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England and the Bourbon Challenge 1701-33

Christopher Storrs

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England and the Bourbon Challenge 1701-1733

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Abstract
This article discusses relations between 1700 and 1733 between England (Britain from 1707) and the two Bourbon powers, France and Spain, a challenge for Britain which did not exist before 1700. It emphasises the need to recognise that none of these states was a monolith; instead, within each state there were forces in play which meant the Bourbons were by no means united in their relations with England. Perhaps the most striking expression of this was the Anglo-French alliance or entente of 1716-31, whose breakdown led to the First Bourbon Family Compact. The article also suggests that an entrenched the emphasis on explaining changing relations between the Bourbons and England in terms of trade should not be allowed to ignore other influences on their relations.

Keybords
Asiento; Gibraltar; Utrecht; Walpole; Philip V.

Riassunto
Questo articolo discute i rapporti tra il 1700 e il 1733 tra l'Inghilterra (Gran Bretagna dal 1707) e le due potenze borboniche, Francia e Spagna, una sfida per la Gran Bretagna che non esisteva prima del 1700. Sottolinea la necessità di riconoscere che nessuno di questi stati era un monolite; invece all'interno di ogni stato c'erano forze in gioco che significavano che I Borboni non erano affatto uniti nei loro rapport con l'Inghilterra. Forse l'espressione più eclatante di ciò fu l'alleanza o Intesa anglo-francese del 1716-31, la cui rottura portò al Primo Bourbon Family Compact. L'articolo suggerisce anche che un'enfasi radicata sulla spiegazione del cambiamento delle relazioni tra I Borboni e l'Inghilterra in termini di commercio non dovrebbe essere autorizzata ad ignorare alter influenze sulle loro relazioni.

Parole chiave
Asiento; Gibraltar; Utrecht; Walpole; Filippo V.

Christopher Storrs

"at present, you must observe, we call all things done in Spain as if done by the French" (Henry Whistler to Thoms Pitt, 20 Dec, 1701)[1].

"no peace can be honourable or safe for her majesty and her allies if Spain and the Spanish West Indies …continue in the power of the house of Bourbon" (lord Somers in Parliament, Dec. 1707)[2].

1. Introduction

England - Britain after the Union with Scotland of 1707 (Trevelyan, 1932), although British ministers, like foreigners, often still referred to England and the English rather than to Britain and the British, reflecting the preponderance of England and its interests in the new version of the composite state[3] - had a "Bourbon problem" throughout the eighteenth century, but the character of that challenge was not fixed or unchanging. Before 1700, it was a problem just of Louis XIV's France, from 1735 it was a problem of France, Spain and the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, ruled by Don Carlos (son of Philip V of Spain and Isabel Farnese, the future Carlos III of Spain), to which must be added Bourbon Parma following the installation there in 1748 of another of their sons, the Infante Felipe. But between 1700 and 1735 the Bourbons meant France and Spain, the two powers at the heart of the Bourbon nexus and problem, for the rest of the century, or at least down to 1789. Having said that, the Bourbons – France and Spain - did not constitute a monolith between 1701 and 1733 (or thereafter); their interests might collide as well as coincide, determined in part by the play of domestic forces and this affected and was affected by their individual relations with Britain. But Britain was no monolith either; there, too, there were domestic differences of interest and policy which would ensure that attitudes and policy towards France might vary significantly from those respecting Spain (Black, 2011). Traditionally, and not only among historians of Britain, the eighteenth century has been seen as one in which Britain achieved remarkable domestic stability and – exemplifying the possibilities of the "fiscal-military state"– great power status and global empire (Brewer, 1989; Brewer, 2016). This may be broadly

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1 British Library, *Additional Manuscripts*, vol. 22851, f. 131-2, in Holmes and Speck, 1967.

2 Cited in Trevelyan (1932), p. 345.

3 Cf National Archives, Kew (London) [henceforth NA], *State Papers, series 94* (Spain) [*SP94*], vol. 109, Benjamin Keene to lord Townshend, 18 Aug 1729.

true but contemporaries, not least in Britain itself, did not necessarily see things in this positive, Whiggish light. In what follows, I seek to demonstrate that, for Britain France was the main Bourbon problem between 1700-15, but that Spain was the chief problem between 1715 and 1730, and that in attempting to resolve the problem of Spain in the later 1720s by 1733 Britain had helped to recreate a more monolithic Bourbon bloc (the first Family Compact, 1733) reminiscent of the situation during the War of the Spanish Succession. British policy and diplomacy were by no means the only factor leading to this outcome but they played a large part in it (Lodge, 1933). There is an extensive bibliography on most aspects of this topic, including relations between the French and Spanish Courts under Philip V (Baudrillart, 1890-1901); British policy in general and in respect more specifically of Spain (McLachlan, 1940; Walker, 1979; Black, 1991); and the diplomacy of the age (Williams, 1930; Lodge, 1931, 1933; Quazza, 1965; Black, 1984b; Black, 2004; Bethencourt, 1998; Storrs, 2014). Nevertheless, the correspondence between ministers in London and their representatives in Spain (and in France), now in the State Papers in the National Archives and among the Newcastle Papers in the British Library in London can throw further light on relations between Britain and the Bourbons in the first decades of the eighteenth century.

