mentioned in his

correspondence with the Lanfredini Company of Florence that he was sending them 80 crates of sugar via the French ports of Marseille and Aigues-Mortes. Lanfredini's agents were requested to sell the sugar profitably for their Augsburg partners, and Anton Welser suggested that similar transactions might be repeated in the future. Some sugar was shipped to Pera, a Levant port near Constantinople. When Giuliano Pitti, a Florentine trader who resided in Pera, failed to pay for a sugar shipment, the Welsers asked the Lanfredini Company for assistance in recovering the debt (Tewes, 2011, pp. 662-663).

In addition, Anton Welser and his associates turned their attention to another emerging center of Atlantic sugar production, the Canary Islands. While the company did not yet maintain an office in Seville, their Lisbon representatives were in frequent contact with Piero Rondinelli, a Florentine resident of the Andalusian city with close ties to the Portuguese and Spanish Atlantic islands, from 1509 onward[8]. In the same year Hans Egelhoff acquired one of the largest sugar plantations on the island of La Palma for the Welser-Vöhlin Company (Vieira, 2004, p. 47).

In September 1509, Lucas Rem ventured out from Lisbon to Madeira, where he and two fellow employees recruited laborers, craftsmen and servants and took them to La Palma. Rem spent only a few days there, but he was obviously disillusioned about the state of affairs there. He referred to the Welsers' plantation as a 'cursed land', which would require many years of capital and labor input before it might eventually become profitable. Anxious to leave the Canary Islands before the onset of winter, Rem quickly inspected the books and hastened back to Madeira, leaving his colleague Hans Egelhoff "with numerous other people" behind. In Funchal, Lucas Rem and his fellow employee Jacob Holzbock, who accompanied him on the voyage, met two other Welser representatives, Johann Schmidt and Leo Ravensburger, whom Rem accused of mismanagement and leading a dissolute lifestyle. Rem set up Holzbock as the new head of the company's office and became involved in a dispute with royal officials on the island – presumably about the consignment of sugar which the Augsburg merchant company expected to receive on the king's account (Greiff, 1861, pp. 12-13; Haebler, 1903, p. 32). In 1513, the Welser Company decided to sell its land on La Palma to the Cologne merchant Johann Byse and his son-in-law Jakob Groenenberg for 11,000 Rhenish florins. Groenenberg (named Jácome de Monteverde in Spanish sources) was a native of Antwerp who had represented his father-in-law in Lisbon since 1502. Shortly before the sale, the

[8] On Rondinelli, see Varela, 1988, pp. 109–125. On his contacts with the Welser Company, see *Ibi*, p. 122; Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, p. 77.

Welser Company had obtained a royal confirmation for this property, describing it as a landed estate endowed with water rights and equipped with a sugar mill (Gramulla, 1972, p. 327; Fernández-Armesto, 1982, pp. 167, 219; Everaert, 1991, pp. 109, 114).

While scholars have long presumed that the Welser office in Funchal existed only for a brief time period, the business journal kept by the firm's Augsburg headquarters in 1514-1515 reveals that its representatives remained on the island for several years. According to this document, "our people on Madeira" had sent twenty-five crates of sugar to Flanders on the ship *Misericordia* in September 1512. As the vessel was shipwrecked, the Welser agent in Valencia, the Italian Cesare Barzi[9], who had insured the cargo for 300 ducats, was requested to collect the sum insured and forward it to the company's office in Saragossa. Moreover, the Welser office in Funchal shipped barrels of sweetened and preserved fruits (*conserva*), an important by-product of sugar production on Portugal's Atlantic islands, to Lisbon and Antwerp for the private accounts of employees and relatives. According to entries in the business journal of the Augsburg headquarters dating from February 1515, Leo Ravensburger, whom Lucas Rem had mentioned in his autobiographical account in 1510, continued to represent the Welser firm on the island of Madeira. Thus Ravensburger helped out a man named João Cassall with a loan of 20,000 *reais* and left several old pieces of furniture behind when he returned to Lisbon. These entries indicate that the company probably closed its office in Funchal sometime in 1514 (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 74-76). By that time, the decline of Madeira's sugar production, which fell by half between 1506 and 1520, had already set in (Everaert, 1991, pp. 109-110; Vieira, 2004, p. 48; Blackburn, 1997, p. 109) and it was apparently no longer profitable for the German mercantile company to retain a direct presence on the island.

The references to *conserva* in these accounts points to another item of consumption that was popular among the social elites of Renaissance Europe: fruits from the Mediterranean or the Atlantic islands which were preserved in sugar or syrup (Stols, 2004, pp. 240-250, 259). Fragmentary Welser business journals dating from 1515 mention the shipment of sweetened fruits from Madeira to Lisbon and from there to Antwerp. Ten years later, the company's representatives in Lisbon outfitted a ship for the Algarve coast, where the vessel loaded a quantity of figs. In Antwerp, the firm's employees sold the entire shipload to the merchant-banker Erasmus Schetz. In the same year three small

[9] On Barzi and his relations with Lisbon, see Guidi Bruscoli, 2014, pp. 69-71, 123-129, 147-153.

barrels of preserved fruit were shipped from Lisbon to the Low Countries (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 108, 111).

In sum, these business records show that the Welser Company of Augsburg pursued the Asian spice trade and the Atlantic sugar trade as interconnected, complementary activities. The Portuguese king's decision to satisfy the firm's claims to pepper imports from the India fleet of 1505 with Madeira sugar paved the way for the establishment of a Welser office in Funchal. Subsequently, the firm's representatives in Lisbon handled shipments of sugar from Madeira and the Canary Islands simultaneously with transports of spices purchased in the *Casa da India*. While Antwerp emerged as the major hub for the marketing of products from the Portuguese Empire in western and central Europe, the evidence on sales of Madeira sugar to the Levant points to the fact that alternative distribution channels existed as well. The Welser business papers thus suggest that we should see European commercial expansion to Asia and the emergence of the Atlantic plantation economy not as separate, but as connected histories[10].

3. The Welser Company and the Portuguese Empire at mid-century

The second argument which this essay proposes is that southern German merchants' involvement in Portuguese commercial expansion was more sustained than many scholars have thought. To be sure, the Welser Company's presence on the island of Madeira lasted only five years, and by the 1520s its focus had clearly shifted towards commercial opportunities in Spain and Spanish America. Still, despite the fragmentary nature of the sources, there is sufficient evidence in support of a continuous engagement of the Augsburg firm in the Portuguese trade to suggest that the Lisbon–Antwerp axis, which had been so important for southern German trade in the first three decades of the sixteenth century, subsequently retained much of its vitality.

In February 1532, the Welser office in Antwerp bought fifty sacks of high-grade and three sacks of low-grade pepper from the Portuguese merchant Diego Mendes. The Augsburg firm paid 1,552 Flemish pounds for this large consignment (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, p. 257; Häberlein, 2014a, p. 57). While this transaction might suggest that Lisbon had lost its importance as a direct supplier and that the Welsers confined themselves to purchases from Portuguese merchants in Antwerp, another business deal from the same period

[10] On the concept of 'connected histories', see Subrahmanyam, 1997 and 2007.

indicates the ongoing importance of the Lisbon–Antwerp axis[11]. In the early 1530s, the Augsburg firm formed a joint venture with the German merchant Joachim Pruner and the Fleming Antoine de Lannoy for the purchase of West African pepper and mixed Iberian wine in Lisbon. The records show that the partnership imported so-called malaguetta pepper on a fairly large scale – in 1532, the Welsers settled accounts for more than eighty sacks – and that they outfitted a ship for this trade in the Dutch port of Flushing (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, pp. 259-260; Strieder, 1962, pp. 61-63; Häberlein, 2014a, p. 58).

In addition to sugar and spices, the trade in Indian diamonds attracted German merchants to Lisbon. While the Welsers were less active in this field than Jörg Herwart, a major Augsburg-born diamond trader who had taken up residence in Lisbon (Kellenbenz, 1990a and 1991, pp. 90-96; Johnson, 2008, pp. 182-183) they did invest in precious stones as well. In the early 1540s, Bartholomäus Welser's representative in Lisbon, Konrad Stuntz, drew 1,800 ducats on the firm's account for purchasing precious stones and gemming thirty rings with diamonds and rubies (Geffcken - Häberlein, 2014, p. 468).

For the period from 1554 to 1560, surviving fragments of a business ledger of the Christoph Welser Company of Augsburg document purchases of large quantities of Asian spices in both Venice and Antwerp (Schmidt, 2015, pp. 124-125, 142-144, 184-186, 278, 285, 344-345, 397, 424-425; Häberlein, 2014a, p. 60). This indicates that the firm reacted to the revival of the Levant route to Venice without giving up the Lisbon–Antwerp axis that had been of crucial importance for its prosperity in the first half of the sixteenth century. It appears that the company sought to benefit from the commercial rivalry between Portugal and Venice for the European spice market (Williamson - O'Rourke, 2009) and made purchases wherever they seemed most advantageous.

During these years, a German employee named Hans Heinrich Muntprot represented the Welser Company in Lisbon. According to the account which he sent to the head office for the business period ending in April 1554, twenty-five debtors owed the firm the huge sum of 188,200 Rhenish florins at the time. About three-fourths of this amount was due from the Portuguese royal treasurer João Gomes. Thus the Welser firm, which had largely withdrawn from its role as banker to the Spanish crown by the early 1550s (Großhaupt, 1987), had obviously shifted considerable amounts of capital from Spain to Portugal. In addition, Muntprot purchased sugar from the West African island of São Tomé in Lisbon, which he shipped to Antwerp. Moreover, he handled

[11] On the Lisbon–Antwerp axis in general, see Marques de Almeida, 1993.

exchange transactions between the Netherlands and Portugal, bought oil and preserved fruit for the private account of his employers, and renewed the company's commercial privileges in Portugal. In 1557, Muntprot netted a profit of almost 340 Rhenish florins from provision fees alone. Three years later, he apparently made the entire journey from Lisbon to Augsburg and back on the back of a mule. The account book of the Christoph Welser Company also reveals that other merchants from Augsburg and Nuremberg – Sebastian and Hieronymus Imhoff, Paul Neidhart, Hans and Marquard Rosenberger – were active in Lisbon during the 1550s (Schmidt, 2015, pp. 110, 162, 169, 230, 284, 309).

Finally, a surviving business ledger of the Christoph Welser Company's Nuremberg branch office for the years 1579–1580 demonstrates that imports from the Portuguese Empire remained important for the firm's commercial portfolio. During a one-year-period, large quantities of pepper and smaller amounts of mace, nutmeg and cloves were sold in Nuremberg for almost 21,000 Rhenish florins. While pepper was mostly imported via Lisbon and Hamburg, other Asian spices reached south Germans both via Venice and via the Lisbon–Hamburg axis (von Welser, 1917, vol. 2, p. 173; Häberlein, 2014a, pp. 60-61).

4. Conclusion

While the exchange of Asian spices for central European silver and copper was the backbone of German-Portuguese trade during the first half the sixteenth century, the evidence presented in this essay suggests that commercial relations between southern German cities and Portugal were more complex. They entailed considerable variety and flexibility, as mercantile companies supplemented the commerce in Asian spices with imports of Atlantic sugar, preserved fruits and African pepper, ventured into the diamond trade, and explored a range of other business options. While Antwerp, Venice, Lyons and Seville may have overshadowed the commercial importance of Lisbon in the mid-sixteenth century, German mercantile companies still found it worthwhile to retain a foothold in the Portuguese capital at the time.

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6. Curriculum vitae

Mark Häberlein is professor of early modern history at the University of Bamberg, Germany, where he has been teaching since 2004. He received his doctorate from the University of Augsburg in 1991 and completed his *Habilitation* at the University of Freiburg in 1996. His research focuses on long-distance migration, the religious and social history of early America, religious minorities and merchant communities in the early modern period.

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The Island Trade Route of São Tomé in the 16th Century: Ships, Products, Capitals*

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Abstract
The 'São Tomé *carreira*' was not just the route that connected Lisbon to the island at the Equator. It stretched along the west coast of Africa to Elmina, Congo, and Angola, and in another direction reached Central America and Brazil. In Europe, it had extensions to the Northern countries of the continent and reached the Italian markets in the Mediterranean. Although it survived beyond this period, it attained its peak in the century from roughly 1520 to 1620. What kept most parts of the route in movement was the trafficking of enslaved Africans, but during this period sugar trade (of which São Tomé and Príncipe became the world's largest producers) also played a major role.

Keywords
São Tomé island; 'carreira'; 16th century; enslaved Africans; Sugar.

Resumo
A 'carreira de São Tomé' não era apenas a rota que unia Lisboa à ilha do Equador. Prolongava-se pela costa ocidental de África até à Mina, ao Congo e a Angola e, noutra direcção, atingia a América Central e o Brasil. Na Europa, tinha extensões pelos países do Noroeste do continente e chegava às praças italianas do Mediterrâneo. Embora tenha sobrevivido para lá desse período, a sua época mais florescente durou cerca de um século, *grosso modo* entre 1520 e 1620. O que animava a maioria dos segmentos da 'carreira' era o tráfico de africanos escravizados, mas, durante o referido período, também o comércio do açúcar (de que São Tomé e Príncipe chegou a ser o maior produtor mundial) teve um papel decisivo.

Palavras-chave
Ilha de São Tomé; 'carreira'; século XVI; africanos escravizados; açúcar.

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As early as the 1500s, navigators knew the route as the 'São Tomé *carreira*', i.e., the São Tomé trade route. This term referred to what could be designated its 'central leg', linking Lisbon with the equatorial island of São Tomé. The *carreira* of São Tomé had, in fact, several branches, albeit of unequal flows: It extended to the western coast of Africa across from São Tomé, touched on the Niger delta, and from there extended to the coasts of Mina, the Congo, and Angola. In the western Atlantic, it spread to the Caribbean and Brazil. In Europe, it went northwards from Lisbon to the ports of Bruges, Antwerp, and Hamburg, and stretched southwards into the Mediterranean, serving, in particular, Seville, Genoa, and Venice. The 'lifespan' of the *carreira* essentially coincided with that of the sugar cycle on the island of São Tomé, i.e., from around 1520 to 1620. Throughout the rest of the 17th century, the relationship between Lisbon and São Tomé gradually decreased until it ceased altogether. With the exception of a few special cases, contact between Portugal and the island was, by then, via Brazil instead.

The *carreira* reached its commercial peak in the mid-16th century. It is not surprising that 'the pilots and masters of the *carreira* of São Tomé' should, at that very time, create a confraternity and brotherhood dedicated to Our Lady of Hope (*Nossa Senhora da Esperança*) in Lisbon, founded in 1524 and located right next to the church of the Convent of Our Lady of Mercy (*Nossa Senhora da Piedade*)[1].

1. Ships

The number of vessels that sailed between Portugal and São Tomé was relatively high. According to one memoir, written in 1554, the estimated annual number 'ranged between 30 and 40, and possibly more'[2]. Around 1585, the somewhat exaggerated calculation of the Portuguese cosmographer João Galego estimated that around 50 to 60 ships 'laden with sugar […] and many black slaves' arrived in Lisbon from São Tomé every year (Gallego, 1894, p. 13).

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1 Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (henceforth BNP), Reservados, Manusc. Ilustr. no 103, *Livro da Fundação, ampliação, & sitio do Conuento de N[ossa]. S[enho]ra da Piedade da Esperança*, fls. 7v-8.

2 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisboa (henceforth T.T.), *Corpo Cronológico*, I/94/28, 1554-11-22. Memoir sent to the King by Cristovão Nunes.

At around a similar date, the Portuguese trader Duarte Lopes, informer to Italian explorer Fillippo Pigafetta, stated that in 1578, the island produced enough sugar 'to fill 40 large carracks' (*grossas naus*) (Lopez-Pigafetta, 1951, p. 24), thus somewhat tempering the exaggerations of Galego's witness account. However, Duarte Lopes' description of the vessels should, it might be suggested, be read metaphorically, rather than literally, i.e., as an attempt to promote the island's sugar production, rather than refer to the actual tonnage of ships. This is supported by the fact that, unlike the large carracks that sailed for India, the vessels that plied the *carreira* of São Tomé were relatively small.

It is not always easy to determine the exact typology of these vessels, as the sources refer to them in relatively vague terms. In this regard, the least illuminating of terms is 'ship' (*navio*): *navio* can refer to anything from a very specific type of vessel of small or medium tonnage and common in the 16th and 17th centuries, to a vessel of any size. In fact, most of the Portuguese vessels linking São Tomé to Europe (Lisbon, Antwerp, Genoa, Venice, etc.) were small carracks that rarely exceeded 100 tons.

One sample, collected for the purposes of this chapter, is, alas, anything but conclusive. It comprises 25 vessels which, between 1530 and 1535, reported the goods they had loaded in São Tomé to the *Casa da Mina*: Thirteen of these vessels were unspecified 'ships'; nine were identified as carracks; two as caravels; and one as a *hourque*, or hulk, a type of sailing vessel built in Central Europe and used by Dutch and Hanseatic merchants (*nau* possibly bought in Flanders and probably with more tonnage than the usual ships that sailed this route[3]). The information relating to another sample of 112 vessels is a lot more specific: Between 1535 and 1548, these vessels, laden with sugar from São Tomé, paid a duty called *avaria* in the *Casa da Nação Portuguesa* in the port of Antwerp (Rau, 1971, pp. 13-16). Out of 112, 82 (73,2%) were carracks; 15 (13,4%) were 'ships'; 14 (12,5%) were caravels; and one was a small sailing vessel named *chalupa*. Leonor Freire Costa – who studied the relevant documentation originally compiled by Virgínia Rau, including a section hitherto unpublished – concludes that there was a predominance of vessels of between 70 and 100 tons (Costa, 1997, p. 115).

It is not difficult to explain this predominance: In sharp contrast to the Cape Route, navigation on the *carreira* of São Tomé occurred within a free system for Portuguese merchants, who were not subject to other constraints, such as the obligation to navigate in fleets. What's more, navigation was not conditioned by the calendar. The so-called 'anonymous navigator' indicates that while

[3] T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, part II, several documents.

February was the best month for sailing from Lisbon, ships departed 'at all times of the year', a statement supported by the documentation (Caldeira, 2000, p. 84). This, together with the relatively short voyages (approximately six weeks from Lisbon to São Tomé, and the same again for the return journey) attracted ship outfitters who, even without great financial means at their disposal, were able to invest in the transport of goods that circulated along the *carreira*. They therefore tended to opt for the construction and operation of vessels with small to medium tonnage. Furthermore, the fact that the great majority of these ships (in the general sense) were not equipped with artillery was yet another factor conducive to reducing operating costs even further. Their vessels being light, the masters and pilots counted on their ability for a swift, strategic escape in the event of an untimely encounter with corsairs.

In the years 1544, 1552, and 1558, successive royal orders were issued which ordered the 'carracks and ships' of the Atlantic routes to be 'armed with artillery and equipped with the necessary crew', but to little effect. Not even the heavy penalties – in 1558, offenders ran the risk of having their ships confiscated – were enough to induce ship outfitters with interests in the *carreira* of São Tomé to desist from sailing without artillery, or to reduce (at least officially) the tonnage of their vessels to less than 50 tons, which would have exempted them from the obligation to install artillery and a corresponding crew[4].

Even after King Sebastian's decree of 1571, compelling small ships (of more than 25 tons) to be equipped with artillery, ship masters continued to resist for two reasons: the costs of armaments as well as larger crews on the one hand, and reduced efficiency due to lower cargo capacity on the other. However, there are cases of compliance. In 1593, the six charterers of a carrack about to load sugar in São Tomé, destined for Hamburg (via Lisbon), demanded from master Francisco Pires Barcelos, a resident of Vila do Conde, that their vessel be 'equipped with artillery'[5]. These precautions on the part of ship charterers can be seen as a result of ever-increasing attacks by corsairs from northern Europe (England, Holland, and also France) in the last decades of the 16th century.

Where the ports of origin of ships that sailed the *carreira* of São Tomé can be identified, the ports of northern Portugal predominate. This demonstrates the capacity of shipyards in that region, as well as the dynamism of local ship outfitters, to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Atlantic trade.

Of 68 identified vessels laden with sugar from São Tomé and bound for Antwerp between 1539 and 1548, 52 (76,5%) were registered in ports north of

4 For all measures mentioned see Ferreira, 1997, pp. 331-392.

5 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 11*, 1593-9-3, fls. 85v-88.

the river Tagus (Vila do Conde, Porto, Azurara, Póvoa do Varzim, and Viana do Castelo), of which Vila do Conde was foremost with 31 ships originating in its harbours, almost half of the total number. Greater Lisbon, including Barreiro and Setubal, contributed a mere 13 ships (making it a modest 19%); the Algarve (Tavira and Lagos) contributed two, and the Azores one only (Rau, 1971, pp. 13-16[6]).

A 1552 register of merchant ships from the ports of northern Portugal confirms this, albeit less obviously so. Of three ports that were on the list (Matosinhos, Leça, and Aveiro), São Tomé does not figure as a destination at all; while in the Douro (Porto and Massarelos), only one out of 22 vessels was headed for the island. In Azurara, by contrast, the situation was very different: 10 out of 13 merchant vessels were bound for São Tomé. In Vila do Conde, 42 ships are mentioned, ten of which were in São Tomé, three in Lisbon, and six in Flanders. Another six were in ports in the Levant, and it is possible that a good many of those featured São Tomé in their logbooks, i.e., did trade with the island. In any case, Amélia Polónia asserts that throughout the second half of the 16th century, the navigators of Vila do Conde became increasingly sidelined because the ship masters of northern Europe took over maritime transport and thus supplanted the Portuguese (Polónia, 2000, p. 619).

In 1599, in fact, Flemish merchant *hourques*, authorised or not, can be seen headed for São Tomé[7]. Subsequently, in the first decades of the 17th century, only foreign vessels loaded the locally produced sugar from São Tomé (Serafim, 2000, p. 247, table 42). However, rather than attributing the waning interest to international competition, it could be argued that the progressive loss of interest of Portuguese ship outfitters in the *carreira* of São Tomé was instead a sign of the economic difficulties on the island after the end of the 16th century, making the journey to Europe unprofitable.

2. Products

2.1. Sugar

After a somewhat slow start to the industrial stage, sugar production in São Tomé developed very quickly in response to the rapid demand on the European markets (Caldeira, 2011, pp. 41-48). In 1517, only three working sugar

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6 The only thing we know for sure is the place of residence of the master, allowing us to deduce, despite some margin of error, the provenance of the vessel. Some of the vessels made more than one trip. The values indicated refer to vessel per voyage.

7 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7 A*, 1599-11-19, fls. 108 a 109v.

mills were recorded on the island[8]. Some 20 years later, a regular visitor mentioned as many as '60 sugar mills powered by water' (Caldeira, 2000, p.107), a number which kept increasing in subsequent decades[9].

Quantifying the actual production, however, is not an easy task. While the amount of sugar that entered the *Casa da Mina*[10] in Lisbon is known for certain years, the figures are far from constituting a continuous series; they also seem to refer to sugar production in the King's plantations only. Thus, between 21 May 1550 and 27 July 1554, the factors (*feitores*) of São Tomé sent 24,676 *arrobas*[11] of sugar[12] to the treasurer of the *Casa da Mina*. Between 10 August 1557 and 31 December 1560, in turn, the treasurer received 40,263 *arrobas* from the same source[13].

As for global production, and merely for illustrative purposes, the numbers suggested by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho are useful. According to his calculations, sugar production in 1528 slightly exceeded 123,000 *arrobas*; in 1535-1536, it stood at around 136,000 *arrobas*; at 150,000 *arrobas* in the mid-16th century; at around 175,000 *arrobas* in 1578; and at 200,000 *arrobas* in 1580 (Godinho, 1983, IV, pp. 96-97). Several known factors contributed to the sharp decline in sugar production after the year 1580. These include social instability (so-called 'runaway slaves' and subsequent insurrections); attacks by corsairs; as well as a serious blight that attacked the sugar cane. Production was also affected by ever-increasing competition from Brazilian sugar flooding the national market. Subsequently, São Tomé never again recovered its previous levels of sugar production.

The final *coup de grâce* to São Tomé's sugar-based economy was the decline of the sugar trade on the one hand, coupled with a sharp drop in its value as a result of both European and global recessions at the beginning of the 17th century on the other. Throughout the 1700s, therefore, sugar progressively lost its relevance as an export commodity.

Yet even during the years of its heyday, when it was leading the world market (Galloway, 2005, pp. 51 and 58-61), sugar from São Tomé never

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8 Letter from Bernardo Segura to the King, 1517-3-15, In P.de António Brásio, *Monumenta Missionaria Africana* (hereafter cited as *MMA*), I, 389.

9 In 1578, for example, there were 70 *engenhos* in operation (Lopez - Pigafetta, 1951, p. 24).

10 The *Casa da Mina* was a Portuguese state-run commercial organization that managed the trade in products from West Africa.

11 *Arroba* is a unit of weight equal to approximately 15 kilograms.

12 T.T., *Chancelaria de D. Sebastião e D. Henrique*, Privilégios, Livro 4, fls. 128-128v, Discharge letter to Álvaro Mendes, 1568-7-24.

13 T.T., *Chancelaria de D. Sebastião e D. Henrique*, Privilégios, Livro 9, fl. 84, Discharge letter to Jerónimo Rodrigues Correia, 1575-1-15.

overcame certain technical problems regarding the last stage of its production: The island's extremely humid climate impaired the drying of the 'sugarloaves', which meant that it was often necessary to resort to drying the sugar in stoves at the risk of it being spoiled by smoke. Even when this did not occur, however, sugar from the island never boasted the hardness and whiteness of Madeiran, or even Brazilian, sugar, and it could only be stored for very short periods of time without liquifying before being loaded.

In Lisbon in 1533, the King (who was, in fact, an interested party) had to intervene. He ordered that a city ordinance, which had been issued the previous year, be suspended. This ordinance had barred Lisbon's confectioners from using sugar from São Tomé in their confections and candied fruit because, unlike the sugar from Madeira, it was purported to be unhealthy (Rau, 1971, pp. 6-7).

The poorer quality, or at any rate, the inferior appearance of sugar from São Tomé, was clearly reflected in the price. In 1552-1553, on the market of Antwerp, one *arroba* of Madeiran sugar fetched six to eight florins, while the same weight of sugar from São Tomé fetched less than two florins (Rau, 1971, pp. 6-7). This marked difference persisted throughout the following decades. In 1578 in Flanders, one *arroba* of sugar from Madeira could fetch as much as 2,600 *réis*, compared with 630 *réis* for sugar from São Tomé; in 1582, the prices were 3,000 and 900 *réis* respectively (Azevedo, 1947, p. 249).

However, its markedly lower price, ironically, turned out to be a great competitive advantage for sugar from São Tomé, and it was favoured, therefore, by the markets of northern Europe. Between 1536 and 1550, of all ships entering the port of Antwerp laden with sugar, 59% came in from São Tomé[14]. In 1552-1553, 51% of sugar arriving in Antwerp came from São Tomé, 20% from Madeira, 10% from the Antilles, while 19% originated elsewhere (Everaert, 2002, pp. 198-199).

The Flemish in Antwerp, for example, recognised in the quality-price ratio an additional business opportunity. After having been refined, sugar from São Tomé matched that of sugar from other provenances in terms of market value; it therefore did not take the Flemish long to set up refineries in Antwerp: one in 1508, 12 between 1535 and 1539, and 24 in 1556 (*Ibi*, p. 200).

In northern Europe, apart from Antwerp, the cities of northern Germany also received sugar from São Tomé. In May 1593, the island's contractors (Rui Lopes, Heitor Rodrigues, and Baltasar Rodrigues de Chaves) chartered the patache vessel *Bom Jesus* from Tomé Dias with a view to transporting 2,200 *arrobas* of

[14] Of a total of 212 ships, 126 sailed with sugar from São Tomé, 88 of which with single cargoes, and 38 with mixed cargoes (Godinho, 1983, IV, 98).

sugar from São Tomé to Hamburg[15]. A few months later, in November 1593, Rodrigues de Chaves, together with several other partners, chartered the carrack *São João Baptista* in order to load 3,600 *arrobas* of sugar, destined once more for the port of Hamburg[16].

In the so-called 'places of the Levant' (*partes do Levante*, i.e., the Mediterranean), the major importers of sugar from São Tomé were from Genoa and Venice. The anonymous author of one of the accounts of voyages to the African coast – published by Giovanni Battista Ramusio in the book *Delle navigatione et viaggi* – was a pilot from Vila do Conde, who, in the first half of the 16th century, regularly sailed the route between São Tomé and Venice (Caldeira, *Viagens,* pp. 29-32). Likewise, a Milanese merchant residing in Portugal in the late 1580s by the name of Francesco Rovellasca, the brother of Giovan Battista, supplied Venice with sugar from São Tomé. As such, it seems that Rovellasca was associated with the Carnesecchi and Strozzi of Florence in the export business of sugar from São Tomé (Alessandrini, 2009, p. 278).

2.2. Enslaved Africans

At the time of the arrival of the Portuguese, the archipelago of São Tomé and Principe was not only uninhabited, but it was also known to be injurious to human health. In order to incentivise settlers to populate a territory like that, therefore, the only thing the Portuguese Crown had to offer were trade advantages with the western coast of Africa. However, since it had no intention of relinquishing the gold trade, which was centralized in São Jorge da Mina, and which the Crown considered an exclusive royal prerogative, little was left but to offer the traffic of enslaved persons.

To that effect, the King granted permission to trade 'in the five slave rivers beyond the fortress of São Jorge da Mina' (Marques, 1971, III, p. 646), extending his authorisation to any subject willing to upend and live in what was then the most remote territory the Portuguese had ever built on. With the royal charter of 1493, when the coast was better known, the area of Portuguese dominion seems to have been extended 'from the Rio Real [the common entrance to the New Calabar and Bonny rivers] and the island of Fernando Pó to the whole land of Manikongo' (*Ibi,* III, p. 423). However, the charter now excluded the 'slave rivers', i.e., the various branches of the Niger delta, which had, in the intervening years, been leased exclusively to the Florentine merchant banker

15 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 11*, 1593-3-29, fls. 63v-65.

16 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 11*, 1593-9-3, fls. 85v-88.

Bartolomeo Marchionni (Heers, 1971, II, p. 921; Guidi Bruscoli, 2014, pp. 118-119).

One of the main economic activities of São Tomé was to be the re-exportation of enslaved Africans to Portugal, as well as to São Jorge da Mina. After 1519, therefore, São Tomé became the sole exporter of enslaved persons to São Jorge da Mina (Vogt, 1973, pp. 453-467; Ballong-Wen-Mewuda, 1993, p. 338). At around 1519, it also became, alongside Cabo Verde, one of the suppliers of an enslaved workforce to the Spanish Antilles, following the Spanish Emperor Charles V's authorisation for enslaved Africans to be shipped directly from the Portuguese islands off the coast of Africa, without having to go through the *Casa de Contratación* in Seville. This, however, did not mean that he had exempted them from the required licenses (Cortés López, 2004, pp. 23-38).

As such, the shipment of enslaved captives to the Antilles followed strict rules. There is a documented reference to the 'Regiment of the Antilles', although it is not known if this was ever put in writing. According to this rule book, there should be twice as many enslaved men than women; none should be younger than 15 years; none older than 40; and all the so-called 'specimen' (*peças*) must be 'good and fleshy and heavy and chosen by the pilot [of the vessel they were boarding] and by two sworn men', after which the letter G (for Guinea) was to be branded on their right shoulder. In 1534, for example, having met all these conditions, the galleon *São Miguel* loaded 201 enslaved persons (134 men and 67 women) in the bay of São Tomé, to be delivered to André Ferreira, the royal factor in Santo Domingo[17]. The following year, three more ships left the island for Santo Domingo, with 671 enslaved persons on board, of which 94 perished during the journey[18].

While, initially, Lisbon was the principal destination for the trade in enslaved persons, it was, after 1520, surpassed by the Caribbean, and also by Mina. This did not mean that Lisbon lost its role as distribution centre of enslaved persons for Europe, as captives continued to be sent from the capital to the Mediterranean, especially to the south of Spain, but also to northern Europe, and in particular, to Antwerp[19].

Re-exportation of enslaved Africans from São Tomé to Lisbon, albeit with fluctuating numbers, was largely concentrated in the first half of the 16th century. This was a time when São Tomé was the main supplier of captive

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17 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /196/147, 1534-12-19.

18 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /205/13, 1535-12-1.

19 Jean Denucé, seemingly discounting Seville, claims that in the 16th century, Antwerp was, after Lisbon, the European city 'with the largest number of inhabitants of colour' (Denucé, 1937, p. 30).

laborers to metropolitan Portugal, as the ships that carried sugar and other goods to Lisbon filled up part of their hold with enslaved persons. It is important to note that the *carreira* of São Tomé never included any so-called 'slave ships' as such. For example, in 1532, the *nau-hourque Conceição,* which belonged to master João Afonso, left São Tomé with 670 boxes of sugar (around 3,200 *arrobas*), 27 *quintais*[20] of ivory, 33 *quintais* of African Coralwood, and 150 'specimen of male and female slaves of all ages'[21]. Because of this irregular cargo situation, enslaved captives travelled in overcrowded conditions, and thus the death rate was extremely high. In the example above, 78 of the captives did not reach their destination alive[22]. In 1525 and 1526, 555 enslaved persons left the *feitoria* of São Tomé, but only 303 arrived in the *Casa da Guiné* alive[23]. Between 1532-1534, of 1,265 captives that left the island, only 785 arrived in Lisbon alive[24]. Many had perished at sea, and two dozen were sold at the stopover in the Azores.

During the 16th century, the merchants of São Tomé and Principe, authorised to deal in enslaved persons on the African coast, frequented chiefly the Gulf of Guinea, especially the area that stretched from Cape Palmas as it was then known (now Harper), to Cape Lopez (named after Lopo Gonçalves). Whenever possible, however, they preferred some of the arms of the huge Niger delta, a region known at the time as 'the rivers'. Some of their most frequent destinations were 'the rivers': this referred to the Benin River, the Forcados River, and the Rio Real. However, with the proliferation of sugar plantations, the demand for enslaved persons increased, and so did the sales of captive laborers. In this way, trafficking of enslaved persons gradually extended to Loango; to the kingdom of the Congo (ships from São Tomé appear in the port of Mpinda from the early 16th century onwards); and as far south as to the estuary of the Kuanza river and beyond. It is probable that it stretched even further, into the region of Benguela.

The prominent role of the islands of São Tomé and Principe as Atlantic trading posts dedicated to the trade of enslaved persons did not last long as sales for the region of Mina plummeted in the 1530s. Lower demands for enslaved persons were due to much-reduced imports of gold to the coast, coupled with King John III's moral considerations. He abhorred the fact that

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20 *Quintal* is a unit of weight equal to 4 *arrobas* (approximately 60 kilograms).

21 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /181/129, 1533-3-19.

22 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II/210/91, 1533-8-4.

23 T.T, *Corpo Cronológico*, I /47/97, 1531-11-13.

24 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, I /57-58, II /174/85; II /176/56, II /178/49, II /181/122, II /181/129, II /182/67, II /184/17, II /190/106, II /195/41, II /207/15, II /207/15, II – 210-91, III /11/102.

Christians sold enslaved persons, some of whom had been baptized, to non-Christians. The flow of enslaved people to Europe, Lisbon in particular, was fully dependent on the sugar trade and ran alongside it, and both came to an end in the early 17th century. By contrast, the most profitable trade in enslaved people, which was the trade with Spanish America, was far too competitive a market for São Tomé to break into and fully take advantage of. What's more, a newly emerging destination, Brazil, became the focus for the trade's rising, and ultimately most dominant, centre: Angola. This came about through direct bilateral trade between the two sides of the Atlantic. Throughout the 17th century, therefore, São Tomé and Principe headed towards considerable isolation in various other economic fields, as well as in the trade in enslaved persons.

2.3. African Coralwood

Coralwood was never a major export product for São Tomé. However, most of the vessels who left the island laden with sugar and enslaved Africans during the first decades of the 16th century also carried Coralwood, which they offloaded in the *Casa da Mina*.

In October 1530, for example, the factor Manuel Vaz sent Afonso Fernandes, master of the *Marieta,* 508 *arrobas* of sugar and 120 *quintais* of Coralwood[25]. In January 1532, the carrack *Santa Maria da Luz* loaded 500 boxes of sugar (the equivalent of 2,362 *arrobas*) and 60 *quintais* of Coralwood[26]. In 1533, the *São Miguel,* whose master was Vicente Rodrigues, loaded 2,386½ *arrobas* of sugar in boxes and caskets, 50 '*peças* of male and female slaves of all ages', and 50 *quintais* of Coralwood, which were added to the sugar cargo[27].

Coralwood (*Pterocarpus soyauxii* or *Pterocarpus tinctorius*) was common in the humid forests of Africa's western coast, Sierra Leone, and also Angola, where it was called *takula* in Kimbundu. It was a resistant hardwood used in exterior carpentry, but especially appreciated as a dye. Although it was a different plant species to Brazilwood, the officials of the *Casa da Mina* in 1526 are recorded as stacking both the African and South American logs in the same warehouse, and seemed to be unable to distinguish between them[28].

Some of the wood exported by São Tomé may have come from the island itself, although consistent information is, unfortunately, unavailable; what is

25 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II/165/80, 1530-10-26.
26 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /173/112, 1532-1-31.
27 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /181/122, 1533-10-15 e II/210/91, 1534-3-24.
28 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /171/62, 1531-1-4.

certain, however, is that the majority came from the coast of Africa. In 1517, João Fialho informed António Carneiro, captain of the donatarie of the island of Principe, that the *Oliveira* had brought enslaved persons, as well as ivory and '36 Coralwoods' from Benin[29]. In 1519, the *Regimento do Trato de S. Tomé* (Regulations Governing the Trade in Enslaved Persons in São Tomé) instructed the clerks of the *feitoria* to register, while unloading, not only the enslaved Africans and ivory, but also the number and weight of the Coralwood pieces[30].

Later, São Tomé lost partial, or possibly total, control over the exportation of 'Tacula wood', as it was also known, as the island was replaced as a shipping port for Coralwood by Loango and Angola'[31]. In terms of its use as a dye, at any rate, Coralwood had by then been supplanted by Brazilwood.

2.4. Ivory

As was the case with Coralwood, ivory was never one of the major products that circulated on the *carreira* of São Tomé, despite the fact that, during the 16th century, many ships from São Tomé that docked in Lisbon carried it as their cargo.

Writing at the beginning of the 1500s, the explorer and geographer Duarte Pacheco Pereira noted the locations where the Portuguese of São Tomé bought ivory, such as the interior of the kingdom of Benin, as well as the river Benin itself, which he called the 'Formoso river'. He makes cursory mention of the region of the Forcados River, while lingering a little more on the mountains and river of the Cameroons, i.e., the continental area across from the island of Fernando Pó, claiming that 'this land has many great elephants, whose tusks, which we call ivory, we buy; and for a *manilla* (shackle) of copper, one can find here a great elephant tusk'[32].

The price of ivory soon increased, a sure sign of demand. In 1517, the crew of the *Oliveira*, property of António Carneiro, donatory captain of the island of Principe, brought back 187 ivory tusks from Benin, for which he paid 1,623 manillas of copper, i.e., an average of 8,7 manillas per tusk. The average price the crew paid per enslaved person was 57 manillas[33].

And still, prices continued to rise. Only five years later, the *São Miguel* bought 228 elephant tusks in Benin, of which 31 were paid for with cloth and

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29 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, I /22/70, 1517-8-24.

30 *Regiment of the São Tomé Slave Trade*, 1519 (*MMA*, IV, 130).

31 Letter from Fr. Garcia Simões to the Provincial, 1575-10-20 (*MMA*, III, 133-134).

32 Letter from Pedro Sardinha, 1611 (*MMA*, VI, 54).

33 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, I /22/70, 1517-8-24.

manillas, while the remaining 197 were paid for with 3,845 manillas. This amounted to an average of almost 20 manillas per tusk, although bigger tusks were known to cost as much as 50 manillas each (Ryder, 1969, 61-62).

There is no information as to ivory ever being the exclusive, or main, cargo of any of the ships that left São Tomé for Europe. As such, it always played a secondary cargo role in the island port. In 1530, the carrack *Santa Maria do Monte*, piloted by João Velho, was dispatched from São Tomé to the *Casa da Mina* in Lisbon with 160 enslaved persons, 120 *quintais* of Coralwood, plus four *quintais* and one *arroba* of ivory[34].

Likewise, in March 1533, the *Conceição* under master João Afonso, resident in Azurara, received in the *feitoria* of São Tomé 150 enslaved persons, 670 boxes of sugar, 33 *quintais* of Coralwood, as well as 27½ *quintais* and 28 *arrobas* of ivory (the equivalent weight of 99 tusks), all destined for Portugal[35]. The following year, another mixed cargo on the carrack *Pena* brought 126 tusks, totalling 36 *quintais*, 3 *arrobas*, and 28 *arratéis*[36] of ivory[37]. In more global terms, it is documented that between June 1582 and June 28th 1586, the 'receiver of the slave trade of the island of São Tomé', Pero Vaz da Quinta, received 253 *quintais*, 2 *arrobas*, and 30 *arratéis* of ivory, which, according to the average cargo tonnage of the *Pena*, corresponded to over 800 elephant tusks[38].

Another receiver, Gaspar Cadena, registered 196 *quintais* and 20 *arratéis* of ivory (approximately 560 elephant tusks) headed for Lisbon between 23 June 1589 and late December 1602. This was a much lower annual average than for the previous period. It allows us to conclude that the global drop in trade on São Tomé in the early 17th century also affected ivory exports[39].

3. Capitals

From the early 16th century onwards, right after the settlement of São Tomé and the transformation of the newly occupied territory into an export economy, the island itself, as well as the *carreira* of São Tomé, developed great potential for both private and Crown investments.

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34 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II/165/80, 1530-10-26.

35 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II /181/129, 1533-3-19; II/210/91, 1533-8-2.

36 *Arrátel* is a unit of weight corresponding to approximately 1/32 of an *arroba* (0,459 kilograms).

37 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II/210/91, 1534-7-16.

38 T.T., *Chancelaria de D. Filipe II*, Privilégios, Livro 2, fl. 25 e 25v, 1602-8-1.

39 T.T., *Chancelaria de D. Filipe II*, Privilégios, Livro 1, fl. 51v, 1602-10-20.

Except for charging customs duties, the King never restricted travel along the main trade routes. He did, however, invest directly in the production of sugar, and had, during various periods of time, exclusive control of the traffic in enslaved persons between the African coast and São Tomé, as well as of the supply of captive laborers from the *feitoria* fortress of São Jorge da Mina. Private investment in the *carreira* of São Tomé, on the other hand, involved both the transport of goods, and trade per se.

In the case of transport, as outlined above, the *carreira* was not limited to vessels with big tonnage only. This allowed investors with moderate financial resources, most of whom resided in the small ports in the north of Portugal, to finance ship outfitting with a view to carrying enslaved persons, as well as sugar and other goods, from São Tomé across the Atlantic. In this context, divided ownership of vessels was not uncommon, as this maximised on opportunities for potential, less affluent investors; it also allowed for the investment risk to be a shared out.

In this way, Gonçalo Afonso Maio, plus two other residents of Vila do Conde, along with António Luís from Azurara, and Miguel Dias from Lisbon, had a carrack (*nau*) built in Vila do Conde. In January 1576, it was 'finished and rigged, equipped and armed with everything that was necessary to go the island of São Tomé', having cost a total of 2,052,624 *réis.* Two of the partners had invested a third each, one of the partners a sixth, and two others divided the remaining sixth between them. The total price of the carrack included '29,000 tiles which in the aforementioned *nau* is paid by all, and 3 barrels of rosin for the ship's use and whatever was left over to be sold'[40]. Apart from this small commercial investment, the main profit anticipated by the five partners was most probably the freight paid by the shippers, since the most common relationship between ship owners and merchants was that of the merchants chartering the vessels from the owners.

One pertinent example here illustrates the system of pre-established freight: In March 1593, Tomé Dias of Viana da Foz do Lima – who was master, pilot, and owner of the *patache Bom Jesus*, anchored in the river Tagus – made an agreement with the 'slave contractors' of São Tomé (Rui Lopes, Heitor Rodrigues, and Baltasar Rodrigues de Chaves) to take 2,200 *arrobas* of sugar, shipped in boxes, from the island to Lisbon, and from there to Hamburg. From São Tomé to Lisbon, the freight was priced at 160 *réis* per *arroba*, from Lisbon to Hamburg it was 6 *cruzados* (2,400 réis) per 'ton of 54 *arrobas*'[41].

40 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 1*, 1576-1-4, fls. 80-81.

41 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 11*, 1593-3-29, fls. 63v-65.

There was, however, another kind of agreement between ship owners and investors, which gave rise to partnership-type companies: In 1586, a partnership was formed between Gaspar Rodrigues, resident in Lisbon and master and owner of the carrack *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda,* along with one of his brothers on the one hand, and the merchant Heitor Coronel on the other. The latter took responsibility for loading the ship, while the two brothers agreed 'to sell the goods in São Tomé at the best advantage', in exchange for sugar and enslaved persons. Two thirds of the profits would go to Coronel, and one third to the two brothers[42].

From the beginning of the settlement of São Tomé, the economic activity that most attracted big private investors ('wholesale merchants', *mercadores de grosso trato*) was the trade in enslaved persons with the African coast, i.e., the Niger delta, and with the kingdom of Benin in particular.

In 1486, just one year after the first donatory captain was assigned to São Tomé, exclusivity of the 'slave rivers' trade for the following ten years was leased to the Florentine merchant Bartolomeo Marchionni, established in Lisbon since 1469, for the sum of 1,100,000 *réis* per year (Guidi Bruscoli, 2014, pp. 118-119). In 1502, this exclusivity was granted to Fernão de Loronha, a prosperous New Christian and Knight of the Royal Household, who twice held the monopoly of the Brazilwood trade also. Other leaseholders followed, always with the contractual obligation of supplying São Jorge da Mina with enslaved persons and *coris* ('blue beads with red lines').

The contracts issued might also have included the levying of the customs duties on goods leaving the island. But the most attractive part continued to be the exclusivity of trade with the African coast, often called a 'slave contract'. In this system of monopoly, the contractors were obliged to sell licenses to private merchants who wanted to participate in the trade between the island and the African continent. In view of the high profits, the island's Crown officials convinced the Portuguese King to get in on this particularly lucrative trade, so that between 1519 and 1529, the Crown came to directly administer both the trade of the African coast, as well as the provisioning of Mina, both from the *feitoria* in São Tomé.

The monopoly remained throughout the decades that followed, oscillating between royal administration on the one hand, and leases to private entities on the other, the latter being especially attracted by the possibility of exporting enslaved persons to Brazil and Spanish America. In the case of Spanish America, an important stipulation demanded that licenses be bought

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42 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 1*, 1586-1-4, , fls. 22-25.

beforehand, and even though they had to be issued by the *Casa de Contratación*, they were nonetheless dependent on royal favour. As such, licenses were not easily obtainable by those who did not move in the financial circles of the Court in Madrid. This gave the trade a subtly international and political dimension, of which all parties involved in the contract would have been all too acutely aware.

In 1579, due to the rapid increase in the exportation of enslaved persons from the port of Luanda, the São Tomé trading contract was separated from that of Angola. This augured a precipitous decline in the island's business. It was somewhat offset, however, by the union of the Iberian Crowns in 1580 and the ensuing anticipation of easier access to the markets of Spanish America. This made the traffic of 'the rivers' and the exportation of enslaved persons from São Tomé more attractive to big European merchants.

Between June 1583 and June 1589, the trading contract of São Tomé was run by the Milanese merchant Giovan Battista Rovellasca[43], who closed the deal for 11,000,000 *réis* per year, having procured from the Spanish King the right to ship a total of 1,800 enslaved persons to the Spanish West Indies during the six years of his lease (Ventura, 1998, p. 32).

Thereafter, until around 1620 (which constitutes the time limit of this chapter), the contractors of São Tomé were always New Christians who, through family ties and commercial connections, were well established in the network of converts that spread all over Europe. Two cases case in point are Heitor Rodrigues' and Baltazar Rodrigues' contract at the end of the 16th century; the other is that of the soon-to-be-estranged brothers Jorge Rodrigues da Costa and Fernão Jorge da Costa (1606-1617) (Salvador, 1981, p. 34).

However, the so-called 'slave contract' only covered one part of the economic activity that passed through the *carreira* of São Tomé. Its main section, the connection with Europe, remained unmonopolised and therefore open to other commercial activities. Extant documentation shows us that the business opportunities provided by São Tomé and Principe allowed for an extensive number of economic agents, from big merchants (working in international networks), to smaller merchants (often associated in partnerships) and even professionals of other areas, all trying their luck at commercial activity.

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43 Giovan Battista Rovellasca is often considered an Italian-Flemish merchant because he lived for a long time in Antwerp where his father, a Milanese merchant, was established. Giovan Battista arrived in Lisbon in 1577 and soon started participating in major business deals, particularly the pepper contract (in which he partnered up with several Portuguese and foreign investors), and, years later, the customs contract. His funding came from prominent Milanese businessmen, whose interests he represented in Lisbon (Alessandrini, 2009, 266).

In many cases, the big merchants were foreigners, representatives of international interests in Lisbon. Often, the only thing we know about those interests is the person who was in situ. In 1525, for instance, the Genovese merchant João de Odon (Giovanni de Odone) bought 600 enslaved persons from the Portuguese King, who at the time controlled the trade monopoly with the African coast. De Odon paid 3,240,000 *réis*, in two instalments[44]. In 1526, another Italian showed a keen interest in this line of business: Estêvão de Espínola (Stefano de Spínola), from Genoa, was a partner in a company for which João Francisco Affaitati acted as guarantor, and bought from the King the same number of enslaved Africans, to be delivered in São Tomé[45]. Decades later, Giovan Battista Rovellasca appears again; he was a so-called 'slave contractor', but in 1587 and 1588, he is seen to be buying from the King 'the new sugar crops from the island of São Tomé and Principe', i.e., 6,000 *arrobas* at 53 *réis* per *arroba*[46]. A Flemish merchant, Gaspar Peres (Pels?), resident in Lisbon, appears in different years between 1573 and 1590 as a buyer of sugar from São Tomé[47]. Lastly, in 1599, two self-proclaimed German merchants living in Lisbon, Luís Godim and Sebastião Bacler (Bachor?), bought 4,000 *arrobas* of sugar to be shipped to Flanders in two *hourques*. The seller was Gaspar de Sousa Lobo, a nobleman of the *Casa del Rei* and landowner in São Tomé[48].

Even more present than the foreigners were the Portuguese New Christian merchants, also active in the European and world trading networks, who, either individually or in companies, participated in the trade in enslaved persons, as well as in the sugar trade.

One case in point is the merchant André Faleiro. He had commercial interests in the Cape route as well as good contacts in northern Europe[49]. In 1591, Faleiro – acting as procurator of his relative Duarte Gomes Solis – bought 2,000 *arrobas* of sugar from Pero Vaz da Quinta, a former receiver of trade goods (*recebedor do trato)* in São Tomé[50]. In 1593, Faleiro associated himself with Vaz da Quinta,

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44 T.T., *Núcleo Antigo*, nº 590, fl. 61, 1525.

45 T.T., *Corpo Cronológico*, II/131/154, Royal Charter of 1526-2-17.

46 B.N.P., Reservados, *Fundo Geral*, 637, fl. 16.

47 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7 A*, 1573-11-2, fls. 130-131v; *Cartório Notarial nº 11*, 1590-6-14, fls. 126v-128v.

48 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7 A*, 1599-11-19, fls. 108 a 109v.

49 André Faleiro belonged to one of the most powerful New Christian families, having been granted the title of Gentleman Knight of the Royal Household. Persecuted by the Inquisition, however, he was exiled in Hamburg and subsequently in Venice, where he was known as Jacob Aboab. In 1606, along with Rodrigo Ximenes, he became Consul of the Portuguese Nation in Antwerp.

50 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7-A*, 1591-8-6, fls. 131-132.

Bernardo Drago, Baltasar Rodrigues (leaseholder of a 'slave contract'), and also with António Faleiro de Abreu, another relative, who was a landowner and *recebedor do trato* in São Tomé, as well as procurator of Manuel Fernandes de Elvas. For their shared purpose of shipping sugar from São Tomé to Hamburg, the five partners chartered the carrack *S. João Batista* from Francisco Pires Barcelos who was, in addition to being the ship's master and pilot, a neighbour from Vila do Conde[51]. It is certain that for the years 1606 and 1607, André Faleiro, in addition to other business dealings, bought the new sugar crops from the São Tomé properties of the *Misericórdia* of Lisbon, amounting to a total of 7,440 *arrobas*[52].

Further examples of New Christian merchants during the 1580s include the prosperous Bento Dias de Santiago. He had a particular interest in transporting enslaved persons from São Tomé to the captaincy of Pernambuco, where he owned the *engenho* of *São Bento*[53]. Another example is António Rodrigues da Veiga who, in the early 17th century, seems to be a principal stakeholder; together with Jorge Lopes de Abrantes, Gaspar da Costa da Palma, and Diogo Ribeiro, Rodrigues da Veiga chartered a caravel to transport sugar from São Tomé to Europe[54]. We also read of one Baltasar Rodrigues de Matos – who later became one of King John IV's bankers, and who had agents both in Mexico and Seville – buying up enslaved persons in São Tomé (where his father was administrator of the estates of deceased and missing persons, *tesoureiro dos bens dos defuntos e ausentes*) and shipping them onwards to Vera Cruz[55].

At times, members of the lower nobility partnered with merchants, such as the merchant knights exemplified by Magalhães Godinho. In 1569, in order to charter the carrack *Santiago* anchored in the port of Viana, two prominent merchants in the Oporto market, Simão Vaz (agent of the Castilian firm of Simón Ruiz) and Henrique Dias partnered with Vicente Rodrigues – a nobleman of the house of the Infanta D. Maria – who appears on different occasions in this type of business. Once the *Santiago* was loaded in Oporto, it was to sail on to Madeira to load wine, from there continue on to São Tomé to exchange the wine for 80-100 enslaved persons, whom, in this triangular trade pattern, they were to take to Bahia, from where, in turn, they were to bring back sugar and cotton to Oporto, before possibly sailing onwards to Antwerp[56].

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51 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº11*, 1593-9-3, fls. 85v-88.

52 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7-A*, 1608-3-13, fls. 4-6v.

53 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº7-A*, 1585-10-17, fls. 87-90.

54 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7-A*, 1608-3-16, fls. 2-3v.

55 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 7-A*, 1609-9-23, fls. 124v a 126v; and 1609-11-14, fls. 24v a 27.

56 Arquivo Distrital do Porto (henceforth ADP), Po. 1º, 3ª série, liv. 33, fl. 63v-67v, 1569-12-21, in

However, noblemen, at times, bypassed merchants, especially when anticipating lucrative deals. In an effort to secure a contract for the provision of services in the *Casa dos Contos do Reino*, three such Knights, Francisco Rodrigues Freitas, and Miguel da Rua, residents in Oporto, together with Manuel da Rocha Pereira, 'resident in his estate in Pombeiro', teamed up with Gonçalo Dinis, for whom they acted as guarantors and main payers, and who was to buy in São Tomé, or Angola, 'a certain number of slaves' and transport them to Brazil[57].

Examples abound of yet another important, albeit more informal, trade model in the *carreira* of São Tomé. In 1568, several residents of Oporto – Francisco das Neves (merchant), António de Freitas and Francisco Rodrigues (identified merely as 'citizens'), Estêvão Garcês (notary), Brás Velho (silversmith), João Gonçalves (manufacturer of fishhooks), and Pedro Álvares (barber) – appointed a procurator to defend their common interests. Six years previously, they had each sent 'goods' to São Tomé, care of a clerk who was responsible for selling them there at the best possible price, and in return send each one of them either sugar or enslaved persons. However, as the agent had died before finishing his mission, the seven men from Oporto tried to recover their investments[58].

They were not the only ones to attempt to profit from the island in this informal fashion, sending goods which they had bought with their savings. In 1592, Gaspar Fernandes (cooper and resident in Lisbon) commissioned Pedro Alvares (pilot of the *carreira* of São Tomé) to sell a *quarta* of wine and half a *quarta* of flour on the island on his behalf, in exchange for one enslaved person[59]. Around 1600, and with a similar objective, Luís Álvares Gago, a tailor from Lisbon, sent a package containing wax candles and flour to an acquaintance in São Tomé[60]. The shoemaker Afonso Fernandes also, from Lisbon, sent a shipment, the content of which is unknown, via a cousin who lived on São Tomé[61].

Although it is not possible to quantify these informal business dealings, which documentation only contemplates in very specific conditions, it is, nevertheless, highly likely that these forms of 'trade de-professionalisation'

Barros, 2004, II, pp. 169-175.

57 ADP, Po. 1º, 3ª série, liv. 74, fl. 65-67, 1584-1-31, in Barros, 2004, II, pp. 319-322.

58 ADP, Po. 1º, 3ª série, liv. 27, fl.s 29v-32, in Barros, 2004, II, pp. 137-141.

59 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº7A*, 1592-4-2, fl. 56, in Fonseca, 2010, p. 132.

60 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 1*, 1604-6-21, fl. 123v.

61 T.T., *Lisboa, Cartório Notarial nº 1*, 1604-3-8, fl. 68-69.

played a significant part in the totality of trade furnished by the *carreira* of São Tomé.

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5. Curriculum Vitae

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The *Carreira da Índia* and the struggle for supremacy in the European spice trade, *ca.* 1550-1615

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Abstract
The study of the economic rivalry between the Cape and Mediterranean Routes in the Early Modern Era remains entrenched around two great theories, one defending the resurgence of Venice's distributing role to the European market in the middle of the sixteenth-century; and the other defending the Portuguese position as the main supplier of spices to Western Europe since 1500. By revisiting these two theories, we want to pay more attention to the quantitative side of the problem, despite the lack of complete series regarding European spice imports, and to look at forgotten aspects related with trade organisation and public finances which, as we contend, shed new light on an old issue. Though centred in Portugal and in the Cape Route, we aim to provide a global vision of the problem, namely by looking to Mediterranean and Asian players, and by using old works, revising known data and employing new sources.

Keywords
Spice Trade; Asia; Europe; Mediterranean; Cape Route.

Sumário
O estudo da rivalidade económica entre a Rota do Cabo e o Mediterrâneo no início da Idade Moderna permanece arraigado em torno de duas grandes teorias, uma defendendo o ressurgimento do papel de Veneza na distribuição de especiarias no mercado europeu em meados do século XVI; e o outro defendendo a posição de Portugal como principal fornecedor de especiarias para a Europa Ocidental desde 1500. Ao revisitar estas duas teorias, queremos dar mais atenção ao lado quantitativo do problema, apesar da falta de séries completas no que diz respeito às importações de especiarias europeias, bem como aos aspectos relacionados com a organização do comércio e as finanças públicas que, como julgamos, lançam uma nova luz sobre uma velha questão. Embora centrados em Portugal e na Rota do Cabo, pretendemos dar uma visão global do problema, nomeadamente olhando para os actores mediterrânicos e asiáticos, mediante o uso de trabalhos antigos, revendo dados conhecidos e recorrendo a novas fontes.

Palavras-chave
Comércio de especiarias; Ásia; Europa; Mediterrâneo; Rota do Cabo.

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The study of the economic rivalry between the Cape and Mediterranean Routes in the Early Modern Era remains entrenched around two great theories, one defending the resurgence of Venice's distributing role to the European market in the middle of the sixteenth-century; and the other defending the Portuguese position as the main supplier of spices to Western Europe since 1500. The assumption that the opening of the Cape Route by Vasco da Gama in 1497-1499 meant the definitive end for Venice as a purveyor of spices to Europe, along with the Mediterranean's ultimate decline, suffered a first setback in the 1930s when Frederic Chapin Lane (1933, pp. 228-229 and 1939-1940, pp. 581-590)proved the revival of the Levantine routes around the 1560s. In 1953, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho went one step further by signaling an earlier Venetian recovery in the 1530s (1953, pp. 581-590 and 1990, pp. 411-426).

Subsequent historians acknowledged Venice's commercial renaissance but failed to agree on its market share *vis-à-vis* Portugal's position as a spice distributor to Europe. A new boundary was established in 1974 by Niels Steensgaard (1974, pp. 155-171), who claimed that the Levantine route had not only competed vigorously with the Cape Route from the 1560s to the 1580s, but had supplanted the latter by the 1590s. While most historians preferred to emphasise Venice's recovered role as distributor in the sixteenth-century European spice trade, along with other Mediterranean players, such as Marseille, only C. H. H. Wake (1996, pp. 141-183) defended the overall importance of the Cape Route over its Levantine rival regarding the supply of spices to Europe in an article published in 1979.

The debate seems to have frozen in two opposite and irreconcilable sides, though a 'third' opinion tried to establish a bridge between the two. This third opinion maintains that Venice and the other Mediterranean players were, at best, secondary providers to the European market whenever the Portuguese *Carreira da Índia* (India Run) performed badly (Subrahmanyam - Thomas, 1991, pp. 303-316). Over the years the theme became more complex, not only due to the increasing number of works devoted to the subject, but also to the ever-changing historiographical flavour of the moment. Recently Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson (2009, pp. 655-684)revisited the subject by using real prices, and they contended that the opening of the Cape Route changed the Eurasian spice trade structure in place since the Middle Age as it led to a

decline in prices which ultimately benefited the European consumer[2]. Until now all theories pay more attention to the quantitative side of the problem, despite the lack of complete time series regarding European spice imports, forgetting aspects related with trade organisation and public finances which, as we contend, shed new light on an old question. Though centred in Portugal and in the Cape Route, we aim to provide a global vision of the problem, namely by looking to Mediterranean and Asian players, and by using old works, revising known data and employing new sources.

1. The supply side of the question

We feel bound to start with the quantitative aspect of the question to understand its ultimate development. India and the Indonesian-Malayan world were the sole producers of spices (pepper, mace, nutmeg, clove and cinnamon) after Vasco da Gama's voyage. Western Africa, however, produced a spice called 'malagueta'[3], which was a poor and cheaper substitute for the pepper consumed in the European market until the middle of the sixteenth-century. The 'malagueta' rivalled with the Asian spices in Europe, and was one of the great Portuguese exports to Flanders since 1450 until 1550; but its consumption declined with the arrival of the Indian spices, namely pepper and cardamom, in the sixteenth-century. The renewed interest in its trade around 1550 by the French and English represented a rival supply route, though the Portuguese continued to control the supply to the crucial Flemish market (Godinho, 1985, pp. 155-156)[4]. Asia continued to be the world's unique spice supplier until the eighteenth-century, when Europeans began to transplant cash-crop plants to other latitudes, namely to their American colonies. An earlier attempt to acclimatise Indian spices to recently discovered Brazil met with King D. Manuel's (r. 1495-1521) opposition, and all plants were uprooted and destroyed by royal command. Only ginger survived and thrived in Brazil and in the island of São Tomé, despite the attempts made to eradicate its cultivation (Thomaz, 2009, pp. 13-57).

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2 Both authors, paradoxically, made no use of time series for Portugal, nor do they have any for the crucially important French market, and the Mediterranean in the overall is poorly represented.

3 The *Aframomum melegueta* Schumman is a zingiberaceae like the ginger and the cardamom, whose taste it resembles somewhat, though it is not so fragrant. Ficalho, 1945.

4 In 1548, a French ship landed 12 tons of 'malagueta' at Honfleur; Miguel de Araújo to Pêro de Alcáçova Carneiro, Paris May 8, 1548. Matos, 1952, p. 185.

According to the estimates made by Tomé Pires at the beginning of the sixteenth-century (1512-1515), the global Asian production of spices varied between 185,160 and 204,730 quintals[5] (9,500 to 10,500 metric tonnes).

Spice	Quintals	Percentage
Pepper	129,200-145,000	67.9-69.8
Ginger	6,000	2.8-3.2
Cinnamon (Sri Lanka)	3,000	1.4-1.6
Mace	2,040-2,450	1.1
Nutmeg	20,420-28,580	11-13.4
Total	**185,160-204,730**	**100**

Source: (Godinho, 1983, p. 196)

The available computation around 1600 doubles the figure known a century earlier if we consider the production growth rate registered for pepper and cinnamon, with the possible exception of Moluccan clove. The total production would have reached between 356,817 and 369,427 quintals per year (18-19,000 metric tonnes). Pepper was and remained the most sought after and traded spice during the Early Modern Age, and India was its major producer until the seventeenth century. The Indian production probably reached its peak around 1607, when Francisco da Costa, a scrivener in Cochin's factory, calculated its general output from Honnavar to Travancore in 258,000 quintals, 400% more than what Pires had estimated a century earlier. Growth in Kerala alone shifted between 200% and 275%, with an annual average increase of 1.6% (Rego, 1963, pp. 350-351).

The most dramatic expansion of pepper cultivation and output occurred in Sumatra and Java. Both islands replaced India as the world leading producer and exporter in the seventeenth-century, when the Indian production dropped. The annual growth rate in Southeast Asia was even bigger than in India: 2.5% from 1500 to 1549, and 2.3% from 1550 to 1599[6]. Sunda, in western Java, witnessed a spectacular increase in forty years, when it passed from the 1,000 bahars[7] of pepper produced in 1512-1515 as recorded by Tomé Pires (Cortesão, 1944, vol. I, p. 168), to a yearly average of 10,000 bahars by 1554, and twice as

5 The Portuguese quintal has 51.405 kg in the 'old system' (*peso velho*), used for the spice trade, and 58.752 kg in the 'new system' (*peso novo*).

6 Kieniewicz, 1986, pp. 7-9; O'Rourke - Williamson, 2002, pp. 419-420; Barendse, 2002, pp. 211-212, 247.

7 Sunda's bahar has 212.976 kg.

much in exceptional years (Felner, 1868a, p. 42). Rising demand led to the expansion of pepper cultivation to new places like Jambi, in Sumatra, where it supplanted the rice paddies. Not mentioned by Pires, Jambi was already frequented by Malacca's traders ca. 1545, and her importance grew after 1580, when Sunda became temporarily closed to the 'Franks'. In the beginning of the seventeenth-century, Jambi had a heterogeneous, cosmopolitan and seasonal merchant population composed of Chinese, Javanese, Portuguese and Malays, as well as the newly arrived English and Dutch (Andaya, 1993, pp. 97-99).

Sumatra became the alternative pepper supply centre for Europe after 1530, rivalling the Portuguese Cape Route (Boxer, 1969, pp. 415-428), whereas in the past the island sent its production to the Bay of Bengal and to East Asia. Aceh became Sumatra's main spice export emporium, and her sultans, beginning with 'Ala ad-Din Ri'ayat Syah (r. 1539-1571), inaugurated a 'pepper imperialism' to compete with Portugal's imperial project for the region. 'Ala ad-Din Ri'ayat Syah declared the commerce of pepper and foodstuffs a royal monopoly, and centred all trade in his capital to make it the most important redistributive port in the region. Fuelled by the income received from pepper exports, 'Ala ad-Din initiated an ambitious expansionist policy in the 1540s to capture all great spice producing centres in Sumatra and in the Malayan Peninsula. Portuguese Malacca was unsuccessfully besieged in 1547, but Perlis fell in 1548. In the 1560s, with Ottoman technical and military assistance, 'Ala ad-Din launched a second expansionist wave, whose climax was reached in 1564 with the conquest of Johor and Aru, though the sultan failed twice to take Malacca in 1564 and 1568. On his death the sultanate plunged into political chaos and Aceh only returned to its old imperial policy in the seventeenth-century under sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607-1636) (Alves, 1999, pp. 174-177; Lombard, 1967, pp. 60-68).

2. Distribution channels and consuming markets in Europe

Despite the sustained growth of Asian spice production, Europe only consumed a very small amount, as Asia was, and would remain, its largest consumer. Surprisingly, average European annual pepper consumption from 1500 to 1625 maintained a level similar to that recorded before the opening of the Cape Route: somewhere around 28-30,000 quintals (1,439 to 1,542 metric tonnes) (Wake, 1996, pp. 141-167)[8]. This figure is relevant and must be taken into

[8] For higher European consumption figures see Lane 1939-1940, 111-120; Steensgaard 1974, 155-158, 171.

account when the spice supply and redistribution to Europe is discussed for the Early Modern Age, because demand levels remained stable, despite occasional peaks and drops in real prices (O'Rourke - Williamson, 2009, pp. 667-669).

Available pepper consumption data for Europe is based on two different estimates, one made by the Swabian pepper contractor Konrad Rott in 1578-1580, and the other made in a report sent to King Filipe II of Portugal (r. 1598-1621) in 1611 (Kellenbenz, 1956, pp. 1-28). Both figures represent an estimate made by men with a good knowledge of the European pepper market, and therefore must be taken as reliable indicators.

Region	1578-1580	1611
Portugal	1,500 α	3,000 β
Spain	3,000	
France	2,500	3,000
British Isles	3,000	γ
Italy	6,000	2,000
Germany, Baltic, Poland, Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Silesia	12,000	20,000 δ
Flanders	ε	2,000
Total	**28,000**	**30,000**

Legend: Values expressed in Portuguese quintals; α including exports for Africa and Peru; β including Spain and Portugal; γ not mentioned in 1611; δ "and the remaining Septentrional provinces" as the document states, which should incorporate the same countries as in 1578-1580; ε not mentioned in 1578-1580. **Source:** (Kellenbenz, 1956, pp. 7-8)

By comparing these figures with pepper production, we see that in 1512-1515 Europe consumed, on average, 15.3% of what was produced in India, but only 8.2% in 1611. Europe's consumption is even smaller when Southeast Asia's production is added to that of India. Average European consumption did not exceed 28-30,000 quintals until the 1620s, when the Dutch and English East India Companies began flooding the market with large quantities of pepper, thus lowering its price and changing the level of consumption in place since the later Middle Age (Wake, 1996, pp. 169-172).

There were, however, occasional peaks that exceeded this average, which were more frequent during the reign of D. Manuel then in later times. Soon the monopolist King learnt that surpluses were not necessarily a good thing. Storage meant a loss in dividends as well as quantity and quality, with the consequent loss of value when the new spice arrived. D. Manuel, therefore, fixed an annual ceiling based on estimated European consumption.

Unsurprisingly the first extant pepper contract (1560) made reference to an annual maximum of 30-40,000 quintals[9], subsequently fixed at 30,000 quintals by new contracts (Rego, 1963, p. 340), but both targets were never realised.

Notwithstanding limited market elasticity, there were peaks, as in 1508, when a cargo of 40,000 quintals of pepper was shipped to Lisbon[10]. In the late 1510s a number of successive records was registered: 44,032 quintals of pepper in 1517 (Godinho, 1987, p. 73), more than 41,477 quintals in 1518 (Bouchon, 1977, p. X); the zenith was reached in 1519 with the shipment of 56,000 quintals of pepper to Portugal, which according to Gaspar Correia was "the greatest cargo ever made, though the pepper was not very well chosen, which accounted for the great losses registered in Portugal, because it was shipped unripe and undried, and mixed with rocks" (Correia, 1923, p. 561). Afterwards volumes declined, and large shipments became more sporadic and smaller. The last great shipment known dates from 1558, with more than 30,000 quintals (Godinho, 1987, p. 75), but subsequently no such quantity was ever to land again in Lisbon, particularly after 1575.

	Outward bound		Homeward bound		Avarage	
Year	Departure	Arrival	Departure	Arrival	Ships year	Pepper decade
1500-09	152	124	80	67	6.7	18,825
1510-19	98	85	54	54	5.4	29,866
1520-29	84	62	25	23	2.3	18,102
1530-39	85	81	51	41	4.1	24,000
1540-49	65	57	43	41	4.1	24,000
1550-59	56	51	39	30	3	17,100
1560-69	49	46	37	30	3	17,100
1570-79	51	50	42	38	3.8	19,500
1580-89	54	45	43	34	3.4	20,800

[9] Pepper contract, Lisbon January 10, 1560, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (henceforth BNP), *Fundo Geral*, cod.11410, ff. 6-14.

[10] António de Sintra (?) to King, Cannanore December 8,1508. Pato, 1903, p. 298.

	Outward bound		Homeward bound		Avarage	
Year	Departure	Arrival	Departure	Arrival	Ships year	Pepper decade
1590-99	52	37	36	21	2.1	9,300
1600-09	85	48	39	30	3	- - -
1610-19	54	42	26	30	3	8.290

The*Carreira da Índia* and pepper cargos, 1500-1619
Caption: The average of ships/year deals only with the homebound voyage. Pepper values expressed in quintals. The totals for 1500-1529 are tentative reconstructions, and the cargos for 1520-1529 should have been greater.
Source: Wake, 1979, pp. 157, 161-163; Guinote - Frutuoso - Lopes, 2000, pp. 67-70.

The two estimates also show how Central Europe, mainly Germany, was the continent's largest pepper consumer, and its overall market share grew between 1578-1580 (42,85%) and 1611 (66,66%). From 1578-1580 to 1611 European consumption dropped, except in Central Europe and France. And by 1611 the English and the Dutch had their own sources of supply and channels of distribution. Portugal remained the continent's main supplier until 1590, when the Mediterranean ports took over, only to be replaced after 1600 by the new Atlantic emporia. It is noteworthy that in 1611 Italy's consumption sank to a third of its previous recorded value, hinting that the Mediterranean markets were undergoing important changes.

	Portuguese supply	European consumption	Other European supply	Percentage
1530-39	24,000	28-30,000	4-6,000	14.28-20
1540-49	24,000	28-30,000	4-6,000	14.28-20
1550-59	17,100	28-30,000	10,900-12,900	38.92-43
1560-69	17,100	28-30,000	10,900-12,900	38.92-43
1570-79	19,500	28-30,000	8,500-10,500	30.35-35
1580-89	20,800	28-30,000	7,200-9,200	25.71-30.66
1590-99	9,300	28-30,000	18,700-20,700	66.78-69

	Portuguese supply	European consumption	Other European supply	Percentage
1600-09	- - -	28-30,000	- - -	- - -
1610-19	8,290	28-30,000	19,710-21,710	70.39-72.36

Note: Annual values expressed in quintals. **Source:** Wake, 1979, pp. 162-163; Cunha, 1995, pp. 458-459.

In short, the European market was supplied via different channels, hinting that it was far from being an integrated spice market until the seventeenth-century, with the advent of the East India Companies[11]. Even before the opening of the Cape Route, Europe was already supplied by two major redistribution centres: Venice and Bursa. Whereas Venice dominated West and Central Europe, though there were other European players in the Mediterranean basin, Bursa commanded the supply to the Balkans and Eastern Europe through the route linking this Ottoman city to Brasov in Romania. The Ottoman route not only survived, but thrived, especially after Selim I (r. 1512-1520) had conquered the Mamluk sultanate in 1517, which gave him control over the traditional spice terminus in Alexandria and in the Levantine ports. In the middle of the sixteenth-century Istanbul replaced Bursa and Lviv became the new terminus redistributing spices and other Asian merchandise to Eastern Europe, including parts of the Baltic (Inalcik, 2000, pp. 300-303; Malowist, 1970, pp. 169-175). Around 1530 the Mediterranean recovered some of its distributive role in the European spice market, even though in 1531 the Venetians complained that the four galleys sent to Alexandria and Beirut had found few spices and those available were sold at "precii excessive"[12]. Five years later, in 1536, both voyages were deemed important to Venice[13], more so to Beirut whose supply line with the Persian Gulf had remained mostly unharmed since the Portuguese conquest of Hormuz in 1515. By contrast, the Red Sea route was beset by frequent Portuguese blockades, although these roles changed around 1550 with the beginning of the Portuguese-Ottoman conflict in the Gulf. In the mid-1540s, the Venetians sailed to both ports in search of spices and other Asian merchandise, especially 'robba'[14].

11 For an opposing position see O'Rourke - Williamson, 2009, pp. 678-679.

12 Senate deliberation, Venice March 28, 1531. Oliveira, 2000, p. 250.

13 Senate deliberation, Venice March 9, 1536; Senate deliberation, Venice March 13, 1536. Oliveira, 2000, respectively pp. 252-253.

14 Senate deliberation, Venice May 21, 1545; Senate deliberation, Venice March 17, 1547. Oliveira, 2000, respectively pp. 261-262.

In Antwerp, where the emblematic Portuguese factory stood until 1549, pepper from the Mediterranean sold by a Parisian merchant to a Castilian trader in 1536 signalled new times (Coornaert, 1961b, p. 103). The Western European spice market had become divided into two zones since the 1530s:

(i) the Atlantic countries and the Baltic supplied by Lisbon through Antwerp, and;

(ii) the Mediterranean basin supplied by Alexandria and the Levantine ports.

France was the best proof of this division, as the line running through Metz-Troyes-Paris-Rouen split the country in two, with the Atlantic side supplied by Antwerp and Lisbon, and the south by Marseilles and Lyon. Whenever one of the suppliers failed to provide its market, its rival would step in. Whereas in 1543-1544 1,387 pepper bales made their way by land from Antwerp to Venice and Ancona (Wee, 1963, p. 156), Lyon sent spices from Venice in the opposite direction in 1544, 1560 and 1577 (Coornaert, 1961a, vol. I, p. 291). The behaviour of Antwerp and Lyon financial markets had much to do with these spice transports.

The Ottoman Empire also consumed and distributed a considerable quantity of spices arriving in the Mediterranean. Consequently, the large figures given for the Red Sea route from the 1550s onwards must take into consideration its pivotal role, particularly after the state became an important player in the spice trade under grand-vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha from 1565 to 1579 (Casale, 2006, pp. 183-84). The total of 40,000 quintals reported by the Portuguese ambassador in Rome, Lourenço Pires de Távora, or the 50,000 quintals referred by the Jewish spy Matias Bicudo Furtado in the 1550s must be dismissed as they had ulterior political motives. Moreover, both men provided lower estimates during the 1550s, indicating how volatile Europe's supply was through the Red Sea route (Cruz, 1991, pp. 108, 114-116, 118-119, 126-127, 131). In 1564, during the height of the Red Sea recovery, two spies in Venice mentioned that at Jiddah only 1,800 quintals of pepper and 3,000 quintals of "other drugs" from Aceh and Bhatkal had arrived, but that was enough to cause the pepper price in Cairo to drop from 25 to 20 sequins[15]. So, the total provided by viceroy D. Antão de Noronha (1564-1568) in 1566 of 20-25,000 quintals of pepper shipped through the Red Sea is more realistic. Certainly, when taken together with his estimate of 10-12,0000 quintals sent to Lisbon via the Cape Route that same year, which amounts to half the volume reaching the Mediterranean[16]. But how much pepper of the former route was really going to Europe?

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[15] Gaspar and João Ribeiro to King, Venice August 27, 1564, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (henceforth ANTT), *Corpo Cronológico*, I-107-9, ff. 1-1v

[16] Viceroy to King, Goa December 16, 1566, ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-108-15, ff. 3v. 12.

There is no precise way to determine this given the lack of series, but the Ottoman Empire could have been the recipient of half the spice reaching Alexandria and Aleppo. Annual Ottoman consumption of pepper alone might represent 5,000 quintals. At least that was the total deemed acceptable to sell to the Turk when King D. João III (r. 1521-1557) negotiated a peace treaty with Süleyman I (r. 1520-1566) in 1541; though he instructed his agent Duarte Catanho to lower the offer and to receive guarantees that no further quantity of pepper or other spices would cross Ottoman territory into Europe[17]. That figure, however, did not take into account the Ottoman role as a spice distributor to Eastern Europe, which must have been considerable. In 1572, for instance, the Venetian envoy Antonio Tiepolo informed Portugal's Regent, the Cardinal D. Henrique, that "in Constantinople flowed much of the same merchandise as in the marts of Alexandria and Beirut, which is consumed there, [and] great quantities are sent northwards"[18]. Lviv seemed to have been one of its destinations, if not the largest, and the Sephardim Jews established in Istanbul dominated that route during the second half of the sixteenth century (Nadel-Golobič, 1979, pp. 364, 373).

Despite estimates, there is some quantitative data to support Wake's figures for Lisbon in the 1560s in Venetian reports. The Venetian ambassador to Spain reported in 1560 that more than 17,000 quintals of pepper had been landed at Lisbon, while he mentioned only 11,500 quintals in 1562[19]. In 1568 one ship of the four of that year's fleet carried 5,000 'cantara di pevere'; and in 1569 a single ship out of four had a cargo of 12,000 'cantara', though a third of the pepper was lost because it was unripe[20], thus corroborating Wake's decennial average.

The unpredictability of the amount landed at Lisbon for the same period, coupled with changes occurring in the Crown's monopoly contracts and the low prices it paid for spices in Asia, made profits irresistible to traders operating from Constantinople, Cairo and Aleppo according to D. Antão de Noronha[21]. In 1569 the bishop of Goa, D. Jorge Themudo, wrote how he feared that the growing quantity of pepper from Kedah and Aceh supplying the Red Sea would "reduce the price of pepper in Flanders" (Wicki, 1961, p. 208), thus curtailing Portuguese profits. As both men advocated reforms in the spice

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17 Instructions to Duarte Catanho, Almeirim February 15, 1541, ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-69-47, ff. 1, 2, 3-3v.

18 Antonio Tiepolo to the Senate, Almeirim January 19, 1572. Oliveira, 1997, pp. 64-65.

19 Paolo Tiepolo to the Senate, Toledo August 28, 1560; Paolo Tiepolo to the Senate, Madrid September 3, 1562. Oliveira, 2000, respectively pp. 270, 275.

20 Sigismondi di Cavalli to the Senate, Madrid August 18, 1568; Sigismondi di Cavalli to the Senate, Madrid November 23, 1569. Oliveira, 1997, respectively pp. 25, 32.

21 Viceroy to King, Goa December 16, 1566. ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-108-15, ff. 3v-4.

trade, this may explain why such dark forecasts were used to describe the state of Portuguese commerce. However, real price indices show a small increase over Europe in 1550-1575, excepting Vienna and Andalusia (O'Rourke - Williamson, 2009, p. 667), thus proving how unfounded Themudo's fears were.

Spice supply to Europe remained uncertain. The Cape Route regained the upper hand from 1570 to 1590. This was due to a change in the royal monopoly by channelling operations to different syndicates (procurement, shipping, sales, duties) (Cunha, 2009, pp. 51-79). The Mediterranean supplied less than in the past due to intermittent warfare. As Venice's redistributive role suffered whenever the *Serenissima* was at war with the Turk, Marseille took her place during the 1570s (Billioud, 1951, pp. 444-46). The Portuguese benefitted from the Ottoman taxation of the Red Sea spice traffic, coupled with the Turk's role as spice distributor, particularly one who did not pay taxes and therefore had an advantage over private traders in his empire (Casale, 2006, p. 191). Even so Lisbon investors still looked to the Mediterranean because, as Fernando de Morais confessed to the financier Simón Ruiz in 1576, "I believe that from now on [pepper] won't have the same value, because it is known that a great sum has arrived in Venice and Italy by way of Cairo, and its price has dropped; and much more has arrived [in Lisbon] in these carracks"[22]. Though the amounts arriving in Europe changed annually, spice prices tended to decrease, again indicating the century's trend.

During the 1580s King Filipe I of Portugal (r. 1580-1598) even tried to make Venice the privileged distributor of Portuguese spices in the Mediterranean, but the prolonged negotiations never bore fruit because the *Serenissima*'s interests lay elsewhere, and Filipe's offer was a political bait to get Venice to join him in an anti-Ottoman league. The pepper contractors also tried to lure Venice into the business. In 1586, for example, Giovanni Battista Rovelasca, Gerhard Paris and Marcus and Matthäus Welser invited the Venetians to participate in their European pepper activities, but to no avail[23]. And in 1590 Rovellasca unsuccessfully tried to attract Venice again, offering to send 6,000 'cantara' of pepper there[24]. As some contractors – men like Konrad Rott, the Welsers and Rovelasca – took double risks since they handled two segments of the Crown operations (procurement and sales), the spectre of bankruptcy became a reality if anything went wrong, especially in the shipping segment, the weakest link in the Portuguese commercial enterprise. Moreover, men like the Welsers, were also involved in other financial operations, namely in lending money to the

22 Fernando de Morais to Simón Ruiz, Lisbon August 13, 1576. Silva, 1961, p. 72.

23 Gerhard Paris to Hieromano Lippomano, Madrid October 15, 1586. Oliveira, 1997, p. 528.

24 Tomaso Contarini to the Senate, Madrid April 11, 1590. Oliveira, 1997, p. 601.

Spanish Crown and trading in the European credit market. Therefore, they were more vulnerable to short-term crises and susceptible to going bankrupt if anything went wrong, which in turn affected their capacity to invest in their Portuguese venture. By 1593 these international investors declared bankruptcy and abandoned the pepper contracts, and their place was taken by men such as Tomás Ximenes and Heitor Mendes, Portuguese New-Christians (Godinho, 1987, pp. 63-65).

The debacle of the *Carreira da Índia* in the 1590s meant the beginning of the end for the Portuguese commercial system in place since 1556. The Atlantic lost its dominant position to the Mediterranean in the European distribution of spices until 1600. In the Ottoman Empire, the dismembering of the state's role as distributor after 1580, saw the emergence of great merchants in Egypt in the 1590s, such as Ismail Abu Takiyya, who controlled all channels in close association with local Ottoman officials (Casale, 2006, pp. 194-96; Hanna, 1997). Significantly, Francesco Vindramin reported in 1594 that it was Brazil's trade that had saved Lisbon's market, not India, especially after the wreck of the Indiaman *São Pedro* off the coast of Pernambuco[25]. As the Mediterranean, and Venice, regained momentarily the role of major spice supplier to Europe, fuelled by the injection of American silver, Lisbon was sometimes supplied by rivals, as in 1606 when a ship from Marseille landed indigo, nutmeg and incense, which led King Filipe II of Portugal (r. 1598-1621) to forbid the entry and sale of any spices and drugs in Portugal and its empire, except for those carried by Portuguese vessels[26]. Around 1609, however, the Dutch began displacing the traditional players by selling 'Atlantic' pepper in the *Mare Nostrum* (Israel, 1991, pp. 97-101), thus inverting the pattern of an age-old commerce. Even Lisbon managed to send pepper to the Mediterranean through Genoa, whose merchants and financiers were deeply involved in the Portuguese economy.

During the sixteenth-century a third route, albeit an insignificant one, reappeared, providing spices to Europe's periphery, *i.e.*, Russia, by way of the Persian Gulf. Traditionally the Gulf had purveyed the Levantine ports rivalling with the Red Sea route in the same bulk products throughout the Mamluk period and afterwards under Ottoman rule. With the end of the Portuguese-Ottoman war in the Persian Gulf (Özbaran, 1994, pp. 119-157; Floor, 2006, pp. 170-190), there was a shift in the bulk products traded, from pepper to luxury spices and Indian textiles. This trade was bolstered by American silver flooding

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25 Francesco Vendramin to the Senate, Madrid November 3, 1594. Oliveira, 1997, p. 640.

26 King to the Revenue Council, n/l November 20, 1606. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (henceforth AHU), *Índia*, box 1, doc. 60.

the Mediterranean, starting in the 1570s(Braudel, 1978, pp. 493-496) and which by the late 1590s was reckoned to be worth two million "in silver coined and broken" exchanged in Hormuz by a cosmopolitan group of traders for "clove, mace, nutmeg, cinnamon, cardamom, textiles, and porcelain, and all this in large quantities, and lots of indigo [...], and even pepper despite all prohibitions"[27].

The Persian Gulf had also been linked sometimes with Lviv via the so-called *Via Tartarica*, but the town's character changed in the sixteenth-century when it ceased to be a transit market to become a continuous fair for spices and silks, among other oriental merchandise, which were re-exported to nearby European regions (Nadel-Golobič, 1979, pp. 355-356). The easternmost route crossed Safavid Persia, bordered the Caspian Sea and arrived in Moscow through the Volga, a commercial way opened after Ivan IV (r. 1533-1584) had conquered Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1554)(Crummey, 1987, pp. 154-155). By 1567 two of Ivan's commercial agents could be found in Hormuz trading (Matthee, 1999, p. 30), indicating its feasibility, although Russians and even Poles were known to trade in the island before that date[28]. Though perilous, the route remained open to trade despite occasional closures due to the ongoing Safavid-Ottoman conflict (Carrère d'Encausse, 1970, pp. 391-422). The English Muscovy Company became interested in procuring spices through this route, but the itinerary proved too daunting to be economically competitive and was abandoned after 1581[29].

The decision to establish a route via the Persian Gulf to the spice sources was then taken by the Levant Company established in Aleppo after 1583. Though Ralph Fitch succeeded in returning to England by the overland route in 1591, the future lay with the Cape Route, as agents of the Levant Company recognised in 1599 in view of the success achieved by the early Dutch voyages to Asia (Marshall, 2001, pp. 267-268). Unsurprisingly, it was the stockholders of the Levant company who became involved in the Asian trade in the 1590s, and provided a substantial part of the capital, directors and governor of the East India Company upon its creation in 1600 (Brenner, 1993, pp. 21-22). As for the Dutch, they managed to send 65 ships to Asia from 1595 to 1602, when all the companies operating in the Cape Route were forced by the States General to merge into the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Gaastra, 2003, pp. 17-23). The

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27 The *Estado da Índia* and where it begins, Rego, 1960, pp. 200, 214-215.

28 Fr. Gaspar Barzeaeus to his brethren in India and Europe, Hormuz December 10, 1549, Wicki, 1948, p. 647.

29 "The Voyage of Christopher Burrough to Persia the sixth time Anno 1579", Hakluyt, 1936, pp. 172-200.

maritime route to Asia became the main supplier of spices for Europe after 1600, when increasingly greater quantities were landed at Amsterdam and London, thus making spices cheap and accessible to more people. Furthermore, the creation of a single integrated market for the sale of spices across the continent made all other supply channels superfluous and economically unsustainable.

3. Financing the Carreira da Índia *and the spice trade*

The reason for the survival of the Mediterranean routes after the opening of the Cape Route by Vasco da Gama was due to D. Manuel's decision to monopolise all aspects of the Asian spice trade, to use its revenues to finance his policy of centralisation, continuing a strategy dating back to the reign of D. Afonso V (r. 1438-1481)[30]. As D. Manuel lacked capital to finance all the necessary investments, including money for the annual Indian fleet and the purchase of spices in Asia, he had to borrow it domestically, and more often abroad from major Italian and German financiers, such as the Fugger and the Affaitati. To pay for his increasing expenditure and growing public debt, which around 1523 surpassed the kingdom's revenues in 57 million *réis*[31], D. Manuel chose to maintain a low level of supply to obtain better prices and conditions from his financiers, but the outcome was disappointing. He ended up being hostage to his foreign lenders, especially the Germans, some of whom doubled as spice distributors in northern Europe exchanging it at the Crown factory in Antwerp for money, merchandises and copper. Furthermore, as pepper became widely used as a form of payment the king's bargaining power with his financiers weakened, as did the value of spices. In the closing years of D. Manuel's reign Portugal's spice trade and shipping to Asia were mainly determined by external factors which he failed to control, as indicated by the unsuccessful negotiations conducted by Rui Fernandes de Almada in Germany to obtain better agreements and establish a diversified financial syndicate in 1519-1521 (Barata, 1971, pp. 75-115).

As D. Manuel's answer to each financial crisis was to reinforce the monopoly, by the end of his reign the Crown had a pervasive presence in the Portuguese spice trade in Asia and Europe. He left his son and heir, D. João III, the ordeal of financing and managing the Cape Route as a royal monopoly,

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30 For an overview of the Portuguese royal monopoly see Godinho 1987, chapters 4 and 5; Dias, 1963; Dias, 1964.

31 Excluding the overseas revenues, *vide* Freire, 1908, p. 375.

coupled with an ever-growing public debt. Any bad result in the management of the *Carreira da Índia* impacted negatively in the royal finances, thus increasing the difficulties to raise more money to finance the State and the monopoly. Until 1549 most of the large loans were foreign, but increasingly the king raised money domestically, either by asking for it from the *Cortes*, as in 1525 (Torres Novas), 1535 (Évora) and 1544 (Almeirim), or more often by selling amortisable or perpetual bonds which paid fixed interest rates to its buyers, starting with 7.14% in D. Manuel's reign to descend to 6.20% during D. João III's rule. Portugal's revenues may have increased more than twofold in Garcia de Resende's lifetime (1470-1536) as he sung in his autobiographic poem *Miscellany* (*ca.* 1536), from 60 to 200 million *réis*, "India and Mina not counting", because if these two were included the total income would have doubled (Camões, 1999, p. 294), but so did the expenditure and at a rate higher than the Crown's available cash-flow. A budgetary document made for the King in 1534 corroborated Resende's versified figures, stressing that on average Portugal's revenue had an annual gross surplus of 32 million *réis*. However, the public debt amounted to more than 808 million *réis*, of which 160 million *réis* were due at Antwerp's factory alone[32].

What had started as an expedient way to finance extraordinary expenses in D. Manuel's days, became a regular financial operation for D. João III to obtain funds to keep the Crown and its monopolies afloat, and especially to bankroll large expeditions sent to India, as in 1528, 1534, and 1537 (Gomes, 1883, pp. 27, 135-137, 140-141). In 1544 the structural cash-flow difficulties obliged D. João III to convene the *Cortes* again to ask for more money. The King's secretary, Pêro de Alcáçova Carneiro, summed up all the major extraordinary expenditures made since the beginning of the reign, and the total reached the staggering amount of 1,460 million *réis*, most of which was India related, though it did not include the cost of the annual fleets nor the money needed to buy spices. Alcáçova Carneiro added that "since much of this expenditure is paid with money in exchange [foreign loans], the sum of the interests already paid [until 1544] amounts to more than two million and two hundred thousand cruzados [880 million *réis*]"[33].

Although Portugal remained the best source for the Crown to obtain financing until the nineteenth-century, because it paid a handsome annual interest, it crippled the royal finances as the available revenue was used to pay

[32] Revenue of the Kingdom, Isles, and trade, n/l 1534, Sanceau, 1973, pp. 38-42.

[33] Andrada, 1937, pp. 328-330. Alcáçova Carneiro calculated that the amount needed to pay the lenders if the King decided to repatriate the debt from Flanders to Portugal, amounted to more than 1,200 million *réis*, cf. Andrada, 1937, p. 330.

an ever-growing debt and its interests. As the debt grew, the Crown's income plus the borrowed money became insufficient to pay all interests, and so delays in payment were common until 1560, when the State decreed its suspension and negotiated its debt structure with the lenders. It was just the beginning of a succession of suspensions and debt restructuration that characterised Portuguese finances for the following decades (Gomes, 1883, pp. 69-75), one which crippled its capacity to invest, namely in the Cape Route and in India.