2. 1700-15: The War of Spanish Succession

On the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, England did not have a Bourbon problem as such, its problem was the France of Louis XIV. In the later sixteenth and much of the seventeenth century, faced with a hegemonic catholic Spanish Monarchy, Protestants like Oliver Cromwell preferred to collaborate with France against Habsburg Spain (Sanz Camanes, 2022). However, in the second half of the seventeenth century, with Spain no longer hegemonic, Louis XIV appeared a greater threat than did the last Spanish Habsburg, Carlos II. Under Charles II and James II Louis' "absolutism" appeared to threatened England's liberties, his Counter-Reformation Catholicism its Protestant religion, and his ambitions in Flanders its security (Kenyon, 1972). Spain was more frequently England's ally than its foe, witness the commercial treaty of 1667, which thereafter underpinned England's advantageous trade with "Old Spain" (McLachlan, 1940). The "Glorious Revolution of 1688 confirmed this anti-French, but not yet anti-Bourbon, direction of English (and Scottish) policy with the elevation of William of Orange as co-ruler, William III, with James II's daughter, Mary. William had long led the resistance to Louis XIV not

only of the Dutch republic, but also of the western European powers generally, including Spain, and had intervened in England in 1688 primarily to ensure that the country's resources were deployed against and not in favour of Louis. Almost immediately the revolution was secured, England entered the War of the League of Augsburg, or Nine Years War (1688-97) - sometimes also thought of as a War of the English Succession- on the side of the Grand Alliance against France. England's participation helped in various ways to ensure that the conflict was Louis' first serious setback since 1661(Clark, 1970A; Lynn, 1999; Claydon, 2002).

But already by the 1690s the problem of Louis XIV was becoming the Bourbon problem, because of the Spanish Succession, i.e. the question of who was to inherit Spain's vast empire, which was so important to the European and global economy, when Carlos II, died. An awareness of the looming problem – the threat of both France and Spain being ruled by one, Bourbon prince - triggered one of the most remarkable efforts in modern history to prevent a major war between the rival claimants to the succession, the Partition Treaties concluded by Louis XIV, William III and the Dutch republic between 1698 and 1700. Discussions, between representatives of William III and Louis XIV began during the negotiations for the peace of Ryswick which ended the Nine Years War. The first partition treaty (1698) allotted the bulk of the Spanish Monarchy to the infant son of the Elector of Bavaria, who had been Carlos II's designated heir in his will of 1696. Unfortunately, this solution to the problem was nullified by the death in 1699 of the Bavarian prince, necessitating the negotiation of a second partition treaty (1700), which allocated Spain, America and Flanders to the archduke Charles, with the dauphin securing the Italian territories. Significantly, neither Carlos II nor Emperor Leopold were parties to this treaty, and when Carlos died in November 1700 he willed the entire Monarchy to Louis XIV's grandson, Philippe duke of Anjou; if he refused the inheritance, it must be offered – again the entire Monarchy - to the archduke Charles (Grimblot, 1848; Ribot and Inurritegui, 2016).

Carlos II's will represented a major challenge for all parties, including William III but above all for Louis XIV, who must decide between fulfilling his treaty obligations to William III and the Dutch republic and accepting the will. Abandoning the treaty would confirm all sorts of prejudices about Louis and France as acquisitive, aggressive and untrustworthy, and would create a Bourbon polity

extending from the North Sea (Flanders) to the Straits of Gibraltar, across the Atlantic to the Americas, and beyond to the Philippines; the Pyrenees would be of little significance as a barrier between France and Spain in Europe. Accepting the will would almost certainly mean war with the Emperor, who refused any suggestion of a partition and was determined to secure the entire Monarchy for his son, but so too would preferring the treaty. Would William then fight his recent ally in order to put Louis' grandson on the Spanish throne? But Louis – effectively acting on behalf of his eighteen years old grandson - opted for Carlos II's will (Clark, 1970b).

Initially, Louis' acceptance of the will went down well with those in England who thought the young Philip would soon become hispanized and independent of France. Moreover, some in England, where commercial interests were very effectively articulated in Parliament, feared that the second Partition treaty, and the allocation to France of Naples and Sicily might threaten English trade in the Mediterranean; In 1701 a Tory House of Commons attacked those Whig ministers of William III who had helped the king to conclude the second partition treaty and William was obliged to recognize Philip as king of Spain (Baxter, 1966; Clark, 1970B; Horwitz, 1977). War against Bourbon France and Spain was the result largely of subsequent errors on Louis XIV's part which brought into sharper focus the new Bourbon menace, ie. that the accession of a French – Bourbon prince in Madrid would fundamentally upset the balance of power in Europe and more specifically threaten England. In December 1700 Louis had the parlement of Paris register a decree declaring that Philip V remained eligible to succeed to the French throne, despite becoming king of Spain. In February 1701 the English government publicized intercepted letters from Jacobite exiles revealing Louis' intentions to restore James II, by force if necessary despite Louis' promise at Ryswick to recognise William and Mary as rightful monarchs in England. In March 1701 Louis secured from Philip an order that French troops should garrison various fortresses in Spanish Flanders which the Dutch had garrisoned since 1697. Furthermore, In August 1701, Philip granted the lucrative contract (the asiento) to supply African slaves to the Spanish colonists in the Americas to the French Guinea Company (Stein and Stein, 2000; Sanz Ayan, 2013). These and other measures of commercial

character transformed attitudes in England, such that William III was able to conclude, in September 1701 the Grand Alliance with the Emperor and the Dutch republic; the allies were prepared to leave Philip in possession of Spain and the Indies but sought to prevent the union of France and Spain, assigned Spanish Italy, Spanish Flanders and the Mediterranean islands to the archduke Charles, and looked to a new partition of the Spanish Monarchy which should not only prevent such a union but also secure trading privileges in the Spanish empire for England and the Dutch republic, in this respect going further than the Partition Treaties in pushing English (and Dutch) commercial interests If these objectives could not be secured peacefully, by negotiation, the allies would resort to force – war (Dumont, 1730; McKay and Scott, 1983; Trevelyan, 1930; Clark, 1970b). Louis' final error followed. On the death in exile in September 1701 of James II, Louis XIV recognized James' son, the "Old Pretender", as king of England and Scotland, effectively challenging the revolution settlement of 1688-89. In May 1702, William III having died his successor, queen Anne, Austria and the Dutch republic declared war on France and on Spain (Thomson, 1954/ 1968; Roosen & Sonnino in Black, 1987) although the Emperor had already begun military operations in north Italy in 1701. This last error of Louis' makes clear that while commercial interests certainly influenced English policy – and that of most of the other combatant powers - before and during the war, they were not the only factor shaping policy; the war was about trade but also about much else (McLachlan, 1940; Hanotin, 2018).

Thus began the War of the Spanish Succession, the "Great War" of the first half of the eighteenth century, in which Philip V depended enormously on his grandfather's aid and in which French officials inevitably figured prominently in the government of Spain, confirming to many – inside and outside Spain – that Bourbon France and Spain were one (Kamen, 1970; Albareda, 2011; Hanotin, 2018; Pohlig and Schaich, 2018; Diaz Paredes, 2022). From 1703, the Grand Alliance's limited war aims were transformed by the conditions laid down by the Portuguese for their accession to the Grand Alliance: "No Peace without Spain", i.e. a commitment to secure Spain and the Indies for the archduke Charles, or "Charles III" (Trevelyan, 1930; Holmes, 1960) In pursuit of these new war aims, English resources - money, men, ships - were thrown into all theatres of the war. England enjoyed some remarkable successes in

all theatres, including in Spain itself the capture of Gibraltar (1704) and Menorca (1708). English troops, and troops subsidized by England, participated in the two brief occupations of Madrid by the allies (1706, 1710) and helped maintain "Charles III"'s regime in Catalonia. In 1709-10 things were going so badly for the Bourbons, and particularly for France, that Louis XIV agreed in peace talks to abandon his grandson, but he was not prepared to use his own troops to force Philip from Spain. The peace negotiations failed and Louis fought on, while Philip's position in Spain and the Indies (where England's navy had surprisingly little impact) was ever more secure, especially following the victory of his forces over those of the allies at Brihuega late in 1710, and less dependent on France (Trevelyan, 1934; Veenendaal, 1970).

The failure to achieve decisive victory in Spain helped to transform English attitudes to the war, the conflict having long divided Whigs and Tories (Holmes and Speck, 1967). There was growing hostility in England to allies who seemed to do little in return for the aid England gave them. In 1710 the Tories won a general election and opened peace talks with Louis XIV, in effect abandoning the Whig policy of "No peace without Spain". The wisdom of this change of policy was confirmed by the death (1711) of the Emperor Joseph I, elder brother of archduke Charles, and Charles' succession as ruler of the extensive Austrian Habsburg territories in central Europe (and his subsequent election as Holy Roman Emperor), raising fears of a vast new Habsburg bloc comparable in some respects to the feared Bourbon bloc (Trevelyan, 1934a; Trevelyan, 1934b; McKay and Scott, 1983). But this did not mean that the Tory peacemakers could ignore the earlier fears of a Bourbon Spain, not least because the peacemaking continued to inflame party divisions at home (Holmes, 1960). Instead, while the "Tory peace" of 1713 accepted the presence of a Bourbon king in Spain (and the Indies), it insisted on certain conditions which were designed to prevent a future union of the crowns of France and Spain. Philip's agreement to these conditions was reluctant, insisted on by Louis XIV, who negotiated on behalf of his grandson (Albareda, 2013), who was not recognized as king by England before the peace was concluded. Perhaps most important, following deaths in the French royal family which meant that in 1713 only a child stood between Philip V and the French throne should Louis XIV die – was Philip's