Letters of credit and bonds had usually been sent to India to pay for the acquisition of spices and settle other expenses. In 1533, for instance, 20% of the money sent to India represented amortisable bonds[34]. As the debt burden increased over time, the more difficult it became to cash the letters of credit in India, since some people like Fernão Álvares da Cunha refused to redeem them in 1546. By 1548 it was obvious that the Crown sent far less money than needed to acquire spices in India. The accumulated deficit for 1546-1547 amounted to more than 53 million *réis*[35], and it was left for the *Estado da Índia* to pay.

The mounting financial crisis forced the Crown to change course and in 1549 an encumbered D. João III closed the symbol of his monopoly, the factory at Antwerp, and started dismantling the monopolistic edifice created by his father. The task was continued by his successors, though the Crown never relinquished all commercial control to contractors, in particular the control over prices and amounts traded, which eventually led the contractors to abandon their contracts. Understandably the Crown saw in the contracts a way to continue its old policies, while it foisted the economic burden of trading and shipping operations with their risks onto the contractors. Besides, this construction guaranteed a regular income to the King in exchange for commercial privileges. Such a hybrid system, in which the Crown continued to dictate policies, was too rigid to effectively compete with the trading world in Asia and in Europe, and so the first to feel the brunt of its effect were the contractors, most of whom went bankrupt with the contracts.

The system of spice procurement in Asia also constrained Portuguese commercial enterprise. Since 1500 the Crown had favoured the supply via the Cape Route, never trying to sell spices in Asia to finance its purchase and believing wrongly that such an endeavour would hinder its role of supplier to Europe because it would provide spices to rival trade routes. At the height of Portuguese pepper imperialism in 1521, Nuno de Castro suggested that D. Manuel halt all vessels carrying spices in Asia, even those bound to China, "so that the Moors will lose all hope of finding a hole through which they can

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34 King to the Earl of Castanheira, Évora February 16, 1533, Ford, 1931, p. 100.

35 Certificate on 1546 and 1547 pepper cargos, Goa May 17, 1548, ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico*, I-80-114.

make it run"[36]. Time and again the Crown debated the possibility of selling spices in Asia, as in 1545 during D. João de Castro's government (1545-1548) (Thomaz, 1998), only to reject it always in favour of supplying solely via the Cape Route.

Such a one-dimensional approach to the supply side of the question, coupled with the *Carreira da Índia*'s structural financial problems and poor operational performance, made the rebirth of the Mediterranean routes a viable one. Moreover, as Portugal was never able to control the acquisition and commerce of all Asian spices, (something unattainable as the Dutch and the English would discover too), these continued to flow through the traditional maritime lanes. Paradoxically Portuguese policies in Asia helped to give renewed life to the old trade routes, either through the ineffective blockade of the Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz; or by tactlessly alienating local producers, middlemen, and sovereigns. The spices also went to the Mediterranean with the unintentional help of Portuguese officials, who had to appease friends and allies.

In 1547, for instance, the controller of the exchequer Simão Botelho complained that Khwaja Shamsoddin Gilani, a great Persian merchant operating in the *Estado da Índia*, sent whatever number of ships he wanted to the Bab al-Mandab with the connivance of the governors[37]. Diplomatic treaties granted sailing permits for a certain number of vessels to carry on their usual trade, even in 'forbidden' merchandise such as spices. For example, the treaty signed with Bijapur in 1571 gave passes (*cartazes*) to all shipping from the Konkani coast bound to Hormuz, besides conceding other six passports for wherever the 'Adel Shahi wanted to send ships[38], which meant the Bab al-Mandab. As Bijapur's Konkani ports experienced a boom due to their trade with the Persian Gulf, even Portuguese merchants took an active part in this commerce, which in 1619 amounted to 27 vessels that made three to four voyages annually[39]. It became irresistible for the Portuguese to supply rival routes given the tantalising profits. Every social stratum participated in this commerce, as Simão Botelho reported, accusing high-ranking officials, for example two captains of Hormuz, Luís Falcão and D. António de Noronha, of trading illicitly in spices with the Ottomans[40]. In the 1590s and early 1600s such

36 Nuno de Castro to King, Cochin October 31, 1520, Mendonça, 1935, p. 173.

37 Simão Botelho to King, Bassein November 30, 1547, Felner 1868b, p. 2.

38 Treaty with Bijapur, Goa December 17, 1571, Rivara, 1865, pp. 825-831.

39 Lopo Álvares Pereira to King, Goa February 14, 1619, AHU, *Índia*, box 9 [6], doc. 32.

40 Simão Botelho to King, Bassein December 24, 1548; Simão Botelho to King, Cochin December 30, 1552, Felner, 1868b, respectively pp. 20, 30-31.

traffic from India to the Persian Gulf was normal, and the Crown's efforts to suppress it were ineffective, as were the judicial inquiries to judge the culprits (Disney, 1989, pp. 57-75).

To make things worse, when the Crown started dismantling the monopoly together with its control checks, the amount of spice coming to Europe through alternative routes soared. It all began in 1539 when the Crown relinquished the clove trade, and by the 1540s that of the luxury spices (clove, mace, nutmeg, and cinnamon), which was largely carried out privately and ended supplying rival routes. In 1552, Simão Botelho complained bitterly of how the liberalisation had disrupted the control and acquisition mechanisms established by the Crown in India, reduced the cargos sent to Lisbon, and highlighted the lack of funds to buy spices[41]. Given the Crown's financial shortcomings D. João III had no option but to liberalise it even more, and around 1555 he decided to contract the procurement and shipment of pepper to a syndicate of Portuguese-Italian investors (Diogo de Castro, Diogo Martins, Belchior Barreto, Luca Giraldi), thus inaugurating a new commercial stage in the history of the *Carreira da Índia* that would last until 1614.

What began as a single contract was eventually segmented into four separate ones (procurement, shipping, sales, duties) leased to different syndicates after 1565, though some financiers invested in more than one segment, as the Ximenes brothers did in procurement and sales, while others bid for the same contracts successively, as was the case of Jorge Rodrigues Solis in shipping Cunha, 2009, pp. 51-92). To these, one can add two related contracts, shipbuilding and supplying food for the *Carreira*, which continued well into the middle of the seventeenth-century, since in 1656 Afonso Álvares contracted with the Crown the building of the 877 tons ship *Natividade*[42].

Thanks to the contracts, the Crown managed to improve the *Carreira*'s results and the spice trade for a quarter of a century. However, its continuing interference with the fixation of prices, irrespective of market value, and the maintenance of privileges that violated the contracts, namely the *liberdades* given as rewards to sailors and officials (Silva, 1949, pp. 5-28), resulted in a steep decline in the cargos and in the number of ships after 1590. Ultimately, this forced capitalists into opting for safer investments, either in the Atlantic or later as bankers to the Spanish Crown. It also explains why after 1570 private merchants invested more in the commerce with China, or in textiles and precious stones than in pepper (Boyajian, 1993). By 1593 all foreigners had

41 Simão Botelho to King, Cochin December 30, 552, Felner, 1868b, pp. 27-30.

42 Calculation of what the Crown spend with an Indiaman, n/l [Lisbon] n/d [1655-56], ANTT, *Manuscritos da Livraria*, cod. 1138, f. 55.

ceded the contracts, and the leases were solely bought by Portuguese New-Christians, who were eventually targeted by the Inquisition and the Crown. In 1598 the procurement and sales contracts were discontinued, since the pepper carried by Portuguese vessels ceased to be competitive. Already in 1593 there was a loss of 8,789,238 *réis* in the pepper trade alone (Cunha, 2009, p. 81), and this trend grew as the years passed. Nonetheless, the Crown continued to use pepper as a means of paying indemnities to the contractors, or giving it as a security to get money, as it did in 1614 to secure the loan from Lisbon's municipality to operate the *Carreira* (Cunha, 2009, p. 90).

Furthermore, after 1592 the Crown disinvested in the Cape Route and made wide use of bonds to finance it. In 1606, however, Filipe II faced difficulties in selling bonds in order to get money to equip the next year's fleet after he had suspended and restructured payment of interests in 1605[43]. Given this financial and commercial situation it was just a matter of time before the system in place since 1556 ended. This occurred in 1614, when the last great contract, that of the shipment handled by Rodrigues Solis, was abandoned and it was left for the Crown to carry alone again the trade and shipping to India. It was the end of an era at various levels, though it ultimately meant the victory of the Cape Route over the Mediterranean in the spice commerce, even at the expense of its discoverer: Portugal.

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5. Curriculum vitae

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Searching the East by the West: Martin Behaim revisited

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Abstract
Martin Behaim is a historical figure presently known as responsible for the conception of a terrestrial globe that is associated with his name. The Behaim Globe, produced in 1492 and kept at the Germanisches National Museum, in Nuremberg, is the oldest extant terrestrial globe. Martin Behaim's life and work have been exhaustively dealt with by modern historiography, particularly in connection with the great Iberian voyages of maritime exploration of the end of the fifteenth century. But the biography of this German merchant / cosmographer / navigator, who spent an important part of his life in Portugal, continues to raise problems and perplexities, which are revisited in the present text.

Keywords
Portugal; 15th century; Martin Behaim; History of European expansion; Geography.

Resumo
Martin Behaim é uma figura histórica atualmente conhecida como responsável pela concepção de um globo terrestre que está associado ao seu nome. O Globo de Behaim, produzido em 1492 e conservado no Germanisches National Museum, em Nuremberg, é o mais antigo globo terrestre existente. A vida e a obra de Martin Behaim foram exaustivamente tratadas pela historiografia moderna, em particular no que se refere às grandes viagens ibéricas de exploração marítima do final do século XV. Mas a biografia deste mercador / cosmógrafo / navegador alemão, que passou uma parte importante da sua vida em Portugal, continua a suscitar problemas e perplexidades, que são revisitadas no presente texto.

Palavras-chave
Portugal; século XV; Martin Behaim; história da expansão europeia; geografia.

Martin Behaim is a historical figure currently known primarily as responsible for the conception of a terrestrial globe that is associated with his name. Although there are

testimonies of other older specimens, the *Behaim Globe*, dated from 1492 and preserved in the Germanisches Nationalmuseum, in the city of Nuremberg, is the oldest known today. The life and work of Martin Behaim have been treated extensively by modern historiography, particularly in its connection with the great Iberian voyages of maritime exploration of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Thus, many of the legends associated with the name of Behaim have been duly criticized. But the biographical trajectory of this German, who spent an important part of his life in Portugal, still raises some perplexities, so it certainly deserves a new evaluation[1].

Behaim was born in 1459 in Nuremberg, then one of the most cosmopolitan German cities, in a family of rich merchants originating from Bohemia. Nothing is known about his formative years, but surely, he will have carried out the same humanistic studies as the young people of his time and condition, that would include the learning of writing and reading, Latin grammar and arithmetic. A sixteenth-century Portuguese chronicler suggested that young Martin would have studied with Johannes Müller, the famous mathematician of Königsberg. Indeed, João de Barros, in his *Primeira Década da Ásia* (First Decade of Asia) printed in Lisbon in 1552, writes about "a certain Martin Behaim (…) who claimed to be a disciple of Johann Monte Regio, famous astronomer among the scholars of this science"[2]. Regiomontanus, as he was also known, lived in Nuremberg between 1471 and 1475, where he maintained an astronomical observatory and a multi-purpose workshop, in which astronomical instruments and celestial globes were manufactured, and where there was also a printing press[3].João de Barros was a generally well-informed chronicler, who had access to a very diversified set of sources, in order to prepare the various parts of his monumental *Asia*, which dealt with Portuguese overseas activities[4], so that it is not impossible that Martin Behaim, between ages 12 and 15, at some point frequented as an apprentice the workshop of Johannes Müller.

From 1476, and for eight years, Martin Behaim lived in the Flemish cities of Mechelen and Antwerp, working with important textile merchants. Several letters of his are preserved from this period, during which he devoted himself to learning the secrets of the international trade of textiles and dyes (Ravenstein, 1908, pp. 107-111). Behaim himself, in addition to collaborating with other Flemish and German merchants, also dedicated himself to this same business

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1 Regarding Behaim, see the classical study by Ravenstein, 1908, that still deserves attentive reading; more recently, Crone, 1961; and above all, Pohle, 2007, where the facts and controversies about Behaim are systematized.

2 Barros, 1932, p. 127 (4-2): "hũ Martim de Boémia (…) o qual se gloriáua ser discipulo de Joãne de Monte Regio afamádo astrónomo entre os professóres desta sciẽcia".

3 About Regiomontanus, see Zinner, 1990.

4 Regarding Barros, see Loureiro, 2018a.

activity. His presence in Flanders, in part, explains the subsequent course of his life. On the one hand, he surely contacted the Portuguese factory in Bruges, which as a result of the Portuguese voyages of discovery in the Atlantic had become an important centre for the exchange of exotic products and the dissemination of news about overseas geographic exploration[5]. Perhaps his curiosity about Portugal and the Portuguese navigations emerged from exchanges with the Portuguese merchants, who at that time owned a house in the city of Bruges. On the other hand, a few years later Behaim was to maintain close relations with the Flemish community living in Lisbon and in the Atlantic archipelagos that were then being colonized by the Lusitanian crown. Most likely, during his residency in Flanders, the young German established links that would allow him to later interact with the Flemish settled in Portugal.

It is not impossible that Martin Behaim, during this period of his life, heard about the ill-fated expedition of Eustache Delafosse to the Gulf of Guinea[6]. The Flemish merchant left Bruges in mid-1479 and travelled to Seville, where he embarked on a caravel bound for the coast of Africa. He was trying to reach the gold producing regions of Elmina, where the Portuguese, during those years, were developing a lucrative trade with their African partners, in a regime of total exclusivity from a European perspective, under the protection of successive papal bulls (Witte, 1958). But in the early days of 1480, Delafosse and his companions were imprisoned by four Portuguese ships sailing in those seas. One of the Lusitanian captains, curiously, was "ung nommé Diago Can" (Escudier, 1992, p. 30), that is to say, a certain Diogo Cão, a Portuguese navigator who in the following years would explore a large portion of the West African coast, and to whom Martin Behaim will make references in some of his writings, as it will be noted later. Eustache Delafosse, after a complicated itinerary, returned to Bruges in early 1481, and surely the fame of his overseas adventures reached Antwerp, where at that time Behaim was residing.

At the end of 1484 or the beginning of the following year, Martin Behaim was already in Portugal, since a later document, written around 1500 by one of his relatives, states that in February 1485 the German merchant "was knighted (…) by the hand of the very powerful King João II of Portugal", in the town of Alcáçovas, in Alentejo[7]. This nomination is not confirmed by Portuguese documentation. But in that month of 1485 the Portuguese monarch was in

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5 On the Portuguese factory in Flanders, see Marques, 1965, pp. 217-267.

6 For details about this expedition, see Escudier, 1992.

7 Pohle, 2007, p. 29: "in der Stadt albassomas (…) wartt ritter geschlagen M. B. von nurmberg van der hant des grosmechtigen konig hern Johanse des andern von Portugal". King João II of Portugal ruled from 1481 to 1495.

Alentejo, and signed several documents in other neighbouring towns, such as Montemor-o-Velho or Viana do Alentejo (Serrão, 1993, pp. 176-178). Obviously, the fact that Martin Behaim was knighted by King João II as soon as he arrived in Portugal is the subject of speculation. Would it be a reward for services rendered to the Portuguese king at an earlier time, on maritime exploration voyages, for example? It is unlikely, as there are no indications of Behaim's presence on Portuguese territories in the period prior to 1484. It was not uncommon for the Portuguese monarch to attribute the title of knight to foreigners recently arrived in Portugal, especially when they represented important European commercial interests. That was the case of young Martin, who could prove his connections to important merchant families in Nuremberg, such as the Hirschvogel. King João II, at that time, was trying to attract foreign investors for his overseas trading projects (Pohle, 2017), and the welcoming reception extended to Martin Behaim could well fit into this strategy.

Most likely, Behaim was carrying with him from Antwerp introductory letters to the Flemish community in Lisbon. Thus, in a short time we find him in excellent relations with Josse van Hurtere (or Jos de Utra, as he is named in some Portuguese documentation). The Flemish merchant had been living in Portugal since the mid-1460s, where he had arrived on the recommendation of Isabel of Portugal, wife of Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy. In 1468, Prince Fernando, nephew of the Duchess of Burgundy, handed over the captaincy of the Faial island, in the Azores archipelago, to Josse van Hurtere, who took charge of the respective settlement, recruiting Flemish emigrants. Years later, in 1482, the Faial grantee also received the captaincy of the neighbouring Azorean island of Pico[8]. Martin Behaim, so it seems, quickly integrated into this Flemish community, since between his arrival in Portugal and 1488 he married Joana de Macedo, daughter of Josse van Hurtere. Obviously, his life was organized in commercial deals between Lisbon and the Atlantic Islands, not only the Azores but also Madeira, where his father-in-law had interests in the sugar trade. In these maritime circuits, evidently, Behaim learned some of the secrets of Atlantic navigation. Recalling that he had started in Flanders in the textile business, it is not impossible that he would have been interested in the dyes produced in Madeira and the Azores, such as pastel and dragon's blood[9].

Curiously, in this Portuguese period of his life, we find indications of Martin Behaim's participation in at least three geographical exploration projects coordinated by King João II, but in all of them without irrefutable documentary confirmation. The Lusitanian crown, by those years, was investing its main

[8] On the Flemish in the Azores, see Leite, 2012.

[9] Regarding these dyes, see Faria, 1991.

financial resources in the exploration of a maritime route to India[10]. At least since 1475, Portuguese cosmographers indicated the African route as the most viable alternative, that is, to sail south along the African coast, to find a sea passage to the Indian Ocean. The western route was open to private initiative, always with the permission of the Portuguese monarch, obviously, but without any financial support from the crown. That is why the 'Indian project' of the Genoese Christopher Columbus – to reach Asia by a western sea route – was rejected by King João II around 1485[11]. The voyages of exploration along the West African coast continued, and in the 1480s the Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão led three successive expeditions, the last of which arrived at the Parda mountain range (on the coast of present-day Namibia) in 1486[12]. Two years later, another Portuguese navigator, Bartolomeu Dias, was able to navigate beyond the Cape of Good Hope and confirmed the possibility of sailing directly from Lisbon to India[13].

The first project in which Behaim participates is mentioned years later by João de Barros. In his aforementioned *Primeira Década*, the Portuguese chronicler reveals that King João II, on an unspecified date – but probably around 1485 –, had commissioned a group of technicians to solve the problem of determining more rigorously the distances travelled by ships on the high seas. In the equatorial regions it was not possible to use the Polar Star as a point of reference, and that is why alternative processes had to be found. This group included "Master Rodrigo" and "Master Joseph the Jew, both his physicians, and one Martin of Bohemia, born in those parts"[14]. Martin Behaim, thus, is associated with master Rodrigo de Lucena and master José Vizinho, two important physicians and astrologers at the court of King João II. Both had participated shortly before in the commission of experts gathered to analyse the proposal presented to the Lusitanian monarch by Christopher Columbus, to "discover the island of Cypango by this western sea"[15]. The three technicians,

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10 On this theme, see Loureiro, 1998.

11 About the reception of Columbus's project in Portugal, see Randles, 1990. Regarding the Genoese navigator's life and deeds, see the recent work by Thomaz, 2021.

12 The chronology of the voyages of Diogo Cão has been revised by Radulet, 1990.

13 On Bartolomeu Dias, a rather enigmatic character, see Randles, 1988.

14 Barros, 1932, p. 127 (4-2): "méstre Rodrigo e méstre Josepe judeu ambos seus medicos, e a hũ Martim de Boémia natural daquellas pártes".

15 Barros, 1932, p. 113 (3-11): "descobrir a jlha de Cypãgo per este már occidental". Regarding Rodrigo de Lucena, it must be noted that his brother Afonso de Lucena was the personal physician of Isabel of Portugal, the Duchess of Burgundy; both were brothers of Vasco Fernandes de Lucena, an important humanist in the court of King João II. See Ferreira, 2015, 26- 27. About Master José, see Canas, 2016. With respect to Columbus's project, see Randles,

according to João de Barros, established a method of "nauegar per altura do sól", that is, a method of determining latitudes by the sun, using the astrolabe and also "tauoádas pera declinaçam" or declination tables (Barros, 1932, p. 127 (4-2).

These complex measurements involved a journey to the equatorial regions, but its exact date is not clear in the contemporary sources. However, an annotation consigned in one of the books later acquired by Christopher Columbus – the *Historia rerum ubique gestarum*, by Aeneas Silvio Piccolomini, in the Venice edition of 1477 – states that "The King of Portugal sent to Guinea, in the year of the Lord of 1485, Master José, his physician and astrologer, to recognize the elevation of the sun in all of Guinea"[16]. Thus, most likely, Martin Behaim would have travelled in 1485-1486, with the two physicians, on a ship commanded by João Afonso de Aveiro, who was the first Portuguese navigator to contact the kingdom of Benin, in the Gulf of Guinea[17]. In his *Vida e feitos d'el-Rey Dom João segundo* (Life and deeds of King John II), a work published years later, in Évora in 1545, the Portuguese chronicler Garcia de Resende, who at the time of this voyage lived in the court of King João II, says that João Afonso died in Benin, but then "the first pepper seen in Guinea was brought to Portugal"[18]. This was a type of pepper different from *malagueta* pepper, which the Portuguese had known for years, and it was later called *pimenta-de-rabo* (*Piper guineense*), soon becoming one of the main commodities of Portuguese trade in these parts of Africa. A few years later, the captions of the Behaim Globe (which will be discussed later) refer that Martin Behaim himself participated in the expedition of two Portuguese caravels to the Gulf of Guinea, "where the pepper discovered by the King of Portugal grows, 1485"[19].

The second project to which the name of Behaim is associated is the voyage of discovery of the island of the Seven Cities[20]. In the year 1486, King João II granted authorization to Fernão Dulmo and João Afonso do Estreito to make a voyage of discovery of unknown islands or lands in the Atlantic, in the unexplored regions to the west of the Azores archipelago. Fernão Dulmo (or Ferdinand van Olmen) was a Flemish who held the captaincy on the island of Terceira, in the Azores, and João Afonso was one of the captains of the island of

1990.

16 Columbus, 1992, p. 91: "(Rex) Portugalie misit in Guinea anno Domini 1485 magister Ihosepius, fixicus eius et astrologus, (ad comperien) dum altitudinem solis in totta Guinea".

17 For a biography of this navigator, see Christo, 1960.

18 Resende, 1994, p. 252: "veo a Portugal a primeira pimenta que se vio de Guine".

19 Ravenstein, 1908, p. 100: "do der pfeffer wechst den der konik in Portugal gefunden hat año 1485".

20 On the subject of this mythical island, see Buker, 1992.

Madeira. They were both supposed to sail at their own expense, without any financing from the Portuguese crown. The document mentions "a great island or islands or continental land, which is presumed to be the Island of the Seven Cities", which is granted to its potential discoverers. But, curiously, King João II refers to a certain "German knight, who will sail in their company, and the said German can choose the caravel in which he will sail"[21]. That is, there is a German knight – who can only be Martin Behaim – who is about to depart with Fernão Dulmo and João Afonso, freely choosing the ship in which he wants to travel. As much as our sources testify, the voyage of Dulmo, Afonso and Behaim never took place, for unknown reasons. But it is significant that this German gentleman is associated with such a journey of discovery of western lands. Once again, the captions of the Behaim Globe (which will be discussed later) refer to the "island of Antilia, called Seven Cities"[22].

Finally, the third project in which Behaim could have participated is related to Pêro da Covilhã's journey. King João II, in 1487, while preparing the fleet of Bartolomeu Dias that in the following year would sail beyond the Cape of Good Hope, sent two men, Pêro da Covilhã and Afonso de Paiva, via the Mediterranean routes, in order to recognize the eastern regions that the Portuguese were trying to contact by a direct maritime route[23]. Many years later, in 1520, after the Portuguese settled in India, Father Francisco Álvares travelled to Ethiopia in a Portuguese embassy, and met Pêro da Covilhã, who had lived in that African kingdom for more than thirty years. The Portuguese traveler, before leaving Portugal, had received from King João II a "a sailing chart drawn from the world map", for his guidance, as Álvares writes in his *Verdadera informaçam das terras do Preste Ioam* (True account of the Kingdom of Prester John), a work published in Lisbon in 1540[24].

This map, according to the version reported by Pêro da Covilhã, had been prepared by "bachelor Calçadilha, who is the Bishop of Viseu, and doctor master Rodrigo (…) and doctor master Moyses, who at this epoch was a Jew"[25]. That is, we find the same experts, master Rodrigo and master José Vizinho, and also a third, D. Diego Ortiz de Villegas, a Castilian who for many years served

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21 Ramos-Coelho, 1892, p. 58: "huũa gramde ylha ou ylhas ou terra firma per costa, que se presume seer a ylha das Sete Çidades"; "cavalleiro allemam, que em companhia d elles ha de ir, que elle alemam escolha d ir em qualquer carabella que quiser".

22 Ravenstein, 1908, p. 77: "Jnsula antilia genat Septe ritade [sic]". Regarding this hypothetical voyage, see Verlinden, 1964 and also Garcia, 2012.

23 It is still worth checking the classical study by Ficalho, 1988.

24 Álvares, 1974, p. 279: "carta de marcar [sic] tirada de Mapamundo".

25 *Ibidem*: "ho licẽçiado Calçadilha que he bispo de Viseu, e ho doutor mestre Rodrigo (…) e ho doutor mestre Moyses a este tẽpo iudeu".

the Portuguese crown[26]. Now, years later, Francisco López de Gómara will refer to this episode in his *Historia general de las Indias* (General history of the Indies), originally printed in Zaragoza in 1552. The Spanish chronicler also mentions the "chart where" Pêro da Covilhã and his partner "got their bearings", that "was copied by the bachelor Calzadilla, Bishop of Viseu, doctor Rodrigo, master Moisén". But he adds one more detail: that the three experts who worked for King João II had taken this partial chart from a "map that should be from Martin of Bohemia"[27].

Behaim's three participations in geographical exploration activities developed by the Portuguese are hypothetical, and evidently, they need further documentary confirmation, which has not been possible until today to obtain. But it is significant that his name is mentioned in these contexts. There is, however, in this same period, another connection of the Nuremberg merchant with Portuguese enterprises of maritime discovery. Before 1490, Behaim met Diogo Gomes, a man who was at that time *almoxarife* (or treasurer) of Sintra, in the outskirts of Lisbon, and who in his younger years had made several maritime journeys of exploration and commerce in the western coast of Africa and in the Atlantic archipelagos[28]. By 1488, the old Portuguese navigator, apparently at the request of Martin Behaim, wrote in Latin a detailed account of his voyages of discovery, with the title *De prima inuentione Guinee* (The first discovery of Guinea)[29]. The only copy of this account is preserved in a long manuscript known as the *Codex Valentim Fernandes*, now deposited in a library in Germany (Costa, 1997, pp. 277-309).

Valentim Fernandes was a printer originally from Moravia, who settled in Portugal at the end of the fifteenth century, where he developed important typographic activities, working closely with the Portuguese royal house. Besides his printing enterprises, Fernandes was interested in the geographical exploration movement accomplished by Portuguese navigators[30]. In Portugal, the Moravian collected a set of travel accounts and geographical descriptions of various authors, which he gathered in a codex written in his own hand, and which he eventually sent to Conrad Peutinger, an Augsburg humanist[31]. The

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26 Regarding this man, see Cristóvão, 1998.

27 López de Gómara, 1965-1966, I, 188: "tabla por donde se rigiesen"; "que sacaron el licenciado Calzadilla, obispo de Viseo, el doctor Rodrigo, el maestre Moisén"; "de un mapa que debia ser de Martín de Bohemia".

28 See a biography of Gomes in Oliveira, 2002.

29 I use the edition by Daniel López-Cañete Quiles, Sintra, 1991.

30 About this printer's activities, see Anselmo, 1981, pp. 146-198; about his collector's activities, see Jüsten, 2007.

31 Regarding Peutinger, see Pohle, 2017.

text of Diogo Gomes, recounting his journeys to the coast of Guinea and the islands of Cape Verde in the decades from 1440 to 1460, begins with a reference to Martin Behaim: "discovery that Diogo Gomes, treasurer of the royal palace of Sintra, recounted to Martin of Bohemia, an illustrious German knight"[32]. For years it was speculated that Behaim could be the author of this account, but it is now established that Diogo Gomes wrote the text in Latin, which he probably by 1488 yielded to Martin Behaim, who, in turn, communicated it later to Valentim Fernandes[33].

In the first months of 1490 Martin Behaim travelled from Portugal to Nuremberg, for reasons related to family heritage, and for three years he remained in that German city. Apparently, he came from Portugal with a reputation of a travelled man, an experienced navigator and an eminent cosmographer: he had established his residence in the remote island of Faial, in the middle of the Atlantic; he had travelled repeatedly on board Portuguese ships, heading to the Atlantic islands and to the coast of Guinea; and he had participated in projects of a scientific nature, following a direct invitation by King João II, who had distinguished him with the title of knight. In the German city, in this period, we find traces of his participation in various projects of geographical and cartographic nature.

Behaim was the intermediary in the acquisition by the municipality of Nuremberg of a map of the world. A document of 1494 refers to the payment to "her Merten Beham" (that is, Mr. Martin Behaim) of a considerable sum for "a printed world map, representing the entire world, (…) which will be hung at the chancellery"[34]. It is unknown what kind of map it was – and besides, being of a "printed" nature –, but it seems clear that Martin Behaim was not the cartographer responsible for the production of this enigmatic planisphere. Before 1490 there are no indications that the German could have obtained the technical skills necessary to draw a world map – except for the reference to the Pêro da Covilhã map. It is more likely that he would have acquired the planisphere, possibly in Portugal, in the nautical and geographical circles of Lisbon. Meanwhile, the same document refers to the fact that this world map was used as a model in the construction of a globe that is still preserved in Nuremberg today and that is precisely known as the *Behaim Globe* (Ravenstein,

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32 Sintra, 1991, p. 3: "quam inuentionem retulit Dioguo Gomez, almoxeriff palatti Sinterii, Martino de Bohemia, incliti militi Alemano".

33 Besides Sintra, 1991, see also Sintra, 2002, where Aires A. Nascimento confirms that the account was written in Latin by a Portuguese.

34 Ravenstein, 1908, p. 112: "her Marten Beham umb ein gedrukte mapa mundy, da die gantse welt ina wegriffen Ist (…) in die kantzley gehenkt wirtt".

1908, p. 112). Which means that the world map of Nuremberg could be of a type similar to the planispheres that in those years were being designed in Florence by Henricus Martellus, also from Nuremberg[35]. Could there be a personal connection between Behaim and Martellus, contemporaries, originating from the same German city, and both interested in cartographic subjects? It is a possibility that would explain the origin of the world map acquired for the municipality of Nuremberg through Martin Behaim.

By contrast, it is certain that Martin Behaim worked on the team that built the famous Nuremberg globe between 1490 and 1492[36]. The project of the globe was a municipal initiative, under the coordination of Georg Holzschuer, one of the city councillors, and had the collaboration of several technicians and artists. The globe has a diameter of 50 cm, is mounted on a pedestal, and is drawn in a wide variety of colours. From the cartographic point of view, it presents a compromise between the Ptolemaic representation of the world and the new information stemming from the Portuguese voyages of discovery on the coast of Africa. More than 1000 place-names appear on the globe, complemented by 48 flags, 15 coats of arms and 48 miniatures of kings and rulers. Martin Behaim, in addition to obtaining the printed world map used as a model, will have been primarily responsible for the information recorded in the extensive captions of the globe, handwritten in German, which included autobiographical references.

It is possible that one of the objectives of the construction of the globe was to visually demonstrate the possibility of a direct maritime route between the western coast of the Iberian Peninsula and the East Indies, that is, of the viability of navigation to Asia by a western route. In face of the advancement of the Portuguese voyages of discovery along the west coast of Africa, which operated in a monopolistic regime, this project had been circulating in some Iberian maritime circles. Christopher Columbus had been one of its proponents and was then in Spain preparing his expedition to the easternmost islands of Asia, following a western route. The globe, thus, could be seen as a product of the cosmographic speculations of the German humanists, mixed with the Iberian experience of Martin Behaim and with the interests of the Nuremberg merchants to intervene in the overseas trade more actively[37].

One of the captions of the globe refers to some of the sources of information used by Behaim and his collaborators: the ancient cosmographic work of Ptolemy, rediscovered by European humanists in the fifteenth century, and

35 See Winter, 1961 and Davies, 1977. About Martelus, see Van Duzer, 2019, pp. 2-42.

36 Regarding the globe, see Ravenstein, 1908, pp. 57-105; and also López-Cañete Quiles, 1995.

37 See Pohle, 2017. On the German interest about the Iberian voyages of exploration, see Johnson, 2008.

repeatedly published in Germany and other European regions; the medieval travel books by Marco Polo, which had a first edition in Latin precisely in Nuremberg in 1477, and by John of Mandeville, whose first illustrated edition was published in Augsburg in 1481; and the explorations ordered by "don Johann von Portugal", that is, textual or cartographic testimonies of the Portuguese voyages of exploration along the African coast[38]. But it is possible to identify in the captions of the globe many other texts deriving from ancient and medieval literary sources, such as the works of Herodotus, Strabo, Pliny, Pomponius Mela, Isidore of Seville and others, and also detect the use of cartographic sources, such as the already mentioned maps of Henricus Martelus[39].

Two captions of the Behaim globe are particularly interesting from an autobiographical point of view. In the first, the Nuremberger declares that in 1484 he participated in a journey ordered by King João II of Portugal to the coast of Guinea, and more specifically to the "konik furfursland" (that is, 'to the country of King Furfur'), where there "grows portogals pfeffer" (that is, 'pepper of Portugal')[40]. This would be the aforementioned trip of João Afonso de Aveiro to the kingdom of Benin, in which it is not impossible that Behaim participated. In the second caption, Martin Behaim mentions the history of the colonization of the Azores and alludes to "hern jobsst võ hürtter" (that is, 'Mr. Josse van Hurtere')[41], noting that the captain of the Faial and Pico islands was his father-in-law. It should be noted here that the textual and cartographic information transmitted by the globe about the regions that were being explored by the Lusitanian crown – the coast of Africa and the Atlantic Ocean – are not absolutely rigorous, denoting that Martin Behaim would not be in possession of the most updated information available in Portugal. Interestingly, in the same year in which the Behaim team completed the construction of the Nuremberg globe, Christopher Columbus sailed from Palos de la Frontera to begin his journey of discovery of a western route to the Indies, which was about to revolutionize the European conception of the world, and also its cartographic representation. The image of the world transmitted by the Behaim Globe, one year after its conclusion became definitely anachronistic (Brotton, 1997, pp. 46-86).

During the period of residence of Martin Behaim in Nuremberg, and perhaps with links to the construction of the globe, another project of globalizing

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38 Ravenstein, 1908, p. 62.

39 About the sources of the globe, see *Ibi*, pp. 62-71.

40 *Ibi*, p. 72.

41 *Ibi*, p. 76.

geographical scope was underway. Hartmann Schedel, one of the most eminent humanists of the German city, coordinated the edition of the *Liber chronicarum cum figuris e imaginibus ab initio mundi*, a monumental chronicle of the world, widely illustrated, which was printed in Nuremberg in 1493, first in a Latin version and then later in a German version[42]. One of the most active collaborators of the project, who prepared several texts for the chronicle, was Hieronymus Münzer, another German humanist who then lived in the city. Martin Behaim, who could have met both of them before, was recruited for the project, and provided information for the section on Portugal, which is not exactly the same in the Latin and German versions. An interesting detail, the two humanists, Schedel and Münzer, possessed important libraries, which could have been used by Behaim in the preparation of the texts for the Nuremberg globe (Goldschmidt, 1938).

The section on Portugal of the *Liber Chronicarum* (Schedel, 2001, ff. cclxxxv-cclxxxv^{v}) includes information about an alleged journey that Behaim made to the southernmost coast of Africa. According to this chronicle, the Portuguese King João II, in 1483, would have ordered the preparation of two ships for a voyage beyond the Pillars of Hercules, towards the regions of Ethiopia (that is, Africa). The captains of these two vessels were "Jacobum canum einen Portugalier und Martin Beheym einen teutschen von Nurmberg", that is, the Portuguese Diogo Cão and the Nuremberger Martin Behaim(Schedel, 2001, f. cclxxxv^{v}). Obviously, Behaim himself was the source of this information, which is not confirmed by the Portuguese contemporary documentation. The *Liber Chronicarum* further added that Behaim was a very knowledgeable man on the geography of the world (perhaps an indirect allusion to the Nuremberg globe) and much experienced in maritime navigation. We can thus verify that everything concerning the demonstration of the maritime experience and the geographical knowledge of Martin Behaim remains problematic.

In 1493 the Nuremberger returned to Portugal, and possibly was the bearer of a letter from doctor Hieronymus Münzer for King João II, dated from Nuremberg in July of that same year. A Portuguese translation of the letter, made by the Dominican Álvaro da Torre, preacher of the Lusitanian monarch, is preserved, and curiously enough was published in Lisbon, in a nautical guide entitled *Regimento do estrolabio e do quadrante* (The rules of the astrolabe and the quadrant). This work has no publication date, but it was probably printed around 1515[43]. Münzer's letter, apparently, had been written at the request of

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[42] See Schedel, 2001 (with a facsimile of the German version). About the chronicle, see Wilson - Wilson, 1976.

[43] See Albuquerque, 1991, pp. 185-187, which includes a facsimile of the very rare first edition.

Emperor Maximilian, who was trying to encourage the Portuguese king "to search for the very rich land of Catay", that is to say, to organize a maritime expedition that tried to reach Asia by a western route, departing from the islands of the Azores. Various scholarly arguments were used to verify the viability of the project; as Münzer wrote, many authors declared "the begging of the inhabited east to be very close to the ends of the inhabited west"[44].

Obviously, this project was similar to the one that Christopher Columbus had tried to achieve with his first Atlantic voyage. Which implies an immediate question: In Nuremberg, the news of the arrival of the Genoese navigator to Lisbon and then to Seville in March 1493 were surely known. Columbus's letter about his discovery had been published in Barcelona in May of the same year (Columbus, 1956). How to explain, then, the proposal of Emperor Maximilian to King João II, to repeat the same project that Columbus had apparently concluded with success? Probably, as has already been suggested, Martin Behaim, the instigator of the project, "thought that the islands that the Admiral of the Ocean Sea had reached did not really belong to India", which thus were "still to be discovered" (Gil, 2007, p. 81).

Or then, another possible alternative, Behaim would have had news about the debates that took place at the court of King João II, right after the visit of Columbus to Portugal, about the opportunity of sending an expedition to the western parts of the Atlantic, precisely from Madeira or the Azores[45]. There was also talk about Francisco de Almeida, an important Portuguese nobleman, commanding this exploratory journey, in order to determine rigorously the nature of the lands allegedly discovered by Columbus[46]. At this juncture, Münzer's letter seems extremely timely, for he also recommended to the Lusitanian monarch "Martin of Bohemia to see this project through", that is, Martin Behaim was proposed by the Emperor Maximilian as the most capable man to command an expedition to the eastern parts of Asia by a western route (Albuquerque, 1991, n.p.n.).

Nothing is known specifically about the development of this Portuguese Atlantic exploration project. But information recorded in two letters from the Spanish Catholic Monarchs of May and June 1493 mentions certain ships sent by the king of Portugal from the island of Madeira, "to discover islands or land to other parts where the Portuguese have not been before"[47]. Furthermore,

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44 Albuquerque, 1991, n.p.n.: "ho principio do Oriente habituel ser achegado asaz ao fim do Occidẽte abitauel".

45 About Columbus's visit to Lisbon, see Loureiro, 2018b.

46 Regarding this expedition, see Cortesão, 1973.

47 Fernández de Navarrete, 1825, p. 109: "a descobrir islas ó tierra á otras partes que non han

many years later, at the end of the sixteenth century, doctor Gaspar Frutuoso, author of an extensive manuscript chronicle of the Atlantic archipelagos, mentions a voyage of maritime exploration to the western Atlantic that would have been inspired by Martin Behaim. In the sixth book of the *Saudades da Terra*, in a passage that relied on oral information collected in the Azores, the Portuguese chronicler wrote that "with information and instructions that the King had from him, he sent certain men (so they say) to discover the Antilia, giving them the rules to find the proper route". That is, Behaim had transmitted concrete instructions to King João II for the organization of an expedition to search for the islands recently discovered by Christopher Columbus. Gaspar Frutuoso concluded by writing that the Portuguese navigators, "tired from such a long journey, sailed back to the kingdom", without finding the land they were looking for[48].

Martin Behaim, after returning from Nuremberg to Portugal, traveled immediately at the end of 1493 to Flanders and England, for somewhat enigmatic reasons, but probably related to his father-in-law's sugar businesses (Ravenstein, 1908, pp. 43-46). In April of the following year he was again in Portugal, and thereafter his trail fades, until his death in Lisbon in 1507. So, for more than a decade nothing is known about the enterprising Behaim, who disappears completely from the known sources. One possible explanation is that because of his apparently close ties with King João II he became a *persona non-grata* in the court of the new king, Manuel I, who ascended the throne in 1495[49]. Once again, there is no documentary evidence to prove such a hypothesis. Probably, Behaim lived in the island of Faial, in the Azores, after mid-1494, maintaining a discreet profile (Pohle, 2007, pp. 33-40).

Meanwhile, at the end of 1494, Hieronymus Münzer himself visited Portugal. The German humanist wrote a detailed account of his Iberian journey, which is preserved in a manuscript copy in the hand of Hartmann Schedel[50]. Münzer, who was on a long European tour, met King João II in Évora, but nothing transpires in his *Itinerarium siue peregrinatio* about the Atlantic exploration project. A few months earlier, in June 1494, a treaty that delimited the respective areas of influence of Portugal and Spain in the Atlantic had been

ido los portugueses fasta aquí".

48 Frutuoso, 1976, p. 274: "com informações e instrução que el-rei dele tinha, mandou certos homens (segundo dizem) descobrir as Antilhas, dando regimento por onde ele os encaminhava"; "enfadando-se da viagem, fizeram volta caminho do reino".

49 King Manuel I of Portugal ruled from 1495 to 1521.

50 For a recent and complete English translation, see Münzer, 2014.

signed at Tordesillas[51]. For the Portuguese crown, the project of navigating to Asia by a western route had already lost all of its importance. And Münzer, who visited Seville a few days earlier, had collected unpublished information about the discoveries of Columbus, also writing a *Treaty on the discovery of the Indies*, which has not yet been located[52].

Curiously enough, the Lusitanian monarch, in Évora, "publicly knighted Lord Anthony Herwart, (…) from Augsburg", one of Münzer's fellow travelers, a member of an important merchant family[53]. King João II had done the same thing years ago with Martin Behaim, in pursuit of the same strategy of seduction of Germanic merchant groups. Continuing is journey, Münzer visited Lisbon, where he stayed "in the lodgings of Lord Martin Behaim's father-in-law, Lord Iodocus of Hurder" (Münzer, 2014, p. 93). Interesting detail, Valentim Fernandes was in Lisbon the interpreter of the German humanist (Costa, 1997, p. 174). In the Castle of São Jorge, Münzer was able to observe "a map of the world on a large and well-designed gilt table", as he writes in his travel account (Münzer, 2014, p. 89). Was there any relation with the world map that Martin Behaim used for the construction of his globe? It is impossible to say, because Münzer makes no more allusions in his manuscript itinerary to Behaim, who at that time was probably in Portugal, perhaps in the Azores.

Could there be a relationship here with the map of Behaim that Antonio Pigafetta, the chronicler of the first circumnavigation, will mention a few decades later? At the end of 1520, when the expedition led by Fernão de Magalhães (or Magellan) was searching, in the southernmost shores of the New World, for a passage to the Spice islands, Pigafetta makes an enigmatic reference in his travel account, which was published for the first time in Paris around 1535. The Italian mentions that Magellan had seen a representation of the much sought-after strait "in a sailing chart belonging to the king of Portugal, which chart had been drawn by a great pilot and mariner named Martin of Bohemia"[54]. Pigafetta was traveling on Magellan's ship, and certainly correctly reproduced the words of his captain. Which means that the Portuguese navigator probably thought he had consulted a world map attributed to Martin Behaim, which would exist in a building in Lisbon, perhaps in the Castle of São Jorge. Obviously, this map could be a later

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51 On the treaty of Tordesillas, see Coben, 2015.

52 Münzer, 2014, p. 163. Also see Calero, 1996.

53 Münzer, 2014, p. 86. Regarding the Herwart family, see Pohle, 2017.

54 I translate from the French version published by Castro - Hamon - Thomaz, 2007, p. 106: "sur une carte marine du roi de Portugal, laquelle carte un grand pilote et marinier nommé Martin de Bohême avait faite".

development of the planisphere that in 1492 had been used to produce the Nuremberg globe, and of the world map that Hieronymus Münzer had been able to see during his visit to Lisbon, successively updated in the sequence of the great Iberian maritime expeditions (Hennig, 1948).

1. Conclusions

Martin Behaim, as we could see, is still an enigmatic figure, difficult to frame within the known documentary sources, but always in the background of important events. There is no doubt that he was intimately related to the Portuguese maritime circles that in the late fifteenth century were actively involved in the search for a sea route to the Indies. He repeatedly sailed on Portuguese ships across the Atlantic, in business ventures and geographic explorations. He acquired without a doubt capability as a cartographer, which he applied in the production of globes and world maps. And at a certain moment in his career, he defended the possibility of navigating to Asia through a western route. Curiously, after his disappearance, a *Behaim legend* developed within Iberian intellectual circles, as we saw in the quoted works of Antonio Pigafetta, Francisco López de Gómara and João de Barros. Martin Behaim gained a reputation as a mathematician, cosmographer, cartographer, and above all his world map was repeatedly mentioned, several of its avatars appearing in sixteenth century chronicles, particularly in the context of the discovery of the Strait of Magellan. This is the case of the *Historia de las Indias* by Bartolomé de Las Casas (1875-1876, IV, p. 377) and the *Historia general* by Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (1992, II, p. 229), for instance. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese chronicler Gaspar Frutuoso, in his already mentioned *Saudades da Terra*, briefly summed up this surprisingly positive image of the Nuremberger, alluding in his account of the island of Faial, in the Azores, to "a foreigner, German, whom they said was a great nobleman, astrologer and mathematician, and some even said that he was a necromancer, called Martin of Bohemia"[55].

[55] Frutuoso, 1976, p. 273: "um estrangeiro, alemão, que diziam ser grande fidalgo, astrólogo e matemático, e dizem alguns que era nigromântico, chamado Martim de Boémia".

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The casados of Melaka, 1511-1641: Strategies of Adaptation and Survival

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Abstract
As in other cities of the Portuguese empire in Asia, the *casados* of Melaka played a major role, in politics and in diplomacy as well as from an economical and military point of view. It was the local elite formed by Portuguese family groups or of Portuguese origin who controlled the local commerce, often in conflict with the Portuguese authorities. Its evolution throughout the 16th and 17th centuries reveals an enormous capacity for resistance and adaptation to the surrounding environment, even in the face of a growing isolation and the emergence of the Dutch threat.

Keywords
Portuguese Empire; *Estado da Índia;* Melaka; *casados*.

Resumo
Tal como ocorreu noutras cidades do império português na Ásia, os *casados* de Malaca desempenharam um papel da maior importância, tanto do ponto de vista político e diplomático, como económico e militar. Tratava-se da elite local formada por núcleos familiares portugueses ou de origem portuguesa que controlava o comércio local, muitas vezes em conflito com as próprias autoridades portuguesas. A sua evolução ao longo dos séculos XVI e XVII revela uma enorme capacidade de resistência e de adaptação ao meio envolvente, mesmo perante o crescente isolamento e o surgimento da ameaça holandesa.