formal renunciation, in the Cortes, of his claim to that throne, lord Lexington being sent to Madrid to witness this event in 1713, the duke of Orleans, who replaced Philip in the French line of succession, formally renouncing any claim he had on the Spanish throne (Storrs, 2013). In addition, Philip was obliged to accept the loss of Gibraltar and Menorca and to make important commercial concessions to England; the French Guinea Company lost the asiento, which passed to England's South Sea Company, along with permission to send (supposedly annually) a ship of 500 tons to trade at the fairs supplied by the regular flotas and galeones; the first legal breach of the Spanish monopoly of that trade (Walker, 1979; Delgado Ribas, 2015). Treaties embodying these concessions were concluded by Philip V's ministers at Madrid and Utrecht between March and December 1713 (Albareda, 2015). Unfortunately, defects in the commercial treaty (December 1713) which had included a conformation of the treaty of peace and trade (with "Old Spain") of 1667 required the conclusion (in December 1715) of a further "explanatory" treaty between England and Spain whereby the duties payable under Carlos II and the position of Juez Conservador were restored, while problems regarding the asiento treaty of March 1713 necessitated an additional "declaratory" treaty (May 1716), these treaties being the work of Lexington's successor in Madrid, George Bubb Dodington. Queen Anne's Tory ministers also obliged Philip, as part of the peacemaking in 1713 to cede to their de facto client, the duke of Savoy, whom they had hoped at one point – in yet another potential solution to the Bourbon problem - might replace Philip in Spain and its Indies with an exchange of territories, the island of Sicily, in part as compensation for his not getting Spain but also reinforcing England's commercial and strategic position in the Mediterranean (Symcox, 1983; Gregg, 1980). By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, English ministers had largely satisfactorily resolved – and even taken advantage of - the transition from Habsburg to Bourbon Spain which had so worried William III (Cantillo, 1843; Lodge, 1933; McLachlan, 1940; McLachlan, 1969; Pitt, 1970; Walker, 1979; Albareda, 2015).

3. 1715-29: Anglo-French Entente

Between 1713 and 1715 there was little real indication of a Bourbon challenge or problem for English ministers to deal with. They were exercised by tardy French implementation of the peace settlement, notably the demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk, from where French privateers had preyed on English shipping during the war (McKay and Scott, 1983) But Louis XIV was preoccupied by France's need to recover after the devastation of the war, and by the fact that he was likely to be succeeded by a child, with the duke of Orleans (not Philip V) acting as regent according to the terms of the peace (Jones, 2002; Rowlands, 2012). Of greater concern in Britain, especially after 1715 was the attitude of Philip V, who represented the greatest threat to the peace in western Europe between 1713 and 1748, with or without the support of Bourbon France (Storrs, 2016). Philip, unlike Louis XIV, had not made peace with Charles VI in 1713-14, and wished to recover the territories - above all those in Italy - lost to Charles (Leon Sanz, 2022). Philip also resented the commercial and territorial concessions (including that of Sicily) he had made to Britain, and in Spain itself was particularly concerned to recover Gibraltar (Conn, 1942; Gomez Molleda, 1953)[4]. In addition to Philip's concerns, his second wife, Isabel Farnese, whom he married in 1714, had her own dynastic claims in Italy - on the duchy of Parma and on the Medici grand duchy of Tuscany – and she wanted to make good these pretentions for herself and for her children, not least because Philip's children (the future Luis I and Ferdinand VI) by his first marriage, to Marie Louise of Savoy, would succeed in Spain (Armstrong, 1892; Perez Samper, 2002; Albareda and Salles, 2021). In a ciphered despatch in 1730, the English minister in Spain, Benjamin Keene, articulating a view widely held in Europe by that time, declared that the queen, whose interest would always override that of Spain itself, would ally with the Turk if that was the way to get Tuscany for herself and her son[5].

The death of Louis XIV in 1715 seriously weakened the Franco-Spanish Bourbon nexus. Philip's renunciation of his claim to the French throne was another aspect of the peace settlement which he resented. Philip believed, along with many in France, that supposedly "fundamental" laws nullified the renunciation, and that he – not the duke of Orleans – should not only succeed there should the infant Louis XV die but should also assume the Regency (Baudrillart, 1890-1901; Shennan, 1979). This

4 NA, SP 94, vol. 107, Keene to Newcastle, 2 and 20 May 1731.

5 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 104, Keene to Newcastle, 20 Aug. 1730.

quarrel between Philip and Orleans could not fail to affect relations between Britain, France and Spain. Indeed, contrary to a historiographical commonplace that the period 1688-1815 witnessed a "second Hundred Years War" between England/ Britain and France, the two states, or their rulers, who had already collaborated to forge the peace of 1713, found it mutually advantageous to become de facto allies for well over a decade from 1716 onwards (Lodge, 1935; Black, 1986; Dhondt, 2021). In the case of Britain this was due largely to the persistence of the Jacobite threat following the death of queen Anne (1714), who was succeeded by George I, of the Protestant house of Hanover. The new king favoured the Whigs, rather than the Tories who had made the peace of 1713 (Michael, 1926; Hatton, 1978). Tory resentment was one of the factors in an abortive Jacobite rebellion against the new order in 1715. British ministers sometimes exploited the Jacobite threat for domestic political advantage (Fritz, 1975; Szechi, 2019) but it was a real threat nonetheless. Since the French Court had been the main supporter in Europe of the Jacobites since 1688, it made sense to maintain good relations with the Orleanist (not Bourbon) regency at Versailles. The accession of the house of Hanover also meant that England's relations with the Bourbons were complicated in a new way by their ruler's interests in the Empire and the Baltic (Langford, 1976).

The Anglo-French alliance, which was in large part directed against Philip V and Spain, reacted forcefully in The War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-20) to Philip's first direct attempt to overturn the peace settlement of 1713-14, the Spanish invasion/ conquest of Sardinia in 1717 and of Sicily in 1718 (Michael, 1939; Salles Vilaseca and Albareda, 2019). An English fleet largely destroyed that of Spain at Cape Passaro in 1718, prompting Spanish retaliatory measures, including efforts to have Charles XII of Sweden invade Britain and in 1719 launching an abortive invasion of Scotland (Williams, 1930; Storrs, 2016), Spain in effect replacing France as the main Jacobite support in continental Europe (Smith, 1987). As for France, where an abortive plot organized by the Spanish ambassador, the prince of Cellamare, in favour of Philip V had been foiled (and Cellamare expelled), French forces invaded northern Spain (Baudrillart, 1890-1901; Shennan, 1979). Philip was obliged to give way, to banish his chief minister, cardinal Alberoni, to withdraw from Sardinia and Sicily, and to join the Quadruple Alliance in 1720, which promised to secure the duchies of Parma and Tuscany for Philip and Isabel's son, Don Carlos (Salles Vilaseca, 2015; Storrs, 2016; Storrs, 2022). This was the basis for improved relations between France, Spain and Britain in 1721 and for an attempt to strengthen the family ties between the French and Spanish Courts (Cantillo, 1843, Lodge, 1933). In 1722 Orleans' daughter, Louise

Elisabeth, married the future Luis I, and Philip and Isabel's three years old daughter, the Infanta Maria Anna was betrothed to Louis XV, and sent to France. The rapprochement between the French and Spanish Courts was enormously helped by Philip's abiding sense of his own French, Bourbon identity- something frequently commented on by the English ministers in Spain[6] - and by the death of the duke of Orleans in December 1723. Louis XV had reached his majority that year such that the regency was no longer an issue.

From 1724 the congress of Cambray sought to implement the promises made to the Spanish Court by the Quadruple Alliance. However, in early 1725 Louis XV fell ill, emphasizing the continued fragility of the French succession. The king's first minister, the duc de Bourbon, in part motivated by hostility to the Orleans dynasty, concluded that the king must marry immediately. This ruled out the Infanta who was sent back to Spain while the negotiations began for Louis XV's marriage later in 1725 to Marie Leszczinska. This episode helped secure the French succession but seriously damaged relations between the French and Spanish Courts. Philip (who had abdicated in 1724 but resumed the throne after the death of Luis I later that year) and his consort were outraged, Isabel probably more than her husband. In a tit for tat measure they sent back to France both Luis I's widow and Don Carlos' intended French bride; they also broke off formal diplomatic relations with the French Court, expelling the French minister and consuls (Morel-Fatio and Leonardon, 1899; Lodge, 1933; Jones, 2002).

Even more dramatic was the transformation of Spain's foreign alliances, amounting to a "Diplomatic Revolution" not unlike that of 1756). Ever since 1700, the one certain element in European politics was the enmity of Philip V and Charles VI. But in the spring of 1725 the erstwhile Dutch diplomat in Spain, baron Ripperda, concluded in Vienna a series of treaties which at last ended that enmity and with it the War of the Spanish Succession as far as Philip, Charles and their subjects were concerned (Cantillo, 1843; Chance, 1923; Mur i Raurell, 2011; Leon Sanz, 2013; Albareda and Salles, 2021). This "revolution" was confirmed by the resentment of the Spanish monarchs at the French Court's treatment of the Infanta, and their very evident desire simply for revenge[7], although they had sent Ripperda to Vienna well before it, in November 1724 (Mur i Raurell, 2021) because of their dissatisfaction

6 NA, SP 94, vol. 107, Keene to Delafaye, 11 May 1731.

7 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 93, William Stanhope to lord Townshend, 14 July 1725.

with the slow progress of the negotiations at Cambray and in the hope of just such a deal with the Emperor as was achieved by Ripperda. The alliance of Vienna included the grant of trading privileges in the Spanish empire to Charles' Ostend Company, which English ministers considered a serious threat to English trading interests (Hertz, 1907; Lodge, 1933). Isabella now hoped to marry Don Carlos to an Austrian archduchess, while Philip anticipated that with the support of the Emperor he might finally oblige the British ministers to surrender Gibraltar, which he believed they had in 1720-21 promised him. In July 1725, in a manner indicative of the extent to which the Spanish Court believed the British government was vulnerable to threats to trade, Grimaldo informed the English envoy in Madrid, William Stanhope, that English commercial privileges in Spain and its empire depended on the return of Gibraltar[8]. The Vienna alliance catapulted Ripperda to the position of de facto chief minister on his return to Spain in 1725 but also renewed the fears triggered by the death of the Emperor in 1711 of Spain and its worldwide empire falling into Austrian Habsburg hands. Suspicions that the Vienna alliance was more aggressive in intent than was the case prompted the creation, in September 1725 of a rival league of Hanover by England and France, which in turn impelled the Vienna allies into closer military alliance. The two opposing camps sought further adherents as Europe prepared for yet another war McKay and Scott, 1983). In the summer of 1726, English naval squadrons appeared off Spain's northern coast and off Portobello, in an attempt to interrupt the flow of bullion to the Vienna alliance which would fund a war against George I, his dominions and subjects (Walker, 1979; Rodger, 2004; Simms, 2007). Charles VI's ambassador in Madrid, count Konigsegg assumed a role similar to that of the French ambassador in the War of the Spanish Succession, enjoying the privileges traditionally allowed only to ambassadors of "the family" (in Habsburg Spain those of the Emperor), to the chagrin of the rest of Madrid's diplomatic community[9].