Palavras-chave
Império Português; Estado da Índia; Malaca; *casados*.

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Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto

Introduction

On 7 September 1641, in Batavia, the commissioner Joost Schouten presented a report to the Council of India of the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Dutch East Indies Company, henceforth VOC), describing the situation in Melaka after its recent seizure from the Portuguese, following a long and painful siege[2]. In the document, Schouten makes a full analysis of the city, describing the devastation caused by the war, and by the final military offensive. With a view to increasing the Company's profits, he also suggests adequate steps to fully recover trade activities and restore the trust of mercantile communities. His report depicts scenes of devastation: a city with most of its buildings in ruins or badly damaged, gardens and orchards destroyed, as well as a decimated and fleeing population. The loss of Melaka constituted a major defeat for the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, yet the Dutch VOC did not reap the fruits they had hoped for when they conquered the city. Despite its success, the Dutch military campaign was very costly in terms of both human and material resources, and the spoils of the final plunder were much lower than expected. Instead, the capture of Melaka from the Portuguese was largely a moral victory that bore psychological and diplomatic results because the VOC's prestige among Malay sultanates and neighbouring powers grew substantially. However, more so than it being a success for the Dutch forces, the final outcome of the initiative was the victory of a "black trinity": war, hunger, and disease (Borschberg, 2010).

One of the most interesting questions regarding Schouten's report is the idyllic tone he adopted in describing the situation of Melaka *before* the siege. It is probable that the author, unfamiliar with the city before the Dutch conquest, was induced to rely excessively on local informants. His sources were residents of Melaka, who, as such, were clearly traumatized by the contrast between a vanished past, a painful present, and an uncertain future. Schouten claims that the city had previously been inhabited by more than 20,000 Christians, divided into what he called "blacks", "mestics" and "Portuguese", spread over the two suburbs of the citadel and living "happily under the shade of coconut trees and surrounded by beautiful gardens and pleasure grounds". Upriver also, beyond the suburbs, an area of pastoral tranquility extended across 8 to 10 miles

[2] Schouten's report of his visit to Melaka in Leupe, 1936, pp. 69-144.

"mostly covered with big fruit orchards, beautiful meadows or pasture grounds for cattle, and extensive rice fields under cultivation". In the direction of the chapel of Our Lady of Guadalupe, 4 miles outside of the city, the panorama painted was similarly idyllic (Leupe, 1936, p. 88).

However, the reality of the city was far more complex. It involved, on the part of the Portuguese, a long process of adaptation to the political and social realities of Southeast Asia, a region that was potentially hostile and far-removed from the centres of power of the *Estado da Índia*. The time span of Portuguese domination in Melaka reflected a process of survival, based on delicate balances, adaptations and adjustments, and where the local elite – composed of both Portuguese and the descendants of Portuguese, commonly known by the generic term of *casados* (literally "married men") – played a fundamental role.

The aim of this paper is to outline the main features of evolution of the *casados* of Melaka throughout the 130 years of Portuguese rule, focusing on their distinctive aspects regarding other cities of Portuguese Asia and underlining their internal dynamics.

1. The strategic decisions of Afonso de Albuquerque

Melaka was under Portuguese rule for 130 years, from 1511 to the final Dutch siege in 1641. The conquest of the city in 1511 was the result of a decision taken by the Portuguese Governor Afonso de Albuquerque to seize an opportune occasion – rescuing, from Melakan captivity, a group of Portuguese men who had belonged to Diogo Lopes de Sequeira's expedition – in order to establish a solid position in the sultanate, either by diplomatic or military means. The famous name of Melaka had spread all over Maritime Asia, as well as across Europe, and ever since the voyage of Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese fleets had brought back news and information about its wealth to Lisbon. King Manuel I longed to make contact with the city, as this would give the Portuguese access to China and the Spice Islands, as well as keep the Spanish from interfering in the region, as he had already reminded the Viceroy D. Francisco de Almeida as far back as 1506[3].

The importance of Melaka as a port city went far beyond local or regional significance. It was a veritable trade emporium with a global dimension, mostly

[3] Letter from the King to the Viceroy D. Francisco de Almeida, 1506, in Pato (ed.), 1884, III, pp. 269-270.

due to its exceptional position in the straits that controlled the main passage connecting two worlds: the Bay of Bengal, India, and the Middle East on one side, and the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, China, and Japan on the other. The Portuguese had arrived in Asia only recently, and Melaka would therefore be an excellent base for the spice trade. As a truly global *share point*, Melaka controlled a fundamental hub of long-distance Asian trade; it also provided ideal access to a wide range of commodities (Pinto, 2015).

Afonso de Albuquerque's expedition to Melaka was the outcome of both his duty to follow royal orders on the one hand, and his own personal plan to establish strong and lasting foundations for the Portuguese presence in Asia on the other. Albuquerque was aware of his limited resources, which contrasted with the vastness of Maritime Asia and the power of his competitors and enemies; it was therefore important to concentrate forces in a few specific, strategic points. As the Portuguese were mostly interested in ports and maritime connections, the 1511 military move was, in essence, the conquest of a trade port that ensured access to routes and goods.

However, Melaka was not only a port city; it was also the head of a vast and complex body. Throughout the 15th century, the Malay sultans had managed to establish a network of political allegiances on both sides of the Straits that were anchored in Islamic solidarity, dynastic connections to several neighbouring kingdoms, and the ideological primacy of the Sultan's own lineage dating as far back as the Sri Vijaya empire (Taylor, 1999, p. 175). The sultans also counted on the ancestral obedience of the local population – known under the general name of *Orang Laut*, literally "Sea People" – who controlled the labyrinth of canals and connections between the tip of the Malay Peninsula and the Strait of Singapore (Andaya, 1975, pp. 45-47). It was a political, social, and ideological mix that counterbalanced the apparent vulnerability of the Sultanate of Melaka and vested the sovereign with territorial solidity, prestige, and economic force.

The Portuguese were unfamiliar with these features and showed no interest in the Sultan's territorial empire, which remained unaltered after his defeat and subsequent escape from Melaka (Thomaz, 1994, p. 215; 1994b, p. 568). This lack of interest was evident in the way Albuquerque dealt with the social complexity he inherited: He left the Sultan's territories and network of vassals intact, as well as the old social structure, i.e., the Sultan's slaves and servants, who passed over to the Portuguese authorities and were allowed to keep their status, at least for some time (Thomaz, 1994c, pp. 274-275).

Afonso de Albuquerque may have miscalculated the political consequences of conquering the city. His confidence in the power of the Portuguese ships and warfare, as well as the pressure to gain access to the Spice Islands and to China,

may have induced him to take the risky option of an aggressive approach rather than trying to reach an agreement with the Sultan, which would have been the usual practice elsewhere in Asia. Albuquerque did, however, consider the possibility of giving over the governance of the city to the King of Siam in exchange for his help in the conquest, a sign that he was aware of the risks and difficulties in maintaining Melaka over a long time[4]. Later sources suggest that King Manuel I might possibly have agreed to give back the city to the Sultan, as long as the Portuguese were allowed control of the port[5].

Once the Portuguese took Melaka, they had to ensure its survival. The measures taken by Albuquerque were mostly pragmatic and intended to maintain the status quo of the city. To that effect, he adopted a policy of low customs duties; he upheld the tradition of keeping jurisdictions and regencies separate; and he simplified the administrative processes of the different communities, turning two important political positions of the Malay sultanate, the *Bendahara* and the *Tumenggung*, into leaders of the main merchant groups of the city (Pinto, 2012, pp. 203-213). Albuquerque was also aware that Melaka was at risk of becoming isolated, and that it depended totally on the exterior, that is, food supplies imported from Java, Burma and other regions. He therefore tried to ensure the future of the new conquest not only by building a fortification, but also by ensuring geopolitical viability. To that effect, Albuquerque sent immediate diplomatic missions and messengers to different kingdoms and neighbouring sultanates in order to calm the spirits, establish trade contacts, attract merchants and capital, and safeguard the survival of the city (Lobato, 2000, pp. 25-27).

2. *Melaka and the* Estado da Índia

In Melaka, Albuquerque did not implement the customary policy of creating the social stratum known as *casados*, i.e., mixed marriages or relationships between resident Portuguese men and Asian women. This was an important difference to other port cities under Portuguese control on the west coast of India. In a letter to the King in 1512, Albuquerque mentions 200 *casados* in Goa, and 100 each in Cochin and Cannanore respectively[6], while leaving open the

4 Letter from Rui de Brito Patalim to the Governor Afonso de Albuquerque, 5 February 1514, in Sá, 1954, p. 43.

5 'O Tombo do Estado da Índia' by Simão Botelho in Felner, 1868, pp. 104-105.

6 Letter from the Governor Afonso de Albuquerque to the King, 1 April 1512, in Pato, 1884, I, p. 63. See slightly different figures to 1514 in Xavier, 2007, pp. 93-94.

question as to how exactly the *casados* of Melaka were to be established in the first place. This may have been due to a lack of opportunity or time, or simply because Albuquerque was busy trying to solve more urgent problems during his brief stay in Melaka; he therefore merely suggested the possibility of establishing such a stratum to King Manuel, having reserved a space next to the fortress for "peoples of those parts who would want to live here, and *casados*, they will settle there"[7]. The matter was therefore postponed, without a clear strategy as to what policy or model to adopt.

At that very time, the embryonic *Estado da Índia* was going through a period of instability, defined by oscillating and undefined policies, as well as by confrontations between parties and factions that degenerated into a near civil war. Not only did the Viceroy Lopo Soares de Albergaria substantially change Albuquerque's strategic lines, but the death of King Manuel I and the ascension to the throne of King John III in 1521 caused a new inflection in the directions and global options of the *Estado*. The anarchy lasted for some time, with the simultaneous presence of two Governors and two opposing fields. It only came to an end in 1529 with the arrival in India of the Viceroy Nuno da Cunha.

These political problems involved the whole *Estado da Índia*. Melaka was, however, distant from Goa and therefore from the epicentre of this turbulence, and it evolved towards solving its own, specific problems: ensuring economic prosperity and trade flows by attracting Asian merchant communities; strengthening diplomatic contacts and ties with neighbouring sultanates and kingdoms; keeping Melaka supplied with provisions; safeguarding the social order; providing for the smooth operation of the port; and, lastly, ensuring the safety of navigation and of the city in view of the incursions by the Malay Sultan who, after fleeing the city in 1511, remained a permanent threat. Until the mid-16th century, a broad pragmatic policy of adaptation to local conditions prevailed. It was especially up to the military authority of the city (the "Captain") to define the daily norms of conduct. Grievances were inevitable and complaints frequent, not only from the Asian merchants but also from the Portuguese settled in Melaka.

There is, unequivocally, something contradictory and paradoxical about Melaka in the 16th century that cannot be explained simply by calculations of material and human resources. It was, fundamentally, a story of adaptation and survival in a frequently hostile environment; of competition with rivalling port cities for the same trade, the same products, and the same merchant

7 *Ibi*, p. 53.

communities. Portuguese Melaka had no nearby bases of support, no reliable or lasting allies, nor military capacity to guarantee its safety in times of crisis. On the contrary, in an era of slow communications that were entirely subject to the pace of the monsoons, the city depended upon relief to arrive with fleets from India and, at times, from as far as Portugal.

The isolation and dependence of Melaka on the outside world; on maritime connections; and on supplies from neighbouring kingdoms on the one hand, as well as the city's structural weakness within the region on the other, made it necessary to resort to strategies of adaptation and adjustment. The first and most obvious was to seek a balance between its closest and fiercest rivals: the sultanates of Aceh to the west, and that of Johor to the east. It meant preventing, at all costs, an alliance between the two powers. This was done by promising alternating support for one and the other, and by fomenting and exploiting the mutual rifts and suspicions (Pinto, 1996, pp. 117-121). The Portuguese used this same strategy on other occasions against other powers and kingdoms, such as the Javanese sultanate of Japara. In 1551, they were able to undo the Johor-Japara alliance in a joint strike on Melaka. Equally, in the 1570s, the initial Japara support for one of the Acehnese offensives against Melaka was neutralized by the Portuguese (Couto, 1975, p. 236).

This strategy entailed the restricted use of warfare; it was limited to defensive and retaliatory actions and always in maritime or coastal contexts with the intention of re-acquiring the position and status prior to the crisis. Direct attacks and landings were rare, and always directed against the former sultan of Melaka and his descendants, as occurred in Bintang in 1526, and in Johor Lama in 1587. No expeditions of territorial conquest ever took place, nor any permanent occupation of territories, or attempts to repeat the events of 1511 in other cities. While plans to that effect were drawn up, and opinions voiced – and some even argued in favour of conquering Aceh, who, from the 1530s onwards, emerged as the most relentless enemy of the Portuguese – none of this was ever actually undertaken (Pinto, 2012, pp. 68-78). The Viceroy D. Martim Afonso de Castro's landing in Aceh in 1606 was an exception to this general rule and took place within extraordinary circumstances. Attacking the Sultanate's capital was not part of the initial plans, which aimed at expelling the Dutch from the region. His decision to strike was made on the spot and resulted in disaster (Queirós, 1699, pp. 334-337).

The Portuguese strategy involved skillful and attentive diplomacy. It prioritized the use of communication channels, as well as circulating information via formal and informal embassies and legations. It also involved various diplomatic agents, such as the Captain, the Bishop, the *Bendahara*, or the

Tumenggung. The offices of the *Bendahara*, being representatives of the Hindu *Keling*, as well as those of the *Tumenggung* as representatives of the Muslim merchant communities, gradually lost these functions that had initially been determined by Afonso de Albuquerque. They did, instead, go on to play an essentially diplomatic and intermediary role with the Sultanate of Johor, as well as the people from Minangkabau (Sumatra) who had settled in Melaka's hinterland[8].

Lastly, it is important to consider the priority given to trade and business ventures to the detriment of ideological prejudices. Attempts to obtain contacts and support from non-Muslim kingdoms and powers – a policy that had marked the early period of Portuguese presence in the region – soon dwindled as Islam permeated Sumatra, Java, and the Eastern Archipelago. The Portuguese in Melaka were soon forced to consider establishing partnerships and alliances with Muslim powers without incurring disruption or inconvenience. On the other hand, the precepts of the Catholic Reform did not affect the city, where, for instance, the Inquisition was never established. It was widely known that Melaka was a refuge for New Christians (who in fact worked as trade agents and middlemen at the Captains' service), and there were complaints against the Bishop for permitting public celebrations of Hindu ceremonies[9].

As a direct result of its isolation and the distance that separated it from India, Melaka was forced to adopt a flexible approach as well as adaptive abilities. Ironically, this turned out to be an advantage, since the situation of self-government that marked daily life in the city not only provided room for manoeuvre for the local elites and more freedom for private business ventures; it also allowed practical solutions to be adopted and managed, despite contravening royal guidelines. In many cases, these solutions were imposed by the Captains, who, during some periods, held discretionary and almost absolute power and used it to their own advantage. This meant taking decisions and making profitable agreements that were, however, harmful to Melaka's own interests and safety, often at the cost of the Royal Treasury, of the merchant communities that frequented the city, and of the residents themselves. While

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[8] Letter from the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque to the King, 18 February 1622, in Rego, 1974, p. 393; *Ibi*, 20 February 1622, in *Ibi*, p. 407.

[9] Letter from the Viceroy D. Francisco da Gama to the King, [1600], Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, *Reservados*, cod. 1976, fl. 131; letter from the *ouvidor* of Melaka to the King, 17 December 1588, Archivo General de Simancas, *Secretarias Provinciales*, liv. 1551, fl. 469v. See Pinto, 2012, pp. 8 and 182.

the wide margin for manoeuvre and the freedom of movement that the Captains enjoyed did allow them to solve the occasional conflict with neighbouring kingdoms, most of the time it led to abuse and extortion, followed by reprisals that put the safety of the city at a serious risk[10].

3. The casados *of Melaka*

Throughout the first decades of the 16th century, the Portuguese authorities were generally reluctant to adopt policies that clearly favoured the settlement of Portuguese in Melaka. It did not occur in other cities of *Estado da Índia*, as seen above, like Goa and Cochin, the former because of its emerging central role as capital of Portuguese Asia and the latter due to the early association between local *casados* and the King of Cochin in inter-regional trade, from imports of timber destined to shipbuilding or horses from Hormuz, to exports of Indian textiles to Southeast Asia (Malekandathil, 2000-2001, pp. 385-391).

In Melaka, however, it would have meant allowing soldiers to exchange their military life for commerce, and would thus have exacerbated the permanent lack of human resources in the far outpost of the Portuguese empire in Asia whose horizons were gradually extending. Whenever soldiers were granted freedoms, they tended to abscond in droves from the official jurisdiction of the *Estado da Índia*, resulting in a shortage of service in the fleets and fortresses. The disastrous "great release" promoted by the Viceroy Lopo Soares de Albergaria (1515-1518) left serious marks and resulted in measures to control and monitor the soldiers. Melaka, as must be understood, was at the core of an immensely vast area where such control mechanisms were scant or non-existent. From the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea and the "Mediterranean" Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, the official institutions of the *Estado da Índia* were scarce and dispersed. They existed, with some complexity and size, in the city of Melaka only in the form of administrative, fiscal, and justice officials; permanent defence forces; a fortress; as well as ecclesiastical structures.

This initial reluctance by the Portuguese authorities to stimulate the settlement of soldiers in Melaka was visible, for example, in regulations that penalised commerce carried out by Portuguese by imposing on them higher customs duties than those imposed on Asian merchants. In 1538, one Captain of Melaka even proposed that all Portuguese who earned more than 2,000 *cruzados* should be expelled from Portuguese Asia (Thomaz, 1994b, p. 574). Regarding

[10] See Pinto, 2012, pp. 2-10, 187-191, and Lobato, 1999, pp. 180-197.

the *casados*, the first Captain of the city, Rui de Brito Patalim, reported to the King in 1514 that there were only seven or eight "honourable men" in Melaka (by which he meant men who had married Asian women), but added that there were many others ready to do the same: "If the clamp is loosened, all of them will marry here, because the land is auspicious for that". In the absence of clear instructions, the Captain withheld authorisation for more Portuguese to settle in Melaka and asked the King for "orders and how should I deal with them"[11].

In 1525, the *casados* of Melaka wrote to King John III asking for a series of benefits that would be vital for the prosperity of the small community. The petitioners claimed that the actual survival of the city under Portuguese control would depend upon the King granting them the privileges they asked for. Invoking the services rendered in previous years, i.e., the defence of Melaka and the conversion of the so-called "infidel" women whom they had married, the *casados* called on the monarch to grant them the same rights and privileges as the residents of Goa, "for here we are not less worthy, nor of fewer services, nor of less quality than them". The complaint, invoking comparison with Goa, culminated in a request for five major privileges: the right to organize themselves in a City Council; the right to choose, elect and control different administrative and port offices; the right to own the lands and gardens on the outskirts of Melaka that had belonged to the Malay Sultan; exclusivity of the commerce of supplies for the city; and finally, freedom to sail to any city or fortress of the *Estado da Índia*[12]. These five areas, present in the document, constituted a regular pattern of demands by the *casados* until the Dutch capture of Melaka over a century later. This confirms their role as local elite with a territorial base, attempting to safeguard their rights and freedoms in the face of the Captains' tentacular power which, by this point, tended to hinder their movements and interfere in all of the city's commerce. It also shows their attempts at maintaining a minimum set of privileges and control over port activity, and over the administration of daily life in Melaka.

The number of *casados* slowly increased over the 130 years that Melaka was part of the Portuguese empire in Asia: from less than ten in the 1530s, to 100 in 1580, and 124-600 in the 17th century[13]. While these numbers show a gradual increase, they also reflect some contradictions and confusion regarding

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11 Letter from Rui de Brito Patalim to the King, 6 January 1514, in Sá, 1954, p. 64.

12 Letter from the *casados* of Melaka to the King, 12 August 1525, in Thomaz, 1964, vol. II, pp. 170-173.

13 Data and sources in Thomaz, *Ibi*, vol. I, pp. 200-201; Macgregor, 1955, p. 12, note 37; Subrahmanyam, 1988, p. 72; Pinto, 2012, pp. 184-185.

demographic figures. In fact, as the "Portuguese" of Melaka gradually lost their defining characteristics and became diluted with the local and regional environment, it became increasingly difficult to trace a line of separation between different social groups: "Portuguese", "casados", "residents" or "Christians of the land" were now blurring notions describing mixed local elites. In 1606, when Johor joined a Dutch army led by Cornelis Matelieff on a joint attack on Melaka, an anonymous Dutch source (based on information provided by a captured Catholic clerk) estimated Melaka's population to be 11,400 souls, cautioning, however that "in this total, there were probably about 300 whites; the rest were half-breeds, natives and blacks, both slaves and free"[14].

The question of definition and exact numbers is exacerbated and rendered confused by the constant mobility of the communities of Melaka; this accounts for the fact that demographic figures presented by authors with some knowledge and permanence in the land – like the Portuguese-Malay Manuel Godinho de Erédia – are generally higher than those presented by visitors, or by those who obtained information from third parties (Pinto, 2012, pp. 184-185). The difficulty in globally evaluating Melaka's population, both before and after the Portuguese conquest, is a long-standing issue that continues to divide scholars and historians alike (Ptak, 2004).

The *casados* of Melaka, who, in 1640, endured the Dutch siege for several months, were a substantially different community from the first group of residents who wrote to King John III in 1525. In the intervening century, communities had adapted to local conditions, inter-married, and established deep roots in the Malay world. The Portuguese of the initial post-1511 years, by contrast, were newcomers to a strange world which, to them, looked both attractive and hostile, while the survivors of the fall of Melaka in 1641 had become perfectly adapted to their environment and thus rapidly adjusted to the new challenges placed by the hegemonic and triumphant Dutch VOC. Miscegenation as early as the first decades of the 16th century rose rapidly, especially extra-maritally. As several sources of the period reveal – causing outrage among the Catholic missionaries – the acquisition of large numbers of women slaves by the Portuguese of Melaka was common. In 1550, a Jesuit reported they used to buy "herds of slave men and women, as if they were sheep", and one of them "had 24 women of different casts, all his captives, and all of them he used"[15].

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14 'Description on the city of Melaka' in Borschberg, 2015, p. 214.

15 Letter from Nicolau Lanciloto, 5 December 1550, in Thomaz, 1964, vol. I, p. 209, note 1.

The gradual growth of a community of Portuguese *casados* settling in Melaka brought about a more rapid increase in family and patronage structures. These descendants of Portuguese men demanded official recognition of their status and privileges, just like other small elites of typical 'colonial' societies – both in Portuguese Asia and elsewhere, such as in South America, for instance – were also trying to achieve. The Crown's official endorsement of conversion to Catholicism – unlike in the early days – facilitated and accelerated this tendency of claiming rights and privileges from the Crown. The scenario described by Joost Schouten in 1641 (also evident in the descriptions of Manuel Godinho de Erédia and António Bocarro, among others), shows the merging of the Portuguese, not only from a demographic point of view, but also in terms of space occupation. This broader social environment included groups vaguely described as "Christians", "mestizos", or "vassals". In the absence of well-defined neighbourhoods or clear hierarchical power structures, such as in Spanish Manila in the Philippines, for example, there was no clear line of separation when it came to the organization and administration of the physical space of the city (Pinto, 2010, pp. 279-284).

However, indicators persisted as to a difference between two groups. On the one hand, a more restricted core of "Portuguese" families, commonly referred to as "white *casados*" who constituted the local elite of "neighbours" or "residents", with political influence, economic power and social prestige. A text from 1626 provides a list of their names, 124 in all, distributed among the various parishes of the city[16]. About the same time, the Flemish Jacques de Coutre pointed out the cohesion of this group and stated that "nothing is done to bring them to justice", for "they are all relatives and godparents [to each other's children]" (Borschberg, 2014, p. 266). On the other hand, there was a more fluid and undefined group of the "Christians of the land", with less economic power and influence. In the decade of the 1630s, while there was a less acute disparity between both strata than in earlier periods, the chronicler António Bocarro still distinguishes between "white *casados*" and "Christian *casados*" (Bocarro, 1990, p. 251).

A whole process of change, therefore, can be seen to occur across an entire century. The scenario that during the early times was so unfavourable to the growth of the community of *casados* of the land, as described above, gradually changed over the second half of the 16th century. In 1552, at last, the King authorized a City Council to be established, and he granted Melaka a set of

[16] Biblioteca Pública de Évora, codex cxvi/2-3, fls. 52v.-54v., in Subrahmanyam, 1988, pp. 76-79.

privileges and rights similar to those of the city of Évora in Portugal. Six years later, the Diocese of Melaka was created. The Catholic Reform movement – which strongly encouraged missionary activities across Asia in the ambit of the *Padroado Português do Oriente* (Portuguese Patronage of the East) – created an atmosphere of religious discrimination and pressure, propitious for conversions to the Catholic faith. Melaka became the main stopping place, as well as the point of intersection par excellence, of the missionary circuits of Indonesia and the Far East, resulting in the settlement of the various religious orders: Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, and, later, Augustinians. The initial preference given to Asian merchant communities over commerce carried out by the Portuguese was inverted, and by the end of the century, the latter benefitted from a much lighter taxation regime (Pinto, 2012, p. 179, note 48). Melaka became more and more a "Portuguese" city, and conversions to the Catholic faith occurred ever more frequently, mainly among the lower social strata (Lobato, 1999, pp. 80-81).

In this way, Melaka gradually changed from an essentially mercantile and cosmopolitan city (following the legacy of the Malay sultanate) into a city with a pronounced 'colonial' character, with a firmly established local elite, as well as a strong component of religious discrimination, both in its social hierarchy and in its regular administration. However, the aspirations of this elite of *casados* and their dependants to participate more actively in the profitable Melaka trade were curtailed, as evidenced by successive complaints to the Portuguese authorities in Goa and Lisbon. These grievances were mostly directed at one target: the Captains and the pressure they exerted over all trade in the city. Not only did the Captains monopolise the most lucrative forms of commerce, they also controlled and levied taxes on small businesses, both local and regional[17].

Unable to confront the growing power of the Captains, who held the highest position of authority in a city far removed from Goa and the centres of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean, the *casados* became increasingly ostracised from the most important trade of Melaka, i.e., the spice trade with the Moluccas and other regions of the Archipelago. In the end, they focused on another set of commodities, less lucrative in terms of absolute yields but essential nonetheless for the survival of the city, and one which gave them a considerable margin of autonomy and power: food provisions. In fact, not only did they operate the gardens in the suburbs and surroundings of the fortress, they also controlled the importation of supplies from distant places. This was mentioned by travellers and chroniclers who, mostly unfamiliar with the

[17] See the "Notes" issued by the city of Melaka, 1599, in Pinto, 2012, doc. 10, pp. 300-302, and letter from the Bishop of Melaka to the King, 31 December 1588, *Ibi*, doc. 6, p. 296.

delicate internal balance of Melaka and the distinctive characteristics of its social structure, blamed the cost of living, as well as the permanent shortage of provisions in the city, on the *casados*[18].

4. A military elite

At the turn of the 17th century, the *casados* of Melaka exerted a more or less concealed and disseminated control over the city. They often conflicted with the more prominent official authorities, such as the Captains, the Royal officials, and the Bishop [19]. Moreover, as local society began undergoing the transformations mentioned above, the *casados* started accruing influence and prestige due to the role they played in the defence of Melaka. In the wake of the escape of the Malay Sultan and his attempts to recover his former capital, the threats to the city's security remained throughout the years following the conquest by Albuquerque. Not only had the Sultan's successors established a new sultanate, Johor, in the near proximity of Melaka, which continued to threaten Portuguese navigation and the safety of the city; a new and formidable enemy emerged and became the most serious concern for the Portuguese in that region: the sultanate of Aceh. It had assumed the role of the Islamic vanguard and champion against the Portuguese and their trade structures, and, after 1538, attempted to conquer Melaka on several occasions.

Melaka was hampered by a permanent shortage of soldiers, as well as by scant military and naval resources in general, and thus could not fully guarantee defending the city against external threats. Furthermore, it relied on the assistance from Goa, which, in turn, was conditioned by the pendular pace of the monsoons, as well as by limited means of communication and transportation. Melaka's survival, therefore, increasingly depended on its internal resources, both military and diplomatic. In both these areas, the *casados* played a fundamental, if not exclusive role, and thus became preeminent protagonists of Melaka's defence[20]. Yet Melaka was not a unique case in the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*: in Bassein, Daman, and Goa, local *casados* acted as a

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[18] See Borschberg, 2014, pp. 264-266; Bocarro, 1876, p. 195; Relação do Estado da Índia, in Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, *Misc. Mss. do Convento da Graça*, cx. 16, t. 6 F, fl. 103.

[19] Of relevance here is the conflict between the *casados* and the Bishop D. João Ribeiro Gaio, as described in San Antonio, 1988, pp. 92-98.

[20] See the examples of António de Andria, António Fernandes de Ilher, and Fernão da Costa in Pinto, 2012, pp. 226-229.

second-line army, too (Rodrigues, 1998, p. 344), despite the traditional mistrust by the authorities, namely the viceroys, who considered them more concerned with their own business than with safeguarding the interests of the Crown (Xavier, 2007, pp. 95-96).

Given the specific characteristics of Melaka, however, their importance was of even greater significance there: During the siege and attack from Aceh in 1568, and those between 1573 and 1575, it was the *casados* who proved to be the decisive force in Melaka's fortunes as assistance from India was delayed and, when it did come, not conclusive to military success.

In the late 16th century, in addition to Melaka's position as trade emporium, the city increasingly became a foothold for Christianity in East Asia, an interface, as it were, for the missionary circuits in Asia, as well as an important military base. This was particularly relevant in times of war, amid mounting concerns for the city's defence. This military dimension, however, went far beyond fortifying and reinforcing the city's defensive structures; it also led to a kind of militarisation of local communities in addition to those of the *casados* and their network of dependants (the overwhelming number of slaves). The relevance of the latter in Melaka's military and defensive capabilities cannot be understated. In 1621, the Governor of India reported to the King that according to the Bishop of Melaka, the proportion of *casados* to slaves was around 1 to 25[21]. Shortly afterwards, the same Bishop wrote that there were no more than 75 professional soldiers in the fortress, meaning that the defence of the city was left to the *casados* (whom he distrusted) (Subrahmanyam, 1988, p. 72). The chronicler António Bocarro presented a proportion of *casados* to slaves at less than 1 to 10, but reiterated just how well prepared and suitably aggressive the "Portuguese", their dependants, and the "Christian *casados*" were (Bocarro, 1990, p. 251).

The pre-eminence and prestige of the *casados* in the social scene of Melaka went far beyond the growing military dimension of the community. They were also fundamental to the other pillar on which the safety of the city rested: diplomacy and a network of links with the neighbouring sultanates, ensuring access to updated information on their movements and plans; in other words, a veritable espionage network. It also left room for diplomatic negotiations through legations and ambassadors that sought alliances, made peace agreements, engaged in business ventures, and negotiated compensation claims. In most situations of great tension and hostility – mainly with the sultanates of

[21] Letter from the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque to the King, 20 February 1621 in Rego (ed.), 1974, p. 226.

Johor and Aceh – it was the diplomacy of the *casados* and their network of contacts that brought about conflict resolution, as well as other advantageous outcomes for Melaka.

The close relations that existed between the *casados* and the regents of the city's Asian communities, the *Tumenggung*, reveal the city's concern with its strategic balance and highlight the importance of diplomacy as vital for its continued survival. This office differed substantially from its earlier role in the first half of the 16th century, as seen above. Throughout the 17th century, the *Tumenggung* acted as intermediary between Melaka and Johor, and as administrator of neighbouring villages in Melaka's hinterland. From 1610 onwards, the position was held by a *casado* named João Lopes de Amoreira, who in 1626 was still resident within the walls of the city (Subrahmanyam, 1988, p. 76).

In this light, the continuous Dutch presence in the region can be seen to have undermined Melaka's importance, since in the eyes of its neighbouring powers it was no longer necessary to follow a policy of compromise with the Portuguese.

5. The fall of Melaka in 1641

As for 1511, the history of Melaka has a *before* and an *after* 1641. The city never recovered from the strain of the prolonged war fought by the *Estado da Índia* against the Dutch VOC. It was a long process *in crescendo* that started with the failed siege of Melaka in 1606, continued with incessant skirmishes and sporadic attacks on the Portuguese navy, and culminated in a policy of systematic blockades after 1636 at the hands of the Dutch Governor General, Anthony van Diemen. The Dutch takeover in 1640, therefore, was the logical and inevitable outcome of a strategy of eliminating Portuguese navigation in the region, and of incorporating Melaka into the political, diplomatic, and commercial network of the Company, which was already a hegemonic power in the Southeast Asian Archipelago.

The siege of Melaka in 1640 and its ensuing fall into the hands of the VOC can be seen as a demonstration of the city's inadequate conditions for survival. Throughout the second half of the 16th century, these were, successfully, based on the *casados* as guarantors of the city's defence and safety. Their capacity for resistance and military action was well suited to the threats that originated in neighbouring sultanates, whose hostility was widely known. Furthermore, their network of patronage, coupled with their contacts in the region, enabled them to carry out effective diplomatic actions, maintain the balance of power, and

diffuse tensions. And yet, all this expertise was rendered futile by the arrival of the Dutch, not only because the VOC's military and naval might was formidable and unprecedented, but also because the diplomatic strategies of the Dutch Company proved to be highly corrosive to the traditional network of complicities and connections which the *casados* had established.

After the systematic destruction carried out by the Dutch and their Malay allies from Johor during the siege of 1641, very little remained of the former glow of Melaka. The population was decimated to a few hundred by war, famine, and disease. In the opinion of Joost Schouten, the Portuguese were now a burden due to their "lazyness and conceit and inability to earn an honest livelihood" (Subrahmanyam, 1988, p. 76). A new Melaka would have to be built, so he argued, shaped according to the political and strategic plans of the VOC, whose heart was located in nearby Batavia. This would be done in accordance with the Company's commercial network, and built on the Dutch parameters of good social order.

The fall of Melaka to the Dutch is usually seen as the origin of a Portuguese diaspora in Southeast Asia. Generally speaking, one may consider that Melaka's residents split into four different groups. The first group, made up of the wealthier elements, was allowed to relocate with all their possessions to Nagapattinam, on the east coast of India. A second group moved to Batavia, the capital of the VOC in Asia, and eventually ended up serving the Company. Others moved to Makassar, where they rebuilt their trade networks and prospered for about two decades until they were expelled by the Dutch in 1667. Lastly, an unidentified number of Portuguese stayed in the city after the Dutch conquest (Pinto, 2017, pp. 139-141). It seems that by the 1670s, this local community of about 4,000, living inside the walls of Melaka as well as in surrounding villages, had regained once more a certain level of prominence (Bort, 1927, p. 40; Fernández-Navarrete, 1676, p. 371).

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7. Curriculum vitae

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Imperative Minorities and Transoceanic Connections (c. 1572 - c. 1621)[1]

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Abstract
In 1601, D. Luís Cerqueira, Bishop of Japan, revealed a multicultural social network composed of merchants - some of which were "cristãos-novos" - and Jesuits which connected Nagasaki, Macao, Manila, Goa and Siam. By analysing the paths of Jewish-origin merchants belonging to this network, we aim to question their importance within the Jesuit project's sustenance and survival network in East Asia and Macao itself. We also look at the reach of the *cristão-novos* network which was useful to the self-financing strategy launched by Alessandro Valignano, SJ, and that was of key importance between 1593 and 1596 when the *cristão-novo* Jesuit Gomes Vaz was the procurator. A network which by operating in concert with the Jesuits still connected Nagasaki and Macao to Portugal, Peru, Panama, Mexico, Manila, Goa, Kochi and the Ottoman Empire.

Keywords
"cristãos-novos"; Jesuits; Macao; Nagasaki; Social Networks

Resumo
Em 1601 D. Luís Cerqueira, bispo do Japão, revelou uma rede social multicultural composta por mercadores – alguns dos quais "cristãos-novos" – e por jesuítas, que conectavam Nagasaki, Macau, Manila, Goa e o Sião. A partir da análise do percurso de mercadores de origem judaica pertencentes a esta rede, propomo-nos questionar o seu peso na rede de sustentação e sobrevivência do projecto jesuíta na Ásia Oriental e da própria cidade de Macau. Questionamos também o alcance da rede de cristãos-novos, útil à estratégia de autofinanciamento projectada por Alessandro Valignano, SJ, na qual foi determinante entre 1593 e 1596, o desempenho do cargo de procurador por parte do jesuíta cristão-novo Gomes Vaz. Uma rede que, operando concertadamente com os jesuítas, conectava Nagasaki e Macau com Portugal, Peru, Panamá, México, Manila, Goa, Cochim e com o Império Otomano.

Palavras-chave
"cristãos-novos"; Jesuitas; Macao; Nagasaki; Redes sociais.

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Introduction

Between 1593 and 1596, the Society of Jesus stopped trading only silk on the Macau-Nagasaki axis – according to the contract signed between Alessandro Valignano, SJ and the "*povo de Macao*"[2] in 1578 –, to trade in gold, "*aljofre*" and other products exchanged on the aforementioned axis, bought with silver *reales de prata* that merchants from Peru[3] and Panama[4], in partnership with Jesuits from the Province of Peru, brought to invest in Macau in 1589.

The Society did it eleven years after the pledge of allegiance to Philip II of Spain, I of Portugal by the representatives of the "*povo*" of Macau, in partnership with merchants of Sephardic origin who operated in networks in the Western Indian Ocean, the Eastern Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Portugal, Mexico, Peru and Panama.

The sale of these products had taken place through Alessandro Valignano, SJ, Father Gomes Vaz (also of Sephardic origin), procurator in Goa, and the procurator in Japan, Father Miguel Soares.

In this way, the Society of Jesus changed the model by which it governed its economic activity according to the contract it had signed with the "povo" of Macau in 1578, despite intermediating the sale of gold on the *Nueva España*-Manila-Macau-Nagasaki axis in 1592.

According to the aforementioned contract, and in return for the permission to negotiate first 50 *picos* of silk, and later, another 50 *picos* "for sale at the end of the season" (Barreto, 2006, p. 140), through the city of Macau's foreman (responsible for the sale of *"seda da armação"* from Macao in Nagasaki[5]), the Jesuit literate elite guaranteed the "apoio financeiro dos moradores e mercadores de Macau" (Barreto, 2006, p. 141). In exchange, they assured the "serviços de elite intellectual e de diplomacia dos missionários" (*Ibidem*).

Between 1593 and 1596 the Society of Jesus, despite the collaboration of merchants belonging to its circle of "*amigos*" (i.e., merchants who, similarly to

2 BA, JA-49-IV-58, fl. 86.

3 AGI, Escribanía 403 A, fl. 56v.

4 *Ibidem*.

5 BA, JA-49-IV-58, fl. 88.

what had happened before the contract, negotiated on its behalf), had triggered a crisis in the partnership like that of 1589.

1589 was a year in which the crisis of the "alliança estratégica"[6] between merchants and Jesuits was related to a struggle for power in Macau between two merchants of high standing in the city (Teixeira, 1967, pp. 289-93), belonging to the circle of "amigos" of the Society of Jesus – Domingos Monteiro and António Rebelo Bravo –, and Domingos Segurado in a context of opportunities generated by the union of the Iberian Crowns.

Domingos Segurado, who in 1589 held the position of captain-major of China (Teixeira, 1967, pp. 289), had opposed the Monteiro-Pinto, Rebelo-Araújo-Nasi and Cerqueira kinships, and to what he considered to be a Jesuit hegemony in the economic, social, and political life of the city (Teixeira, 1967, pp. 289), as they constituted a group that defended Portuguese hegemony in East Asia and Macau's "Europa/Ming China"/Japan frontier condition(Barreto, 2006, p. 37).

Domingos Segurado and the other merchants belonging to the municipal government in 1589 were, as can be inferred from the fact that they were arrested (Teixeira, 1967, 289), after having resorted to a judge and Spanish soldiers during the conflict, in favor of Spanish interference in Macau, due to the opportunities that it provided relatively to zones of Spanish influence and integration on the American continent.

In addition to being the captain-major of China and councilor of the municipal government, Domingos Segurado had belonged in 1582 to the most important circle of power of the Macau mercantile oligarchy, made up of the "eleitos".

A circle of power that between 1582[7] and 1584 (the year in which, as can be seen from the "carta de confirmação"[8] of the contract, from Viceroy Francisco Mascarenhas, of April 18, 1584, were the dominant elite[9]), was composed of five[10] or six merchants of great economic power who were recognized as having experience in economic, social and political matters concerning Macao, and who, for that reason, were empowered with authority to represent the "*povo*" when sustenance and survival of the city were at stake.

Between 1593 and 1596 the Society of Jesus, when investing, in the name of its owners, money from Peru and Panama, which in 1589 had been confiscated

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6 BA, JA-49-IV-58, fl. 89.

7 AGI, Patronato 24.R.60, fl. 2.

8 BA, JA-48-IV-58, fl. 86.

9 "Concerto feyto entre o Padre Visitador; e o povo de Macao (…) em o qual se concertarão de manera que esta dito querendo prover a que não falte o sustentamento aos Padres, e para tirar todas as novidades, que acerca disto podem fazer os eleytos de Macao …", *ibidem.*

10 AGI, Patronato 24.R.60, fl. 2.

and deposited at the College of St. Paul, disrespected, just as the group of merchants headed by Domingos Segurado in that year, the border condition of Macau.

Therefore, at stake was, between 1593 and 1596, not only the disrespect for the "concierto"[11] of 1578 (approved by the General of the Society of Jesus in Rome, Claudio Acquaviva, in 1582[12]) – after the Pope had given as an opinion that to the Jesuit mercantile activity "no se podia propriamente llamar trato pues se hasia por pura necessidade"[13] – and the condition of frontier in Macau, but also the inscription of the Jesuits in the mercantile networks operating in the Western Indian Ocean and the Eastern Indian Ocean, resorting to a segregated minority in Portugal and in areas of Portuguese integration and influence in Asia.

The integration of the Jesuits in the mercantile environment had never been a peaceful matter, given the threat it constituted as competition, namely for merchants outside their network, operating in the axis Macau-Nagasaki-Siam, Malacca, Cochin and Goa. The very existence of the contract presupposed, as Miguel Rodrigues Lourenço pointed out, "rivalidade commercial, pois regularize uma situação de concorrência anterior" (Lourenço, 2016, p. 151). This despite the fact that the contract, according to Luís Filipe Barreto, formalized and reinforced the "presença mercantile da Companhia de Jesus" (Barreto, 2006, p. 141), having been confirmed on April 18, 1584 by the Viceroy of India, D. Francisco Mascarenhas, in 1585 by Alessandro Valignano, SJ, and by the general procurator of Japan, Father Miguel Soares[14], and on April 29, 1589[15] by the visitator in question and by the "*officiales de la Camera*"[16] of Macau.

Through unexplored and unpublished documentation, we propose to problematize the economic activity of the Society of Jesus as a support for its missionary activity and reconstitute the mercantile network of Sephardic origin that was part of Macau's sustenance and survival networks, to which it associated itself. We also propose to identify the social actors that made up the latter, signaling constant actions and models of cooperation between this network and the Jesuits.

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11 BA, JA-49-IV-58, fl. 88.

12 *Ibidem*.

13 *Ibidem*.

14 ARSI, Jap-Sin 42, fl. 236, Barreto, 2006, p. 236-7.

15 BA, JA-49-IV-58, fl. 88.

16 *Ibidem*, fl. 86.

1. A New Era of partnerships

In 1601, the Bishop of Funai, D. Luís Cerqueira, presided over an inquiry, required by the Inquisition of Mexico, regarding Rui Pires (Uchmany, 1986, pp. 85-103, Sousa, 2015) (father of two merchants of the Portuguese diaspora in Asia known as António Rodrigues and Manoel Fernandes, respectively), who was accused of "judaísmo" in Manila on 9 September 1596[17]. In that same year, the Inquisitors of Goa, António de Barros and Marcos Gil Frazão, wrote to D. António de Matos Noronha, Inquisitor General of Portugal, alleging that there were "muitas pessoas de nação na çidade de Macao"[18]. It was also the year in which the position of the Procurator of the "casa professa"[19] of Goa, held by the "cristão-novo publico"[20] Gomes Vaz, SJ, found itself in jeopardy. This collective data allows us to address the issue of Macau's social networks of maintenance and survival, and analyse the importance of the community of Sephardic origin.

The "qualidad"[21] of the witnesses was a key criterion for their selection by the Bishop, and the nature of their answers expose a multicultural, miscegenated, composite (by de presence of merchants and Jesuits) and mixed (by the presence of New Christians and Old Christians) social network. Two merchants – Francisco Rodrigues Pinto ("Hombre de bien"[22], "Portugues"[23], "tenido por hombre de la Nacion"[24]), as well as Manuel Rodrigues ("Portugues y Judio de nacion"[25]) – unequivocally confirm the existence of a Sephardic community in both Macau and Nagasaki. The summoning of these merchants, as well as the subsequent acquittal of Rodrigues Pinto by the Bishop, reveal the intention to defy Frei Bernardo de Santa Catarina: "[Y] aunque este es hombre de la Nacion se le ha perguntado porq esto ssabe mejor deste negocio que se pesquisa"[26]. A new Christian not expressly referred to as such, António Garcês de Miranda (Coelho, 2007, pp. 116-121). A merchant known to be "contra los

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17 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 237, fls 443-477, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fls 66-66v., fls 136-142, Sousa, 2015, pp. 168-211, pp. 224-247.

18 Letter from António de Barros and Marcos Gil Frazão, Inquisitors of Goa to D. António Matos de Noronha, General Inquisitor of Portugal, Goa, 19.12.1596, Baião, 1930, II, p. 248, Lourenço, 2016, p. 156.

19 *Documenta Indica*, Letter from G. de Belmonte, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Acquaviva, Goa, 20.12.1593, vol. XVI, p. 581.

20 *DI*, letter from Francisco Vieira, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 24.11.1596, vol. XVI, p. 858.

21 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 136, Sousa, 2015, p. 226.

22 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 136v., Sousa, 2015, p. 227.

23 *Ibidem*.

24 *Ibidem*.

25 *Ibidem*.

26 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 136, Sousa, 2015, p. 226.

Judios de nacion", Jorge Durões. Four Japanese (three of whom were *ôtonas* of the city of Nagasaki: Moro João, Sôyn Thome, and Tacaquy Luis) and their testimonies as reputable men of "mucha verdad"[27] were essential for the theory which the inquiry intended to prove. The first two witnesses were the only ones summoned; this was done in an affirmation of Portuguese hegemony in Japan during a period of crisis between Macau and Manila with crisis peaks reported in 1584, 1592, 1597, and 1598-1600, motivated by the Castilian advance into areas of Portuguese influence and integration in East Asia. Two Jesuits, Francisco Rodrigues, SJ and Ambrósio Fernandes, SJ. The particular classification applied to Manuel Rodrigues; the fact that the adjective "Judio" was used in eleven testimonies in the inquiry following the denunciation of Rui Pires in Manila to refer to men of Jewish origin who "judaizavam"; coupled with the admonition which D. Luís Cerqueira issued to Frei Bernardo de Santa Catarina[28], warning him that the narrative of miracles by Frei Juan de Santa Maria (which took place in Nagasaki according to the author in a *Relacion*, published in Madrid in 1599) could result in the "menosprecio de nuestra Santa Fee de los verdaderos milagros de Christo nuestro Senhor, y de los Santos y aun de la veneracion de los mismos siervos de quem se rifiren"[29] in the Japanese Christian community; all this provides a glimpse of how the aforementioned Bishop used the expression "Portugues y Judio de nacion" deliberately and provocatively.