However, it was increasingly clear that Spain could not supply the Emperor with the promised subsidies. Konigsegg's criticisms on this score triggered the disgrace early in 1726 of Ripperda, who took refuge with William Stanhope, revealing further details of the Vienna treaties and further embittering relations between London and Madrid. Philip revoked Britain's commercial privileges in Spain and its empire: the annual "permission" ship, the Prince Frederick was impounded at Vera Cruz in

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8 NA, *SP 94*, vol 97, Newcastle to Stanhope, 16 Sept. 1726.

9 NA, *SP 94*, vol 94, Stanhope to Newcastle, 22 and 31 July 1726 NS.

1725, and no further "permission" ships would sail before 1731. In February 1727 Philip's troops opened the siege of Gibraltar, which George I and his ministers had failed to return, largely because of the hostility of "opinion" (Black, 1984b). War meant the end of formal diplomatic contacts: Stanhope left Madrid (Horn, 1932), and Pozzobueno left London[10]. But the Imperial Court did not open hostilities against the Hanover allies and avoided committing itself to Don Carlos' marriage with an archduchess. Indeed, in May 1727 Charles VI agreed peace preliminaries with Britain and France (Quazza, 1965; Morel-Fatio and Leonardon, 1899). Just as in the War of the Quadruple Alliance, Philip V could achieve little alone and in June 1727 he too signed up to the peace preliminaries, promising to end hostilities and to restore England's commercial privileges. While relations between the Vienna allies worsened those between the two Bourbon Courts improved, mediated by the papal nuncio. Most commentators agreed that Philip found the breach with France particularly difficult: according to the English minister, writing in August 1726, there was "great uneasinesses" between the Spanish monarch and his consort, which some attributed to Philip's wish to rejoin his "ancient allies" (ie France)[11]; a few months later Stanhope thought that Philip could not enjoy his present situation, reduced by the queen to a submission to the Emperor, contrary to the dictates of his own judgment, inclination and interest[12]. The rapprochement was greatly eased by the fall of the duc de Bourbon in 1726, replaced as de facto chief minister by Louis XV's former tutor, cardinal Fleury. Bourbon had been responsible for the return of the Infanta, and Philip and Isabel had insisted that the apology of the French Court for that insult must be brought to them by Bourbon himself, which most observers recognised was impossible. As long as Bourbon remained chief minister the rift would continue. His fall triggered a reconciliation and the resumption of formal diplomatic contacts, the comte de Rottembourg being received (October 1727) as French charge to Spain, the marquis de Brancas (1728-30) as ambassador "de famille" (Quazza, 1965; Morel-Fatio and Leonardon, 1899). Difficulties continued, he Spanish Court delaying the restitution of the Prince Frederick to the South Sea Company. But continued Anglo-French pressure, continued disappointment with Vienna in Madrid, and a relapse of Philip V which made Isabel Farnese more anxious

10 NA, *SP 94*, Vol. 97, Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 Dec. 1726 and 6 Feb. 1726-1727.
11 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 94 Stanhope to Newcastle, 5 Aug. 1726.
12 NA, SP 94, vol. 95, Stanhope to Newcastle, 4 Oct. 1726.

for the prompt implementation of the allies' promises regarding the Italian duchies paved the way for the Convention of the Pardo (March 1728) in which Austria, Britain, France and Spain agreed to refer all the outstanding issues to yet another congress, which opened at Soissons in June 1728 (Baudrillart, 1890-1901; Lodge, 1933; Quazza, 1965). As in 1720, the Bourbon nexus was restored, as were good relations between the Bourbons and England.

Unfortunately, the congress of Soissons – like that of Cambray – proved a disappointment for the Spanish Court, which was becoming ever more hostile to its former ally, Charles VI (Lodge, 1933; Quazza, 1965). Anxieties about the health of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and reports of the Emperor's preparations to intervene in Tuscany on that prince's death meant the Spanish Court was anxious for the Hanover allies to act. One again it sought to put pressure on the English (and on the Dutch and French) by delaying the release of the cargoes belonging to their subjects on the returning galleons (and levying an excessive indulto) and by raising difficulties regarding the satisfaction of other points at issue. Ministers in England were divided. Robert Walpole who must defend government policy in the House of Commons was among those who preferred a more peaceful solution to the problem of satisfying the Spanish Court. But the king, George II and Walpole's brother-in-law, viscount Townshend were inclined to more warlike, anti-Habsburg measures. This facilitated the conclusion in November 1729 of the treaty of Seville between Britain, France and Spain. The Hanover allies promised to secure the introduction of 6,00 Spanish troops in central Italy (Parma and Tuscany) and the installation there of Don Carlos, with or without the Emperor's consent. In return Philp cancelled the privileges granted top the Emperor's Ostend Company, confirmed their trading privileges of the English and promised redress of their other grievances (Dumont, 1730; Cantillo, 1843; Quazza, 1965; Langford, 1976).

4. 1729-33: Breakdown of Anglo-Frech Entente; the First Family Compact (1733)

Implementing the treaty of Seville proved far more challenging than anticipated, not least because Charles VI would have to be coerced (Quazza, 1965). War loomed yet again. The allies, decided to attack the Emperor in Sicily, but agreeing how this was to be done and the individual contributions - in men, money and ships – dragged on[13]. Increasingly the Spanish Court, aware of Fleury's preference for peaceful

[13] NA, *SP 94*, vol. 103, Keene to Newcastle, 2 June 1730; Keene to marques de la Paz, 22 July

measures, concluded that it was simply being fooled, above all by the French Court, although the latter, and Jacobite exiles who hoped to exploit Anglo-Spanish tensions, sought to blame the delays on the English[14]. In September 1730, the Spanish monarchs commented that France's behaviour towards England was "too gentle if we are Enemys and too malicious if we are Friends and allies"…[15] The Spanish Court once again sought to put pressure on George II and his ministers by mobilising England's merchant community and Parliament, dragging its feet over the issue of a new cedula for the "permission" ship[16], and delaying the distribution of the effects aboard the returning flota which reached Cadiz in the summer of 1730: in August 1730 Patino told Keene and the French ambassador, that those effects would remain aboard until the Spanish Court knew what to expect regarding the execution of the treaty of Seville[17].There were even fears that the unpredictable and erratic Spanish Court would resume alone hostilities against the Emperor, as in 1718[18]. In December 1730 Patino went further, declaring that if the Ottoman Turks attacked the Emperor, Spain would also confront him in Italy, with or without Britain and France if they would not fulfil their Seville treaty obligations[19]. In January 1731 the patience of the Spanish Court finally snapped and - with Imperial troops expected to occupy Parma - the Spanish representative in Paris, the marques de Castelar, declared that Philip no longer felt bound by the treaty of Seville (Quazza, 1965; Bethencourt,1998), with all the implications that had for English commercial privileges in Spain[20]. This and the despatch to Vienna of the duke de Liria) fueled suggestions that the Spanish

1730.

14 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 104, Keene to Newcastle, 18 Aug. 1730.

15 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 104, Keene to Newcastle, 2 Sept. 1730.

16 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 104, Keene to Newcastle, 18 Aug. 1730**;** Keene to the Court of Directors of the South Sea Company, 31 Aug. 1730.

17 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 104, Keene to Newcastle, 18 Aug., 2 Sept. and 3 Nov. 1730.

18 Horace Walpole to Robert Walpole, 2 Aug. 1730 NS, in Coxe (1798), vol 2, p. 10-16. The letter throws interesting light on the different understanding on the part of those involved of the balance of power, or "equilibre"; Spain, Walpole claimed understood it to mean "the reunion of all their possessions to the crown; by the queen, the conquering them for her children, is meant by us [England] and the Dutch, to preserve the ballance as it is; provided the emperor will consent to the execution of the treaty of Seville…" On the concept of the balance, see Blsack, 1983.

19 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 104, Keene to Newcastle, 22 Dec. 1730.

20 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 107, Keene to Newcastle, Mar. 1731.

Court might once again – as in 1725 - seek a direct and separate deal with the Emperor[21], thus reviving the Vienna alliance and old war atmosphere of the late 1720s. Once again the de facto English prime minister Robert Walpole, who was very aware that war implied more debt and taxation (the "fiscal-military state") which was unpopular with the landed classes who were as important in parliament as the mercantile community and who in early 1730 had therefore outmanouevred and ousted Townshend, sought a peaceful resolution, one which also prioritised English over Hanoverian concerns in Vienna (Quazza, 1965; Black, 1986). Thus, was concluded the treaty of Vienna (16 March 1731). Charles VI agreed at last to abolish the Ostend Company and to allow the establishment in Italy of Don Carlos, in return for a British guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, the instrument whereby Charles sought to ensure the integrity of the Austrian Habsburg territories should he die without sons and be succeeded by his daughter, Maria Theresa (Quazza, 1965; McKay and Scott, 1983)[22]. Despite French hostility to the treaty, which had been concluded independently of the French Court by the English ministers, and efforts to denigrate it at the Spanish Court[23], in July 1731 Philip V's representative in Vienna was ordered to sign up to it (Quazza, 1965; Cantillo, 1843; Bethencourt, 1998). The English ministers were rewarded by the Spanish Court with a Declaration that the treaty of Seville – and in consequence their trading privileges - was once more operative (Vaucher, 1924)[24]. In the autumn of 1731 an Anglo-Spanish expedition finally carried Spanish troops and Don Carlos to Tuscany (Baudot Monroy, 2016).