The fact that Rafael da Costa, António Garcês de Miranda, and Francisco Rodrigues Pinto testified that Rui Pires (habitually) attended Mass seated by the main altar (a sign of his importance in the *Nanban* community); that he confessed and took communion; and that he and his sons "[c]orrião commumente com os demais portugueses"[30], shows that the inquiry conducted by D. Luís Cerqueira was intended to refute the theory prevalent in Manila that the adjective "*judeu*" (and as it was inferred, "judaizava") was applicable to Rui Pires, and prove that he was, instead, a New Christian whose behavior was consistent with the norm, in the line of protection of this universe ascribed by the Inquisitor Rui Sodrinho de Mesquita to the Bishop of China, D. Leonardo de Sá[31]. The same accusation was made by the latter against Father Gomes Vaz and his fellow Jesuits, Jeronimo Javier, SJ, and Cristovão de Castro, SJ – all of whom officials of the table of the Holy Office – for having helped a "portugues

27 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 136, Sousa, 2015, p. 226.
28 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 135v., Sousa, 2015, p. 226.
29 *Ibidem*.
30 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 142, Sousa, 2015, p. 246.
31 Lourenço, 2016, p. 123, *ibidem*, 2014, pp. 49-67.

converso", who had been sentenced to 2,000 *pardaos*[32], to be released from prison.

Despite the fact, that a "Judio de naçion" was summoned to give evidence regarding Rui Pires, and notwithstanding the discrepancies between the two inquiries (Manila and Nagasaki, respectively), the vulnerable position of the Sephardic diaspora in the areas of Portuguese influence in East Asia was unequivocal.

In his *Summario de las cosas que pertenecen a la provincia de la India Oriental y al govierno della*, written between 1577 and 1580, Alessandro Valignano pointed out to General Everardo Mercuriano that:

> los que vienen de Portugal, primero se han de excluir totalmente todos los que participan de alguna raça de chystianos nuevos (...) porque comúnmente son estos tales no sólo tenidos entre los portugeses por infames, mas aun por judíos y chrystianos fingidos; (...) porque no solamente elles son tenidos en tan mala opinión de los portugueses, mas la misma Religión pierde mucho de su reputación y crédito quando los recibe[33].

This measure was intended to safeguard the Society against situations like the one that occurred in 1596 and resulted in Father Gomes Vaz being released from the office of Procurator of the "casa professa" of Goa. The fact that there were individuals who were being prosecuted for "*judaismo*" in Macau between 1582 and 1599 (Lourenço, 2016, pp. 130, 155) confirms a rather severe form of segregation. Twice, Rui Pires was accused by merchants who were active in the Macau-Nagasaki-Manila-*Nueva España* axis. The first time was an accusation levied by Bartolomeu Jorge in 1589 or 1590[34]; the second time, in 1597[35], was by a collective in the context of two inquiries made in Manila. 1597 was also the year in which his "parente" (i.e partner), Diego Hernandez de Victória (Diogo Fernandes de Victória), was being investigated. However, the failure of the mission of João Gomes Fayo, who had been assigned the task of "prender todos los cristianos nuevos que judaizavam"[36] in Macau (despite the promise of "la mytad de los bienes al denunçiador"[37]) and which resulted in a "brega"; the trajectory of the other merchants who belonged to the minorities summoned by

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[32] *DI*, Letter from Manuel Dias, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Cláudio Acquaviva, Malaca, 27.6.1593, vol. XVI, p. 154.

[33] *DI*, Alessandro Valignano, SJ, Summario de las cosas que pertenecen a la provincia de la India Oriental y al governo dela, vol. XIII, p. 260.

[34] AGN, Inquisición, vol. 237, fl. 457, Sousa, 2015, p. 185.

[35] AGN, Inquisición, vol. 237, fls. 443-467, Sousa, 2015, pp. 170-197.

[36] AGN, Inquisición, vol. 237, fl. 457, Sousa, 2015, p. 185.

[37] *Ibidem*.

D. Luís Cerqueira, as well as the nature of their presence in that part of the world; the matrimonial strategy of António Rebêlo Bravo and of Sebastião de Araújo (of which the Nasi were a part[38]); the choice of Macau as the destination for a daughter of Mosén Belilla – "cabessa de todos los judios blancos de Cochin de Sima" – (baptized "con mucha solennidad"[39]) in order to "evitar los enconvenientes de su padre y parientes" and with a view to her being "bien ayudada"[40]; all of the above clearly indicate that the Sephardic merchants were able to live normally in Macau, Nagasaki, and Siam.

This is evidenced by the summoning of the "Judio" Manuel Rodrigues by D. Luís Cerqueira, after the former's part in an embassy to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, headed by Alessandro Valignano, SJ, in March 1591. This, and only this, allows us to explain that Manuel Luís – a merchant from Oporto with ties to the *parentela* (extended family) of the Monteiro/Pinto by intermediary of Domingos Monteiro and of António Monteiro Pinto, his brother-in-law – said in Manila (in the line of Salvador de Figueiredo) that Rui Pires "venia huyendo del fuego de la yndia"[41] and had gone to Macau some 10 years previously.

1597 was also the year in which Rui Pires was detained in Manila was the same year in which António Garcês de Miranda was accused by the Castilian elites of the Philippines of having acted to the detriment of the crew of the galleon *San Felipe*. This led the Bishop of Japan, D. Pedro Martins, to defend him in a written statement[42]. While the incarceration of Rui Pires and other New Christians, e.g. Diogo Fernandes de Victória, undoubtedly involved economic interests, these episodes cannot be dissociated from the rivalry that existed in the two areas of Iberian influence in Asia, and especially from the policy of repression against those who – acting alongside the Jesuits in the Province of India, the Mission of Japan, and the Province of Peru – operated in a network in the West Indian Ocean, the East India Ocean, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Portugal, Mexico, and Peru. The Jesuits and New Christians involved between 1593 and 1596 operated in a contraband network of *reales de prata*; they also exported gold, "aljofre" and other products from Macau and Nagasaki to Goa and Cochin as a sideline of the contract of "armação" of 1578, effected between Alessandro Valignano, SJ, and the mercantile elites of "Porto do nome de Deus nas partes da China". This was an option that, in 1593, implied expanding into untapped areas of the Indian subcontinent beyond the Macau-Japan-Siam axis:

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38 BA, JA-49-IV-66, fl. 92.

39 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 25.11.1591, vol. XV, p. 661.

40 *Ibidem*.

41 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 237, fl. 461, Sousa, 2015, p. 190.

42 BL, Add. 9868, fls 2v-3, Frison, 2013, p. 157.

> E daqui tambem procede não se contentar o Padre [Valignano] com a viniaga e mercancia que té agora se fez de Amacao pera Japão e Sião, crecendo de cada vez mais o emprego; senão que de tres annos a esta parte vem da China a Cochim e a esta cidade de Goa mui grosso emprego, que inda que venha embuçado debaixo do nome e marcas de outros, por derradeiro não há segredo e tudo se vem a saber, porque os mesmos o descobrem[43].

While, in 1583, Domingos Álvares wrote to the (Superior) General (of the Society), Claudio Acquaviva, describing the volume of business of the procuratorate of Macau in the plan of mediation with secular stakeholders, at that time under the tutelage of André Pinto, SJ, and his connection to Goa[44], done with the knowledge of his "superiores"[45], in 1593 – the year in which the priests Gomes Vaz, Jeronimo Javier, and Cristovão de Castro had helped a New Christian sentenced to pay a fine of 2,000 *pardaos* in Goa; and the departure of Gaspar Pinto da Rocha, who belonged to the *parentela* of the Monteiro/Pinto(s), as *capitão-mor* (Head Captain) in the voyage from Japan to Nagasaki) – the Company invested not only in 50 *picos* of silk that yielded 6,000 or 7,000 *pardaos,* but it also invested in gold and "aljofre" exported to Goa:

> E tanto que ho mesmo Padre visitador me escreveu este anno, que empregou seis mil taeis em ouro e dobrou o dinheiro, que sam só no ouro doze mil pardaos, afora o mais emprego que cuido que nam hé pouco, porque até pera aqui pera a India me disse o Padre Gil da Mata que trouxera, se bem me lembra, em aljofre dous mil taês empregados, que sam quatro mil pardaos, em que se ganhou a 25 por cento, affora outro emprego d'ouro em que se fizeram mais de [dez mil pardaos, de modo que nos ganhos em proprio lhe foram este anno 20] mil pardaos. E porque elle foi o que ho trouxe, a elle me remeto, ...[46]

Smuggling gold in 1596, which was still ongoing in 1617, was a practice in which Vasco Dias and Duarte António had participated in 1592; both merchants

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43 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ, to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 10.12.1596, vol. XVIII, p. 618.

44 "Custumão os Padres, que de Goa partem pera Japão, trazerem algum dinheiro de pessoas amigas nossas pera em a China se empregar, e os Padres que trazem isto a carreguo tem cuidado de correrem com os feitores das naos a lhe paguarem os fretes daquele dinheiro. E por serem as partes muitas, cujo he aquelle dinheiro, causa inquietação en aquella casa da China e os nossos Padres parecem mais feitores ou procuradores, pollo trabalho que nisto levão.", letter from Domingos Álvares, SJ, to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Malaca, 28.12.1583, *DI*, vol. XIII, p. 474.

45 *Ibidem*.

46 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Cochim, 15.12.1593, vol. XVI, p. 520.

were incorporated in the Macau-Nagasaki-Manila-*Nueva España* axis, "aparentados" i.e., related to each other throught partnership and to the Peruvian Juan de Solis[47]. The death of the second merchant after his arrival in the Philippines via Seville occurred during the command of the *capitão-mor* (Captain major) of the voyage from Japan, Roque de Mello Pereira, and in the course of a conflict generated by Juan de Solis in Nagasaki – one of the merchants who had arrived in Macau in 1590 in a ship from Peru, which counted among the procurators of the "armação" two Jesuits, Father Felipe Leandro and Brother Gonzalo Belmonte, alongside 200,000 *pardaos* of *reales de prata* to be invested in the Portuguese settlement in the province of Guangdong[48] – displeased Toyotomi Hideyoshi, thereby undermining the Society of Jesus. Duarte António, who, like Vasco Dias, "bendier[a] su oro libremente"[49] through the mediation of Alessandro Valignano, SJ, in Nagasaki, wrote in a letter addressed to the Visitator, SJ:

> [...]pido a V. Paternidade me haga merced como siempre me ha hecho de mandar que ese oro y plata se me este alla y si pudiere vender el oro por lo menos los diez y seis panes de la limosna y fuera deso valia de dos mil taeis por el preçio que se hallare aun que sea a ciento y veynte taeis receuiere en esto grandissima merced [...][50].

Considering that it was during the mandates of the Bishop of Japan, D. Pedro Martins[51] and that of the viceroy Mathias de Albuquerque, that the three Inquisitorial trials for "judaismo" in Macau in the 1590s took place, it is worth pointing out that António Garcês seemed to have avoided the New Christian stigma, which in itself reveals his power – which had been consolidated after the deaths of his brother Francisco Garcês de Miranda, of António Rebêlo Bravo, and that of Domingos Monteiro – but also of this self-referential group in Macau. He is the only one who mentions that Rui Pires was "asmatico", an indication of their proximity[52]. Manuel Rodrigues, Francisco Rodrigues Pinto, as well as António Garcês de Miranda belonged to a network of "*amigos*" or "parentes" (i.e partners) of the Jesuits and the mercantile elites of Macau and Nagasaki. In the case of Garcês de Miranda, whose presence in "China" dates to

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47 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fls 5-5v.

48 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Cochim, 15.12.1593, vol. XVI, p. 520.

49 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 6v.

50 *Ibidem*, fl. 43.

51 *DI*, Letter from General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva to Bishop of Japan D. Pedro Martins, vol. XV, p. 816.

52 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 263, exp. 1U, fl. 142, Sousa, 2015, p. 246.

1572 (or, most likely, earlier), he was still there in 1621[53]. The presence in 1592 of the first merchant in Western Asia, a combatant in the war in Korea, went back twenty years[54]. By 1601, the year in which he was summoned by D. Luis Cerqueira to testify as a witness, he had been in Nagasaki for about 28 years[55]. This is a period that confirms the right conditions for him to stay in Macau and in the *Nanban* community, his economic power, even after the commission of João Gomes Fayo and of the mandate of the *capitão-mor* of the voyage to Japan, Roque de Mello Pereira, who, according to an enslaved person from Bengala, wanted to detain Rui Pires for the same reason. Pires was, as inferred by the testimony of Rafael da Costa, a "parcero em trato" of the Society of Jesus, as was Diogo Fernandes de Victória, the "regidor" of Manila, "parente" of João de Oliveira, who counted António Rebelo Bravo and António Garcês de Miranda among his procurators[56]. Rafael da Costa alleged that Rui Pires and his sons "tratavão" with the Jesuit priest António Lopes. This was why Lopes asked Tacaquy António to allow him to sail to Hirado, where Rui Pires had a Japanese mercantile network associated with his *parentela* that gave him access to Manila. According to Pero de Solis, "muchos dezian que conoçian a parentes suyos en langasac [Nagasaki]"[57]; he also alleged that Diego Jorge and Vilela Vaz, both "judios", had met "a sus parientes que eran tanbien judios"[58], in a reference to a *parentela* of exclusively Sephardic origin, comprised of "christianos fingidos" which, according to Jorge Durões, effectively segregated so-called Old Christians. The fact that Rui Pires belonged to a network of this nature brings us to the inquiry into the actions of Duarte Gomes Solis in the State of India, an order given by Phillip II in 1591 to the viceroy Matias de Albuquerque, for excluding other merchants from "sua rede de negócios, constituída apenas por cristãos-novos" (Coelho, 1994, p. 224), similarly to Francisco Lopes d'Elvas and Simão Garcia. In the same fashion, the year 1587, which was when Rui Pires arrived in Macau, coincided also with his stay in Goa. The fact that Duarte Gomes Solis was welcomed by the governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho – by whom he was "muito aceito" and whom he "ajudava nos negócios assim particulares como gerais" (Coelho, 1994, p. 171), and who was the same person who supported António Rebelo Bravo and Domingos Monteiro, siding with the Society of Jesus in Macau in 1589 in the fight for power against Domingos or

53 BA, JA-49-V-4, fl.11, Penalva-Lourenço, 2009, p. 326.

54 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 59v.

55 *Ibidem*.

56 AGI, Filipinas 34, N. 65, Letter from João de Oliveira to Diogo Fernandes de Victoria, Canton (Guangzhou), 22.11.1584, fl. 652v.

57 AGN, Inquisición, vol. 237, exp. 1U, fl. 458, Sousa, 2015, p. 187.

58 *Ibidem*.

Diogo Segurado – plus the fact of having raised impediments for the "projecto de visitação inquisitorial à China" (Lourenço, 2016, p. 149) of the Inquisitor Rui Sodrinho de Mesquita, all this suggests that these three merchants as well as the Jesuits belonged to the same network. It is interesting that Duarte Gomes Solis twice mentions in this *Discursos sobre lo Comercio de las dos Indias* that he has letters from the "obispo del Iapon, y China" (Solis, 1943, p. 107). Letters mentioning the price of silk in the Philippines (Solis, 1943, p. 106). The "*parentesco*" between Francisco Lopes d'Elvas and Domingos Monteiro in 1591[59] – the year in which Duarte Gomes Solis was imprisoned and as such occuring during the mandate of viceroy Mathias de Albuquerque (Coelho, 1994, pp. 171, 194) – corroborates this hypothesis. Duarte Gomes Solis held the position of "feitor do contrato da pimenta e de correspondente dos grandes mercadores de Lisboa, nacionais e estrangeiros: João Batista Lita, Revelasco, Fugger e Welser" (Coelho, 1994, pp. 171, 194).

In the late 1580s and early 1590s, the marriage market of Macau was ennobled by the daughters of João Baptista Nasi (Catarina Nasi and Antónia Nasi) and of Mosen Belilla respectively, and the city attracted New Christian and Jewish capitals. It is worth noting that Juan de Solis (whose connection to Pero de Solis and Duarte Gomes Solis is a topic of research to be pursued) had partnered with a "grego" and an "arabio"[60] in 1592, and also that the Society of Jesus had been careful to avoid giving rise to any ill feelings on the part of the Belilla clan in Mattancherry.

There is a Jesuit connection to the Sephardic mercantile networks which intersects with the West Indian Ocean, the East Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and East Asia; it is not explained by the existence of New Christians in their midst (particularly in the extensive and complex Province of India), such as Luís Almeida, SJ, Henrique Henriques, SJ; Gomes Vaz, SJ; Duarte de Sande, SJ; Afonso Vaz, SJ; Afonso de Castro, SJ; Luís de Almeida, SJ; Pero Gomez, SJ; Garcia Garcez, SJ; António Vaz, SJ; and Hernando Núnez, SJ, which, although important for the cohesiveness and efficacy of the network resulting from the association of the Society of Jesus to merchants belonging to this self-referential group.

After 1578, the year in which the contract of "armação" between the Jesuit scholarly elite and the mercantile elites of Macau with access to power was celebrated, the financial paradigm of the Society of Jesus changed after the Visitator Alessandro Valignano appointed André Pinto, SJ, and João de Castro, SJ, as procurators of the Mission of Japan in Macau and Nagasaki. The experience of André Pinto, SJ, in the mercantile world, especially in the markets

[59] AHSCMP, Série H, banco 6, Livro 17, fl. 281.

[60] ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 25.

of Canton after 1564, was decisive (Loureiro, 1996, pp. 117-129). He was a Jesuit who had been raised in "India" and belonged to the same self-referential group from Oporto and the Douro region that António Rebelo Bravo, Domingos Monteiro, Diogo Fernandes de Victória, and, probably, João de Oliveira and António Garcês de Miranda belonged to, in the same way that Father Gomes Vaz belonged to the self-referential group of New Christians. This is an identity (or, more accurately, one of the "identities", as a general rule in the Portuguese diaspora in Asia[61]) which weakened it at the time of the discussion over his exoneration in the context of the investigation about the *reales de prata* invested between 1593 and 1596[62]. Investment made in goods exported from Macau and Nagasaki to Goa with the connivance of Father Miguel Soares, procurator of Japan in "China", were later forwarded "secretamente" by "letra" from India to the "Reino" to "seus constituintes, que erão os senhores deste dinheiro"[63] by Father Filipe Leandro, one of the two Jesuit procurators in Peru. A type of operation similar to the one that Duarte Gomes Solis would come to propose in 1622 taking into account Mexico[64]. It was in this context that (Superior) General Claudio Acquaviva, with the acquiescence of Alessandro Valignano, yet against the will of the Provincial Francisco Cabral, ordered that Father Gomes Vaz be released from the office of procurator of the "casa professa" of Goa. The procurator, through his New Christian identity, was the link between the Society of Jesus on the one hand, and the transoceanic and trans-Asian Sephardic mercantile network on the other. Through his success in the "trato en

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61 The identity of the merchants we have been studying was, as a general rule, plural. Due to naturalness, nationality, religion, culture of origin, acculturation, and because merchants were linked to more than one Asian City. It was common for merchants to have long stays in Macao, for exemple, but have the status of "casado" or family in another city.

62 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to João Álvares, SJ, Goa, 10.12.1596, vol. XVIII, pp. 620-624.

63 *Ibidem.*

64 "Y será contrato [contract proposed by the ambassador of Persia on silk produced in that country] agradable a Dios en satisfacion de sus seruicios, e de otros contratos en que se les ocosionò perderse las naues sin contrastes de la mar, y com vn million de oro, que por via de Mexico en dos años fuesse a las Filipinas, empleandose en cobre, y loiias, y seda en la China, y dandose a los hõbres de negócios para que iuesse esto administrado por sus ordenes, se les auia de obligar a los hombres ricos de la ciudad de Lisboa, que fuessen fiadores de sus correspondiètes, que estan en la ciudad de Goa, y estos elegendo otros para la ciudad de Macao, y Malaca, com que hagan libros de caxa de todo lo que entrare en su poder, siruiendose su Magestad de ser mercader, com mandarles entregar en dos años el dicho millõ de oro de reales, para que dellos hagã empleos susodichos en la China, e en Malaca de calain, y especerias de macia, clauo, y nos, y otros infinitos géneros que ay en la China, vnos que sirven para la India, y los de Malaca que siruen para la India, y para Vrmus;" Solis, 1943, p. 107.

la India", despite "tenido para con los forasteros en buena opinión, aunque es hombre de la nación"[65] for being "cristiano nuevo muy conocido de todos, porque es de padre y madre sin tener ninguna mestura de cristianos viejos"[66], the procurator had to be neutralized vis-à-vis the complaints of merchants from outside the network on the one hand, and the repression at the hands of the viceroy Matias de Albuquerque on the other, especially because the procurator was the very person who, according to the viceroy, gave "dinero a responder aun por más del justo precio"[67]. This act was not unrelated to an accusation hanging over Alessandro Valignano, SJ, made by one of the merchants from Peru (one of four procurators responsible for the "armação" of the ship), claiming that the dividends from the sale of the goods in which the *reales de prata* had been invested had only benefitted the Society of Jesus, this being the reason why "se embarcava pera Portugal a fazer queixume ao conselho supremo de Madrid deste dinheiro e pedir-lhe mandem tornar seus ganhos"[68]. The case was even more serious because it involved another financial operation which was, as a general rule, effected by the Sephardic community in whose network, according to the viceroy, the procurator of the "casa professa" de Goa was involved:

> E como o Viso-Rey tinha visto as grandes murmurações, queixumes e poeyra que nestes dous ou tres annos ouve nesta cidade de tão grossos empregos, como o P.e Valignano tinha mandado pelo P.e Gil da Mata, e troixe consigo, quando agora fará dous annos veyo da China, a muita copia de fazendas que este anno lhe vierão, as quais não bastou virem embuçadas debaixo dos nomes de outros pera se deixar de saber, descobrindo-as os mesmos que as trazião, como fizerão os outros annos. E por o mesmo P.e Alexandre e o P.e Manoel Diaz, seu companheiro, entenderem no meneo dellas e em darem huma soma de milhares de pardaos a ganhos aos xarafos, que são cambiadores, o qual dinheiro dentro desta casa professa se recebia e se pagava [...][69].

Reales de prata were among the most profitable products in the Asian financial market, surpassing the gold "venezianos" which was in circulation in

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65 *DI*, Letter from Alessandro Valignano, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 6.12. 1595, vol. XVII, p. 428.

66 *DI*, Letter from Alessandro Valignano, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 14.12.1583, vol. XIII, p. 247.

67 *DI*, Letter from Alessandro Valignano, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, goa, 1.12.1596, vol. XVIII, pp. 591-592.

68 *DI*, Letter from Jeronimo Javier, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 10.11.1595, vol. XVI, p. 791.

69 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to João Álvares, SJ, Goa, 10.12.1596, vol. XVIII, p. 620.

Asia after Ormuz, or "xerafins de plata baxa, o santomés": "[...] para la China no vale la moneda de la India, sino estos reales y assí comprarlos, es comprar plata más que aver dinero"[70]. Put in circulation when the ships arrived from Portugal in September[71], they were bought and then sold after the April monsoons[72]. In 1593, numerous New Christian merchants were part of the network of "amigos" or "parentes" of the Jesuits: "Perché di ordinario si radunano et vengono tutti principale di essi di questa città, che sono molti, alla casa professa trattare li suoi negotii, praecipue con il P. Gomez Vaz..."[73]. The activity of this Jesuit (Gomez Vaz), who was all too involved in the *"trato"*, is described in relation to the investment he made of a loan of 3,000 *pardaos* he had received from Brother Gonzalo Belmonte in 1592. The loan was intended to cover the payment of a bill of exchange by the Mission of Japan that was overdrawn in a year when, according to the "*Judio*" Manuel Rodrigues, "faltarão tres viagens"[74], a *nau* (ship), as well as a junk. Father Laerzio gives a general account of this a year later:

> [L]i domandò li desse imprestito tre millia pardai. Il Fratello ce lo diede et il Padre li portò a un mercante, christiano novo suo amico et celi diede a guadagno, con li fare il mercante una scrittura, nella quale diceva che li daria di guadagno a ondici per cento, et cossi fu fatto.[75]

In 1594, Father Jeronimo Javier explained this type of financial operation – which hitherto was unknown to some Jesuits – to (Superior) General Claudio Acquaviva with a view to finding out if it was lawful for the Society of Jesus to carry out this kind of activity[76]. He thus addressed the fact that the financial

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70 *DI*, Letter from Jeronimo Javier SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 10.11.1597, vol. XVI, pp. 790-791.

71 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Cochim, 15.12.1593, vol. XVI, p. 520.

72 *DI*, Letter from Jeronimo Javier, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 10.11.1594, vol. XVI, pp. 790-791.

73 *DI*, Letter from A. Laerzio, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 28.11.1593, vol. XVI, p. 454.

74 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 61.

75 *DI*, Letter from A. Laerzio, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 28.11.1593, vol. XVI, p. 454.

76 "V. P. vea se acertando a tener la casa o colegio mil o dos mil ducados en outra moneda, podrá trocarla en essos reales o comprarlos com ella y, guardaándalos hasta Abril, tornarlos a trocar por la moneda de la tierra o verderlos por ella, y llevar aquellos ocho o diez por ciento que subiendo en el precio se ganen. (…) Acertara a tener un procurador doz mil ducados agenos como en deposito (non en rigor de deposito que no se pueda tocar), y entretanto se ofrece este acierto destos reales: si será licito comprarlos y tornarlos a vender y

paradigm of the Society had been altered, and which, he envisaged, could become a problem, which, indeed, it did.

Between1593 and 1596, the Jesuits triggered a crisis in the partnership with the mercantile elites of Macau when they disrespected the contract of "*armação*" of 1578; the contracts of 1584 and 1589, incidentally, were similarly disrespected. The increasing investment made under the orientation of Alessandro Valignano, as well as the extension of the Society of Jesus' areas of operation in the financial plane, which was contested by merchants from outside their network, was repeatedly questioned by the Provincial Francisco Cabral, accused by the viceroy Mathias Aires of (allowing) "los padres hazían trato en la India":

> [A]lem dos 60 mil pardaos de reales que pagou aqui ao P.e Leandro, por outros tantos que lhe mandou dar do dinheiro dos castelhanos, me disse Baltezar Coelho, que hé hum homem honrado e rico, casado nesta cidade que há muitos anos está na China e muito nosso amigo, e o principal feitor que corre com esta fazenda de Japão e sabe bem o que tem: que afora do que veo empregado cá ficava de cabedal lá trinta mil taes, que fazem 60 mil pardaos. (...) quam pouco necessaria hé tam grossa mercancia, nam somente nas partes da China mas ainda nestas da India [...][77]

Between the late 1580s (the period when António Rebelo Bravo's daughters were born in Macau) and 1596, the Jesuits had connections to the *parentelas* of the Monteiro-Pinto, the Rebelo-Araújo-Nasi, Garcês, Viegas, and the Coelho. The first four, "aparentadas" to each other, belonged, in the case of the Monteiro-Pinto, Rebelo and Garcês, to the group of merchants from Oporto and the Douro region, and whose presence in the respective lineage in the Indian subcontinent dated back to 1548 and 1510 in the case of the first and second, and to 1504 in the case of the third. The Garcês had connections to Malacca, India, Oporto, Medina, Armenia, Amsterdam, Peru, Mexico, and Brazil. Many of the merchants who operated from Macau and Nagasaki, such as Domingos

ganar aý dozientos ducados? Tiremos escândalo y negociación própria, y que nada desto se haga por nuestra mano sino de amigo fiel, etc. Solamente dudemos de la negociación. Más digo, acertaré a tener dos mil ducados o quatro de los quales agora non tengo necessidade hasta daqui a un año. En esto tiempo doilos a un mercader amigo que los busca e digole: "Señor, doi esto, darméis lo que quisiéredes." Y el mercader gana para sí veinte o treinta por ciento, y al cabo de año torname mi dinero com cinco o seis por ciento más. Para los seculares ay sus reglas de justificación, no trato desto si nos será lícito a nosotros tomar alguna cosa a este título.", DI, Letter from Jeronimo Javier, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 10.11.1594, vol. XVI, pp. 790-791.

77 *DI*, Letter from Francisco Cabral, SJ to General of the Society of Jesus Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 17.12.1596, vol. XVIII, p. 693.

Monteiro, António Rebelo Bravo, Gaspar Viegas, and Baltazar Coelho, maintained ties with Goa, Cochin, and other Asian powers, as was common in the Portuguese diaspora in Asia.



Figure 1. "Amigos" and "parentes" of the Society of Jesus between 1587 and 1605.

The association of the Sephardic merchants with the Society of Jesus through their economic power, and their importance as links to both Ormuz and to the Ottoman Empire (as well as to international wholesale trade), were essential to strengthen the networks of sustainability and survival of Macau and of the Jesuit mission in Asia. This is why the embassy of twelve "portuguezes" headed by Alessandro Valignano, SJ, included, apart from Álvaro Monteiro – a relative of Domingos Monteiro who, in 1592, was the scribe on the ship of Gaspar Pinto da Rocha, the *capitão-mor* in the trip to Japan, cousin of the first[78] – Giovanni Baptista Bonaçina ("[o milanes que] viera da India com o padre Visitador [...]) acompanhando a dita embaxada"[79]) as well as Gaspar Munis Barreto, Manuel Rodrigues, and António Garcês de Miranda. These were merchants who were part of a network that included "agentes" of the Society of Jesus that Alessandro Valignano, SJ, knew how to expedite, as evidenced by the words of António Garcês de Miranda in the inquiry of 1602, and whose underlying theory implied his disavowal:

78 AHSCMP, Série H, banco 6, Livro 17, fl. 281v.

79 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 68.

> "[...] pedião [os jesuítas] seus gasalhados e os comprauão aos capitaens das naos e ainda metião terceiros, e que elle (...) o fora hum vez entre o padre Visitador Alexandre Valignano, e o capitan Enrique da Costa [...]"[80].

The connection between the "Judio" Manuel Rodrigues, "casado e morador" in Nagasaki since the late 1570s or early 1580s and one of the men of trust of the Jesuits, who kept in his house "mujtas cousas, pera se fazer presentes e dadiuas"[81] on the one hand, and António Garcês de Miranda on the other, came about through Ignacio Moreira, the merchant whose *cursus honorum* included the position of "eleito" in the oath of loyalty to Phillip II of Spain on 18 December 1582[82] in Macau and who, in 1590, was the guarantor of the Peruvian Juan de Solis[83].



Figure 2. Link between António Garcês de Miranda, Manuel Rodrigues and João de Solis through Inácio Moreira.

80 ARSI, Jap-Sin 21-II, fls 80v-81v.
81 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 60v.
82 AGI, Patronato 24.R.60, fl. 2.
83 ARSI, Jap-Sin 31, fl. 44.



Figure 3. Five merchants who formed part of the embassy to Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1591, led by Alessandro Valignano, SJ.

In 1598 in Manila, Rui Pires declared that he had "por via del padre Antonio Lopez de la Compañia de Jesus en el xapon le bienen çiento y cinquenta pesos que los dio a Cristoval de Mercado marido de doña Francisca de Guzman"[84]. The presence of the "Alferes" Mercado who was part of the network of "amigos" of the Jesuits, who testified with António Garcês de Miranda in their favour in an inquiry carried out in Nagasaki regarding Toyotomi Hideyoshi's seizure of the galleon *San Felipe* – referred to 1597. Rui Pires belonged to the same network and was in the "sombra" (protection) of the Society of Jesus in Nagasaki. Another constant in 1609 and between 1616 and 1621, such as the involvement of Francisco da Gama (a merchant who was active in the Macau-Goa-Manila-*Nueva España* axis[85]) Luís Carcês de Figueiredo, the "cristão-novo" (New Christian) merchant from Santarém whose power enabled him to correspond "directamente com a Mesa do Santo Ofício" (Lourenço, 2016, p. 186), evaded reporting to the Inquisition of Goa that had been ordered by the bishop of China, D. Frei João Pinto da Piedade in 1613, and achieved the favourable intervention of the Inquisitor, Gonçalo da Silva, bishop of Malacca, who maintained that a second inquiry was unjustified (Lourenço, 2016, p. 186), instigated for the first time in 1607 – and of Catarina Nasi and João Baptista

84 AGN, Inquisición, exp. 1U, vol. 237, 470, Sousa, 2015, 202.

85 LUL, BPL 876.

Inace (a distortion of "Nasci"/Nasi), that the following excerpt from the former to the Visitator Francisco Vieira in Manila shows that the relationship between Luís Garcês de Figueiredo and the Society of Jesus was of a contractual nature and bore similar characteristics to that of António Garcês de Miranda:

> Bem não quizera tornar de novo a magoar a Vossa Reverencia na materia da prata do ouro; mas como se moverão couzas de novo, que apontarei a Vossa reverencia brevemente, me he forçado dar conta a Vossa Reverencia do que pertendo; e pr.º que de dar minha tenção, saberà Vossa Reverencia como João Baptista Inace [Nasi] andava em demanda com a Companhia sobre o mesmo ouro. No cabo do tempo, que a demanda durou, disse João Baptista, que o Padre Provincial se concertara com elle, e lhe dera certa prata, e assim não foi a cauza por diante[86]

The cases of Luís Garcês de Figueiredo, João Baptista Nasi and Catarina Nasi reported to 1609 are related to the change in the Jesuit financial paradigma in the late 1580's. It's what explains the priests Jeronimo Rodrigues, Manuel Barreto, Celso Confalonerio, Diogo Pinto and Vicente Ribeiro:

> (…) procurador de fazendas alheas que misturam o dinheiro de suas partes com o seu, não he obrigado a pagar a seus constituintes de certo e limitado dinheiro senão daquele que milhor lhe vier a este, e a suas partes, como na verdade no principio começamos a pagar vinte e sete mil, duzentos e corenta e seis taeis do dinheiro dos castelhanos que em Japão estavão o qual tomamos a onzena pera isso, e não do dinheiro que se fez das fazendas (…)[87].

In the "[m]emoria do dinheiro e ouro que leuo de partes para heu benefisiar e o que leuo para entregar que tira em folha aparte" of one of the ledgers compiled by Francisco da Gama (annotated between 1618 and 1621)[88] – who was part of the same network as Ferdinand Cron and Saraswat Govinda (Subrahmanyan, 1994, pp.183-184) – the biggest sums correspond to the Society of Jesus. A list with the heading "dinheiro e ouro que levo para entregar"[89] mentions the "fisico João Pereira"[90], probably a New Christian, as well as 2,200 pesos and "32 taes douro"[91] of the Jesuits. Continuity was given to the financial pattern that had been inaugurated in the decade of the 1580s. This is confirmed

[86] BA, JA-49-V-5, fl. 214v.
[87] ARSI, Jap-Sin 16-II, fl. 293v.
[88] LUL, BPL 876, fls 14-14v.
[89] LUL, BPL, 876, fl. 15.
[90] I*bidem*.
[91] *Ibidem*.

by the "tytolo de Francisco Fernandes mestre do pataxo do filho de Luis de Lemos"[92], which has the following annotations:

> enbarcarão os padres da Companhia des sacos de Crauo com sete picos e sesenta cates a entregar ao padre procurador da Companhia de Goa[93]
> enbarcarão os ditos padres des sacos com os mesmos picos pouco mais ou menos a entregar a Mateus Vseta[94]
> enbarcou o padre procurador da Companhia hum caixão do suqure[95]
> enbarcarão os ditos huã petaca de miudesas e leua alguã tartaruga[96]

Vicente Henriques da Paz and Bertholomeu Soares, two merchants affiliated with the Malacca-Macau-Nagasaki axis in 1617, were also part of the Jesuit "parentela". The surname of da Paz, described by the Procurator of Goa, Father Bartolomeu de Sequeira as "o nosso amigo" (born in Porto), points to the Duarte da Paz and to his son Tomé Pegado da Paz, both with connections to the Ottoman Empire (Tavim, 2003, pp. 212-215).



Figure 4. Network of investors from Goa, Malacca and Macao who resorted to the Society of Jesus between 1609 and 1621.

92 *Ibidem.*
93 *Ibidem.*
94 *Ibidem.*
95 *Ibidem.*
96 *Ibidem.*

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ARSI (Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Rome), Jap-Sin 16-II, 21-II, 31.

BA (Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon), 49-IV-58, 49-IV-66, 49-V-4, 49-V-5.

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5. Curriculum vitae

Elsa Penalva is an integrated researcher at Centre for the Humanities (CHAM), of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities, from the Universidade NOVA de Lisboa. Among her main works, we can find *Mulheres em Macau – Donas Honradas, Mulheres Livres e Escravas* (CCCM-CHAM, Lisboa, 2012) (awarded with the Academia da História/Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, História da Presença Portuguesa no Mundo 2012 Prize), "Les Clarisses à Macau au 17e Siècle: Foi, Pouvoir et Liberté" (Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, Roma, 2012), "Mercadores, Jesuítas e Jurubaças (1600-1627)" (CCCM, Lisboa, 2015), "Assertividade e Poder em Macau: o caso de Dona Catarina de Noronha (c.1640-1696)" (Oriente, Lisboa, 2020).

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Italian Merchants in Habsburg Portugal (1580-1640)

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Abstract
The study of the presence of foreign communities in Lisbon during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is not yet properly studied, despite the undeniable key role they had in the development of the Lusitanian economy. The present contribution aims at reconstructing the path and the activity of Italian merchants in the Portuguese capital. The chosen chronological frame are the years of the Dual Monarchy (1580-1640). The objective is to present new research clues that may contribute to deepen political and social dynamics in a time that was deeply significant for the Portuguese Kingdom.

Keywords
Italian Merchants; Dual Monarchy; Portugal; Lisbon.

Resumo
O estudo da presença de comunidades estrangeiras em Lisboa nos séculos XVI e XVII não está ainda devidamente aprofundado, não obstante o inegável marco que estas tiveram no desen-volvimento da economia lusitana. O presente contributo visa reconstruir o percurso e a actividade de mercadores italianos na capital portuguesa tendo como balizas temporais os anos da Monarquia Dual (1580-1640) no intuito de apresentar novas pistas de investigação que possam contribuir para aprofundar dinâmicas políticas e sociais numa altura pro-fundamente marcante para o Reino português.

Palavras chave
Mercadores Italianos; Monarquia Dual; Portugal; Lisboa.

Introduction. - 1. Brief remarks on the background of the Italian presence in Lisbon. -2. From Spain to Portugal: The Italian contracts in the last quarter of the 1500s. - 3. Business ventures of the Florentine

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Introduction

Foreign communities were vital for the Portuguese economy in the 16th and 17th centuries. For the purposes of this chapter's chronology – the Dual Monarchy of 1580-1640, we will present the trajectory as well as the commercial networks of the Italian merchants living in the Portuguese capital at that time. Lisbon then had a considerable number of Italians from various regions of Italy. They had forgotten, or at any rate put aside the differences and internecine struggles that had afflicted the Italian peninsula and had established in Lisbon a compact and prosperous community of entrepreneurial merchants. Italians had begun to arrive in Portugal as far back as the 12th century, an influx which continued all along subsequent centuries, reaching its peak in the 1700s.

Several studies have attempted to reveal the role of the Italians in the Portuguese Expansion, recognizing their importance – both in terms of human resources, as well in terms of capital investment – in bringing about the economic 'miracle' of new commerce. However, despite a renewed interest on the part of both Portuguese scholars and the international academic community in the period relating to the Iberian Union, there is little, and only fragmented, information about this group of foreigners[2]. After the great Italian protagonists of the first half of the 16th century died out, little is known about the activity of their descendants, or about other Italians who had moved to the Portuguese capital in the intervening years.

The focus in the following pages will be on picking up the trail left by the Italian merchants who lived in Portugal under Castilian rule, reconstructing their lives and activity in the newly born monarchy, and identifying how the new political situation provided them with a range of opportunities.

1. Brief remarks on the background of the Italian presence in Lisbon

Commerce had been boosted by opening up a maritime route to India at the end of the 15th century and thus establishing a *carreira* (trade route) that, once a year, connected the port of Lisbon with the distant Orient; it also prompted the arrival of foreigners eager to participate in the lucrative trade. At this very time,

[2] See Trivellato, 2009; Alessandrini, 2011, 2015, 2015a; Alessandrini-Viola, 2013; Alessandrini-Bastos Mateus, 2015; Crivelli, 2017.

as António Borges Coelho points out, Lisbon became a place of opportunities, acquiring great importance for many different social classes:

> For the King, the city was the administrative centre not only for his palaces, but also because of the *Casa da India* with its warehouses and its wealth. For merchants, it was of such importance that, with the [Portuguese] Kingdom on one side and Lisbon on the other, the balance swung in favour of the latter. For many New Christians, Lisbon, while on the one hand signifying the Babylon of spiritual captivity, was also a place of riches which made them forget the memory of Zion. For many of the poor, it was the paradise of lost dreams. For the slaves, it was a strange land of suffering, of iron, and also of a new life (Borges Coelho 1986, pp. 299-300).

These lines sum up perfectly the rapid pace of the Portuguese capital's growth in the 16th century and show that even the less privileged classes and minorities found in Lisbon's riches and its splendor a positive contrast to their hardships.

The Italians, who were both protagonists and actors in the growth of the city, stood out among the groups of foreigners who flocked to it. They were clustered around important commercial houses, most of them Florentine, whose opulence guaranteed a strong financial support for the Portuguese Crown, for whom it had become difficult to sustain the heavy costs incurred in the annual expeditions to India on the one hand, and in purchasing oriental goods on the other. In addition, the cash flow remained immobilized for the duration of the ships' round-trip journey, and only after many months did money circulate again on the market. This meant that between the departure and arrival of the fleet, the shortage of money limited the possibility of granting loans. Due to this lack of liquidity, King Manuel was not in a position to spurn the substantial help that the wealthy Florentine merchants, as well as renowned and respected bankers, could provide for the success of the newly born overseas commerce.

However, although the Portuguese monarch tried to define some general lines in order to guarantee the stability of the new mercantile regime – instituting, among other measures, the requirement for royal authorization to participate in the spice trade[3] – the first five years (1499 to 1504) were unregulated, and the King was increasingly concerned about the need to introduce regulatory measures. The absence of any type of restriction, as well as the lack of control over prices, created profound instability. The fact that

[3] Royal authorization was granted to Portuguese merchants and also to foreigners who had been established in Portugal for a long time.

anyone could sell their merchandise at whatever price they chose led to alarmingly fluctuating prices and resulted in huge losses because buyers were apprehensive about stocking up on large quantities of goods. After 1504, a new commercial regime began to take shape, aiming to create a sense of security among the merchants, and to avert uncertainty provoked by extremely oscillating prices. However, the new measures were not enough to stimulate any rapid purchasing of goods. In these first decades of the 1500s, Italian families and private merchants began entering overseas trade. The Marchionni, (Guidi Bruscoli, 2014) Sernigi (Radulet, 1991), Giraldi (Rau, 1965; Alessandrini, 2013) Affaitati (Alessandrini, 2014) and Salvago, to mention but the most influential and well-known families, prospered and produced offspring in the Kingdom of Portugal, linking themselves to the Portuguese nobility. Until the mid-1560s approximately, i.e., until the death of Luca Giraldi in 1565, the Italian merchants in Lisbon were well-known for being descendants of the "old" group of merchants who had found fortune in the Portuguese capital at the beginning of the century. Among other illustrious names were the Affaitati brothers from Cremona, Cosme and Agostinho, although only Agostinho remained in the commercial world; the brothers Giraldi from Florence, Luca and Nicoló; Jacome de' Bardi of the former de' Bardi Florentine firm, installed in Portugal since the 14th century; and Antonio Calvo, Genoese, descendant of the Calvo sugar merchants. Despite the acute economic crisis that was shaking Portugal, they maintained their important positions in the major businesses, i.e., the spice trade, the chartering of ships, customs' contracts, and finance. They also became important operators in a business that was then taking its first steps: sugar from Brazil was soon to replace the trade of oriental products. One example of the entrepreneurial skills of these merchants, including their capacity to identify lucrative business opportunities, is Luca Giraldi. Together with Jorge de Figueiredo Correia, Mem de Sá, and Fernão Alvarez, he foresaw the importance of the Brazilian trade, and in 1550, they set up at least three *engenhos* (sugar mills) near the town of S. Jorge dos Ilhéus; in 1561, they bought the captaincy of the Ilhéus from Jerónimo de Alarcão de Figueiredo for 4,825 *cruzados.*

2. From Spain to Portugal: The Italian contracts in the last quarter of the 1500s

During the 1570s, a series of external and internal circumstances in Portugal turned the attention of merchants to the Lisbon market. The Spanish bankruptcy of 1575, the 'diaspora' of merchants from Antwerp, as well as the difficulty in obtaining spices on the Venetian market all contributed to making the Portuguese capital highly desirable from an economic and commercial point

of view. When adding the internal situation in Portugal to these external circumstances, a framework emerged that allowed for the arrival in Lisbon of more foreigners, particularly Italians, who, in the last quarter of the 1500s, managed to acquire the most profitable contracts.

The newly arrived Italians integrated with those who had been living in Lisbon for many years. When Phillip II was crowned King of Portugal in 1581, the Italian community in Lisbon comprised families of three different types. The first group was made up of the descendants of wealthy families who were predominantly, but not exclusively, Florentine, and who had become very successful in the first decades of the 1500s. These Italians had often established roots by marrying into families of the Portuguese nobility; in other cases, they pursued different paths, such as ecclesiastical life, or military careers in the overseas territories. A second group were Italians who had moved to Lisbon in the 1570s to benefit from the commercial advantages granted by King Sebastian. A third group consisted mainly of Genoese who, unlike the powerful Genoese bankers of the Spanish Court, did not belong to any particular *albergo.* With a few exceptions, members of this third group became important figures in the Portuguese economy a few decades later. The following pages will address the second and third group in particular, bearing in mind that the commercial activity of the families that prospered in the first decades of the 1500s became slowly diluted, and their descendants occupied other places in Portuguese society.

In order to understand the economic environment that Phillip II of Castile inherited when he took to the throne of Portugal in 1581, we must go back to the decade of the 1570s when King Sebastian, by enacting the Regiment on trade with the Orient on 1 March 1570, aimed to "largar o trato da pimenta, e mais especiarias, e mercadorias, que houver nas partes da India, a meus vassallos" (Silva Rego, 1996, IX, p.49). With this Regiment, King Sebastian granted free importation of all oriental goods, legitimizing, on the one hand, the numerous infractions that occurred constantly, while maintaining some restrictions, such as the prohibition on reselling goods on the other. While merchants could freely acquire the spices, including pepper, the products, once laded, had to be shipped to Portugal where they had to enter through the *Casa da India.* It is likely that the limitation on reselling goods was the main reason why the Regiment did not attain its projected objectives. Once they arrived in the warehouses of the *Casa da India,* the spices had to be distributed in Europe in order to fill the Crown's coffers, which, in December 1576, amounted to 200,000 *cruzados* (Gentil da Silva, 1961, p. 96). The King, therefore, had to

modify the Regiment to make the spice trade even more appealing; he also extended its benefits to distributors.

A day before departing for Guadalupe to meet with Phillip II of Castile in order to discuss his own marriage, but especially to plan the campaign in Africa, King Sebastian granted the customs contract to a Genoese named Stefano Lercaro, while granting the Mina contract to the Florentine Jacome de' Bardi. Lercaro had come from Spain in 1576 where he had been an *asientista* of the Spanish King, whom he had loaned 400,000 *reis*. De' Bardi also owned half of the customs contract. These were extremely remunerative businesses, especially that of Mina, which was "seen as the main business" as it was worth double that of the customs contract.

While still in Spain, Lercaro had engaged in commercial relations with Antonio Calvo, a Genoese merchant living in Lisbon, who died in 1576. Calvo was involved in the spice trade and had secured the shipping contract "de cinquo armadas e de qatro nãos en cada hu*m*a com lhes dar à f*azend*a do Rej as prim*ei*ras duas armadas postas a vella E a sua custa" (BNP, Pombalina 644, fl. 396). Between 1571-1576, Calvo, together with Manuel Caldeira, owned the lease of the customs contract.

His friendship with Calvo was the reason that the customs lease was given to Lercaro for 93.5 *contos*, valid until 1582. By 1578, Lercaro was earning large profits, having also taken on the dry ports contract. He had a permanent residence in Lisbon, and, creating a trajectory that expanded not only into the economic area, started buying up real estate.

Lercaro's other prerogative was diplomatic activity. As pro-consul for the Republic of Genoa, he took care of delicate dealings between Genoa and the King of Portugal. Of particular note in Lercaro's correspondence with the Republic of Genoa are sensitive issues regarding the control of information flow, and also the salt trade. Around 1582, for example, the Genoese Senate directed Lercaro to intercede with the King so that the Genoese ships sent to the island of Ibiza to load salt were not embargoed. The King's positive response by letter arrived on 24 October 1582, with the order "que fuesen relaxadas las que estavan ymbargadas y quando acacciese outro embargo se me hiziese saber para mandarlo remediar" (ASG, Archivio Segreto, 2659).

The influence of Stefano Lercaro at the Portuguese Court became evident in 1587 when, together with another Genoese, Giulio Spinola, he obtained royal authorization to open a money exchange bank in Lisbon with a clause that prevented any other merchant to open a bank of this kind within the next 10 years (Oliveira, 1997, p. 544). It is safe to surmise that the partnership between the two Genoese remained in effect at least until the first decade of the 1600s,

judging from the correspondence with Cosme Ruiz during his residences in Madrid and Valladolid respectively. In 1600, Lercaro and Spinola offered their financial services to Cosme Ruiz in Madrid, assuring him that he would "always be well assisted by us" (Gentil da Silva, 1956, p. 364). On 28 October 1606, the Venetian Gio Maria Cornari, resident in Lisbon, where he had established a commercial firm, refers to a letter of exchange issued to Lercaro and Spinola. Another member of the Lercaro family, Sebastião, received privileges from the King of Portugal in 1587, witnessed by the noblemen André Soares[4] and Francisco da Cunha, as well as by Ambrosio Cantello. The two merchant bankers, Lercaro and Spinola, were well known in the Court in Madrid; they took advantage of their good relations with Phillip II of Spain and came to the Portuguese capital in order to bolster their investments.

Apart from the customs contract, the Mina contract, and the *porto seco* contract, the pepper contract landed in Italian hands as well; in 1575, it was awarded to the consortium formed by the German Conrad Rott and the brothers Litta from Milan, Giovanni Battista and Agostino. The Milanese merchant brothers transferred their operations to Lisbon, where they specialized in the Indian spice trade at a time when the Venetian market, which supplied Milan, was extremely weak. This resulted in the commercialization of the pepper that arrived from Lisbon in the port of Livorno. Payment was made through letters of exchange on Alberto Litta, resident in Milan and agent of his cousin Giovanni Battista Litta in Lisbon. The pepper sent by Giovanni Battista Litta derived from a payment in goods for a loan that Gerolamo Litta, his father, had made to the Portuguese King John III.

This new source of pepper supply was a result of the war between the Most Serene (Venice) and the Turks, which had seriously disrupted the spice trade with the Levant and caused havoc on the Venetian market, leaving it devoid of goods. The merchants who had normally stocked up in the Venice market began to resort to the Lisbon market, where the consul of the Venetian nation, Giovanni Dall'Olmo, had presented a petition to the Royal *fazenda* (treasury) in 1577 proposing privileges for Venetian ships so they could unload their goods in the port of Lisbon (Alessandrini, 2013).

It was at that time, in 1577, that the Milanese merchant Giovan Battista Rovellasca arrived in Lisbon together with Febo Roque, also from Milan, with the intention of negotiating with Jacome de Bardi and assume a debt of 15 *contos* which the King owed to the Littas. Rovellasca set up residence in the

[4] Probably the same André Soares who had bought the contract for *pau-brasil* wood for 13 *contos* 600,000 *reis*, and which terminated in 1592. See: BNP, *Fundo Geral*, 637, f. 15v.

parish of Lisbon Cathedral, where the great merchants João Francisco Affaitati and Luca Giraldi had lived, and where the Florentine Jacome de' Bardi still lived. Rovellasca entered into the pepper contract with Konrad Rott and, together with Giovan Battista Litta and Jacome de' Bardi, owned 3.5 shares out of a total of 12. The biggest shareholder was Konrad Rott with 5 shares, while António Fernandes d'Élvas, Thomas Ximenes de Aragão, and Luís Gomes d'Elvas held the remaining 3.5 shares (Boyajian, 1993, pp. 20, 265).

The conditions of the pepper contract meant that every year, contractors were obliged to send money to India for the purchase of 30,000 *quintais* of pepper, 15,000 of which they could sell to whomever they wanted. The other 15,000 were for the King, who sold them to the contractors for 32 *cruzados* per *quintal*. After the tragic death of King Sebastian at Alcácer Quibir in 1578, the contract was suspended and only come back into effect between 1579 and 1584. On 26 March 1585, Phillip II wrote to Dom Duarte de Meneses, viceroy in India, regarding the previous contract: "[C]omesarão ho anno de blxxx e acabarão por vimda das naõs que vierão ho anno passado de blxxxiiij" (Archivo Portuguez Oriental, 1861, 3, p. 52). Thanks to Giovanni Dall'Olmo's *Informazione*, we know that contracts came into effect in the month of January of the year right after the contract was signed. Therefore, the contract between Rovellasca and King Henry was signed on 7 October 1578, and only came into effect in January 1579 (*Informazione di Giovanni Dall'Olmo*, 1584, p. 26).

It was not only the Milanese and Genoese who aspired to take advantage of King Sebastian's urgent need for liquidity and get involved in the Portuguese trade. In the spring of 1576, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Francesco I, tried to enter the spice trade of the Iberian Peninsula, in order to "tenere la scala di Livorno come piú comoda d'ogni altra"[5] (ASF, Mediceo del Principato, 689, f. 8) turning the port of Livorno, bought from the Genoese in 1421 for 100,000 *ducados*, into a trading centre. To that effect, Francesco I intended to establish agreements with both the King of Spain, and the King of Portugal. That year, 1576, the Grand Duke sent his agent Antonio Vecchietti to Lisbon to initiate negotiations with the King of Portugal. Upon his arrival in Madrid on 30 March 1576, Vecchietti, along with the Florentine ambassador, cautiously presented himself to the Portuguese ambassador. The Grand Duke's envoys, who were well received by the Portuguese ambassador, were informed that King Sebastian had just completed a four-year contract with the Germans. Vecchietti was advised to go to Lisbon as quickly as possible because the King wanted to

[5] Letter from Antonio Vecchietti to the grand duke of Tuscany. Lisbon, 10 September of 1576.

begin the "pratica com V. A. Serenissima e con i suoi fiorini"[6] (ASF, Mediceo del Principato, 683). Immediately upon his arrival in Lisbon on 9 April 1576, Vecchietti contacted the Florentine merchant Jacome de' Bardi and showed him the letter from the Grand Duke regarding the possibility of settling the spice contract, including all conditions and details about quantities and prices. Thanks to his many years of experience in the Portuguese trade, Jacome de Bardi immediately saw how difficult it would be to meet the Grand Duke's expectations, since the Portuguese King needed money and preferred "danari contanti piú che in altre mercantie"[7] (ASF, Mediceo del Principato, 684). The agreement would have been a lot more feasible if the Grand Duke had provided some money that could have been invested right away.

Although he had not secured the contract, the Grand Duke was nonetheless pleased with how business progressed, since trade movement in Livorno was quite satisfactory. In September 1576, two letters, one from Vecchietti and another from Jacome de' Bardi, reported that 1,500 *cantaras* of pepper had been dispatched on board the ship Fantona at the end of August, and that a shipment of 2,500 *cantaras* on board the vessel Bellina Raugea had been completed[8] (ASF, Mediceo del Principato, 689, f. 8). The correspondence between the Grand Duke of Tuscany and his agents in Lisbon suggests that more spices, especially pepper, could have been shipped if the Grand Duke had deployed his galleys.

When Portugal was annexed to the Spanish monarchy, Phillip II did not intervene in pre-existing contracts. In 1581, the pepper contractors, including Giovan Battista Rovellasca, of the ship S. Pedro continued to send the *cabedal* (capital) that had been stipulated by an earlier contract for the purchase of pepper. After Conrad Rott declared bankruptcy in 1582, Phillip II allowed Rovellasca to acquire the five shares of the German merchant. Rovellasca agreed to pay "250,000 cruzados in three payments, [of which] 83,333 cruzados [i.e., one third] at the end of 1584; 83,333 cruzados [the second third] at the end of 1585; and 83,333 cruzados [the last third] at the end of 1586" (De Luca, 1996, p.94). The Milanese merchant, who had employed the Florentine merchant Filippo Sassetti as his *feitor* in India, was, apart from the spice contract, also involved in the customs contract in 1582 for the sum of 262,000 *escudos*; in the slave contract, in which he had invested 4 *contos* and 400,000 *reis* in 1584 (BNP, Fundo Geral, 637, fl.15); and in the São Tomé sugar business, which in the last

6 Letter from Antonio Vecchietti to the grand duke of Tuscany. Madrid, 30 March of 1576.

7 Letter from Antonio Vecchietti to the grand duke of Tuscany. Lisbon, 9 April of 1576.

8 Letter from Antonio Vecchietti to the grand duke of Tuscany. Lisbon, 10 September of 1576.

decades of the 16th century was also notable[9]. Between 1589 and 1592, Gaspar Cadena, a wealthy merchant residing in the Portuguese capital, was the King's *feitor* on the island of São Tomé. He lived in the Lisbon parish of Loreto, where he married the aristocratic Ângela Margarida Villa Sante of the Espinosa de Monteros family. They had five sons, all of whom served in Portugal's overseas conquests.

Giovan Battista Rovellasca's involvement in Portuguese trade was extensive, and the Mina and Achem contract was still available. Through the *Rendimento da casa da Índia, Mina, Brasil, Ilha de S. Thome, Cabo Verde, Angola* of 1588, it is known that "for two years it has not been capitalized on, or a contract been signed for it until now". This void was filled by the younger brother of Giovan Battista Rovellasca, Francesco Rovellasca, who is likely to have arrived in Lisbon around 1586-87, since he was still living in Milan in 1585 (Kellenbenz, 1986, p. 825). In April 1589, he had contracted the trade of the Mina and Achem fortresses for nine years, provided that he dispose of the goods that he had in those fortresses within one month (BNP, Pombalina 644, fl. 18).

Giovan Battista Rovellasca maintained his residence in Lisbon, although he continued to interact with Spain, where, in the last years of the 1500s, he engaged in the trade in enslaved persons. His fortune in Portugal was rooted in two factors: the first was the strong financial support he had from Milanese merchants, particularly his father-in-law, Cesare Negrolo. The second had to do with the failure of Phillip II's project. Ever since he had taken over the Kingdom of Portugal and all its possessions, Phillip II tried to promote the spice trade, hoping to attract the city of Venice, whom he wanted to favour with the distribution rights for pepper. Several objectives underpinned his intentions to strengthen ties with a commercially experienced city like Venice; but first and foremost, his strategy was to turn Lisbon into the sole centre for distribution of oriental products, to the detriment of the Levant route.

Venice's reaction to the Portuguese King's proposal was, understandably, one of great perplexity, considering that the Venetian presence on the Iberian Peninsula at that time was rather insignificant; instead, many Venetian families lived in Cairo, Alexandria, and Damascus, where they were prospering through commerce. The Venetian Senate conducted the negotiations skillfully, adopting

[9] It is worth noting that from 1579, King Henry – in order to continue the construction of the church of S. Sebastião, which his nephew King Sebastian had commissioned – donated each year one *conto de reis* from the increase in duties on the sugars from the Island of Santomé, which is paid in the customs of this city of Lisbon, see Oliveira, 1887, vol. II, p. 366n. Also, in 1581, Filippo Sassetti wrote to Francesco Valori that the sugar of S. Tomé was a "mercanzia sospettosissima e richiesta per tutto il mondo" (Sassetti, 1970, p. 285).

a strategy that kept the negotiating process open, but without responding to the solicitations. Venice knew that a blatant rejection would offend Phillip II and lead to unfortunate consequences. It was thus necessary to "stancare l'interlocutore, sottoponendolo ad una attesa sempre piú pesante ed inconcludente, scoraggiandolo progressivamente, senza ricorrere a dinieghi ufficiali e categorici" (Oliveira, 2000, p. 146), subtly compelling the Portuguese King to choose another solution. And so it was that he entered into a final contract with Giovan Battista Rovellasca on 15 February 1586; in April, the Welsers joined the contract.

3. Business ventures of the Florentine merchants in Lisbon (1575-1620)

The Venetians, Milanese, and Genoese developed important commercial activities in Portugal in the last quarter of the 1500s and knew how to take advantage of their 'familiarity' with the Court in Madrid, and so did the Florentines. They all knew well how to benefit from the new political situation, and it is worth highlighting some of the names of those merchants who, at the end of the 16th century and early 17th century, extended their business ventures to the Iberian Peninsula.

Four times *provedor* of the church of Nossa Senhora do Loreto (Our Lady of Loreto), the respected merchant Raffaele Fantoni was remembered as a "amico de' ministri apostolici" (Demoulin, 1974, p. 160). His name appears frequently in the reports of Giambattista Confalonieri, who, at the service of the Roman curia, became a specialist in Portuguese matters. Confalonieri's first experience in Portugal dates back to the last decade of the 1500s, when Fabio Biondo was secretary of the *colector geral* in the years 1592 to 1596[10]. Upon his return to Rome, Raffaele Fantoni was asked to write reports on the situation in Portugal for the benefit of the *colectores* leaving for Lisbon. In his report of 1598 to Monsignor Decio Carafa, *colector* in Lisbon, Confalonieri mentions Raffaele Fantoni, along with his friend and fellow Florentine Giulio Nessi, a merchant employed by the customs house of Castille. In 1601, when he was quite elderly, the name of Raffaele Fantoni again appears in the information intended for the Colector Gaspare Paoluccio Albertoni as being a "buono amico, e huomo leale"

[10] There is a reference to "Gio batta gonfalonero di Roma", who on 2 January 1619 owed 57,296 *reis* to the Church of Loreto, corresponding to the ¼ per cent fee, ANSL, *Livro Mestre das receitas e despesas*, fl. 28.

(good friend and loyal man) (*Ibidem*); and in the same year, Fantoni's name features once more in an inventory made for the *colector* Ottavio Accoramboni. A son of Giovanni de Agostino Fantoni, Raffaele Fantoni, who had taken up commercial activities with his brothers, came from a family of Florentine noblemen. The presence in Lisbon of the Fantoni is not well-documented, but it does go back to the early 16th century, as evidenced by a letter from Francesco Guicciardini to his brother in Valladolid, dated 17 June 1513. Guicciardini reports that he had news via Iacopo Fantoni that one of the ships that he had sent to Malaca in the expedition of 1510 had arrived in Lisbon on 20 May 1513 (Spallanzani, 1997, p. 106).

In Lisbon, Raffaele Fantoni had a trading company in partnership with the Florentine Giulio Nessi, with whom he had some kinship, the latter having married Esperança de Cáceres, Raffaele Fantoni's mother-in-law. Nessi kept the marriage a secret, which caused friction between the two friends. Their friendship cooled, and their business ties lessened[11]. Fantoni and Nessi had business connections with the Venetian Luc'Antonio Giunti who sent books, as well as articles in glass and ironwork, to Lisbon, receiving pepper and sugar from Brazil and São Tomé in exchange. The ships belonged to the Venetian Stella family, whose members were also in Lisbon and had commercial contacts with Giunti. Angelo Stella had lived in the area of S. Paulo since 1574 and probably acted as an *in loco* agent of the firm founded in 1571 by Luc'Antonio Giunti and Marc'Antonio Stella. He was also a friend of Gaspar Cadena, was *feitor* in São Tomé between 1582 and 1592, and probably held the office of *provedor* of the Church of Loreto in 1605, 1609, and 1614.

The activity of Raffaele Fantoni was, of course, linked to the port of Livorno. Boxes of sugar were sent from Lisbon to his brother Francesco Fantoni, while another brother, Agostinho, was the ship's captain. The vessel Fontana, owned by the family, was used to ship the goods to the port of Livorno, and, according to Filippo Sassetti, Raffaele Fantoni and Giulio Nessi had volunteered to be intermediaries in delivering goods from India to their Florentine friends. The Venetians Giulio Nessi and Alvise Vezzato[12] signed the Algarve tuna fishing contract, making an advance payment of over 100,000 *ducados,* and taking advantage of the favourable conditions which, according to Alvise Vezzato,

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[11] The differences must have been resolved because on 5 August 1592, Raffaele Fantoni and his mother-in-law, Esperança Cáceres, became godparents in the christening of Marta, "[…] daughter of Baltezar Roiz Santiago merchant and his wife Maria Natalia", *Registo da Freguesia de Santa Cruz do Castelo desde 1563 até 1628* (1913), vol I, p. 331.

[12] Alvise Vezzato's house in Alcântara had been looted during the occupation of Lisbon in 1580, cf. Teixeira Marques de Oliveira, 1997, 242.

aroused the envy of many merchants. However, of the contract's six years duration, the first five were unprofitable, with a loss of over 90,000 *ducados*. This firm went bankrupt in 1593 with a sizeable loss of 150,000 *ducados*. While he was involved in the tuna fishing contract, Alvise Vezzato, after the death of Giovanni dall'Olmo, held the office of Venetian consul in Lisbon. Through the intercession of the Venetian ambassador in Madrid, he tried to obtain a promissory note for the debts the King owed both him and private investors, with a view to deal more calmly with the question of his diplomatic office, i.e., the consulate, which he wanted to maintain. However, the Venetian ambassador had not received any orders from the Venetian Senate regarding the consul in Lisbon, and Vezzato's request was denied.

The last years of the 1500s were problematic for the Spanish monarchy, and the bankruptcy of some Florentine operators, including the Milanese Giovan Battista Rovellasca, should be evaluated in the context of that crisis. Phillip II's bankruptcy in 1596 led to the enactment of a royal decree which suspended interest payment. A lack of liquidity resulting from this royal measure, coupled with the closure of the exchange, severely affected the financial circles. Business came to a halt, and another Florentine merchant established in Lisbon, Carlo Velluti, unable to pay the letters of exchange, was at risk of being arrested (Gentil da Silva, 1956, pp. 156). However, he was granted authorization to meet his business partner, Cristóvão Aldana, in Castile. In August 1597, the decree regarding the suspension of payments was still in effect, and to make matters worse, Lisbon was ravaged by the plague, obliging the businessmen to move to outskirts such as Carnide, Odivelas, Loures, Santo Antonio do Tojal, Seixal, and Montijo, among other places. Lisbon became depopulated until April 1599, when sanitary conditions appeared to improve.

In the meantime, Phillip II died in September 1598, and when the Venetian ambassador in Madrid, Francesco Soranzo, transmitted the news to the Senate of Venice, he mentioned that the Crown had incurred a debt of "cento millioni d'oro" (Oliveira, 1997, p. 686). In 1601, widespread distrust made it "impossible d'arranger les affaires de Carlo Velluti" (Gentil da Silva, 1956, p. 70), and the bankruptcy of the Florentine merchant affected the commercial circles of Lisbon to a considerable degree.

In terms of the diplomatic situation, relations between Florence and Castile suffered a reversal due to the change of political strategy of the Grand Duke, Ferdinand I, who intended to obtain autonomy in the face of Castilian hegemony and create a network of contacts with other high ranking European states (Volpini, 2008, p. 1134). The tension between Florence and Madrid didn't ease until the death of D. Pietro de' Medici in 1604, brother of Francesco I and of

Ferdinand I. In 1604, when tensions had eased between Florence and Phillip III, the Grand Duke Ferdinand I wrote

> i Chiarissimi Magistrati e stimati Consigl*ie*ri, che amministrano la giustizia di qualunque ordine, che per nostro rispetto e grazia voglino fare à d*ett*o Carlo Velluti il favore convenevole come per il suo onore, ed utile perché tutto il favore che li si farà perpetuamente ne avremo memoria (ASF, Carte Dei, 51, n.8)

A year later, in 1605, Giulio Nessi went bankrupt, and after that, as evidenced by the payment of a rate of ¼ per cent to the Church of Loreto for the goods sold, the economic situation of these Florentines over the first two decades of the 1600s remained relatively modest. It is probable that economic difficulties led Giulio Nessi to sell the chapel of Santa Catarina within the Church of Loreto. It had belonged to his wife, Esperança de Cáceres, since 1582, when it was bought for 160,000 *reis* (ANSL, Livro Mestre, fl.6). Through a deed dated 20 April 1618, the chapel was sold to Francesco de la Corona for the sum of 300,000 *reis*.

The last record of Raffaele Fantoni is from 1619, when his ¼ per cent fee to the Church of Loreto added up to 17,140 *reis* and was registered in documentation in the Archives of the Church of Loreto (ANSL, Livro Mestre, fl. 36). In the year 1619, in observance of King Phillip III's arrival in Portugal, the Italians convened, having been instructed by the City Council of Lisbon, along with other merchants from all nations and citizens of Portugal, to erect their own triumphal arch.

4. The business networks of the Italians in Lisbon (1620-1640)

The wide range of goods which the Italians commercialized included precious stones and coral. In India, there was great demand for Mediterranean coral, especially from Genoa and Barcelona, and large quantities of it were sold in India. As a highly profitable trade, it was controlled by the Crown monopoly. To facilitate the introduction of this precious product on the Indian market, King John III (1521-1557) introduced new rules regarding customs duties, such as replacing the previous duty of 20% with a newly-established fee of 16 *ducados* for each *quintal* of first quality coral, 4 *ducados* for a *quintal* of second quality, and 3 *ducados* per *quintal* of third grade coral[13].

[13] First quality coral was called *bianca,* second quality coral was called *toro,* and third quality coral was called *bastardo*. Cf. *Informazione di Giovanni Dall'Olmo,* 1584, p. 17.

Regarding the trade of diamonds, recent studies show that there was a well-structured network that brought together agents of different ethnicities and religions with one shared objective: commercial success (Trivellato, 2009). The origin of this network can be traced to the expulsion of the Jews from Portugal in 1496. Forced conversions during the reign of King Manuel I (1495-1521), coupled with the establishment of the Inquisition in 1536 under King John III, played a fundamental role in the diaspora of Portuguese Jews, who found a promised land in Italy. Those who preferred to flee rather than convert engendered creative plans of escape, leaving from Vigo, Coruña, Bilbao, (and) La Rochelle, for Livorno, Genoa, Florence, Venice, Ferrara, Ancona and the Pontifical State (Mea, 2007, p. 131).

In Florence, the Medicis adopted a strategy of drawing Jews to their territory by guaranteeing protection from the Inquisition. There were two important moments in this process of attracting Sephardic Jews. The first was in 1549 when the Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo I, granted privileges to Portuguese Jews (Fischer, 2008). The second event took place in 1591 when Grand Duke Ferdinand I enacted the so-called *Livornine*: By granting privileges to all merchants, including Jewish ones, he founded in the port of Livorno the largest Sephardic colony on the Italian peninsula. This tightly knit mercantile community in Livorno maintained commercial relations with the Italians of Lisbon. They, in turn, became intermediaries between the Hindu merchants of Goa, who were the buyers of uncut diamonds, and the Jews who had spread out over Europe.

Trivellato (2009) studied sources from notarial registries in Amsterdam and Livorno that corroborate these networks in which the Italian merchants of Lisbon moved. He discovered the existence in 1623 of two agents of Felipe Henriques of Amsterdam: the Florentines Francesco Morelli and the abovementioned Giacomo Tatti, brother-in-law of Raffaele Fantoni. The testamentary dispositions of Francesco Morelli show that this merchant engaged in the coral trade, sending coral to India, where he was paid in diamonds which he then exported to Venice (ANSL, Caixa IX, doc. 37). The payments of the ¼ per cent fee to the Church of Loreto reveal, albeit vaguely, the general lines of operation of Giacomo Tatti's business activities, which showed some growth during the years that he was active on the Amsterdam market. In 1625, Francesco Morelli owed the Church of Loreto 131,992 *reis*, a significantly higher amount than in previous years[14]. Francesco Morelli,

[14] In the five-year period of 1613-1618, the fee paid by Morelli was 83,662 *reis*; in 1621, it was 18,976 *reis*, and in 1622, it was 46,110 *reis*, ANSL, *Livro Mestre das Receitas e Despesas*, fl. 12, 13.

probably a descendant of Giovanni Morelli, married a Portuguese, Simoa dos Santos[15], and participated in the spice trade, as indicated in the ledger *Livro Mestre das Receitas e Despesas* (fl.28). He died in 1629, leaving to the Church of Loreto a legacy of 9,000 *reis* for the celebration of two weekly masses, and for expenditures of the sacristy (ANSL, Caixa XV, doc. 16). Giacomo Tatti, for his part, engaged in business with the brothers of the Genoese Francesco André Carrega, Simão and Inocêncio, who were established in Cadiz, again corroborating the extensive collaboration among Italian merchants throughout the Iberian Peninsula.

Another Italian merchant who was active in Lisbon in the first decades of the 1600s was the Genoese Francesco de la Corona, married to Clara Thomé, and resident in the parish of S. Mamede. Information regarding his family can be found in the last will of one of his sisters, Lucrezia, read on 20 October 1626 (ANTT, *Registo Geral de Testamentos*, L.16, n. 76). De la Corona probably died around 1622, which is the last year any mention of him is recorded. Judging from his payments of the obligatory ¼ per cent fee to the Church of Loreto – i.e., a fourth of a *ducado* for every 100 *ducados* of Italian merchants' commercial transactions – it is safe to surmise that de la Corona's business ventures were modest in volume, and that he relied on the support of his brother-in-law, the German merchant João Filtre, who had married his sister Lucrezia. Francesco de la Corona was the procurator of the Giunti of Venice, who, as mentioned above, had interests in the Iberian Peninsula. Between January 1615 and September 1619, he paid 475,680 *reis* to the Church of Loreto. In the two following years, from 1619 to 1621, the payment due had decreased to 142,216 *reis*. The business activities of the Venetian Jacome Quisali, treasurer of the Brotherhood of S. Carlo and Santa Francisca Romana of the Church of Loreto, show a similar trajectory. Quisali's volume of business for the period between 30 April 1615 and September 1619 entailed a payment of the ¼ per cent fee of 305,983 *reis*, while the payment he made on 20 March 1622, corresponding to 1621, shows a big inflection, since he only paid 8,288 *reis*.

The five-year period of 1618-1623 was problematic for Portugal's economy. The loss of Ormuz in 1622 resulted in decreasing commercial operations in the Indian Ocean. In the Atlantic area, a temporary drop in the price of sugar was alarmingly indicative of an impending trade crisis with Brazil. The group of Italian merchants were also aware of the financial difficulties faced by the government in the Philippines. These forebodings soon turned into reality

[15] Simoa dos Santos and Francesco Morelli were married in 1627. After the Florentine merchant died in 1629, his widow remarried the German merchant Cristóvão Mayer, resident in São Julião, in 1630. This information was kindly provided by Doutor Gonçalo Nemésio.

when Portugal lost important holdings of its empire. The Dutch occupation of Bahia, albeit temporary, put additional financial strain on an already depleted royal treasury. Money was also needed to equip the India fleet, and the King was forced to sell *padrões de juro* (bonds) of the royal treasury. The Dutch occupation of Pernambuco in 1630 led the Count-Duke of Olivares to introduce new measures to finance the defense of Brazil. An order was issued by the government on 6 February 1631 aimed at collecting 100,000 *cruzados* to start building an armada for the recovery of Pernambuco. This was to be collected through the sale of *juros do real dagua* (royal bonds). The Venetian João Baptista Quisali, *provedor* of the Church of Our Lady of Loreto, as well as Domenico Micone and Paulo Valerio, also officials of that church, found out that these bonds were to be issued and informed the Senate of the City Council of Lisbon that they wanted to buy 15,000 *reis* worth of bonds (ANSL, Livro Mestre das Receitas e Despesas, fl. 41).

With regard to Domenico Micone, extant information dates to 1622, when he was a clerk in the Church of Our Lady of Loreto (in Lisbon). He also held that position in 1629 and 1630, but in 1631 and 1632 he worked as a chamberlain (ANSL, Livro Mestre das Receitas e Despesas, fl.87, 92, 97). Domenico was a nephew of Nicolao Micone, a Genoese merchant who attained great economic success in the second half of the 17th century (Alessandrini - Viola, 2013). After living for a time in Lisbon – in the Rua da Barrera, parish of Our Lady of Loreto – Domenico Micone became a canon of Braga Cathedral. In Lisbon, he had engaged in some commerce, as evidenced by the payment of the ¼ per cent fee. He must have died between 1671 – the year when Nicolao Micone's testament was written, in which Domenico still figured as heir – and 1674, the year of Nicolao Micone's death. The inventory of Nicolao's estate included an inheritance left by his nephew Domenico, comprising the houses he owned in Lisbon in the parish of Our Lady of Loreto.

Although the commercial networks created by the Italian merchants in Lisbon in the 1630s did not attain the amplitude and vitality of those in the mid-17th century, they did show modest success. After a somewhat discouraging early phase, the names of Italian families gained prominence as they started to build highly lucrative businesses in the second half of the 1600s.

The Italians in Lisbon continued to collaborate with the Genoese in the Court in Madrid. Despite the Count-Duke of Olivares' attempt to exclude the Genoese, they maintained a strong influence and secured profits for their community in Lisbon. The prominent Genoese bankers in Madrid during the 1640s, Carlo Strata, Ottavio Centurione, Luigi and Benedetto Spinola, Alessandro and Gio Luca Pallavicini, as well as Lelio and Giovanni Stefano

Invrea relied on trustworthy "agents" in Lisbon. One of these bankers, Gio Luca Pallavicini, who had been active in Madrid since the early 17th century, asked his nephew Paolo Gerolamo Pallavicini in 1635 to participate in the *asientos* so as to initiate relations with Carlo Strata, who held an important position as the King's banker and was the Count-Duke of Olivares' right-hand man.

To illustrate their closeness and the excellent relations between Carlo Strata and the Court in Madrid, it is worth pointing out a sumptuous party that he organized in his residence in the Calle de San Jerónimo in 1637, to which he invited Phillip IV and the Count-Duke of Olivares. The Genoese banker, apart from paying the onerous costs of the event, offered the King some of the precious decorative objects in his house; these were subsequently used to embellish the Buen Retiro Palace.

Perplexed at and concerned about the heavy loans taken on by the Crown, and in the face of the Count-Duke of Olivares' visible hostility towards the Genoese, Paolo Girolamo Pallavicini advised his uncle to be careful, reminding him that during the bankruptcy of 1627, Carlo Strata had reimbursed the Pallavicini with bonds instead of cash, thus incurring big losses. The correspondence between Paolo Girolamo Pallavicini and his uncle corroborates the existence of an important network of operatives on the main international markets. On the Lisbon market, the operatives of the Pallavicini in 1628[16] were the Genoese Gio Ambrogio Salvago; whereas between 1636 and1638[17] (Marsilio, 2005, p. 105), Gio Batta and Bartolomeo Laviosa supplied them with sugar. According to Gio Luca Pallavicini, sugar, as well as wool, were the only goods that could be expected to "fare arbitrio di somma considerabile"[18]. In those very same years (1636 -1638), the Laviosas – together with Francesco Bresciani from Brescia, and Nicolao Micone – had trade interests also with India. Although presented as merchants with a less substantial business volume, the fee they paid to the Church of Loreto showed that it was rather average.

The Laviosa brothers and the Genoese Antonio Maria Conti Ventimiglia were involved in the sugar and spice trade, which they sent to Lisbon to be sold in Genoa and other cities. Their agent in Genoa, Pelegro Peretti, received, monitored, and also sold the goods, from where he sent corals, silk ribbon, and

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16 In a letter dated 1 July 1628, Gio Luca Pallavicini asks his nephew Paolo Girolamo for news about developments in the sugar business and seeks information about his supplier of sugar in Lisbon, Ambrogio Salvago. Many thanks to Doutor Marsilio for this information.

17 Many thanks to Doutor Marsilio for kindly sharing this information, which he found in the Archivio Durazzo Giustiniani of Genova.

18 Letter sent from Madrid on 8 April 1634 to his nephew Paolo Girolamo Pallavicini. Archivio Durazzo of Genova, *Archivio Pallavicini*, ramo primogénito, busta 220.

fabrics manufactured by his own son. The quantity and quality of the business ventures of the Laviosa brothers did not compare, however, with the great fortune amassed by their partner Nicolao Micone, who, as a partner and friend of Franco André Carrega, became a wealthy and respected businessman in the Portuguese capital in the second half of the 17th century. Described in a document from 1647 by Brother Bartolomeo of Genoa as being a peace-loving man who had been residing in Lisbon for over 25 years, Nicolao Micone's success began in the 1640s when Franco André Carrega arrived in Lisbon from Cadiz to replace his brother Inocêncio Carrega. The Genoese Carrega family was dispersed over the Iberian Peninsula, living between Genoa, Cadiz, Seville, and Lisbon. Until 1631, Inocêncio Carrega had lived in Lisbon, where he worked with another Genoese, Alberto Savignone, and engaged in commercial relations with his brothers. It is safe to surmise that Franco André Carrega arrived in Lisbon in 1631, the last year for which there is any reference to his brother Inocêncio's presence in Lisbon.

This date is confirmed by Antonio Maria da Conti Ventimiglia. In 1636, he claimed that he had known Francesco André Carrega for four or five years. In 1636, Francisco André Carrega became a *familiar* (member) of the Holy Office, following the path of his brothers Simão and Inócencio, who were *familiares* of the Holy Office in Cadiz, and that of his brother Marco Antonio, who was a *familiar* of the Holy Office in Seville. For their entire lives, Nicolao Micone and Francisco André Carrega worked and lived together in the houses over the Muro dos Cubertos in the Mártires parish in Lisbon. They became very wealthy and, together with the powerful Ghersi family from Genoa, founded a commercial firm in a global-scale economy that connected Europe to the rest of the world.

5. Conclusion

The abundant sources, not all of which studied yet, show that there were strong relationships among the Italian merchants in the Iberian Peninsula, a presence that had always been continuous but which, not surprisingly, intensified during the years of the Dual Monarchy. The Italian families living on the Iberian Peninsula established commercial networks which involved trading a variety of goods that were sold in places that went far beyond European borders. These commercial networks intensified and led to the establishment of important commercial firms in the second half of the 17th century.

However, while, from a business perspective, the Iberian Peninsula provided new opportunities for trade on the one hand, mercantile and diplomatic

correspondence on the other indicate that the mentalities of Italian merchants in the two countries, Spain and Portugal, remained quite distinct.

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Dislocating a Trade Network: New Christian and Jewish Merchants Between the Portuguese and the British Empires (1700-1730)*

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Abstract
This article correlates the transformations of the Lisbon's commercial elite during the first half of the 18th century, the Inquisition repression against New Christians, and the Sephardic influx to London in the 1720s-1730s. These intertwined events are considered under the framework of the Anglo-Portuguese relations. Our analysis focuses on the crisscrossed trajectories of three New Christian merchants, which illustrate how changes in the profile of the mercantile group of Lisbon and the migratory flows to London are key points to understand the dynamics of the Anglo-Portuguese trade in the 18th century.

Keywords
Inquisition; Migrations; Sephardim; London; Lisbon.

Resumo
Este artigo inter-relaciona as transformações da elite mercantil de Lisboa na 1.ª metade do século XVIII, a repressão inquisitorial contra os cristãos-novos e o fluxo migratório sefardita para Londres nas décadas de 20 e 30. Estes acontecimentos são analisados à luz das relações luso-britânicas. A nossa análise foca-se das trajectórias de três homens de negócio cristãos-novos, as quais ilustram como as circunstâncias da progressiva mudança do perfil da elite mercantil lisboeta e os fluxos migratórios para Londres são pontos-chave para a compreensão das dinâmicas do comércio luso-britânico em Setecentos.

Palavras-chave
Inquisição; migrações; Sefarditas; Londres; Lisboa.

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Introduction

In the 1970s, while tracing a prosopographic picture of the "mercantile class" in seventeenth-century Lisbon, David Grant Smith found a group deeply marked by the distinction between New and Old Christians[1]. Without an official census of the mercantile group in Lisbon for this chronology, Grant Smith based his analysis on a sample of 364 merchants active in the city between 1620 and 1690, mentioned in a selected set of sources, such as Inquisitorial trials, *habilitações* (processes of qualification for officers), and notarial documentation. The New Christian element is dominant. Among the individuals whose quality of blood is fully identified (257 of the total sample), 78% were New Christians (Smith, 1975, pp. 11-53)[2].

Little over a half century later, something had, however, changed. After analysing the profile of businessmen and contractors residing in Lisbon during the period from 1755 to 1822, Jorge Pedreira discovered a group in expansion, but still below the number recorded in other large European port cities. Focusing on a period that encompasses the official abolition of the distinction between New Christians and Old Christians (1773), Pedreira concludes that the individuals of New Christian background had become a minority in the Lisbon merchant elite. However, some New Christians still appeared among "the first figures of the mercantile body", such as António Soares de Mendonça, Manuel Caetano de Mello, or Gaspar Pessoa Tavares (Pedreira, 1995, pp. 222-226; 1992, pp. 431-433).

Historiography has been less insightful in the study of the mercantile group from Lisbon in the period covered by the chronologies of the two studies carried out by Pedreira and Smith respectively. In his doctoral thesis, William Donovan broaches the subject of this group in the context of commerce with Brazil, based on one particular case study: the mercantile house of Francisco

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1 "New Christian" is a term used to designate both Jews who converted to Christianity, as well as their descendants, after the edict of expulsion and forced conversion at the end of the 15th century. The distinction between New Christians and Old Christians was officially abolished in Portugal in 1773.

2 Apart from limitations resulting from the typology of the sources (with a strong presence of Inquisitorial documentation), Smith also calls attention to the fact that a considerable part of the 107 merchants whose blood quality does not appear to be identified may have been, at least functionally, Old Christians (Smith, 1975, p. 18).

Pinheiro. Focusing on the trajectory of this businessman of Old Christian origins, Donovan addresses only secondarily the New Christian element and its role in the mercantile framework of the Lisbon market in the first half of the 18th century. He holds that when Francisco Pinheiro and his family began operating in Lisbon at the turn of the century, most businessmen were by then Old Christians,

> a point borne out by the decreased number of merchants tried and sentenced in Inquisition *Autos-da-fé*. The eighteenth-century merchants whom the Inquisition arrested were, in the main, provincial merchants with Spanish origins (Donovan, 1990, p. 61)[3].

The absence of any systematic records of the mercantile group active in Lisbon during this period does not allow for a categorical refutation of Donovan's assertion. However, documentary evidence reveals that the argument presented in his work is not completely accurate. With the Inquisitorial repression still vigorous during the first three decades of the 18th century, New Christian merchants continued to be a prime target. Triggered by the relentless arrests, the climate of fear encouraged migration to safer territories, and Inquisitorial files, as well as diplomatic records, unveil one particular destination of choice for these New Christian exiles: London. In this article, I will explore the way in which the recurring repression exercised by the Inquisition in the early decades of the 18th century impacted on the mercantile group of Lisbon, and how this contributed to a change in its profile. By following the path of one particular group of New Christian merchants directly affected by these waves of repression, I will argue that the Inquisitorial activity during this period provoked a migratory movement which, rather than lead to an actual collapse of their trade networks, instead prompted them to dislocate their epicentres to another space, while retaining their actual trading activities. We therefore start our investigation from the destination point of this migratory movement: London. There, among a group of merchants involved in the Brazilian gold trade in the early 1720s, we will find some Iberian Jews who had left Lisbon only a few years earlier: Diogo de Aguilar, Fernando Dias Fernandes, and Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro. I will then analyse the very circumstances that had caused their departure from Portugal in the first place. Returning, therefore, my gaze to Lisbon, a city haunted by the Inquisition, I will follow their paths towards London. By crossing a broad typology of documentary sources (Inquisitorial files, diplomatic correspondence, the fonds

[3] David Francis advocates a similar point of view in Francis, 1985, p. 40.

of the Junta da Administração do Tabaco, as well as the records held by the Spanish and Portuguese Jews' Congregation in London), I will shed light on the trajectory and networks of these merchants within a particular framework that combined what was to be the last breath of the Inquisition's assault on New Christians in Portugal on the one hand, with the strengthening of the Anglo-Portuguese economic relations in the first half of the 18th century on the other.

1. London, February 1723

In order to understand the transformations that occurred in Lisbon during the first half of the 18th century, it is necessary to look towards London. In February 1723, 56 merchants and commercial partnerships based in the British capital authorized the shipmasters, captains, and masters of any vessel bound for England and laden with gold (either consigned or at their own expense) to deliver it to the merchant John Goodall or any other person named by him[4].

Most of the gold that entered the English market was originally from Brazil and arrived via Lisbon. Since the end of the 1600s, shipments of Brazilian gold had repositioned Lisbon in international commerce. Its port became a commercial trading centre that connected English commerce with the Mediterranean markets and the American colonies (Costa - Rocha, 2011, p. 148; see also Costa - Rocha - Sousa, 2013). Charles Boxer – albeit lacking thorough data to verify the weight of this gold flow out of the kingdom – estimated that between half and three quarters of the Brazilian gold that entered Portugal was promptly dispatched to England (Boxer, 1962, p. 157). Aboard merchant ships, war ships, and packet boats that sailed the regular route between Lisbon and Falmouth, the precious metal entered the English market as payment of commercial transactions with Portugal, but also by way of legal commerce (through Portuguese agents), as well as illegal commerce in the form of contraband, both of which carried out by the English mercantile partnerships in Brazil (see Costa - Rocha, 2007; Pijning, 1997).

Therefore, the above-mentioned 56 signatories represented a mercantile group operating in Anglo-Portuguese commerce. Among them, we find 13 Jewish merchants and partnerships: Pereira & Lima, Fernando da Costa & son, Jacob da Costa, Anthony Mendes, Jacob Mendes da Costa, Miguel Viana, Francis Salvador Júnior, Isaac Salvador, Moses de Medina, Abraham & Jacob

[4] Kew, The National Archives (TNA), SP 100/39, unnumbered folio. See also Yogev, 1978, p. 39.

Franco, Joseph Mendes da Costa Júnior, Joseph & Daniel Viana, and Solomon de Medina[5].

Their surnames reveal their Iberian background. The Costa/Mendes da Costa and the Salvadores were two of the most prominent Sephardic families in London, whose ancestors had arrived in the city in the 1650s and 1660s from Portugal and Amsterdam, respectively (Perry, 1981; Wolf, 1962-1967, pp. 104-105; Vanneste, 2011, pp. 126-139, 154-174). The Medinas also arrived from Amsterdam around the same time: Solomon de Medina, involved in East Indian trade and in contracts with the Crown, was the nephew and son-in-law of Moses de Medina (Rabinowicz, 1974; Marly, 1978-80, p. 155; Yogev, 1978, p. 279). The brothers Abraham and Jacob Franco from Livorno were agents of their father Moses Franco Albuquerque's commercial house, and constituted one of the vertices of a family network that connected Tuscany to India (another brother, Samuel Franco, was in Bombay), and also to London, in the coral and diamond trade (Trivellato, 2009, pp. 60-61; Roth, 1971).

The other Jewish merchants who signed the document of authorization had arrived in England more recently, coming from Portugal. Pereira & Lima was the partnership of Diogo de Aguilar (*alias* Diogo Lopes Pereira), a merchant from Porto, and of his brother-in-law, Luís/Jacob Álvares Pereira (*alias* Gabriel de Lima). In February 1723, Aguilar was in Vienna, after a brief passage through London, his first destination after leaving Lisbon. His brother-in-law represented the partnership in London, where he had settled at the end of the previous decade (Yogev, 1978, pp. 39-40)[6].

Miguel Viana and Daniel Viana were the pseudonyms used by the merchants Fernando Dias Fernandes (alias Abraham Dias Fernandes) and Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro (alias Moses Lopes Pinheiro) in their businesses in Portugal, where they continued to operate through agents, especially English mercantile houses established in Lisbon (Barnett, 1973-75, pp. 217-221; Yogev, 1978, p. 278; Vieira, 2015, pp. 114-132). It was not only the fictitious surname that united them, but also family ties. On 3 September 1721, a few months after arriving in England, Lopes Pinheiro married his niece, Isabel Pinheiro (alias Rebecca Lopes Dias), daughter of his sister Maria Gabriel Pinheiro and Fernando Dias Fernandes[7].

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5 TNA, SP 100/39, unnumbered folio.

6 The first piece of information of Jacob Álvares Pereira in London is a record of his *ketubah* (marriage contract) with Rahel de Aguilar, sister of Diogo Lopes Pereira, on 29 August 1718. London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), Spanish and Portuguese Jews' Congregation (S&P), *Book of Ketubot 5471 to 5482*, LMA/4521/A/02/03/003, f. 66 (by permission of the Board of the S&P Sephardi Community of London; the same for other documents from this collection).

7 LMA, S&P, *Book of Ketubot 5471 to 5482*, LMA/4521/A/02/03/003, f. 107. Fernando Dias Fernandes was married to Maria Gabriel Pinheiro, sister of Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro. These

His father-in-law had settled in London several years before. After having been imprisoned by the Inquisition between 1703 and 1705, Dias Fernandes boarded a ship to England[8]. By the end of 1707, he was already part of the Jewish community in London[9] (Fig. 1).

3. Lisbon, 6 November 1707

In the same year that Dias Fernandes arrived in London, an *auto-da-fé* took place in Rossio (Lisbon). The list of sentenced people was divulged to English readers by the polemicist Michael Geddes (c. 1630-1713). Between 1678 and 1688, Geddes had served as chaplain of the English *feitoria* (trading post) in Lisbon. During the years he lived in the "Papist" kingdom of Portugal, he collected a substantial portion of the arguments that fed the prolific anti-Catholic polemical work which he developed after his return to England. He experienced first-hand the iniquity of the tribunal when, in September 1686, he was called before the Lisbon court to respond to a denunciation: he stood accused of holding liturgical services in the English Consul's house. According to the inquisitors, he only had authorization to do so in the official residence of the envoy of the British Crown. Despite invoking Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace and Alliance between Portugal and England, signed in 1654, which safeguarded the right of English residents in Portugal to freely profess their religion, the inquisitors remained unconvinced, and the case dragged on until Geddes abandoned his mission in Lisbon (Shaw, 1998, pp. 171-174)[10].

The second edition of Geddes' work *Miscellaneous Tracts* includes a list of those sentenced in the *auto-da-fé* which took place on 6 November 1707. The list

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two families were intimately connected through marital ties from the days when they lived in Portugal. Two other sisters of Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro, Luisa and Beatriz Pinheiro, married two brothers of Fernando Dias Fernandes, Gaspar and Antonio Dias Fernandes, respectively. See the genealogies on the website *Nation Between Empires*, <https://nationbetweenempires.wordpress.com/genealogies>.