The two treaties of Vienna of 1731 were a English diplomatic triumph, but they were fatal to the Anglo-French entente/ alliance (Lodge, 1931). By 1730, France had recovered from the War of the Spanish Succession, the succession was assured with the birth of a dauphin late in 1729, and the country was ready to resume its traditional rivalry with the Austrian Habsburgs and that – more recent – with England (Black, 1986; Black, 1987a; Black 1987b; Wilson, 1936). Subsequent years would see the reknitting of relations between the two Bourbon Courts while Anglo-Spanish relations were dogged by continued disputes, especially in Spanish America

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21 Lord Harrington to Thomas Robinson, 28 Jan-8 Feb 1730-31, Coxe (1798), 2, p. 83-87; NA, *SP 94*, vol. 107, Keene to Newcastle, 6 and 9 Feb 1731.

22 NA, *SP 94*, vol. 107, Keene to Newcastle, 28 Apr. 1731.

23 NA, *SP 94*, vol. Keene to Newcastle, 6 Apr. 1731.

24 At just this time Keene complained to the Spanish Court of the inhuman treatment of captain Jenkins by the Spanish Guarda Costas in the Indies: NA, SP 94, vol. Keene to Newcastle, Seville, 26 July 1731 NS.

(Woodfine, 1998) and an escalating quarrel between Madrid and Vienna over the status of Don Carlos in Italy. The death of the king of Poland triggered a broader crisis which escalated into the War of Polish Succession (1733-35/38) an unduly neglected conflict fought well beyond Poland - and in September 1733 the (First) Bourbon "Family Compact", aimed against both the Emperor and Britain (Lodge, 1933; Quazza, 1965). Britain remained neutral in the Polish succession struggle (Black, 1986c), avoiding a costly war against the Bourbons which might be unpopular with taxpayers at home, but for some historians, Walpole was simply postponing an inevitable confrontation which came in the parallel and interlocking Wars of Jenkins Ear and of the Austrian Succession from 1739 (Lodge, 1931).

5. Conclusion

For English ministers, the Bourbon problem from 1700 on was in many respects about Spain and its resources. Relations between Britain and the Bourbon powers, just like those between France and Spain themselves were by no means straightforward between 1701 and 1733. We certainly need to acknowledge the fragility of the Bourbon nexus, relations between them being poor to the point of conflict for virtually half of the period under discussion, and later, witness the Spanish Court's resentment of the manner of France's conclusion of the War of the Polish Succession – an advantageous separate deal with the Court of Vienna - although French ministers felt that the intransigence of the Spanish monarchs regarding distribution of the spoils of the war obliged them to act as they did in ending that conflict before Spain had achieved all of its war aims (Lodge, 1933; Quazza, 1965). In both Bourbon states there were differing interests, whose influence might make for better or worse relations with the other, and with Britain: English and French merchants with effects aboard the flotas and galeones had a shared interest for example in seeing those effects unloaded in Seville without excess penalty. A powerful historiography emphasizes the dominant influence in Spain of Isabel Farnese, but Philip V's own, rather different attitudes – his awareness of being Bourbon and French - and aspirations – Gibraltar – should not be ignored. As for Britain, the asiento (and "permission" ship) proved to be less profitable than was anticipated in 1713 (McLachlan, 1940) and a source of contention between the two Courts, but the South Sea Company was by no means the only influence on English policy towards Spain (or France) and Spanish ministers surely exaggerated the extent to which commercial factors determined attitudes and policy in the country

at large, in Parliament and among the king's ministers (Black, 2007). Commerce was important in the eighteenth century in most states, in some more than others, but other issues mattered too, not least dynasty and succession, religion, and security (Claydon, 2007). As for Britain's ability as the pioneering fiscal-military state of the age, to fund war by debt and parliamentary taxation, that did not necessarily make ministers ready for war; on the contrary, it made some more determined on peace, witness the impact on British policy of the so-called Excise crisis of 1733-34 (Vaucher, 1923; Langford, 1975). In 1739 Britain went to war with Spain, and subsequently was at war with France, but Britain's relations with each of the two Bourbon powers developed very differently, shaped by different dynamics, all of which had made for collaboration, co-operation and peace as often as for confrontation and conflict between 1700 and 1733.

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7. Curriculum vitae

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Christopher Storrs graduated BA Hons Modern History (Oxford, St Catherine's College, 1976) and was awarded his doctorate by the university of London for a PhD thesis on "Diplomatic Relations between William III and Victor Amadeus II of Savoy 1690-1696". Between 1994 and 2022 he was Lecturer and Reader, at the university of Dundee, Scotland. His chief research interests centre on early modern Europe, with special reference to Spain and Italy, international relations and war. His chief publications are War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy 1690-1720 (CUP), The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665-1700 (2006) and The Spanish Resurgence 1713-48 (Yale, 2016). He has also edited The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe (Ashgate, 2009) He is currently preparing a majors.

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