8 Lisbon, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Tribunal do Santo Ofício (TSO), Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2014.

9 On 11 December 1707, Fernando Dias Fernandes was mentioned by his Jewish name, Abraham Dias Fernandes, in the records of the *Mahamad* (administrative body) of the Jewish congregation of London as payer of the *finta* (duty), a contribution paid by the *Yehidim* (privileged members) and calculated according to a person's income. LMA, S&P, *Orders and Resolutions of Mahamad, Nisan 5438 to 28 Elul 5484*, LMA/4521/A/01/02/001, f. 66. On the subject of the *finta*, see Samuel, 2004, p. 359.

10 This episode is described in the publisher's note at the beginning of Geddes' posthumous work, *Several Tracts against Popery* (London: Bernard Lintott, 1715), pp. xiii-xvi.

is accompanied by a series of comments that show how Geddes, years after his return to England, continued diligently to seek out news about the activity of the Inquisition in Portugal. One of his observations focused on its impact on the economic structures of the Portuguese kingdom:

> By this List we see what a terrible Havock is made by the Inquisition in Portugal, and especially among the trading People, to the great Diminution both of its Stock in Trade, and of the Number of its current and expert Merchants (Geddes, 1709, p. 517).

Careful analysis of the list verifies that the number of defendants linked to commercial activities was dominant. Businessmen (22%), merchants, store owners (*tendeiros*), and sellers (*caixeiros*) constituted approximately half of the male New Christians sentenced in that particular *auto-da-fé*[11]. Among them, the contractor Francisco da Costa Pessoa can be found, a "prosperous and creditworthy person" ("pessoa abonada e de crédito"), who was not in Portugal at the time the trial took place. After the imprisonment of his wife, Inês Mendes de Campos, he had fled to Bayonne[12]. His son António Tavares da Costa remained in Portugal and, in that same *auto*, he ended up being *relaxado* (handed over) to the secular justice, which means that he was sentenced to death[13]. At the time of his imprisonment in Lisbon, António Tavares was a businessman who had started his career working for his father as intermediary in European ports like London, Seville, Cadiz, and Bilbao[14].

However, the *auto* of 1707 was not the most representative of the sweeping wave of repression that assailed Lisbon at the beginning of the century. The peak had occurred the previous year. On 12 September 1706, 108 New Christians were sentenced out of a total of 111 defendants. Two years earlier, the list of the *auto-da-fé* of 19 October 1704 totalled 99 defendants, of which only three were Old Christians[15]. Between 1704 and 1706, around 650 sentences were

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11 In these calculations, as in the following ones, we do not include the category of "living from their estate" in the context of mercantile activities.

12 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 5386, f. 31v.

13 Canon law barred the inquisitors, who were clergymen, of sentencing people to death. Therefore, at the end of the trial, when the inquisitors considered that the defendant was impenitent and should not be reconciled, they handed him/her over to the secular justice in order for the final sentence to be imposed. Therefore, being "*relaxado*" did indeed mean that the defendant was burnt at the stake.

14 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 9112.

15 Lisbon, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP), Cod. 863: *Collecção de Listas impressas e manuscriptas dos Autos de fé publicos e particulares da Inquizição de Lisboa corrigida e annotada por António Joaquim Moreira*, ff. 358-367v.

issued by the three courts of the Holy Office in Portugal (Évora, Lisbon, and Coimbra)[16].

The profile of individuals sentenced by the Inquisition of Lisbon throughout the first decade of the 1700s remained unchanged.



Graph 1: Proportion of New Christian merchants and businessmen penanced by the Inquisition in Lisbon during the first half of the 18th century[17].

As the graph above indicates, until the *auto* of 1707, the proportion of individuals associated with commercial and financial activities that were sentenced in the *autos-da-fé* in Lisbon was close to, or above, 50%. It was those same five public *autos* between 1703 and 1707 that showed the highest incidence of Inquisitorial repression of the elite of businessmen and contractors, surpassing one quarter of all sentenced individuals. Later, the number of sentenced merchants decreased, with a brief but significant revival in the second half of the 1720s. The *auto* of 25 July 1728 registered the record percentage of 77% of defendants linked to mercantile activities. However, the proportion of businessmen and contractors (*contratadores*, i.e., merchants who had contracts specifically with the Crown) never again reached 20%.

The impact of the Inquisition's repression on the New Christian mercantile elite during the first decade of the 18th century was also reflected in the accounts of the tribunal of the Holy Office of Lisbon. According to Bruno Lopes, revenue obtained from the prisoners showed a predominantly positive balance during

16 291 defendants were sentenced in public and private *autos* in Lisbon, 165 in Evora, and 185 in Coimbra (Mendonça - Moreira, 1980). See also Torres, 1978, p. 66.

17 In this calculation, we only considered New Christian males sentenced in public *autos-da-fé*. The number of penitents that conformed to these criteria amounted to over 20. The category of "businessmen" includes not only the individuals referred to with this designation, but also merchant financiers and *asientistas* (on these categorizations see Donovan, 1990, pp. 89-91). The "merchants" category, in turn, comprises the total number of individuals engaged in commercial and financial activities.

this period, contrasting with the tendency throughout the rest of the century. This revenue refers to the payment of prison costs by the prisoners themselves. While poor prisoners (*presos pobres*) were provided for by the *Fisco* (exchequer), rich prisoners (*presos ricos*) were obliged to pay all their expenses. In fact, the revenue obtained from prisoners reached its peak between 1703 and 1706 (Lopes, 2016, pp. 195, 201-203). These same years evince the largest concentration of businessmen and contractors in the Inquisition of Lisbon's prison.

The list of the *auto* of 1707 reflected another characteristic of this wave of repression to which Donovan alludes in the above excerpt, i.e., the significant number of "Castilian" defendants. Geddes comments on this fact, and searches for an explanation:

> The Portuguese Inquisitors, to be reveng'd on the Castilians, for calling their Countrymen Jews, among other opprobrious Names, where ever they can have the least Colour for it, do never fail in their printed Lists of Acts of Faith, to put down their Jewish Prisoners, Castilians; as this Prisoner is here said to have been originally, who was born, and had lived all his Days in the City of Lisbon (Geddes, 1709, 484).

The prisoner was Miguel Lopes Montezinhos, referred to as "born and resident in this City [Lisbon], originating from the Kingdom of Castile" ("natural, & morador nesta Cidade, originario do Reyno de Castela")[18]. Contrary to what Geddes affirms, this indication is not far from the truth. Although he alleged in his trial that he had always resided in Portugal, Montezinhos' father was Spanish[19]. The two other defendants who figure in the list as "Castilians", Álvaro Nicolau Nogueira and Gabriel Luís de Medina, were actually born in Madrid, albeit into families of Portuguese origin[20].

This tendency is repeated in other *autos*. The high number of defendants of allegedly Spanish origin and sentenced by the Portuguese courts during the first decades of the 18th century should be interpreted in the light of two circumstances: i) a better chance of escaping to England via Lisbon; ii) considerable mobility between both sides of the Spanish-Portuguese border, determined by commercial interests and Inquisitorial repression.

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18 BNP, *Collecção de Listas impressas*, f. 369.

19 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2260, ff. 14, 23, 27, 45v, passim.

20 The father of Álvaro Nicolau Nogueira, Manuel Rodrigues Nogueira, was a businessman from Lisbon. The paternal family of Gabriel Luis de Medina had roots in Vila Real, and his father had also lived in Lisbon before settling in Madrid. See ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, procs. 9103 e 5381.

Lisbon had become the principal point of departure for the flight to England. The two treaties signed between Portugal and Great Britain in 1703, in particular the so-called Methuen Treaty, had already cemented the political, diplomatic, as well as economic relations between both kingdoms[21]. British mercantile communities in Lisbon, Porto, and other cities grew, as did maritime traffic between the ports of the Portuguese and British kingdoms. The diplomatic immunity enjoyed by the English packet boats and war ships that regularly anchored in Portuguese ports made them the preferred vehicles for escape. Individually and in groups, Spanish New Christians crossed the border and headed to the Portuguese capital with the intention of clandestinely embarking on English ships. Some were successful, but others were arrested and tried, thus increasing the number of Spanish defendants in the lists of the *autos-da-fé* carried out by the Portuguese Inquisition[22].

The flow of New Christians between Portugal and Spain was not only fuelled by hope of a successful escape. Most of the "Castilians" put on trial during this period were not newcomers, but rather individuals who had lived in Portugal for years, and some of them, such as Nogueira and Medina, had strong family ties to Portugal. Apart from persecution by the Inquisition, economic motives spurred the mobility between both kingdoms.

A particularly illustrative case is that of the Madrilenian João Dias Pereira, who was arrested in 1702, following accusations of Judaism accumulated by Inquisition tribunals from both sides of the border. The geographical trajectory of the denunciations against Pereira, as well as his subsequent confession, included several Spanish and Portuguese locations: Benavente, Ocaña, Galicia, Soutelo Verde, Salamanca, Porto, Lebução. When the Inquisition of Lisbon arrested him, he was selling cloth in the Praça da Palha (a Lisbon's square). Pereira's high mobility was motivated mainly by his participation in the tobacco trade, as he explained in his trial: "in all these locations, he had the

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21 In 1703, Portugal and England signed two treaties: a defensive treaty on 16 May, and also a commercial treaty (known as the Methuen Treaty) on 27 December. These treaties strengthened an alliance that had already been boosted following the Restoration in 1640, and also by the peace treaty of 1654. See, among others, Cardoso et al., 2003; Fisher, 1971; Shaw, 1998.

22 For example, at the beginning of 1723, the tribunals of the Inquisition of Seville and Toledo alerted the tribunal of Lisbon regarding a group of fugitives who had left Spain in the direction of Portugal with the intention of sailing to England. In June 1727, 22 New Christians had been imprisoned, while four more had voluntarily gone before the Inquisition of Lisbon. Most of them were Spanish, and all were suspected of planning an escape aboard English ships. ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, liv. 155, fls. 111-117v; proc. 1435 (Afonso Fernandes Rombo).

tobacco *estanco*" ("em todas estas partes teve estanco do tabaco")[23]. This activity remained in the family through his son, Manuel Dias Pereira – an *estanqueiro* (a holder of a tobacco *estanco*) in Torres Novas – who was imprisoned by the Inquisition about a week after his father's detention[24].

3. Troubles with tobacco

To recapitulate: During the first years of the 1700s, as well as throughout the 1720s, the Portuguese Inquisition intensified its repressive action, and the New Christian mercantile group in Lisbon was one of its main targets. We saw how a significant proportion of the defendants fit into the category of businessmen and contractors. After analysing inventories of goods – as well as the progression of denunciations, confessions, and defence articles of the trials – the tobacco trade appears to be almost transversely present. It builds fortunes and generates debts, cements relationships, and provokes disagreements.

After the second half of the 17th century, tobacco gained increasing importance in colonial commerce at a time when the sugar economy was revealing signs of decline (Hanson, 1986, pp. 263-267). At that time, New Christians played a prevalent role in the transatlantic networks that arose around the tobacco trade, linking the centres of production in America to Iberian and North-European markets (Figueiroa-Rego, 2013, pp. 177-199; 2014, pp. 15-39). Some examples include Pedro Furtado, a businessman from Cabaços (a village near Moimenta da Beira, in the northern interior of Portugal), who had lived part of his life in Castile and had returned to Portugal in the late 1680s. He administered the tobacco *estanco* in the *comarca* (district) of Pinhel from 1687 to 1689, and in the city of Lisbon between 1696 and 1698. Diogo Mendes Sola, a cavalry captain ("capitão de cavalos") living in Lisbon at the time he was arrested in 1703, had held the *estanco* in the *comarca* of Lamego and in the province of Trás-os-Montes between 1696 and 1698. This was a profitable business, since shortly afterwards he bought, as sole buyer, the soap contract of the province of Beira for 1,810,000 *réis*. Both Gabriel Pereira Mendes – who subsequently obtained the contract for the *comarca* of Santarém between 1684

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[23] ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 530, ff. 104v-118. Tobacco *estanco*: a monopoly over sales of tobacco in a given territory.

[24] ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 150. Manuel Dias Pereira was imprisoned on 5 December 1702. His father was sent to the prison of the Inquisition of Lisbon on 30 November. See also Figueiroa-Rego, 2014, p. 30.

and 1695 – and Manuel Mendes Henriques, owner of the tobacco *estanco* of Estremoz from 1687 to 1698, were imprisoned in 1703 and 1704, respectively[25].

Created in 1674 and with regiment since 1702, the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* (Tobacco Administration Board) began to lease the management of the revenue resulting from tobacco trade in the 23 Portuguese *comarcas* and stores in Lisbon to private individuals. After a period of instability, the tobacco monopoly was leased to a single contractor, D. Pedro Gomez, in 1700. The contractor general was obliged to acquire all the tobacco necessary to supply continental Portugal, the Azores, and Madeira, in order to undertake its processing in the *Fábrica Real* (Royal Factory), and to administer the wholesale transaction of this commodity (Gonçalves, 2003, pp. 123-125, 131-133). The sub-leasing of the *estanco* to third parties delineated a continuity vis-à-vis the management system initiated in 1674 by allocating the distribution of tobacco in territorial units to other merchants. The partners who held the general contract tended to combine the leasing and direct administration of these units on the one hand with a distribution guarantee by local agents, the *estanqueiros*, on the other (Costa - Salvado, 2018).

During the first half of the 18th century, two of the 13 businessmen who took on the general contract of tobacco were New Christians (Salvado, 2014, pp. 152-153): Manuel de Aguilar (1710-1712) and António Ribeiro (1719-1721)[26]. Aguilar is often referred to as Spanish, although he was from Mogadouro (in the northeast of Portugal)[27]. He did, in fact, spend a large part of his life in Spain. He had abandoned Portugal with his family as a child, after his father, Francisco Lopes Pereira, had been imprisoned in 1652 by the Inquisition of Coimbra[28]. The first destination of the family was Andalucía, where Aguilar's father took on the administration of the tobacco monopoly in Granada, and shortly thereafter, the salt contract in Malaga. Francisco Lopes Pereira's businesses were flourishing in the south of Spain when he was again arrested in

[25] ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, procs. 2006 (Pedro Furtado), 5384 (Diogo Mendes Sola), 2349 (Gabriel Pereira Mendes) e 6784 (Manuel Mendes Henriques). See Gonçalves, 2003, attachment.

[26] Antonio Ribeiro had been imprisoned by the Inquisition in 1703, accused of practicing Judaism. At the time, he was a tobacco contractor for the district of Santarém. ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 525; ANTT, Junta da Administração do Tabaco (JAT), mç. 127A, cx. 177.

[27] ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2708 (Francisco de Medina), f. 27v; proc. 4690 (Joana Pereira de Medina), f. 29.

[28] ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, proc. 6790. See also Andrade and Guimarães, 2005, pp. 253-297; Figueiroa-Rego, 2014, p. 25.

1658, this time by the Inquisition of Granada[29]. Released in 1664, he managed to recover his businesses along with his sons. In the meantime, Manuel de Aguilar settled in Madrid as a contractor. He was there when the spectre of the Inquisition once again assailed the family. In 1675, his brother Gaspar Lopes Pereira was detained. His trial lasted over seven years and culminated in the death penalty imposed in the *auto da fé* on 10 May 1682 (Fig. 2)[30].

Again, at the end of the 1680s, Manuel de Aguilar returned to Portugal and settled in Porto. Between 1696 and 1698, he contracted the tobacco *estanco* in the *comarcas* of Guimarães, Porto, and Viana (in northern Portugal), and also in the city of Lisbon (Gonçalves, 2003, attachment). He continued to diversify his investments in the following years. In 1704, together with Pedro Furtado, he participated in a company that bought the cod contract for 13,605,000 *réis*[31]. Both men had been partners in the contract of the *consulado da alfândega* (consulate of the customs) of Lisbon between 1701 and 1704, together with Fernando Dias Fernandes and his uncle Luis Francisco. The four merchants paid the Royal Treasury 203,946,000 *réis* for the contract[32].

Unlike his partners Pedro Furtado and Fernando Dias Fernandes, Aguilar managed to escape the wave of imprisonments in the early 1700s unscathed. A number of his relatives had been arrested, such as his sister Beatriz Pereira del Angel, his brother-in-law Pedro de Medina, his two nephews Francisco and Gaspar de Medina, and his niece Joana de Medina[33]. Aguilar, for his part, remained at liberty, and his reputation as a thriving merchant in Porto stayed intact. In 1709, he realized that the conditions were right to launch a proposal for the general contract of tobacco during 1710-1712, for which he offered 1,550,000 *cruzados* per year[34]. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of State, Diogo de Mendonça Corte-Real, the Marquis of Minas, president of the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* recommended Aguilar, affirmed that

> this man, from the information I have, is of great means and very creditworthy; I have heard that all the men of the market of Porto and those with greater means in this court will go in with him when he becomes the Contractor of Tobacco. If this business were mine, I would lease it to none other than him, not only because of his wealth and his great credit, but for the great satisfaction of the

29 Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Inquisición, 1616, Exp. 6.
30 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2744 (Gaspar Lopes Pereira), f. 76v.
31 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2006 (Pedro Furtado), f. 36.
32 ANTT, Chancelaria de D. João V, liv. 28, ff. 166v-167.
33 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, procs. 8338, 8340, 2708 e 4690.
34 ANTT, JAT, mç. 7, unnumbered doc. (Manuel de Aguilar's contract. 5 December 1709).

businessmen when he buys their tobacco and pays punctually as he does with all his business ventures[35].

Therefore, the Marquis of Minas emphasized the need for a group to support the future contractor general, and especially guarantors who would be responsible for the sound execution of payments. Aguilar appeared to meet these conditions with more reliability than did his competitors. The Marquis of Minas' concern shows the risks inherent in this type of contract. The large amounts of money offered for the acquisition of the *estanco* obliged the contractor to avail himself of a group of partners with whom to share both the expenses and potential profits. João Paulo Salvado notes how, in the first half of the 18th century, the general contract of tobacco was recurrently in the hands of partnerships composed by a large number of partners, reaching, at one point, as many as 37 partners. The dimension of the partnerships, together with the short duration of the contract (three years), would have been two of the factors that contributed to the high failure rates during this period: only a quarter of the contracts ended with their accounts paid off on time, and almost half of the general contractors were imprisoned because of debts, or forced to flee Portugal (Salvado, 2014, 145-147).

Manuel de Aguilar encountered problems from the very beginning of his contract. Right after he signed it, he found himself involved in legal disputes with merchants in Lisbon. In January 1710, these merchants presented a petition to the King to order the contractor general to buy all the tobacco for the *estanco* immediately, and pay in cash, or simply authorize them to send tobacco out of Portugal. Aguilar committed to buying all the tobacco, albeit gradually and throughout the year, and according to demand. This condition was not acceptable to the merchants, and the dispute dragged on for many months[36]. In April 1710, the president of the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* lamented the discord between Aguilar and the Lisbon merchants, and stated that these had

[35] "[E]ste homem, pelas notícias que tenho, é de muito cabedal e de maior crédito; consta-me que todos os homens da praça do Porto e os de maior cabedal de esta corte entrarão com ele, quando seja ele o Contratador do Tabaco. Se este negócio fora meu, a nenhum outro o arrendara senão a ele, não só pelos cabedais que tem e pelo seu grande crédito, mas pela grande satisfação que haverá entre os homens de negócio de que ele seja quem lhes compre os tabacos e que lhos pague com a pontualidade com que o faz com todos os seus negócios". ANTT, JAT, mç. 7, unnumbered doc. (Letter by Marquis of Minas to Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real. 30 October 1709).

[36] ANTT, JAT, mç. 8, unnumbered doc. (From JAT on the petition of João Rodrigues de Moura and several other businessmen in which they ask that the general contractor of tobacco buy all their tobacco for the *estanco*, paying in cash, or let them be removed from Portugal. 27 January 1710).

"turned into turbulent complaints and hard headedness"[37]. The feud concealed another problem: lack of liquidity on the part of Aguilar and his partners, preventing them from complying with the directives of the contract. In September, Aguilar revealed that he had trouble paying the monthly allowance of 30 *contos de réis* that was needed to sustain the *gente de guerra* (war costs), a provision that he had committed to spontaneously in the contract. He complained of non-payment on the part of lessors in the districts, and of a lack of debt enforcement by local authorities[38].

His troubles continued during the contract. Tobacco became scarce, and Aguilar was forced to request extraordinary measures to meet the demands of the *estancos*[39]. The number of suppliers was increasing – between 1710 and 1712, a total of 75 merchants supplied tobacco to the factory in Lisbon – and the price of the raw material became excessively high. In the three-year period of Aguilar's contract, the average price of tobacco was 131.7 *réis* per pound, about one *real* above the average recorded between 1716 and 1720 (Salvado, 2018, table 6)[40].

These, as well as other factors led Aguilar to ruin. In a petition directed to the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco*, his son Diogo de Aguilar said: "being the son of a father who solely to serve Your Majesty came from Oporto where he lived with an abundance of means, all of which he consumed in this contract, proceeding in it with the truth which is notorious"[41].

His words need a little contextualizing. Manuel de Aguilar had died in June 1712, before the end of the contract, and the young Diogo, as *herdeiro a benefício do inventário* (legal heir of the inventory), took on the administration of the tobacco *estanco*, i.e., he had to ensure that the estate he had inherited along with his mother and two sisters would serve to pay the contract's debts before its

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37 "[J]á passado a tumultuosas queixas e obstinadas teimas". ANTT, JAT, mç. 8, unnumbered doc. (From JAT on the petition of the general contractor in which he exposes the damage that ensued after the contract by allowing the businessmen to ship the tobacco in the *alfândega* (customs house) out of Portugal, a result of the role of these same men. 2 April 1710).

38 ANTT, JAT, mç. 7, unnumbered doc. (Contract of Manuel de Aguilar. 5 December 1709); mç. 8, unnumbered doc. (From JAT to the general contractor Manuel de Aguilar to nominate a general conservator to collect the debts from the *comarqueiros* of the Alentejo, Algarve, and districts of Estremadura, Coimbra, and Esgueira, 6 September 1710).

39 ANTT, JAT, mç. 79, unnumbered doc. (From the *provedor* [manager] of customs: information for the contractor to take tobacco freely, 7 July 1711).

40 The ledger for the period of Manuel de Aguilar's contract is in ANTT, JAT, liv. 19.

41 "[S]er filho de um pai que só por servir a Vossa Majestade veio do Porto aonde vivia mui abundante de cabedais, que todos consumiu neste contrato, procedendo nele com a verdade que é notória". ANTT, JAT, mç. 9, unnumbered doc. (Petition by Diogo de Aguilar, 24 September 1716).

end[42]. However, by then, the debts had spiralled to 1,860 *contos de réis*, a sum the inheritance did not cover. On 22 May 1713, Diogo was arrested and sent to the Limoeiro prison in Lisbon[43].

Given this situation, Diogo de Aguilar asked the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* to grant him the opportunity to settle the accounts of the contract "since, in prison, he neither pays, nor collects means to be able to do it and is unable to continue to take action and meet the many demands that are of great interest to the contract"[44]. He obtained authorization to leave prison for four months in order to settle these accounts, although his freedom was conditional and consigned to the oversight of "fiéis carcereiros" ("trustworthy warders"). Together with his partner Tomás Ferreira Pinto, Diogo took the necessary measures with regards to the *comarqueiros* and other debtors, and thus managed to reduce the debt to little over 533 *contos de réis.* Even so, the inheritance left by his father was not enough to liquidate this sum. As a result, the case dragged on, and Diogo de Aguilar was still in prison in September 1716. It was only on the 24th of that month that the *Junta* decided to set him free.

Diogo de Aguilar's turbulent early career contrasts with the fact that, nine years later, Emperor Charles VI entrusted him with the imperial tobacco monopoly for more than two decades[45]. Between the Limoeiro prison and the imperial court in Viena, the son of Manuel de Aguilar had managed to build a promising career based on an influential commercial network. During the first decades of the 18th century, the epicentre of this network moved from Lisbon and Porto to London, a move that was propelled by the Inquisition's persecution.

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42 ANTT, Mesa da Consciência e Ordens, Habilitações para a Ordem de Cristo, Letra T, mç. 6, n.º 34. "On 30 August of 1712, I declare Diogo de Aguilar recipient, as heir of his father, the contractor general Manuel de Aguilar, and Tomas Ferreira Pinto, as procurator of the guarantors of the contractor general [...]" ("Em 30 de Agosto de 1712, carrego em receita ao dito Diogo de Aguilar, como herdeiro de seu pai, o contratador geral Manuel de Aguilar, e a Tomás Ferreira Pinto, como procurador dos fiadores do contratador geral [...]"). ANTT, JAT, liv. 19, f. 103v.

43 The documents regarding the imprisonment of Diogo Lopes Pereira are dispersed and unnumbered in *Junta da Administração do Tabaco*, mç. 9.

44 "[P]ois preso, nem paga, nem cobra para o poder fazer e fica impossibilitado para continuar as diligências e muitas demandas que há de grande interesse do contrato". ANTT, JAT, mç. 9, unnumbered doc. (Petition by Diogo de Aguilar, 24 September of 1716).

45 About Diogo de Aguilar, see Studemund-Halévy and Collin, 2013, pp. 239-294; Stechauner, 2014, pp. 49-91.

4. The Dias Fernandes brothers

The family Dias Fernandes, from Muxagata in the bishopric of Lamego (in the northern interior of Portugal), was part of Aguilar's trade network. The family's trajectory also vacillated between both sides of the border. The patriarch, Diogo Dias Fernandes, lived in Pastrana and Madrid until returning to Portugal around 1679[46]. In the following generation, the family became dispersed around Freixo de Numão, Lisbon, and Oporto, creating a commercial network that linked the border region of Beira with the two main Portuguese trade centres (Sideri, 1970, p. 46). Diogo's oldest son, Fernando Dias Fernandes, was Manuel de Aguilar's partner in the contract of the *consulado da alfândega* in Lisbon. In 1703, the Inquisition found him living in Lisbon, from where he operated in the Brazilian trade through agents in Pernambuco (António Rodrigues Campelo), Rio de Janeiro (José Gomes da Silva), and Bahia (Luís Mendes de Morais), all of whom sent him sugar in exchange for English cloth[47].

Fernando had been in prison barely two months when his brother Gaspar Dias Fernandes and his sister-in-law Luísa Pinheira, both residents in Porto, were also imprisoned. A slave of Gaspar Dias Fernandes' household testified as to overhearing him confide that he planned to flee to Holland. Rumours circulated in the city after people saw him selling merchandise at low prices and heard that he was sending money to "the North" by means of letters of exchange. The accusations against the Dias Fernandes brothers had been accumulating in the courts of Lisbon and Coimbra over the years. Their regular visits to Manuel Aguilar's home, where other New Christians used to meet, aroused suspicion. In his defence, Gaspar justified his attendance at Aguilar's home citing his dual capacity as both physician and trader: As a physician, Gaspar was treating Aguilar's wife "who was very sickly and suffered mysterious ailments"; as a trader, he frequented Aguilar's house for business reasons since "it was a house of conversation and *estanco*, located on top of the walls, with windows giving on to the river"[48].

Gaspar Dias Fernandes was able to present a solid defence and, on 3 March 1704, all charges against him were dismissed, and the confiscation of his estate lifted[49]. His brother, however, remained imprisoned, and in the *auto-da-fé* of 12

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46 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 1437 (António Dias Fernandes), f. 179v, 182v.

47 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2014, fls. 49v-50.

48 "[M]uito achacada e de achaques ocultos"; "era casa de conversação e de estanco e ficava sobre o muro e com janelas para o rio". ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, proc. 6378, fls. 10-19v, 42 [Charges], 104v [Defence]. The pagination of the trial of Gaspar Dias Fernandes is irregular, with some parts numbered separately.

49 Gaspar's sentence determined that "according to what was demonstrated throughout the

September 1706, he was sentenced to "cárcere e hábito penitencial perpétuo" ("perpetual imprisonment and penitential habit", i.e., up to three years in prison). In the meantime, two of his sons, Diogo Dias Fernandes and António Lopes Dias, had tried to escape on board a Dutch vessel. However, the plan was discovered. The *corregedor* (judicial official) of the neighbourhood of São Paulo, Lisbon, found them hiding in the hatch of the ship[50]. Several years later, the two brothers struck luckier in their second attempt at escaping, this time accompanied by their father, and by December 1707, Fernando and his sons were safely ensconced in London.

This swoop by the Inquisition did not cause lasting damage to the Dias Fernandes family businesses. The ledger of Gaspar Dias Fernandes, with records dating back to 1697 and apprehended by the Inquisition of Coimbra in 1725, reflected the vitality of his business ventures and how he developed these through a network rooted in the family core, particularly with his brothers Fernando and António Dias Fernandes. The earliest records show that Gaspar was already active in the Atlantic trade: through his agents in London, he commercialized English cloth and other goods coming from the northern markets of e.g. Amsterdam and Hamburg (butter, game, herrings, arms), and goods originating in India (spices, incense, textiles); some of these goods he sold in Portugal, and some he dispatched to Brazil in exchange for Brazilian sugar. This cargo of sugar, in turn – along with Portuguese products such as olive oil, wine, chick peas, and silk – he then sent to the very same northern markets of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and especially also London on board the returning Brazil fleets. Those returning goods were then exchanged for local ones, and the same cycle continued. This flow of goods was made possible by a widespread network of agents and correspondents which was consolidated with the settlement of Fernando in London[51].

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process, and since the evidences were not enough for a harsher condemnation, and considering what the defendant alleged and proved in his defence, the tribunal absolves him from all charges and commands that the defendant must hear his sentence at the Holy Office board, before the inquisitors and officers of the Inquisition, and that the sequestration of his assets must be lifted, and that he must pay the expenses of his trial" ("O que tudo visto e o mais que dos autos consta, havendo respeito à prova da justiça não ser bastante pera maior condenação, e ao que o Réu alegou e provou em suas contraditas, absolvem ao Réu da instância do juízo, e mandam que ele ouça sua sentença na mesa do Santo Ofício perante os inquisidores e oficiais da Inquisição, e que seja levantado o sequestro que lhe estava feito em seus bens, e pague as custas"). ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 6378, unnumbered folio.

50 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, liv. 274, ff. 534v-535v.

51 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, liv. 770.

About 20 years later, the Inquisition, once again, pursued the family. On 5 January 1725, another brother of Fernando, António Dias Fernandes, was detained by the court of Lisbon. He was then a tobacco contractor in Lisbon. With his son Gaspar Lopes Pinheiro (not to be confused with his homonym, also known as Daniel Viana), he had bought the tobacco contract for the Minho province in 1719-1720, and for the Beira province in the following three years. Another son, António Dias Correia, worked for the family in Brazil. The long inventory of goods in the António Dias Fernandes' trial revealed the dynamism of his business ventures, as well as the scale of his commercial contacts. After he was imprisoned, fear set in among those who were closest to him[52].

Anticipating that the Inquisition was again hounding his family, Gaspar Dias Fernandes was quick to take measures. With the help of a *familiar* of the Holy Office, and a prison guard in Lisbon, he continued to correspond illicitly with his imprisoned brother. António Dias Fernandes eventually revealed the name of the guard, José Moreira[53], to the inquisitors. Years later, in London, Moreira appears once again: In a petition addressed to the *Mahamad* (governing body) of the Jewish congregation, Moreira, newcomer to London, pleaded for financial assistance for himself and his family. He claimed that during the approximately 20 years that he worked as a guard for the Inquisition of Lisbon, he had always tried to "help and alleviate the prisoners, both the poor and the rich, without any interest other than using the good inclination that he had always had towards this *nação*"[54].

On 7 May 1725, the inevitable occurred, and Gaspar was sent back to the dungeons of the Inquisition of Coimbra. He employed a strategy similar to that of the first trial: he resorted to every possible means to defend himself, i.e., a network of connections that he did not hesitate to set in motion as soon as he felt the Inquisition on his heels[55]. But this time, Gaspar gave in and confessed to having carried out Jewish practices in the past. This occurred on 16 October 1726, exactly five days after his brother Antonio had begun admitting his alleged guilt before the inquisitors of Lisbon. It is likely that Gaspar had been informed of his brother's confession through his "mole" in the Lisbon tribunal. Acting prudently, Gaspar claimed that he had stopped believing in the Law of Moses six or seven years before. By then, he claimed, he had not only stopped

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52 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 1437, ff. 85v-87v, 111, 122-123.

53 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 1437, f. 728.

54 "[F]avorecer e aliviar os presos, tanto pobres como ricos, sem mais interesse que usar da sua boa inclinação que sempre teve a esta nação". LMA, S&P, *Mahamad and Treasurer's correspondence*, LMA/4521/A/01/16/002, doc. 70, undated document.

55 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, proc. 6378-1, ff. 38v-43, 70v-71 [Charges].

interacting with other New Christians, but also started "composing a little book for print" ("compôr para imprimir um livrozinho") that he believed would help enlighten "all the New Christians who live in blindness" ("todos os cristãos-novos que vivem cegamente")[56]. The text, entitled "Catholica Synderesis, e Hebreo convencido" and written in his own handwriting, was attached to his case[57]. This "little book" ("livrinho") provided what Gaspar believed was compelling evidence for his defence.

The fact that certain inconsistencies in his confession were not pursued by the inquisitors reveals Gaspar's success in manoeuvring his contacts inside the Holy Office. For example, although his brother Antonio had alluded to a trial in the Inquisition of Llerena against their father, Gaspar firmly reiterated that "neither his parents, grandparents, great-grandparents or great-great-grandparents had ever been apprehended, punished, or detained for crimes against the Holy Office of the Inquisition"[58]. Surprisingly, another issue that was not raised during his inquiry was the contact he maintained with his brother Fernando Dias Fernandes. Gaspar alleged that they had not spoken to each other for 25 years, and that he had lost contact as soon as Fernando was absolved by the Holy Office and left Portugal for an unknown destination. His ledger, however, records debts, bills of exchange, and shipments of sugar sent to a trader called Miguel Viana in London[59]. How could the inquisitors ignore that Miguel Viana and Fernando Dias Fernandes were the same person? Around that time, one of Gaspar's son, Francisco Dias Fernandes, was also

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56 *Ibidem*, fls. 276-277 [Examination].

57 *Ibidem*, [Catholic Synderesis and the convinced Hebrew. Orthodox discourse that demonstrates convincingly, and with the most authentic passages of the Prophets, as well as with the Authority of the most famous Rabbis of the Synagogue, that the only true Messiah was Jesus Christ Our Lord, God, and Man. With reverent spirit, [the author] offers, dedicates and consecrates it to the ever immaculate and most holy virgin Mary, Mother of God and our Lady. Doctor Gaspar Dias Fernandez, Doctor of the City of Porto, etc. ("Catholica Synderesis e Hebreo convencido. Discurso orthodoxo, em que se manifesta com demonstrativas razõis, e com os mais authenticos lugares dos Profetas, como tambem com as Authoridades dos mais celebres Rabinos da Synagoga, aver sido o unico e verdadeyro Messias Jesus Christo Senhor Nosso, Deos, e Homem, o qual com reverente animo offerece, dedica e consagra, a sempre immaculada sacratissima virgem Maria, Mãy de Deos e Senhora nossa. O Doutor Gaspar Dias Fernandez, Medico da Cidade do Porto, &.ª")]. This treatise is incorporated at the beginning of Gaspar Dias Fernandes' trial with a separate numeration.

58 "[N]em seus pais, avós, e bisavós e terceiros avós imemoriavelmente nunca foram compreendidos, nem castigados, nem presos por crime contra o Santo Ofício da Inquisição". ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 1437, f. 183; ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, proc. 6378-1, f. 140v [Defence].

59 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, liv. 770, fls. 94v-97v.

imprisoned. During his confession, he said he had found a strange book in his father's office containing verses in Spanish and Portuguese and with an annotation on the Jewish fast days. The young man added that the sheet with that annotation had come from Holland, "sent by his uncle Fernando Dias Fernandes, whom he thought had changed his name to Miguel Viana"[60]. It should be noted that this denunciation was part of Gaspar's case.

The unusual outcome of this trial was the final proof as to just how favoured Gaspar was by higher bodies of the Holy Office. In March 1728, he was notified by the Inquisition of Coimbra that he would be *relaxado* to the secular justice. Three months later, he can be found confessing before the Inquisition of Lisbon. Shortly afterwards, in the *auto-da-fé* on 25 June 1728, he was sentenced to "cárcere e hábito penitencial perpétuo, sem remissão, com insignias de fogo"[61] and exiled to the galleys for five years. As such, he had managed to escape the death penalty for which he was indicted in Coimbra. The transference of the process to another tribunal is not explained in any part of the document. What he confessed to the inquisitors in Lisbon was less than adequate to satisfy the substance of the accusation against him. His confession, therefore, should have been considered "diminuta" (insufficient), and the trial, according to the Inquisition's by-laws, would ordinarily have culminated in the maximum penalty. This, however, was not what happened.

5. Diogo de Aguilar and Gaspar Lopes Pinheiro leave Lisbon

When the brothers Dias Fernandes were arrested, Diogo de Aguilar was no longer in Portugal. His departure must have occurred between the second semester of 1720 and the beginning of 1721. Indeed, the last evidence of Aguilar in Lisbon indicates that, in April 1720, he was living in the "downstairs room of the Count of São Lourenço's house, next to the church of Santa Catarina do Monte Sinai" ("no quarto baixo do Conde de S. Lourenço, junto a Santa Catarina do Monte Sinai") and was set to marry the daughter of Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro, the brother-in-law and also future son-in-law of Fernando Dias Fernandes[62]. Aguilar and Pinheiro ended up leaving Portugal on board an

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60 "[E] lhe mandara o seu tio Fernando Dias Fernandes que lhe parece mudou agora o nome para Miguel Viana". ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, proc. 6378-1, f. 63v [Charges].

61 "Perpetual imprisonment and penitential habit with fire symbols, without remission" meant up to five years in prison. In the *auto-da-fé*, the defendant had to use a habit (*sambenito*) with flames pointing downwards, signifying that he had narrowly escaped being *relaxado*.

62 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 1647 (Diogo José Ramos), fls. 620-621.

English ship some time later[63], and by the spring of 1721, Pinheiro was already in London[64].

When they left Lisbon, both Pinheiro and Aguilar were reputable businessmen. They can be seen to be financing the government of the captaincies of Brazil, and of advancing the salaries of the governors of Espírito Santo (Aguilar in 1716) and of Maranhão (Pinheiro in 1718)[65]. A ledger seized from Salvador Mendes Furtado, a businessman from Porto, during his Inquisitorial process in 1725, is prolix in references to Aguilar and Pinheiro. In 1712, when Aguilar took on his father's general contract, he owed Furtado 553,600 *réis* for sugar ordered from Pernambuco. At the same time, he was due to receive some money from freight costs that Furtado had collected in his name. Pinheiro appears in Furtado's accounts since 1709. Most of the debts and credits recorded ensued from cloth trade, probably dispatched with fleets destined for Brazil[66].

Therefore, Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro was able to successfully rebuild his career after having been arrested by the Inquisition of Lisbon between 1702 to 1704[67]. The personal humiliation and the confiscation of his assets were not enough to bring down this merchant at the beginning of his career. Apart from the cloth trade, Pinheiro focused his investments on the tobacco business. In 1713, he presented a proposal to take on the general contract that the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* had withdrawn from a consortium headed by Domingos Cordeiro Mascarenhas. He asserted that during the previous months, he had supplied 150,000 *cruzados* in tobacco to the *estanco* and lent 35,000 *cruzado*s to that consortium. He offered 1,400,000 *cruzados* a year for the acquisition of the general contract, guaranteeing to find trustworthy guarantors, and promising that he would maintain all the local *estancos*[68]. His proposal was

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63 "Dom Pedro Alvares da Cunha says that his English servant told him that in England he heard from Diogo de Aguilar, Luís Gomes da Costa, and Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro that the master, an Englishman living in Corpo Santo, were the one who encouraged them to embark" ("Dom Pedro Álvares da Cunha diz que o inglês seu criado lhe disse que ouvira em Inglaterra a Diogo de Aguilar, Luís Gomes da Costa e Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro, que o mestre, inglês de nação, morador ao Corpo Santo, foram o que os conduzira para se embarcarem"). ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, liv. 155, f. 495.

64 In a letter dated 15 April 1721, the Portuguese envoy extraordinary to the English Court, António Galvão de Castelo Branco, mentioned that Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro was already residing in London. Lisbon, Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, Série Azul, cod. 600, f. 8v.

65 ANTT, Conselho Ultramarino, Registo de contratos e de termos de fianças, liv. 2, fls. 128v, 155-155v.

66 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Coimbra, liv. 795, fls. 22v-23, 37v-39, 56v-57, 59v-61.

67 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 2348.

68 ANTT, JAT, mç. 9, unnumbered doc. (Petition by Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro to JAT, proposing to

not favoured by the *Junta*, who preferred to give the contract to D. Pedro Gomez. However, the figures reveal that, in the period between 1710 and 1737, Pinheiro was one of the main suppliers of the *estanco real*: 276,139 pounds of tobacco in only five years[69]. Apart from the tobacco business, Pinheiro also invested in other contracts. Between 1714 and 1716, he was *assentista* in the province of the Alentejo, in partnership with the English businessman Tempestre Milner. Four years later, he was managing the *assento* of Trás-os-Montes[70].

It is safe to contend that the main motivation for Pinheiro's and Aguilar's departure was not directly related with a plan to expand their commercial activity by relocating the centre of their sphere of action to London. Instead, this rerouting of the core of their business network can be seen as a consequence, rather than a cause. The driving motive for their relocation to England was, it can be argued, a result of the persecution suffered at the hands of the Inquisition, although their departure had preceded the beginning of the new wave of detentions that affected the Dias Fernandes family, as well as several other New Christian merchants in the mid-1720s.

The key to this enigma may lie in an arrest carried out in Beja in the autumn of 1720. Around this time, almost one hundred New Christians, mostly from the Alentejo province, were denounced by the physician Francisco de Sá e Mesquita. On 9 September 1720, Mesquita presented himself before the Inquisition of Lisbon to testify regarding alleged meetings to practice Jewish rituals in Beja. Under disguise and using a fake name, he repeated the same denunciation a month later before the tribunal of Évora. After all, he must have reasoned, any prison sentence handed down by the Inquisition should be supported by at least two accusations by different witnesses. Two years later, however, Mesquita's deception was discovered, and he was sentenced to death (i.e., "relaxado" to the secular justice) in the *auto* of 10 October 1723[71].

Mesquita had alleged before the Inquisition that he was taken to the purported Jewish ritual meetings by Diogo José Ramos, a merchant from Osuna (in southern Spain), who administered the tobacco contract of the districts of

take on the general contract. Undated document).

69 Calculations made by João Paulo Salvado based on the tobacco entries in the *Fábrica Real* in Lisbon (Salvado, 2018, table 7).

70 Lisbon, Arquivo Municipal de Lisboa, Chancelaria Régia, Livro 4.º de registo de cartas do Senado Oriental, doc. 94, f. 27v, doc. 96, f. 28, doc. 456, f. 118v, doc. 457, f. 118v; Livro 6.º de Consultas e Decretos de D. João V do Senado Oriental, f. 192; Livro 8.º de Consultas e Decretos de D. João V do Senado Oriental, ff. 105, 115.

71 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, procs. 11300, 11300-1 e 11300-2. See also Carvalho, 1930, pp. 15-20.

Beja and Campo de Ourique, in Alentejo. On 20 October 1720, as a consequence, Ramos was arrested by the Inquisition of Évora[72].

At first sight, this case seems entirely unrelated to Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro and Diogo de Aguilar. However, a closer look reveals a direct connection in that Ramos was both a first cousin of Aguilar, as well as his procurator in several business ventures[73]. The news of Diogo José Ramos' arrest must have greatly alarmed Pinheiro and Aguilar. They were, indeed, justifiably afraid. After almost three years of imprisonment and several statements of defence, Ramos began his confession on 27 September 1723. Among the first denunciations he made, he recalled a journey to Lisbon where he stayed in Aguilar's home. On that occasion, Pinheiro was also present. Ramos alleged that they disclosed their inner belief in the Law of Moses at that point. He told below that, a few days later, he went to an estate in Campo Grande where he observed the fast of Queen Esther, together with Aguilar, Pinheiro, and several other people[74].

In the *auto-da-fé* of 10 October 1723, Ramos was sentenced to "cárcere e hábito penitencial perpétuo, sem remissão, com insignias de fogo" and sentenced to forced labour on the royal galleys. Little is known about his life after that, apart from some denunciations against him for non-fulfilment of the penitence, and for falsifications in the tobacco business during the time that he had the *estanco* of the *comarcas* of Beja and Campo de Ourique. Another report located him in southern Portugal in 1725, where he was administering the tobacco contract of the kingdom of the Algarve[75]. His son, Duarte Lopes, became more renowned. In 1752, Lopes settled in Newport, Rhode Island, where he adhered to Judaism and adopted the name Aaron Lopez. He became an outstanding merchant of colonial America, operating in the whaling business, as well as in the triangular trade between the Caribbean, North American ports, and Western Africa (see Chyet, 1970; Pereira, 2005).

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72 Ramos was transferred to the Inquisition in Lisbon in November 1720. ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 1647.

73 Diogo José Ramos was the son of Ana Maria de Carvajal, sister of Branca Teresa (Manuel de Aguilar's wife). Ramos arrived in Portugal around 1697, settling in Vila de Frades, where he lived until 1719. He then moved to Beja. Ibid., ff. 178v-179, 229v-230.

74 *Ibidem*, ff. 230, 620-621, 663-663v.

75 ANTT, TSO, Inquisição de Lisboa, liv. 155, f. 484.

6. London-Lisbon

Once more returning to the authorisation signed by the merchants of London in February 1723, there feature Diogo de Aguilar, Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro, and Fernando Dias Fernandes, side by side with the Jewish trade elite of London. Their departure from Portugal and exile in England did not imply a complete break in the structures of their mercantile practice. The authorisation of 1723, signed approximately two years after Aguilar's and Pinheiro's arrival in the British capital, demonstrated continuity in their trade with Portugal. Two episodes that occurred during the year of 1731 corroborate this assertion.

In May 1723, a shipment of goods arriving on board the Brazil fleet and belonging to Miguel Viana (*alias* Fernando Dias Fernandes) was confiscated in the port of Lisbon because Viana allegedly owed money to the Royal Treasury. Viana's agents were required to pay the amount due: 1,400,000 *reis* were demanded for payment to the house of Buller and Bear. William Buller then presented a petition signed by Viana to the Secretary of State, Diogo de Mendonça Corte-Real, in which he declared the seizure to be unlawful. Viana claimed that he was not a Portuguese, but born in Pastrana, and that the confiscated goods were legal. Furthermore, Viana affirmed that he had never owed money to the Portuguese Crown. He even suggested that it was nothing but a misunderstanding since the Portuguese authorities had confused him with another merchant of the same surname: Daniel Viana, the commercial pseudonym of Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro (Barnett, 1973-75, p. 217-221).

In 1731, the name of Lopes Pinheiro again reached the ears of the Portuguese authorities in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Woodward & Co. One of the main reasons for the fall of this English bank was a ruinous loan of £56,000 made to Pinheiro and his partner Diogo de Aguilar[76]. At that very time in Lisbon, William Buller managed the business of a merchant who appears under the name of Pedro Forte. The outbreak of the scandal of the Woodward bankruptcy and enquiries into the partnership's debts revealed that Pedro Forte was another pseudonym used by Lopes Pinheiro in his business ventures with Portugal[77]. An anonymous record regarding this case stated that supposedly "Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro had in this kingdom, in the hand of Guilherme (William) Buller, enough means to cover what he owed the banker"[78]. However,

[76] BNP, Colecção Pombalina, cód. 738, ff. 294-294v.

[77] TNA, SP 89/37/33 (Letter from Lord Tyrawly to the Duke of Newcastle. Lisbon, 18 May 1731).

[78] "Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro tinha neste reino, na mão de Guilherme Buller, suficiente porção de efeitos para cobrir a sua dívida que devia ao banqueiro". BNP, Colecção Pombalina, cód. 738,

the resolution of this case was not so simple. Instead, it generated tension in the diplomatic relations between Portugal and Great Britain. The Portuguese authorities claimed that Pinheiro had fled Portugal with a debt to the Royal Treasury, so his goods should be confiscated. When the real identity of Pedro Forte was discovered, all the money that he had placed in Buller's hands was confiscated by the Portuguese justice. Consequently, his debt to Woodward went unpaid, and the bank was ruined. In the face of so many false names and subterfuges engendered to escape obligations, Lord Tyrawly, envoy extraordinary to Lisbon at the time, wrote in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle: "[T]he present affair, My Lord (pardon the expression), is a very dirty one, and is a confused jumble of people under fictitious names"[79].

Buller's connection to the two "Vianas" must have dated back to the time when they all lived in Portugal. After Pinheiro's and Dias Fernandes' departure to England, Buller took over the management of the businesses which they, in their absence from the country, continued to carry out in Portugal, taking advantage of the opportunities created by the Methuen Treaty, in particular the relief of tax duties on English woollen cloth. The gold that arrived in England in February 1723 in the name of Pinheiro & Lima, Miguel Viana, and Daniel Viana was surely, at least in part, a result of the sale of English cloth on the Portuguese market. After all, ever since the beginning of the century, the participation of Jews resident in London in the Anglo-Portuguese trade was prevalent (Yogev, 1978, p. 278).

In 1732, Tyrawly acknowledged this situation: "I believe it is without contradiction, that the greatest dealers to Portugal in our woollen goods, are the Jews in London"[80]. These words of the English envoy were echoed by D. Luís de Cunha, who, in his *Instruções Políticas* to Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho, identified the departure of businessmen persecuted by the Inquisition as a "sangria" (bloodletting) that urgently needed to be stopped. He wrote that these businessmen were "leaving every day from Portugal with their possessions to go enrich foreign countries", thus provoking the ruin of the Kingdom, in particular the provinces of Beira and Trás-os-Montes, where manufacturing and commerce flourished in the past[81].

Silk from Bragança and cloth from Guarda and Fundão gradually vanished, being replaced by English textiles that inundated the Portuguese market after

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f. 294v.

79 TNA, SP 89/37/77 (Lisbon, 27 June 1732).

80 TNA, SP 89/37/73 (Lisbon, 23 May 1732). See also Barnett, 1973-75, p. 218.

81 "[T]odos os dias saindo de Portugal com os seus cabedais, para irem enriquecer os países estrangeiros" (Cunha, 2001, pp. 235, 244-245).

the signing of the Methuen Treaty. Some protagonists remained the same. The Inquisitorial persecution, as well as their exile in London, led to a shift in their textile investments of the Beiras and Trás-os-Montes regions over to English ones. The axis of the trade network and the direction of transactions changed, yet the trading area remained the same, at least in part. Other cases reveal other continuities. For example, Diogo de Aguilar's experience with the unfortunate contract that he inherited from his father was undoubtedly decisive in his success when, years later, he acquired the Austrian tobacco monopoly.

7. Conclusion

Diogo de Aguilar, Gabriel Lopes Pinheiro, and Fernando Dias Fernandes are examples of a New Christian mercantile elite who, persecuted by the Inquisition, relocated their network's core to the newly emerging commercial and financial hub of Europe, particularly London. They brought with them capital, contacts, and know-how. This move to another epicentre was not the result of a planned decision to expand their trade network by settling the core of their businesses in London, but, rather, a response to ever-increasing, repressive activities against New Christians on the part of the Inquisition in Portugal. Their choice of London over other European centres with vibrant Jewish communities, such as Amsterdam, arose from the particular context of the Anglo-Portuguese relations in the first half of the 18th century. The growing maritime traffic between Lisbon and British ports facilitated their escape. In addition, these New Christian merchants who had escaped to England (in particular Aguilar, Pinheiro, and Fernandes) had, while still living in Lisbon, forged long-standing contacts and connections with the increasing number of British mercantile houses with agents in the Portuguese city. This allowed these New Christian/New Jewish merchants – while now being physically located elsewhere – to retain their businesses in Portugal and continue to participate in the Portuguese Atlantic trade. Furthermore, their move to England did not lead to a dismantling of their trade networks, nor did it mean a radical change of their business profiles. Leaving Portugal for England, therefore, did not mean severing their ties with the past, nor with their business activities. They continued to operate on the Portuguese markets through agents, but profits were now re-directed to their place of exile. In the words of Cunha, they helped "bleed" ("sangrar") Portugal of Brazilian gold, which flowed in a torrent towards the English coast.

The examples of Aguilar, Lopes Pinheiro, and Dias Fernandes show us that the migration from Portugal to England of part of the New Christian mercantile

elite, and their eventual settlement in London, should be interpreted under the lense of continuity, rather than of rupture. When we analyse the particular connections which the emigrant merchants kept with Portugal even after their departure, and also the specific framework that shaped these links, we arrive at a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding as to the real impact of the Inquisition's repression and of the ensuing migratory waves towards London in the 1720s and 1730s. Both are deeply interconnected. They are essential elements that shed light onto the transformed profile of the Lisbon mercantile group. They also illuminate the unique dynamics of Anglo-Portuguese commerce in the first half of the 18th century.

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9. Figures



Fig. 1: Genealogy of the Lopes Pereira / Dias Fernandes families



Fig. 2: Genealogy of the Lopes Pereira family

10. Curriculum vitae

Carla Vieira is a post-doctoral researcher at the CHAM (NOVA FCSH/ Uaç), with the project "Nation between Empires: New Christians and Portuguese Jews in Anglo-Portuguese Relations (first half of the 18th century)", funded by the FCT (SFRH/BPD/109606/2015), website: <https://nationbetweenempires.wordpress.com>. She is the principal investigator of the project Western Sephardic Diaspora Roadmap, developed by the CHAM and the Digital Humanities Lab and supported by international funding. She is editor of the journal Cadernos de Estudos Sefarditas, published by the Cátedra de Estudos Sefarditas Alberto Benveniste.

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The General Contract of Tobacco and the Azorean Economy (17th and 18th Centuries)*

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Abstract
From the second half of the 17th century, the Tobacco trade became one of the main revenues for the European colonial empires. In Portugal there was a general contract, based on a system of contracts and exclusive businesses, with associated financial and tax benefits. How were the regulatory and surveillance mechanisms of this monopoly transposed to insular spaces? What kind of behavior did contractors have in island society? What is the role of the tobacco trade in the Azorean economy? These are some of the questions we will try to answer in this text.

Keywords
Azores; Portugal; Tobacco contract; Contractors, Monopoly rights.

Resumo
A partir da segunda metade do século XVII, o comércio do tabaco passou a ser uma das principais receitas dos impérios coloniais europeus. Em Portugal existia um contrato geral, baseado em regime de contratos e negó-cios exclusivos, com benefícios financeiros e fiscais associados. Como foram transpostos para os espaços insulares os mecanismos reguladores e de vigilância deste monopólio? Que tipo de comportamentos tinham os contratadores na sociedade insular? Qual o papel do comércio do Tabaco na economia açoriana? Estas são algumas das perguntas que tentaremos responder neste texto.

Palavras-chave
Açores; Portugal; Contrato do tabaco; Contratadores; Direitos monopolistas[2].

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The archipelago of the Azores played an important role within the heart of the Portuguese overseas empire. Its geographic position made it a fundamental stopover for ships returning from the Orient, as well as for those sailing from the American continent via Seville, and later from Brazil. Indeed the Azores provided vital support to the maritime expansion, i.e., navigation: foreign merchants were present in the Azores since the 1500s, awaiting the arrival and departure of the ships; this allowed them to carry out their business, a situation that continued throughout the Old Regime and even later, especially in the 19th century, when the orange trade flourished and brought prominence to the Azorean ports.

> O préstimo açoriano na correspondência intercontinental persiste à passagem do tempo e à sucessão das hegemonias económicas, porque faculta sempre a conexão entre a velha Europa e a costa de África e as paragens mais longínquas do Oriente e do Novo mundo (Meneses, 2001, p.14).

The Azores' participation in the Atlantic routes remained a constant in their economic history, which, conditioned by external stimuli, re-centred their ports according to the dynamics of the international routes. When the economic power shifted to northern Europe, and the colonial component extended to the American continent, the archipelago re-adapted, retaining its centrality within the periphery of the system of oceanic routes. The South Atlantic trade route, i.e., Brazil, was the one most dynamic and used by Azorean wholesale merchants. However if we analyze the entry books of Azorean Customs from the 17th and 18th centuries, numerous arrivals from Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio de Janeiro are recorded, with the most common cargoes being sugar, soles and half-soles, wood, sugarcane spirits, and whale oil (Machado, 2006, pp. 148,149). There is, however, no information regarding tobacco.

The question, therefore, beckons: What happened in relation to the tobacco trade, when we know that in the 17th and 18th centuries it was one of the major Brazilian exports and was grown in several areas of northeastern Brazil, especially in the region of Bahia? Is it possible that, contrary to what occurred in Europe, and even in continental Portugal, this product had little economic importance in the Azores? This chapter analyses the role of the tobacco trade in the Azorean economy and its connection to the General Contract of Tobacco.

In Portugal, as in Spain, revenue was collected from the tobacco trade through a monopoly[3]; this alternated between being controlled directly by the Crown on the one hand, being leased to private individuals on the other. One important aspect of the Portuguese tobacco monopoly was that it restricted the area of production to Brazil, i.e., Bahia. Tobacco growing was forbidden both in the metropole and also in the archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores. But the restrictions were not only limited to its production; the processing of tobacco was only allowed in the *Estanco* factory in Lisbon – others were created later in Oporto, Madeira, S. Miguel, and Terceira, but under the direction of the General Contract in Lisbon)[4] – and the only legal route of entry of tobacco into the metropole and the islands was the direct one between Brazil and Lisbon[5]. (Machado, 2014, p. 159; Costa, 2014, pp. 23,24; Salvado, 2014, p. 133).

The Tobacco Contract was a monopoly created during the Iberian Union, in the reign of Phillip IV (1621-1649), and it controlled the sale of tobacco. The contract lasted between 1636 and 1865, with short periods of liberalisation of its sales. Between 1633/63 and 1636/39, it was acquired by a Jewish merchant on the Madrid market, but the restoration of Portugal's independence in 1640 interrupted that lease, which was then passed on to Álvaro Fernandez and Diogo Fernandes Sequeira (Garret - Gordillo- Lúxan, 2012, p. 37)[6]. As it was necessary to oversee the entire process, from cultivation to manufacturing and sale, and in order to avoid illicit trading, the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco*[7] (Tobacco Administration Board) was founded in 1674, along with a tobacco factory in Lisbon, where only the tobacco received in rolls from Brazil could be ground into powder. Tobacco sales were limited to the *Estanco* stores (properly indicated and authorized by the contractors and sub-contractors) (Caldeira, 2000, p. 575). Prices were also subject to legislation, and although initially this was free, the contract of 1691 stated that a contractor himself, or via his administrators, could sell tobacco at whatever price they wanted, without any legal action being taken to prevent it[8]. In the first decades of the 1700s, a

3 When we use the word tobacco monopoly, we are referring, on the one hand, to a privilege of the monarch, who has the power to establish rights over trade and, on the other hand, to the prerogative to reserve for himself the production, sale and distribution of tobacco.

4 Estanco = Monopoly: commercial power granted by the State to a company. It can also be a store specializing in the sale of tobacco.

5 The only exception was the creation of a second route between Bahia and the Portuguese African colonies.

6 On the organization of the Tobacco Contract in Spain see also: Romero, 2007.

7 See also: Figueiroa-Rego (2019), pp 41 e 42.

8 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Regional de Ponta Delgada, (from now on; BPAPD), Livro de registo da Câmara de Ponta Delgada dos anos de 1655 a 1718).

regiment was issued in which the different qualities of tobacco were tabulated, together with the highest price.

This whole economic and administrative apparatus was also put into practice in the Azores, whereby the contractors general of the Kingdom delegated their competences to the tobacco contractors of the islands. These sub-leases could be done jointly for the entire archipelago or in branches (or segments), whereby it appears that the most common version was segment leasing in the two cities, Angra and Ponta Delgada, although we also find, for some years, a branch for the town of Horta**.** In the Azores, the great royal monopolies, throughout the kingdom, such as, for example, whale oil or tobacco, took place in accordance with the normative and institutional framework defined by the state with the respective consortia, unlike the royal insular rents which, following the creation of the Captaincy-General and the Royal Treasury in Angra (1766), were auctioned in this Azorean city, usually by companies formed by insular merchants. All contracts were leased for periods of 3, 6, or 9 years, leading to greater stability and greater potential benefits for the general contractor[9].

In January 1645, a provision issued by King John IV on 8 August 1644 was transcribed in the Register Book of the Customs in Ponta Delgada informing the governors of the island of S. Miguel that the Royal Revenue Council had leased to Diogo Sequeira and João Duarte the "Contract of the monopoly of Tobacco of the Kingdom of Portugal and its Conquests, with the exception of Brazil and places in Africa", for a duration of six years and for the annual amount of 64,000 *cruzados.* The provision also stipulated that after that date no one was allowed to sell tobacco without the authorization of the contractors, and that all those who until then had sold tobacco were obliged to declare the amount they still had left, for which a maximum price of one *cruzado* for every *arrátel* of powdered tobacco was prescribed, while tobacco in rolls sold for 3.5 ounces per *arrátel*, and the price of snuff was to be agreed on by both parties. In addition, "devassas" (searches) were ordered to ensure that everyone complied with the order (Machado, 2014, p. 160)[10].

Enforcing the exclusive sale of Brazilian tobacco was not easy since before 1645, all kinds of tobacco was consumed freely, particularly tobacco from Castile and from Portuguese production. Any farmer could grow tobacco, and the system of impunity permitted the nobility and the clergy to cultivate it on

[9] For further knowledge on royal contract in Portugal end in Azores see: Costa, Fernando ,1992; Costa, Leonor, 2014; Costa - Salvado, 2019; Hespanha,1993; Madureira, 1997, pp. 102-104; Pedreira, 1995; Salvado, 2014, pp.133-153; Costa, Ricardo, 2005; Machado, 2005, pp. 153-186; 2017; Melendez e Machado, 2019, pp.101-118.

[10] BPARPD, Livro de Registo da Alfândega de Ponta Delgada, 1639 a 1654, fol. 328.

their lands. With a view to addressing this problem, new and abundant legislation was prepared to ensure that offenders were penalized. The consultations with the "Junta de Administração do Tabaco" attest to the complexity of this issue. Sanctions were enacted according to the social standing of the offenders: In the case of *fidalgos* (noblemen) who ordered tobacco to be pressed in their houses or any other place, the tobacco was confiscated, and the perpetrator had to pay a fine of 2,000 *cruzados*, as well as serve a two-year sentence in the kingdom of the Algarve. Anyone not a *fidalgo* but enjoying similar privileges had their tobacco confiscated and was made to pay a fine of 1,000 *cruzados*, as well as being exiled to Mazagan for two years. The sanctions intensified as they went down the social pyramid, with the worst punishment being flogging and five years in the galleys. There were constant appeals by the *Junta* to move the authorities to control and outlaw the illicit tobacco trade. In the Azores, for example, the *Junta* issued petitions for His Majesty to order the governors, magistrates, *juizes de fora* (judges appointed by the King) and other royal officials, as well as the Bishop and clerical magistrates, to punish offenders exemplarily and carry out searches in the houses of all social strata, including convents[11].

Information about the cultivation, and especially about the pressing and sale of tobacco in convents, resulted in attempts to legitimize the searches in these "sacred" places. A document dated 29 April 1676 – referring to a search in the Monastery of S. Bento and justifying the confiscation of a stromp and other instruments used in the production of powdered tobacco, as well as the subsequent penalization of the monk who was manufacturing it – argues that:

> Ainda que os religiosos e mais pessoas eclesiásticas sejam isentos de jurisdição real por ser secular, por razão de domicílio são vassalos e como tal obrigados e sujeitos ao poder económico e político de seu Príncipe, guardando suas leis, dando-lhe fidelidade, obedecendo a seus mandados e zelando o bem comum dos seus vassalos[12].

This problem was transversal to all the Kingdom. There were many complaints from the tobacco contractors on the islands of the Azores, where the manufacturing and sale of tobacco in several convents and houses of noblemen went unpunished, despite inquiries being carried out. This led to a constant illicit trade in tobacco, resulting in considerable losses to the contractors.

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11 Torre to Tombo (from now on: TT), Junta da Administração do Tabaco, Consultas, maços nº1, doc 73,junho 1671; Maço nº2, doc.34; Março de 1681, between others.

12 TT, Junta da Administração do Tabaco, Consultas, maço nº1, doc.42.

But this activity was not limited to the sowing and pressing of tobacco; the sea that bathed the coasts of the Azores was also a stage for contraband. As mentioned above, the Azores were linked to Brazil by a direct route, i.e., the big port of Bahia, from where Brazilian tobacco was exported. Many complaints were made by the tobacco contractors, denouncing the carelessness and lack of control regarding the ships arriving in Azorean ports. Several accounts substantiate the illicit tobacco trade that took place at sea. One such appeal was made in 1678 by the contractor of the island of Terceira and its adjoining islands, in which he reported that the prelate of S. Mateus, António da Silva Ferreira, had gone out to sea to fetch tobacco rolls illicitly, which he then sold in his parish. Another case was that of father Antonio da Pax from the island of Faial, who sold two barrels of illegally acquired powdered tobacco (Machado, 2014, p. 162; 2020 pp. 108-112; Silva, 2001, p. 583; Santos, 1974, ~~pp. 258-265~~) . The State took action all over the country, and many people were detained, while others (i.e., the ecclesiastics) were denaturalized. The lists of individuals condemned to the galleys and deported to Angola and Brazil got longer and longer. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Reverend John Colbacth, who visited Portugal in the late 1600s, felt that the severity of treatment for anyone pressing tobacco for their own use was comparable only to the treatment which counterfeiters received in England (Hamson,1982, p. 154).

The first allocation we find of a lease for the Azores was made in 1691 for S. Miguel and its adjoining islands[13]. Based on this contract and comparing it with the general contract of the Kingdom, we learn that it had been bought in Lisbon by Jacinto Siqueira, resident in S. Miguel, for a period of three years and for the amount of 4,000 *cruzados* per year, to be paid in cash and divided into quarterly payments of three months. This contractor committed to sending, at his own expense, the stromps and workshops that he deemed necessary for the manufacturing of tobacco.

After careful analysis of all the other conditions of the contract, it becomes evident that they replicate those of the general contract, adapted to a regional scale, whereby the contractors and *estanqueiros* enjoyed the same privileges as the contractors general. For example, only contractors and *estanqueiros* were allowed to manufacture and sell tobacco, while anyone who dispatched tobacco in the Customs of Ponta Delgada could not take any tobacco home nor store it in their warehouses without first declaring the rolls, *arrobas*, and quality of the different grades of tobacco. In addition, they were exempt from levies and tolls, and also from having to provide *aposentadoria* (accommodation) which they

[13] BPAPD, Livro de Registo da Câmara de Ponta Delgada dos anos de 1655 a 1718.

could, in turn, use for the sound administration of their contracts. Instead, all illicit trade in tobacco was to be penalized, and the contractor could appeal to the governors, judges, procurators, and magistrates for assistance in order to carry out confiscations and denunciations. Contractors could also sell tobacco for whatever price they wanted (the regiment that tabulated the price of tobacco was only created in the first decade of the 1700s)[14], as well as lease or transfer the contract separately according to places, towns and cities, and for the administration of these islands and of the Royal Treasury. Furthermore, His Majesty could appoint an officer or clerk in each place. Contractors could benefit from wagons to transport tobacco and receive munitions for their defense. Another very important condition, especially regarding contraband, was that contractors, at their own expense, could send guards to the ships arriving from Brazil in order to carry out searches and other proceedings without interference from shipmasters or shipowners.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the privileges granted to the tobacco contractors, as well as their profits, increased. According to Arlindo Caldeira the average annual consumption of tobacco in Portugal went from 21,085 *arrobas* in the late 17th century to 87,624 *arrobas* in the late 18th century (Caldeira, 2000, p. 15). In 1644, the Tobacco Contract provided the State with an income of 64,000 *cruzados* Whereas in 1684, it yielded 1,000,000 *cruzados*, and in 1730, it reached 1,700,000 *cruzados* (in 1708, the annual earning reached 2,200,000 *cruzados*) (Caldeira, 2000, p. 15).

Although we do not have enough quantitative data to confirm that the contract in the Azores yielded outstanding profits, we do know from reliable sources that the returns were, nonetheless, high, and that the bidding and purchasing of contracts grew steadily: In 1678, for example, the branch of the island of Terceira was bought for 2,410,000 *réis,* increasing to 3,300,00 *réis* in 1681. In the following triennial, the price in Terceira dropped to 1,130,000 *réis*, while in S. Miguel, it went for 1,300,000 *réis* a year. In 1688, the contract for all

[14] Due to the big discrepancy in prices, a regiment was issued in the first decade of the 1700s in order to standardise prices according to the different qualities of tobacco. This was recorded in the books of the Municipal Council of Faial in 1722 as follows: Sample tobacco (*amostra* or *amostrinha*, the best quality tobacco, made with the innermost leaves of the rolls) cost 2,000 *reis* per *arrátel,* and 8 *vinténs* for an ounce of loose tobacco. City tobacco (manufactured with intermediate leaves) cost 1,600 *réis* per *arrátel*, while an ounce of loose tobacco cost 6 *vinténs*; and simonte tobacco (the most ordinary and obtained from the outside leaves) cost 1,200 per *arrátel*, while the loose tobacco cost 96 *réis* per ounce. Finally, the wholesale price of tobacco in rolls (which was cheaper since it had no industrial preparation) cost 800 *réis* per *arrátel*, and half a *tostão* for an ounce of loose tobacco.

the islands of the Azores was bought for 10,000 *cruzados* (4,600,000 *réis*)[15] in each of the three years, increasing fivefold in 1744, when the contract for all the islands was bought for 55,000 *cruzados* per year = 25,300,000 *réis* (Machado, 2014, p. 164).

If we then draw a parallel with the most important royal contract of the region, that of the *Dízimos do trigo* tand *Miúnças* (tithes of wheat and taxes) of the island of S. Miguel – which was bought in 1767 for 13,200,000 *réis* (Machado,2006,p.156) even though the timeframe was different (based on our knowledge of prices in the Azores during the second half of the 1700s, we can affirm that the Tobacco Contract was even greater than in 1744) – we get an idea of the magnitude of this contract. A comparison worth drawing is that between the Tobacco Contract and the Whaling Contract. In the case of the latter, in 1767, the contractor subleased the sale of whale oil in all the islands of the Azores to Nicolau Maria Raposo for an annual rate of 6,000,000 *réis* (Machado, 2006, pp. 45 e 46). This allows us to verify that in the Azores also, the Tobacco Contract was the main source of revenue for the State.

Another difference between the tobacco and the whaling contract reveals a tighter control exercised by the redistributing centre, i.e., Lisbon. While in the case of the subleased whale oil contract the merchant Nicolau Maria Raposo sailed to Rio de Janeiro in his own ships in order to buy the oil and from there sent it directly to the Azores, in the Tobacco Contract, by contrast, redistribution to the Azores was effected from Lisbon, without taking into account the illicit trade that was carried out in the seas of the Azores.

The book of entries of the Customs of Ponta Delgada for the 1760s[16] reveals that all the ships that arrived with tobacco came from Lisbon[17]. Furthermore, most of the tobacco was in rolls, although some was in powder and transported in barrels (in the 1760s, only one ship brought powdered tobacco).

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15 For the purpose of converting *cruzados* into *réis*, the following ratio was used: 1 *cruzado* = $480 *réis* (Arragão, s.d., vol. 2, pp. 41-92).

16 Some of the books of entry from the Customs of Ponta Delgada are seriously damaged and not accessible to researchers. Therefore, as a sample, the decade of the 1760s was used, when whale oil was entering the island of S. Miguel directly from Pernambuco, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro.

17 Although this situation was normal given the privileges of the contract, it would be prudent to cross-reference this with the *livros de manifestos,* since one of the entries in 1689 taken from a commercial book – which was part of the estate of Nicolau Borges de Bettencourt – makes reference to a ship that arrived from Bahia bringing tobacco, among other goods.

Entry of tobacco in the port of Ponta Delgada (1764-1783)

Date	Number of ships	Quantities
1764	4	104 rolls and 8 barrels of powder
1765	4	210 rolls
1766	4	90 rolls
1768	1	40 rolls
1769	5	132 rolls
1774	2	70 rolls
1775	3	70 rolls
1776	3	85 rolls
1777	2	110 rolls
1778	-	-*
1779	3	270 rolls
1780	-	-*
1781	3	177 rolls
1782	3	90 rolls
1783	2	110

Source: BPAPD, records of the Customs of Ponta Delgada, Entry books, 1763 to 1780

As mentioned above, this tobacco came from Lisbon, usually directly to Ponta Delgada; there were, however, four exceptions. One galley arrived in Ponta Delgada after a stopover on the island of Terceira, another ship went to Faial; another to Terceira; and the fourth to Santa Maria, the latter two with stopovers in Ponta Delgada, demonstrating that the other islands received tobacco directly from Lisbon. As a general rule, the Tobacco Contract in the Azores was divided in three branches: Ponta Delgada, Angra, and Horta.

Most of the ships that transported tobacco to Ponta Delgada in the 1760s were foreign: 11 galleys from Denmark, 9 from England, 2 from Holland, and 16 Portuguese. These vessels were generally consigned to the tobacco administrator, who at that time was Captain José de Azevedo. In most cases, the ships used sand or gravel ballast with the tobacco rolls, while other cargoes are rarely mentioned. However, in the last two years of the 1770s and early 1780s, the ships that arrived were consigned to the major merchants of S. Miguel, together with other cargoes, and with particular frequency to the two merchants Leocádio Vieira and António Francisco e Carvalho.

As such, the arrival of foreign ships in the Azores with a certain amount of tobacco, albeit with complementary cargoes of "sand ballast" consigned to the tobacco contractor, points to other economic problems. These are all interconnected and reveal the importance both of the contract itself, and of the tobacco contractors, to the Azorean economy in two ever-present aspects: The free exportation of cereals on the one hand, and the limitations on circulation and re-exportation of other goods from the Azores to Brazil on the other.

Several charters restricted free commerce between the Azores and the Brazilian ports. One example is the charter of 1736: not only did it prohibit the exit of foreign products from the Azores to Brazil and allowed only goods produced in the islands to be exported, it also restricted the number of ships with a maximum tonnage of 500 boxes sailing from the islands to Brazil to three per year: two from Angra, one from Ponta Delgada (Meneses, 2011, pp. 292 - 293).Although in the 1740s the number of authorized vessels increased slightly, it was always a great privilege to obtain a license to send a ship to Brazil. In 1744, this privilege was extended to the contractor general of tobacco, Feliciano Velho Oldemberg, granting him the right to send a vessel to Brazil during each year of his contract. The ship was not allowed to exceed 250 tons, and for every 100 tons he was obliged to take with him two couples emigrating from the islands, on condition that i) he not alter the prices of the goods; and that ii) he return straight back to the Kingdom with the fleet (Meneses, 2011, p. 296).

This restriction on free navigation and external commerce brings us to the tobacco contractor's privilege to send foreign ships consigned to their administrators on the islands; this, in turn, related directly to the problem of free exportation of cereals from the islands.

A large part of the profit obtained from the tobacco contract on the islands was used to purchase cereals for export to mainland Portugal, Madeira, and the Portuguese bastion of Mazagan, areas where there was always a shortage of these staple crops, especially wheat. Proof of this is the account of the main wholesale merchant on the island of S. Miguel, Nicolau Maria Raposo, who in his correspondence in the last third of the 1700s wrote that the tobacco contractors were the biggest buyers of cereals in the archipelago and therefore set the highest prices for these goods to be sold. This explains Raposo's instructions to his buyers sourcing goods on the island: in their purchases, they were to use as the highest limit the prices established by the aforementioned contractors (Machado, 2006, p. 198).

The trade in cereals was one of the most important businesses on the island (Machado, 2008, pp. 478, 479) and involved an added value that was not overlooked by buyers. By purchasing wheat, barley, and corn (the latter in

lesser quantities until at least the end of the 18th century) and reselling the grain in mainland Portugal, these goods acquired a higher value because the island currency was worth 25% less than that of the Kingdom (Mendes, 2008). Therefore, investing the tobacco profits in goods was not only tempting but indispensable, given the sparse economic activity on the island. It was therefore important to have ships ready to set sail immediately on lading the cereals, bearing in mind the transport difficulties on the island, and the at times urgent need to get the wheat out of the granaries and thus avoid the danger of grain weevil infestations[18]. Perhaps the biggest problem was obtaining shipping licenses from the Municipal Council, who, afraid that uncontrolled exportation of cereals would result in local shortages, did everything they could to prevent large amounts being removed, especially wheat (Machado, 2008, pp. 95-98).

It was not easy to sidestep these challenges, thus one important aspect was the privilege of being able to send tobacco rolls on foreign ships that, in turn, brought back wheat on the return trip. Even more desirable were the special licenses that enabled tobacco contractors to circumvent the Municipal Councils' attempts to prevent the exit of wheat and barley.

Several royal orders in the records of the Council of Ponta Delgada reveal indications of the following nature:

> Ordem para se não embaraçar os contratadores gerais do tabaco, Anselmo José da Cruz, Policarpo José Machado e companhia, de embarcarem para o Reino cereais a saber: da ilha da Terceira e Graciosa, 600 móios de trigo, 300 móios de cevada e 300 de milho; da ilha de S. Miguel e S. Maria: 800 móios de trigo, 200 móios de cevada e 300 móios de milho [19]

This problem was presented on several occasions to the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* (Tobacco Administration Board) which proposed to the King that the licenses be granted without exception, and that preference be given to exportation. Exports were essentially to Lisbon, although sometimes to Figueira da Foz, and also to Mazagan (the Azores was obliged to supply wheat to the latter until 1769, when the Portuguese lost this stronghold). Furthermore, it was often the big contractors in Lisbon who secured the leases for this trade, and not the Azorean merchants, i.e., the tobacco contractors in Lisbon, as is exemplified herein (Meneses, 2008, p. 162). Once again, the connection between the State's interests and those of the big monopolists is confirmed.

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[18] Gorgulho -insect found in cereals, being the humidity one of the main causes of its spread.

[19] BPAPD, Câmara Municipal de Ponta Delgada, Livro de registo nº 4, 1769, fol. 27.

But the activity of the tobacco contractors in the economy of the Azores was not limited to cereals. The islands had an abundance of vineyards, and the contractors also invested in wine, and especially *aguardente* (spirits).

Apart from commerce, the tobacco contractors had great influence and power over credit practices in the Azorean markets, and this greatly fomented the business of bills of exchange between Portugal[20] and foreign markets. Whenever Nicolau Maria Raposo, for example, needed a loan – even though he was considered one of the few wealthy merchants in the Azores – he would ask for credit from the tobacco contractors. In 1782, for instance, he persuaded the tobacco contractor Joaquim da Costa Barradas to lend him 20,000 *cruzados*, paid in bills of exchange in Rio de Janeiro, in order to purchase linen cloth from the Island, that he wanted to send to Brazil (Machado, 2006, p.162).The tobacco contractors were also the major creditors of the Royal Treasury, enabling the Crown to secure transport for Azorean couples emigrating to Brazil.

Between 1740 and 1770, a constant scarcity of wheat on the islands of the central group, i.e., Pico, Faial, S. Jorge, and Graciosa – as well as the Crown's effort to permanently settle the area of Santa Catarina in southern Brazil – resulted in the departure of couples from the islands to the American territories (Meneses, 2011, pp. 405-433). In 1747, a dispatch issued by the Overseas Council ordered credit to be granted by the tobacco contractor of the island of Faial, Francisco Silva Carvalho, in order to pay for the expenses of transporting Azorean couples; the dispatch also ordered that a bill of exchange be issued to the treasurer of the Royal Treasury. It became common practice to use credit provided by the tobacco contractors to finance transportation expenses. These included the costs exacted from the couples – who travelled to Faial from the islands of Graciosa and S. Jorge – upon embarkation onto the contractor's ship (Machado, 2019).

In the decade of the 1750s, the destinations for Azorean couples changed to Maranhão and Pará, but the recourse to credit from the tobacco contractors continued. One such example was a loan of 200,000 *réis* made in 1753 by the tobacco contractor of Faial, João Chamberlin, to finance the departure of 426 people; for this, he received a bill of exchange to be cashed in Lisbon (Machado, 2014, p. 170).

The economic importance of the tobacco contractors – even those who leased the contract of the islands, either in its entirety or in branches – seems unquestionable; yet the same cannot be said of the social importance of the

[20] Remember that due to the lower value of the Azorean currency, it was the bills of exchange that circulated between the insular markets and the metropolis.

Azorean contractors, at least until the late 1700s. Who were they? Were they part of the social and commercial elite of the Azores?

Although, as yet, a complete list of contractors is not available, what can be observed is a certain volatility among the men who bought the Contract General of Tobacco of the islands in the second half of the 17 century, with the exception of two consecutive acquisitions made by Joaquim Siqueira. In 1688, he bought the contract for all the islands, and in 1691 for the branch of S. Miguel only. Some of the contractors may have belonged to the group of the islands' wholesale merchants in the 17th and 18th centuries, revealing by then a higher social status. However, when comparing the names of the tobacco administrators and those of the *estanqueiros* to all the other royal contractors in the Azores (at least during most of the 18th century), none of them coincide. The mercantile elite of the Azores, consolidated by the Pombaline government[21], was not represented in these purchases of the Tobacco Contract. This is surprising, given the fact that, being important merchants, they usually attempted to involve themselves in all the business opportunities available. Is it possible that, in view of the situation in Portugal with many contractors going bankrupt, the Azorean mercantile elite preferred to invest in other royal contracts in the islands?

After the 1780s and during the first two decades of the 19th century, contractors in all the islands tended to keep the tobacco lease on for several years. What changed? Can we apply João Paulo Salvado's theory (Salvado, 2014, pp. 147-150) to the Azorean context and postulate that in the first years of the contract, the merchants who bought the Tobacco Contract – many of them having gone bankrupt – were neither the most affluent, nor did they belong to the Portuguese mercantile elite? There are strong indicators that this was indeed the case, and there are equally strong indicators that after the 1780s, the profile of the contractor/*estanqueiro* in the Atlantic islands changed along similar lines to the trajectory in the Kingdom , in other words , the general contractor appointed administrators who, for a percentage of the turnover, managed wholesaling there (Costa - Salvado, 2018, pp. 17-18).

1. Conclusion

The economic activity related to the Tobacco trade in the Azores showed a great dependence on the metropolis and on the controlling done by the Tobacco

[21] On the action of the Marquês de Pombal regarding the elitization of wholesale traders: Costa -Rocha - Sousa 2013, pp. 121-138; Pedreira,1995; Macedo, 1982.

Administration Board. The prohibition of growing tobacco in the region, as well as the prohibition of importing the plant directly from Brazil, meant that the only tobacco route through the Azores archipelago was Lisbon-Azores, which in a way clashed with the interests of the island's merchants who had always traded directly with Brazil. Furthermore, the ban on growing tobacco in the Azores began to be challenged in the 19th century, after some experiments showed that the region had favourable conditions for the production of the plant. This prohibition was an obstacle to agro-industrial development, at a time when the Azorean economy was going through a major crisis with the collapse of the citrus plantations and the export to the United Kingdom. Freedom of tobacco production was only achieved after the abolition of the contract in 1864 and had as its main leader in the archipelago the Society Promoting Agriculture in S. Miguel (Machado, 10).

The Royal Tobacco Contract was leased to traders, normally from Lisbon, who, in turn, would sublease it to island traders or traders residing in the Islands (Salvado, 2014, pp. 137-141; Machado, 2014, pp .159-164).

Integrated in this economic policy of monopoly and privileges of all kinds, the contractors who rented the Archipelago's contract granted by the State (sometimes subdivided into three branches: S. Miguel and S. Maria, Terceira, and Faial) will have an economic importance in the islands and a strong connection to the State. The privileges they had in sending foreign ships to the islands with tobacco and taking back the cereals or wine w from the islands, the several orders they gave to the City Councils so as "not to hinder" the exit of these same cereals, as well as the obligation to take Azorean couples to Brazil in their ships are examples of this connection between the interests of the State and those of these big monopolists.

However, the autonomy of these insular contracting companies was losing steam, especially after the second half of the 18th century, when the general contracting companies started to appoint administrators and not subcontractors who, in exchange for a percentage of the turnover, managed wholesale sales under strict rules.

The Tobacco Contract under the Old Regime in the Azores did not play a more active role in international trade, as the Portuguese metropolis did not allow the Azores to re-export the product. The privileges of the big contractors in the metropolis, at a time of monopolies and close ties between the latter and its economic agents did not allow this. However, we have no doubt of how important this business was in the islands, as the synergies created by this trade generated profits that were invested in the purchase of cereals, wines, and brandy and their subsequent exportation, in the credit market and in the spread

of the circulation of bills of exchange between the islands, the Kingdom and abroad, which integrated the islands, whether one liked it or not, in the international routes of the Atlantic or in the Atlantic system of tobacco.

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4. Curriculum vitae

Margarida de Mendonça Vaz do Rego Machado obtained her PhD in Modern History from de University of Azores, Portugal. Currently retired she was a professor in the Department of History, Philosophy and Arts of the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences from the same university. Researcher at CHAM-CH at Universidade Nova de Lisboa and Universidade dos Açores, she was director of CHAM-Açores.

Her main research interests lie the economic and social history of Azores, with a particular focus on the 18th and 19th century. The importance of tobacco in the Portuguese archipelagos (Madeira and Azores) and its integration into the Atlantic system is, currently, at the center of her research.

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Recensione / Book Review

Antoni Furió (ed.) (2020) *En torno a la economía mediterránea medieval. Estudios dedicados a Paulino Iradiel*. València: PUV.

Giuseppe Seche
(Università degli Studi di Sassari)

Il volume, curato da Antoni Furió, raccoglie sedici saggi di argomento mediterraneo dedicati a Paulino Iradiel, uno dei padri della moderna storiografia sul grande Mare. Si tratta di un secondo omaggio a lui offerto, dopo *El País Valenciano en la Baja Edad Media. Estudios dedicados al profesor Paulino Iradiel*, curato da David Igual Luis e Germán Navarro Espinach, venuto alla luce nel 2018 sempre per i tipi della Universitat de Valéncia.

Nel saggio introduttivo, il curatore ripropone il percorso di Iradiel, ricordando le tappe fondamentali della sua formazione: studi superiori a Tortosa, tesi di laurea a Salamanca discussa nel 1969, tesi di dottorato difesa a Bologna nel 1971; e, proprio durante il soggiorno italiano, iniziò a frequentare il Corso di specializzazione in storia economica, tenuto presso l'Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica Francesco Datini, un legame forte ancora oggi. Basterebbe questo per far capire come Iradiel si sia formato in prestigiosi centri universitari, sedi di un rinnovamento storiografico sia sul versante iberico sia su quello italiano. Professore di storia medievale prima a Salamanca poi a Valenza, la sua produzione si muove sul versante della storia sociale ed economica, con attenzione a tanti temi, tra i quali si possono segnalare il ruolo e l'organizzazione dei mercanti, le produzioni tessili, le strutture agrarie, le corporazioni, il patriziato urbano, il feudalesimo, le relazioni tra economia e politica; il tutto in ambiente castigliano (si pensi a *Evolución de la industria textil castellana en los siglos XIII-XVI. Factores de desarrollo, organización y costes de la producción manufacturera en Cuenca*, venuto alla luce a Salamanca nel 1974, un innovativo e documentato lavoro sull'industria tessile a Cuenca), italiano (*Progreso agrario, desequilibrio social y agricultura de transición. La propiedad del Colegio de España en Bolonia. Siglos XIV y XV*, edito a Bologna nel 1978, costituisce un valido contributo alla struttura agraria dell'Italia centro-settentrionale), valenzano e mediterraneo (si vedano le numerose tesi dottorali da lui dirette o i suoi saggi innovativi, alcuni dei quali sono raccolti in *El*

Mediterráneo medieval y Valencia: economía, sociedad, historia, pubblicato a Valenza nel 2017). Insomma, un medievista che per decenni ha guidato la rigenerazione della storiografia iberica e mediterranea, formando una nuova generazione di storici, come dimostrano le 21 tesi dottorali discusse da allievi che hanno poi proseguito nel mondo della ricerca, e le sedi accademiche dei 16 amici-autori, i quali hanno offerto io proprio contributo al testo in analisi.

Il volume si apre con il saggio di Alberto Grohman (Università di Perugia), che riflette sul concetto di Storia economica e sull'impostazione metodologica della disciplina. Seguono quindi gli approfondimenti dedicati all'organizzazione del lavoro di Franco Franceschi (Università di Siena), Giampiero Nigro e Giuliano Pinto (Università di Firenze). Nigro si sofferma sul ruolo della bottega nella Firenze rinascimentale, non solamente inteso come un banco di vendita ma come anche un luogo di sviluppo dell'imprenditorialità e dell'educazione al rischio. Pinto affronta il tema dell'Arte della lana nelle città italiane, segnalando come nelle realtà urbane circa un terzo della popolazione era, a vario titolo, impiegato in attività legate a questo settore: ne derivava la necessità di provvedimenti a favore del mondo della lana e, di conseguenza, di una vasta parte della popolazione. Franceschi riflette sulla condizione dei lavoratori salariati nell'Italia centro settentrionale: per una vasta fetta di popolazione, il salario significava una remunerazione fissa ma dipendente da una serie di fattori (stato civile, carico familiare, età anagrafica e condizioni di salute) e, comunque, non consentiva di uscire da quella marginalità politica e sociale che fu causa di rivolte e del costante tentativo di migliorare la propria condizione economica.

Gabriella Picccinni (Università di Siena) e Juan Carrasco (Università di Navarra) accompagnano il lettore nel mondo del prestito e dell'usura: considerando che la necessità di denaro contante spingeva verso queste soluzioni (a tal proposito, si può aggiungere anche il caso dei prestiti richiesti dai produttori di riso analizzati nello studio di Antoni Riera i Melis), non può sfuggire che il tema ha sì una rilevanza economica e sociale, ma anche politica. E, infatti, il primo studio parte dal contesto senese e dalla decisione di regolamentare e frenare le irregolari attività di usura, mentre il secondo si sofferma sul regno di Navarra, dove i contratti di debito prevedevano anche il pagamento di una tassa all'erario reale.

I saggi di Alfio Cotronesi (Università della Tuscia) e Antoni Riera i Melis (Università di Barcellona) si soffermano sulle aree geografiche del viterbese e degli acquitrini valenzani, registrando lo sviluppo delle diverse produzioni locali; in particolare, lo studio dedicato al caso iberico è dedicato alla coltura del riso e alla sua diffusione nella regione catalana, ricostruendo le modalità di

lavorazione, di compravendita, esportazione e utilizzo culinario. Vi sono poi i saggi su due grandi città italiane del Mediterraneo, Venezia e Napoli. Sulla prima si sofferma Élisabeth Crouzet-Pavan (Università La Sorbona), che getta luce sui luoghi e sulle persone legate alle produzioni, con la lavorazione del ferro, del cotone, del cuoio, dell'edilizia, del vetro e della lana, senza dimenticare gli arsenali e la tipografia. Su Napoli, invece, si incentra il lavoro di Amedeo Feniello (Università dell'Aquila), un saggio dedicato al Trecento che, però, propone frequenti affondi sul periodo precedente, utili a mostrare la crescita di una città caratterizzata da una stabile relazione tra mercato urbano, porto e produzioni rurali della sua regione. Questo sviluppo spinse gli uomini d'affari stranieri a penetrare nel sistema di distribuzione commerciale partenopeo, con i fiorentini che riuscirono a costruire uno stabile sistema di potere fino a proporsi come partner finanziario della Corona. Accanto alle grandi città, si collocano anche gli studi legati ai centri secondari. Nel mondo aragonese, svolse funzione di scambio la città di Tarazona: qui, i mercanti catalani portavano i prodotti di origine mediterranea e si rifornivano di quelli realizzati in Aragona o qui giunti dalla Castiglia, dalla Francia o da altri centri dell'Europa continentale. Grazie all'analisi dei registri della dogana relativi agli anni 1446-1149, che José Ángel Sesma Muñoz (Università di Zaragoza) riassume con preziose tabelle promettendo comunque una prossima edizione integrale della fonte, è stato possibile segnalare quantità e caratteristiche del commercio di pesce, legname e frumento, evidenziando come i momenti di scontro tra Aragona e Castiglia abbiano influito in tali affari. Sul versante italiano è l'analisi di Luciano Palermo (Università della Tuscia) a mostrare le vicende dei porti pontifici nel Tirreno, importantissimi nella fitta rete di relazioni commerciali basata sulla navigazione di cabotaggio tra la Sicilia, la Sardegna, le coste dell'Italia meridionale e settentrionale, la Provenza e la città di Roma.

In un testo sull'economia mediterranea non può mancare l'approfondimento sulle relazioni con il mondo musulmano, che in questo caso è affidato allo studio di José Enrique López de Coca Castañer (Università di Malaga) sulla *Casa de Contratación de Orán*. Istituzione voluta da Ferdinando il Cattolico all'indomani della presa della città di Orano, la *Casa* gestiva in regime di monopolio gli affari tra i mercanti iberici e il Maghreb: l'analisi si sofferma sull'amministrazione portata avanti da Alonso Sánchez, tra il 1510 e il 1512, e si basa su sullo studio di nuove fonti che sono puntualmente trascritte in appendice.

Attorno alle fonti, questa volta un inventario e un testamento, ruota anche il saggio di Alfonso Franco Silva (Università di Cadice): questo getta luce sulle proprietà di María de Saavedra (†1526), esponente della potente famiglia

sivigliana, figlia del maresciallo di Castiglia Gonzalo e cognata del cardinale Juan Tavera.

José María Monsalvo Antón (Università di Salamanca), concentrandosi sulle città poste a Sud del fiume Duero, affronta il tema dei *linajes* della nobiltà urbana, gruppi suprafamiliari capaci di unire famiglie facenti parte di una stessa cerchia politica (bando). L'autore ne precisa caratteristiche e composizione, evidenziando il tentativo di costruire una memoria che potesse legittimarli, sia per presunta antichità delle origini sia per riconoscimenti concessi dal potere regio. Infine, José Ángel García de Cortázar (Università della Cantabria) analizza le chiese biscagline nel XV secolo, la cui situazione è caratterizzata da una costante resistenza al controllo vescovile e alla riorganizzazione. Un atteggiamento sfociato in continui scontri, sia con i patroni laici delle chiese sia con i villaggi, e che, tra le altre cose, portò a una mancata consegna delle relative decime.

Dunque, il volume si configura come un prezioso riconoscimento ai meriti storiografici di Iradiel e, fedele all'impostazione del medievista, presenta una raccolta di saggi che rende possibile trovare riferimenti a fonti inedite, quadri bibliografici aggiornati e numerosi spunti comparativi per future ricerche.

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